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ABSTRACT 
The common law partial defence of provocation for murder was abolished and replaced 
by a new defence, loss of control, in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.  The thesis 
evaluates the reform with an analytical approach by looking at its success in resolving 
the problems identified with the pre-2009 law, in particular the defence being used as a 
platform for male violence against women and victims of domestic violence and abuse 
struggling to rely on the defence, and, also, looking at how the key areas of the defence 
are dealt with and how they ought to be framed: rationale, definition of provocation, 
objective element and subjective element. Through evaluating the reform many aspects 
are found to be deficient, including the retention of the loss of self-control concept and 
the sexual infidelity exclusion, and a proposal is set out which is seeks to address the 
main problems and make the defence effective. Specifically, two measures are 
advanced which tackle key concerns: a reliance on contextual evidence to support the 
defence in cases where the defendant was the victim of domestic violence and the use 
of presumptions against provoked killers in order to restrict the defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 
 
Part I: The Development of Provocation 
Chapter 1 - The Early Defence ........................................................................................6 
Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence ..............................................................................33 
 
Part II: A Critique of Provocation 
Chapter 3 - Rationale .....................................................................................................54 
Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation .................................................................................86 
Chapter 5 - Objective Element ......................................................................................102 
Chapter 6 - Subjective Element ....................................................................................137 
 
Part III: Reform of Provocation 
Chapter 7 - Law Commission .......................................................................................159 
Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice ......................................................................................186 
Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009 ..................................................................201 
 
Part IV: Proposal 
Chapter 10 - Contextualising Intimate Partner Violence and Creating Presumptions 
Against Provoked Killers ...............................................................................................251 
Chapter 11 - Proposal ...................................................................................................283 
 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................297 
 
Appendices (Law Commission proposal, Ministry of Justice proposal, Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 provisions)...............................................................................303 
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... ...........307 
 
Introduction  1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
By the time the Law Commission was asked to report on reforming the partial defence 
for murder of provocation not only was the defence's ability to operate effectively in 
doubt but its foundations were being legitimately questioned. The Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 implemented a reform of this area by abolishing the provocation defence and 
replacing it with the loss of control defence. There were two main reasons why reform 
was necessary: firstly, the defence needed to be restricted for those who killed in anger, 
particularly men killing their partners whilst citing reasons connected to possessiveness 
and jealousy as the provocative conduct, and, secondly, there was a need for the partial 
defence to be more open to excessive fearful killers, particularly women who killed their 
abusive partners. It is only possible to identify whether the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 is a success in resolving the problems with provocation if first those problems with 
the pre-2009 defence are fully appreciated, then it is possible to evaluate the reform and 
outline improvements based on this analysis. Whilst the 2009 Act improves various 
aspects of the defence this thesis will also detail where it does not satisfy the aims of the 
reform and a proposal will be suggested which would more effectively deal with these 
issues by introducing new measures to tackle these two forces for the reform. 
 
The Homicide Act 1957 had previously given a legislative framework to the common law 
defence, albeit making changes which would prove to be significant. The provocation 
defence, if successful, allowed D to be liable for manslaughter instead of murder if he 
was provoked into losing his self-control and a reasonable man, later reformulated as 
the ordinary person, would have done so too. The new loss of control defence instead 
permits a partial defence where D's loss of self-control was brought about by a trigger, a 
fear of serious violence and/or a provocation-type scenario, and an ordinary person may 
have acted as D did. The 2009 reform makes specific changes to various elements of 
the defence, some of this is in line with how the defence was interpreted since the 1957 
Act. However, the key points with the reform are that it allows for fear of serious 
violence, as well as provocation, to be a valid trigger for D losing his self-control, relying 
on the provocation trigger is much more difficult as it requires D to meet a warranted 
emotion standard, sexual infidelity must be disregarded whilst making the determination 
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over whether the trigger is satisfied and there is greater scope for the trial judge to rule 
out the defence. 
 
At the core of the thesis is to find the partial defence's true rationale and then go about 
exploring the elements of the defence from this basis. A coherent approach is required 
in order for the defence to operate effectively but, also, to demonstrate that it still is 
deserving of a place in the criminal law. Put briefly, the partial defence rests on D 
experiencing an emotion which made him act excessively but that this stemmed from a 
situation where it was understandable that D got emotional and his actions were 
consistent with this. The thesis will look at justifications and excuses as it is possible to 
indentify a framework to explain how provoked anger and fear of violence are 
appropriate emotions for the defence to rest on and how the subjective and objective 
elements combine to give a legitimate foundation for the partial defence. 
 
The thesis will demonstrate that a key component of the partial defence is to 
appropriately label conduct as provocative; it has meaning to describe action as 
provocation to kill and provide a partial defence, for instance, if V leaves a relationship D 
should not be able to rely on this as a valid stimulus for him getting angry and killing as 
V's conduct is normal behaviour. The provocation defence is no longer simply about 
anger, fear is similarly an emotion which can cause D to act excessively but, also, 
somewhat understandably, therefore, a key aspect of the reform has been to set out a 
suitable partial defence rather than shoehorn cases into a defence which was designed 
for provoked anger. The thesis needs to look at why the common law defence has not 
been able to deal with fear of violence cases well and inspect how best to move forward 
with this. If the partial defence is going to centre on the two emotions, provoked anger 
and fear, both the subjective and objective elements must be in line with this and the 
thesis must explore the functions of these tests and identify how best to test if D 
experienced the emotion and evaluate its legitimacy. Also, how the defence operates is 
of importance, in terms of what evidence is required for the jury to hear the case; owing 
to the nature of the defence and the sorts of questions it asks the correct balance 
between the role of the trial judge and the jury must be struck, the defence must not 
become a platform of unjust victim blaming but whilst the defence looks into the 
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sufficiency of the emotions, values of society over what constitutes valid provocation and 
ordinary behaviour requires the jury to be the arbiter on such matters. 
 
In this thesis an analytical approach will be used to examine the partial defence. 
Through a discussion early on of the development of the defence and a look at the 
various approaches to each of the key areas a broad outline of how the defence ought to 
be formulated will be achieved and then through the evaluation of the reform process it 
will be determined how best the specific provisions of the partial defence could be put in 
line with the broad aims of the reform and the underpinnings of the defence. This thesis, 
after initially looking at the development of the defence (Part I), will set out how the key 
areas ought to be made up (Part II) and use this discussion as a benchmark so that the 
reform can be evaluated (Part III) and then a more suitable defence will be proposed 
(Part IV). 
 
Part I will look into how the defence developed from its origins so it is possible to 
appreciate and put into perspective what the problems were with the pre-2009. Chapter 
1 explores the pre-1957 defence and demonstrates how the core elements and issues of 
the defence can be tracked throughout its history. Chapter 2 looks more specifically at 
how the provocation defence was interpreted after the 1957 Act and why this meant that 
legislative reform became necessary. Part I finds that the changes which took place with 
the introduction of the loss of self-control element, the reasonable man test and the 1957 
Act were particularly significant as these were events which dramatically shaped the pre-
2009 law and became a source of criticism. 
 
Part II is set out into four chapters, each chapter looking at an individual issue; through 
the course of examining these areas a critique of the pre-2009 law is made and there 
are suggestions for how each individual issue, thereby the defence, ought to be 
reformed. Chapter 3, after looking at various approaches,  identifies the true rationale of 
the provocation defence as being partial excuse and this is of much importance as all 
the subsequent findings stem from this outlook. Chapter 4 explores the sufficient 
evidence test, thereby examining the requirements for the defence to reach the jury and 
the role of the trial judge, finding that there was an insufficient filter in this process and 
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suggests how the correct balance is to be found between raising the bar and restricting 
the defence. Chapter 5 looks at how the evaluative tests ought to be formulated and how 
this marries up to the rationale; much of the discussion rests on how far D's own 
circumstances and characteristics should be ingrained into the evaluative test so the jury 
can contextualise events and assess if D's behaviour was ordinary in the circumstances. 
Chapter 6 identifies how the subjective element ought to be formulated by first setting 
out its function and then evaluating various subjective states, such as the loss of self-
control concept, to indentify which one is the most appropriate. Part II is therefore where 
the various possible approaches in these key areas are analysed and the judgements 
made in this section are the basis for the evaluation of the reform and the foundation for 
the proposal which is set out. 
 
Part III inspects the Law Commission's proposal (Chapter 7), the Ministry of Justice's 
response to that proposal (Chapter 8) and the reform which ultimately took place in the 
2009 Act (Chapter 9). The benefit of looking at these proposals in this manner is that it is 
it is possible to see how the defence developed over the course of the reform process 
and it helps the understanding of the purposes behind the specific provisions of the 2009 
Act. An analysis of the various proposals gives an opportunity to discuss whether the 
2009 Act was successful in resolving the problems with the defence, which were outlined 
in Part II, and then this gives a platform to put forward a proposal which is more 
effective, for example, in restricting the defence in provoked-anger cases and allowing 
victims of domestic violence and abuse to have a more fitting partial defence. Part IV, 
therefore, looks at how best to resolve such key issues and sets out how the provisions 
would work in practice (Chapter 10) before a proposal is set out which codifies all which 
has been supported across the thesis (Chapter 11). 
 
Owing to the nature of the defence and the circumstances it covers this thesis will 
discuss many significant issues and this underlines how important the legal response to 
these cases is: setting the correct boundaries for a partial defence dealing with 
excessive killings involving anger and fear; the standards imposed and expectations 
placed on victims of domestic violence and abuse; the reasons used, such as a partner's 
sexual activity, homosexual advances or honour killings, to be the basis for being 
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provoked; the significance of gender bias in the legal standards, such as assessing 
whether D's reaction was ordinary; using the loss of self-control concept to determine if 
D was sufficiently emotional at the time of the killing; how those with an 'abnormal' 
capacity for self-control ought to be dealt with; the defence's relationship with other 
defences, such as diminished responsibility and self-defence, and the scope of these 
defences; the role of the judge and jury in making determinations on the sufficiency of 
emotion and behaviour. It is easy to appreciate the importance of evaluating the reform 
and then setting out a more preferable partial defence when considering the areas which 
it touches on. 
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PART I: THE PRE-2009 LAW 
The partial defence of provocation has steadily been adapted since it origins and in Part 
I the history of the defence will be set out. The reform of partial defences which took 
place in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolished provocation but there was a new 
defence which was put in place, loss of control, which is heavily based on provocation. 
Notwithstanding that the reformers sought to distance this new defence from 
provocation, there is no getting around the fact that loss of control adopts many of the 
tests and is based on similar principles to provocation. Chapter 1 will detail the 
provocation defence from around the seventeenth century, when it started to take 
shape, and Chapter 2 will explore the defence post-1957, thereby looking at the impact 
of the Homicide Act 1957. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE EARLY DEFENCE 
In order to identify if the new partial defence has resolved the problems with provocation 
it is necessary to begin by looking at the birth of the old defence as there are important 
themes which will become apparent from the discussion in Part I and they carry through 
to the new defence. Firstly, provocation, and partial defences in general, exist because 
they are useful as they enable a distinction between murder and manslaughter and they 
are particularly necessary with the continuance of mandatory punishments for murder. 
Providing defences to those who intentionally kill will bring natural resistance, so partial 
defences must be sensitive to their function; the murder label and its mandatory 
punishment are there for certain intentional killings but allowance can be made for 
circumstances where this is not suitable. 
 
Secondly, provocation "enjoys no canonical definition";
1
 there are various ways to frame 
the defence and Part I exhibits that. Through the discussion of the defence it will be 
shown that there are three core elements: D must experience the genuine emotion 
(subjective element), the reason why D got emotional must satisfy the standards of the 
                                           
1 S.P. Garvey, 'Passion's Puzzle' (2005) 90 Iowa LR 1677, 1691 
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day (gravity test) and D must reach an expected level of behaviour (control test). The 
defence should constantly be under review as society's standards and expectations 
adapt and in order to work effectively these elements must correspond. 
 
Thirdly, the purpose of this opening Chapter is to examine the development of the 
defence but by doing so it is evident that provocation has perpetual issues which cannot 
truly be settled; restricting the defence from dealing with certain types of cases, setting 
standards to reach, how to treat the impetuous people, ensuring the killing was 'hot 
blooded', delayed responses and where there is a range of emotions behind the killing 
are issues which all forms of provocation defences have to deal with suitably. The 
defence often requires tests which entail balance and, ultimately, the jury are left to 
apply the defence. Providing a consistent and clear defence has proven to be difficult 
and this is inevitable because of its nature. All the points raised above are themes which 
apply equally to provocation and the new partial defence, loss of control, so it easy to 
see why this area of law remains controversial and problematic. 
 
This Chapter will begin by detailing the early chance medley and provocation defences 
and show how they were heavily influenced by the definition of murder, mandatory 
punishments and the period in which they existed. The defence then slowly but 
drastically changed from being based on categories of adequate provocation to the 
reform which took place in the Homicide Act 1957. 
 
Malice and Chance Medley 
In the seventeenth century the provocation defence began to take a recognisable form. 
Parliament passed statutes and there were judicial decisions
2
 which distinguished 
between murder and other forms of homicide and this distinction was based on the 
presence of malice aforethought: 
 
                                           
2 See J.F. Stephen, A History Of The Criminal Law Of England (MacMillan 1883, Volume III) 44-60. 
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"[H]omicide was finally divided into two main branches, namely, murder 
which is unlawful killing with malice aforethought, and homicide in general, 
which is unlawful killing without malice aforethought".
3
 
 
Initially, malice included all intentional homicides whether premeditated or not.
4
 In order 
to restrict the use of royal pardons, which allowed killers to escape the death penalty, 
Parliament enacted a statute in 1390 to make murder an unpardonable felony;
5
 murder 
needed to be accurately defined and it was found to be a premeditated killing. The term 
"malice prepensed" was used in the statute and, broadly, a killing in heated blood was 
found to be outside this, therefore such killings remained pardonable.
6
 These 
developments helped to define murder and manslaughter and the distinction was made 
significant, in terms of murder's death penalty punishment, as a result. The Sailsbury's 
Case was the first reported manslaughter case. In that case D was unaware of a 
planned ambush and was deemed not to have killed with malice aforethought as he 
"took part suddenly" in the killing of V.
7
 
 
With killings done in heated blood seen to be outside the scope of malice it meant that 
malice was equated not to intention any longer but "a notion of actual premeditation 
accompanied by actual ill-will"
8
 and Stephen stated that "for malice means nothing but 
wickedness" and that other interpretations of malice were incorrect.
9
 However, this 
created a problem as there were killings where mitigation was seen as unworthy but 
malice, under this definition, was not evident; for example, where D kills in heated blood 
                                           
3 Ibid 45 
R.B. Mison, 'Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation' (1992) 80 Cal L 
Rev 133, 137: "The moral culpability of the defendant, therefore, provided the basis for drawing the distinction 
between murder and manslaughter." 
4 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1992) 6: "As it does now, this term at that time 
encompassed not only premeditated murder but all intentional killing, whether in cold blood or in hot blood." 
5 Ibid 10-1 
6 Ibid 12-3: Clergy pardons were restricted too and in 1547 the clergy could no longer pardon for murder, only 
manslaughter. 
7 (1553) Plowd Comm 100 
8 R. Singer, 'The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I – Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code', 
(1986) 27 BCLR 243, 307 
9 J.F. Stephen, A History Of The Criminal Law Of England 56 
Chapter 1 - The Early Defence 9 
 
but it stemmed from trivial provocation. In order for these cases to remain under the 
scope of murder malice was implied and Horder cites Lambarde who stated that in these 
cases "this cannot be thought but to have bene done of a pretensed purpose".
10
 So, 
even though they were hot-blood killings without premeditation they were included within 
murder because of implied malice
11
 and there was a presumption of malice.
12
 The 
distinction between murder and manslaughter was meant to represent circumstances 
where malice was successfully removed
13
 and chance medley was able to satisfy this.
14
 
 
Stephen stated that many of the cases which fell under chance medley could come "very 
near to" being described as cases of provocation "and in fact must have included most 
of the cases of what we should describe as provocation."
15
 This highlights that chance 
medley and provocation are different defences but there is an overlap in the scenarios 
which they cover. Provocation can be described as being a killing in the heat of passion 
but it requires that this passion is brought about by adequate provocation, whereas 
chance medley merely is based on a sudden quarrel: 
 
"The envisioned chance medley fact pattern starts with a verbal argument 
between A and B, which escalates into use of non-deadly, and then deadly 
force. It is critical that both parties be equally armed and able to defend 
themselves. The paradigm is a barroom brawl."
16
 
 
                                           
10 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 16-7 
11 E, Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (W. Clarke & Sons, 1817) 47: "[m]urder is when a man of sound memory 
... unlawfully killeth … with malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party, or implied by law". 
12 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' (1976) 35(2) Cambridge Law Journal 292, 292: "Killings were presumed 
to proceed from malice aforethought: if there was no evidence of express malice, then the law would imply malice." 
13 M. Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736, Volume I): "inquired, what is 
such a provocation, as will take off the presumption of malice in him, that kills another." 
14 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 17: If "a sudden killing took place in hot blood, in anger, then this would 
[have] provide[d] the factual and moral foundation for a rebuttal". 
15 J.F. Stephen, A History Of The Criminal Law Of England 59 
16 R. Singer, 'The Resurgence of Mens Rea' 250-1: "This provoked killing slowly obtained the label of 
'manslaughter'." 
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As a provocation defence is able to cover a wide range of circumstances chance medley 
therefore can be seen as, although not exactly, one type of provocation.
17
 An important 
part of chance medley was the suddenness of the reaction and temporal issues are 
something which the provocation defence struggles to deal with as somewhat delayed 
reactions in responding to being provoked can be evidence that D was not genuinely 
provoked but killed owing to another reason or at a point when it is expected that he 
ought to have calmed down. It is possible that common expectations for D to lash out 
spontaneously after being provoked are based on the kind of situations which chance 
medley covers and not the wider set of circumstances and emotions which provocation 
covers.
18
 The differences between chance medley and provocation were evident in the 
case of Oneby.
19
 D killed V in a duel in a public house, the case became not whether the 
duel was contested fairly but whether there was too much delay between the argument 
and the killing for it to fall under provocation.
20
 
 
How exactly provocation developed into being the basis for manslaughter instead of 
chance medley is not straightforward. Coke was influential in elevating chance medley 
into manslaughter and it became established that it was the sole defence which could 
rebut the presumption of malice.
21
 Singer discusses the influence of the legal 
commentators and a few key cases in developing provocation and even though they 
were significant in this development they may not have reflected the law's true position 
at that time.
22
 He states that the finding that the defence was based on heat of passion 
instead of chance medley and then the finding that heat of passion was limited to certain 
narrow categories was "expanding that rationale far beyond what Coke, and presumably 
                                           
17 In the terms of the Mawgridge case, it would be similar to '(i) angry words followed by an assault' (n32-5). 
18 Delay and the emotions in provocation will be discussed in 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element'. 
19 (1727) 2 Ld Raym 1485 
20 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 29: Horder has stated that chance medley is bilateral, whereas 
provocation is unilateral. 
21 R. Singer, 'The Resurgence of Mens Rea' 251: "the first articulation of the rationale of manslaughter is that a 
killing done upon chance medley is by definition not done with malice. Coke further emphasizes that a killing done 
'on a sudden' or 'by chance' is done 'without premeditation'." 
Also, at 258-9: "according to Coke, manslaughter was essentially a category of offense with the single fact pattern of 
chance medley – a killing during a fight in which both are armed, and where there was no prior malice on either 
side." 
22 Ibid: 'I. Manslaughter and Provocation at Common Law - The Early Centuries' 
Chapter 1 - The Early Defence 11 
 
the prior common law, would have allowed."
23
 It can best be seen that chance medley 
was too narrow and that other circumstances needed to be recognised, this is what 
helped to shape the sort of provocations which would be permitted. As the provocation 
defence became the basis for manslaughter and extended its scope it meant that 
instead of chance medley it was heat of passion which was the source for removing 
malice:
24
 the suddenness of a fight was replaced by passions stemming from 
appropriate anger.
25
 
 
The Early Provocation Defence 
In the Mawgridge
26
 case Lord Holt CJ summarised four categories which would be 
sufficient as provocation and five categories which would not be.
27
 In line with modern 
law, Holt CJ viewed malice differently and saw that a provoked killer formed malice; 
malice was interpreted as merely meaning an intent to kill and when D was provoked he 
was still adjudged as having formed such intent.
28
 Under Holt CJ's view the defence was 
no longer about rebutting the presumption of implied malice
29
 but instead about showing 
that the killing was not grossly excessive: even though D was wrong to kill there was 
some proportion between the provocation and the retaliation.
30
 The defence was 
therefore viewed as a partial justification.
31
 
 
 
 
                                           
23 Ibid 258-9 
24 Ibid 259: "The heat of passion made it impossible for the defendant to consider carefully. Because consideration 
was essential to premeditated malice, there could be no pre-existing malice, hence no murder." 
25 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 29: "It was only after the demise of chance-medley manslaughter, 
therefore, that mitigation for all hot-blooded killings came to depend on the gravity of the provocation offered, 
rather than on whether or not the parties involved had fought on equal terms." 
26 (1707) Kel 119 
27 The four categories of provocation and some relevant cases are discussed below. 
Ibid: (i) words alone, (ii) affronting gestures, (iii) trespass to property, (iv) misconduct by a child or servant, and (v) 
breach of contract. 
28 Ibid 124-30 
29 (n8-14) 
30 Mawgridge 131: "this blow though not justifiable by law, but is a wrong, yet it may be manslaughter". 
31 See (n46-9) and 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n46-62) for discussions of partial justifications. 
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(i) angry words followed by an assault 
In Watts v Brains V made a rude gesture to D, this was adjudged to be insufficient and 
was described as "such a slight provocation".
32
 The later case of Sherwood
33
 
demonstrates that something equivalent to a "violent blow" was necessary: 
 
"It is true that no provocation by words only will reduce the crime of murder 
to that of manslaughter; but it is equally true that every provocation by 
blows will not have this effect".
34
 
 
The judgment went on to state that if the blow is accompanied by words "calculated to 
produce a degree of exasperation" equal to a "violent blow" it is possible to find 
manslaughter. Therefore, there was freedom to take both the words and the conduct of 
the provoker into account to decide on the adequacy of the provocation. When 
discussing the reform of provocation in the Homicide Act 1957 the fact that words alone 
could not be relied upon will be a significant point as reversing this position was one of 
the aims of Parliament.
35
 
 
(ii) the sight of a friend or relative being beaten 
In Royley's Case
36
 the provocation was that D's son had been beaten by another. D did 
not see the attack and there was a long delay between being told by his son and the 
killing as D travelled a long distance in order to find V. D successfully claimed 
manslaughter. This form of provocation and the category discussed below are important 
as they indicate, even at this early point, that, contradictory to later statements, D himself 
                                           
32 (1600) Cro Eliz 778 
33 (1844) 1 C & K 556 
34 Ibid 557 
35 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n3-5) 
36 (1612) 12 Co Rep 87. This case will be referred to below, see (n93 & n120), as it is about a delayed reaction and 
tests the idea of heated passion and genuine emotion. 
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did not need to be the subject of the provocation but could take offence at conduct 
directed at others.
37
 
 
(iii) the sight of a citizen being unlawfully deprived of his liberty 
In Hopkin Huggett
38
 D killed V, who was pressing men into service. It was found that to 
rescue a person who is deprived of his liberty, even if it a stranger who is not seeking to 
be rescued, merited this defence "for common humanity sake".
39
 The defence 
succeeded in Tooley, where a woman was taken into custody on illegal grounds, even 
though D did not know that the person which he had rescued had been arrested 
unlawfully, this is best, but not wholly, explained as being consistent with the justificatory 
nature of Holt CJ's explanation of the defence.
40
 
 
(iv) the sight of a man committing adultery with the accused's wife 
In Mawgridge
41
 Lord Holt CJ stated that 
 
"jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of 
property ... If a thief comes to rob another, it is lawful to kill him. And if a 
man comes to rob a man's posterity and his family, yet to kill him is 
manslaughter. So is the law though it may seem hard, that the killing in the 
one case should not be as justifiable as the other."
42
 
 
                                           
37 See (n90 & 96). 
38 (1666) Kel 59 
39 Ibid 60 
40 (1709) Holt KB 485: "If a man is oppressed by an officer of justice, under a mere pretence of an authority, that is a 
provocation to all the people of England." 
C.f. English law, however, looks into D's motivation for justificatory defences, see Dadson (1850) 4 Cox CC 358, so 
D's action cannot be justified by accident. 
41 (1707) Kel 119: "When a man is taken in adultery with another man's wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer, 
or knock out his brains, this is bare manslaughter". 
42 In the same vein, in Maddy's Case (1617) 1 Vent 158, 159 D killed in these circumstances, it was stated that "[it] 
was but manslaughter, the provocation being exceeding great". 
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Howe discusses this category of adequate provocation and details how the use of 
sexual infidelity as providing a basis for provocation was restricted, but mostly for where 
the husband was merely suspicious.
43
 A condition on this category was that there had to 
be "ocular inspection of the act" for the provocation to be valid.
44
 Howe states that an 
"oft-overlooked footnote" from Mawgridge was that the finding of the existence of this 
category was with "'great benignity'", meaning that, somewhat contrary to the above 
quotation from the case, this category of provocation was viewed then as being 
generous for husbands.
45
 
 
Horder describes Holt CJ's position in Mawgridge as finding "a kind of continuum or 
spectrum of (lack of) moral justification".
46
 At one end, a killing remained as murder after 
finding that there was no genuine provocation (for example, self-induced provocation). 
Moving along, then there was trivial provocation, the retaliation grossly exceeded the 
affront. Then, the four categories of provocation were meant to establish that D's 
reaction, even though excessive, was not so far from the mean that mitigation was 
appropriate.
47
 At the far end, Holt CJ then discusses justifiable retaliation to provocation; 
despite 'misconduct by a child or servant' being a category of insufficient provocation
48
 
the example he gives is that of the killing of a servant or child in the course of 
correction.
49
 
 
                                           
43 A. Howe, ''Red mist' homicide: sexual infidelity and the English law of murder (glossing Titus Andronicus)' (2013) 
33 Legal Studies 3, 407, 418-21 
R v Matthias Kelly [1848] 175 ER 342: "to take away the life of a woman, even your own wife because you suspect 
that she has been engaged in some illicit intrigue, would be murder; however strongly you may suspect it, it would 
most unquestionably be murder". 
44 Pearson's Case [1832] 2 Lewin 216. Maddy's Case was decided on this basis (n93). 
45 A. Howe, ''Red mist' homicide' 419: "[T]he Court stated that at law 'a man is not justifiable (sic)' in killing a man he 
'taketh in adultery with his wife' for this 'savours more of sudden revenge, than of self-preservation', adding 
however, that this law 'hath been executed with great benignity'. Even so, a doubt had been registered about a 
vengeful motive in such cases right from the start." 
46 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 55 
47 At 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n49-52), when discussing the rationale of provocation and partial justifications, this will 
be explored in greater detail. 
48 (n27) 
49 Mawgridge 132-3 
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Ashworth states that the categories were based on "the unlawfulness of the deceased's 
conduct" as they relied on assaults and adultery.
50
 Horder, on the other hand, states that 
the categories were concerned with honour.
51
 Honour was important and "[m]en of 
honour were expected to retaliate in the face of an affront", the greater the affront the 
more violent the response.
52
 Honour does not simply cover D feeling aggrieved, a part of 
the honour was acting out the retaliation. Horder states that the "retaliation would, as it 
were, 'cancel out' the affront" and "[h]e was expected to resent the affront, and to 
retaliate in anger."
53
 By D retaliating in the 'correct' manner to an affront then it turns the 
violence into an act of virtue: "the passionate man is led to act virtuously rather than 
'viciously'".
54
 Reason drives both the anger and the response.
55
 At this point, the role of 
reason is important to highlight as the defence drastically alters as it develops.
56
 
 
What is clear from this is the importance of an adequate affront and that this linked to 
standards of the day. The four categories may be viewed as arbitrary but they highlight 
that the defence was intended to reflect that only these provocations ought to be 
allowed; they were raised above all else and no concession was available to those who 
were provoked outside of them: "[A]s it is murder to kill without any provocation, so if the 
provocation be slight and trivial, it is all one in the law, as if there were none."
57
 
 
The necessary requirements for provocation which exist today were shaped by the 
seventeenth century defence;
58
 the subjective element, the gravity test and the control 
test all existed within the early defence. The control test compares D's behaviour to an 
                                           
50 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 294. The third category is described as being somewhat "anomalous" 
but still could be explained by being concerned with wrongful conduct. 
51 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility, 24-5 
52 Ibid 26-7 
53 Ibid 27 
54 Ibid 41 
55 Ibid 40: "with the guiding influence of reason, passions could assist men to act virtuously." 
56 At 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n29-35) reason in D's response will be discussed as it is at odds with loss of 
self-control element, the concept which the defence would later be build on. 
57 Lord Morley's Case (1666) 6 St Tr 770, 780 
A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 295: "There was more than a hint that people ought not to yield to 
certain types of provocation, and that if they did the law should offer no concession to them." 
58 Referred to above (n1) and these requirements will be greatly discussed throughout Part II. 
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expected level of behaviour, however at this time that standard, rather than being an 
ordinary person, was a man of honour. As the reliance on the four categories suggests, 
the gravity test was a key component, however the defence only operated where D killed 
in heated blood, it must have been shown that there was no premeditation. Ashworth's
59
 
view of Maddy's Case
60
 shows that even "where the provocation was of the highest 
degree" there was a need for the setting of heated blood. In that case Justice Twisden 
stated that the defence would have been unavailable to D if he had made a prior 
declaration that he intended to kill. Horder describes the provocation defence which 
existed at this time as being concerned with "anger as outrage":
61
 it was necessary for it 
to distinguish between provocation and killings which stemmed from outside heated 
blood and it required provocation which was limited to the four categories and deemed 
as a serious affront. 
 
The Reasonable Man and Loss of Self-Control 
The necessary requirements developed through the common law into the reasonable 
man test (containing both the gravity and control tests) and the loss of self-control 
requirement and this would help to transform the defence into being one which was 
more encompassing and introspective. These changes also significantly altered the 
rationale of the defence. An important part of Holt CJ's understanding of provocation in 
Mawgridge was that the defence mitigates as D's response, although wrong, was close 
to the mean; the defence from his outlook was about proportion, it was excessive to kill 
but not overly excessive. To fully understand this it is important to appreciate that for 
Holt CJ malice meant intent to kill and not premeditation combined with ill-will towards 
V,
62
 as had previously been relied upon
63
 and what would later be relied upon again. 
According to Holt CJ, therefore, being provoked does not remove malice, the reason for 
mitigation was this link to proportionality.
64
 When the defence then became centred on a 
partial excuse, with the reliance on a loss of self-control, rather than partial justification 
                                           
59 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 294 
60 (n42) 
61 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility, 42 
62 (n28-31) 
63 (n8-14) 
64 The role of malice and intent becomes important again (n70-1). 
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the basis of the defence clearly shifted and became about human frailty to provocation 
instead of killing out of honour. 
 
Horder outlines how the development of the loss of self-control requirement significantly 
altered the understanding of the defence from the late seventeenth century to the 
nineteenth century.
65
 In Walters
66
 provoked anger was described as "an ungoverned 
storm" and in Oneby
67
 the defence was described in a manner that draws it close to 
temporary insanity: 
 
"it must be such a passion as for the time deprives him of his reasoning 
faculties; for if it appears, reason has resumed its office ... the Law will no 
longer ... lessen [the offence] from murder to manslaughter." 
 
Horder states that the defence demanded that "reason [would] ... be incapable of 
exercising control over actions until the passion abates" and that this is very different 
from the basis of the defence in the seventeenth century as this was founded on reason 
and judgement determining anger and the response.
68
 The case of Fisher,
69
 where D 
killed a man he suspected of abusing his son, highlights how much the defence altered: 
D claimed that by killing V he had done what any man in England would have done, but 
it was argued along the lines of a loss of self-control, that he was temporarily not in 
control of his actions. 
 
How the reasonable man test developed was a result of the defence being incoherent. 
Previously, the provocation defence was concerned with rebutting the presumption of 
implied malice by finding that if the provocation was a severe affront and there was 
                                           
65 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility, 'Chapter V – The Rise of Loss of Self-Control' 
66 (1688) 12 St Tr 113 
67 (1727) 2 Ld Raym 1485 
R v Selten (1871) 11 Cox CC 674, 675: "throw a man's mind off its balance". 
R v Kelly (1848) 2 C & K 815: "he could not resist it". 
68 (n51-56). See J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility, 75 
69 (1837) 8 C & P 182. The case is further discussed (n92). 
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heated blood then this demonstrated no malice and the offence was manslaughter 
instead of murder.
70
 Holt CJ's basis for provocation did not involve malice but rather 
showing that D killed with a degree of proportion and this was the key to mitigation.
71
  
However, rebutting implied malice then became the centre for provocation again. Malice 
was again treated as requiring premeditation and ill-will towards V and not merely an 
intention to kill. 
 
The defence developed into being based on D temporarily but completely losing his self-
control and his act of retaliation being deprived of reason.
72
 The four categories 
remained as evidence or a presumption of the sort of thing that would produce such a 
loss of self-control.
73
 It was viewed that only such provocation could cause a loss of self-
control and a distinction could be made between those who had lost their self-control 
and those who killed owing to trivial provocation. Foster stated that when D killed 
because of a loss of self-control stemming from gross provocation it showed that the 
killing was down to "human frailty", but a killing from trivial provocation, where it was 
seen that no loss of self-control was possible, shows a "heart bent upon mischief".
74
 
Rebutting implied malice was the basis for the defence and the loss of self-control 
requirement functioned through rebutting it because of the fact that D killed whilst not 
being in control of his reason; this ignores the reality that D could lose his self-control 
owing to trivial provocation or from provocation outside the four categories. Horder 
states that there was a use of "fiction" to maintain the defence in this state as on this 
understanding any loss of self-control, no matter what it stemmed from, ought to have 
been able to rebut the presumption of implied malice as it would have produced the 
same impact on D.
75
 
 
                                           
70 (n8-14) 
71 (n28-31) 
72 It is important to note the difference between how the loss of self-control was being defined then, D completely 
losing his self-control, and how it was defined more recently, the partial loss of self-control. See 'Chapter 6 - 
Subjective Element' (n11-6). 
73 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility, 89 
74 Cited at ibid 90 
75 Ibid 94 
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To confront this problem the defence then became focused on losses of self-control 
which stemmed from any form of provocation; the jury was to decide this and the 
reasonable man test was used.
76
 Keating J's judgment in R v Welsh found that there is 
an expectation that D ought to maintain his self-control when subjected to trivial 
provocation, it was seen that D does not legitimately lose his self-control but "that such 
people give way to their passions, indulge them rather than conform their actions".
77
 This 
is different than before as instead of being concerned with ungoverned storms of 
passion the basis was to do with weakness of will;
78
 allowing for the fact that a loss of 
self-control could stem from a source other than from the categories of adequate 
provocation, the distinction between murder and manslaughter is then found by 
demanding a reasonable (or an excusable) loss of self-control. Under this basis of the 
defence D does not "follow the inclinations of a less compelling emotion",
79
 D does not 
do the right thing as he does not restrain himself from killing his provoker: 
 
"though the law condescends to human frailty, it will not indulge to human 
ferocity. It considers man to be a rational being, and requires that he 
should exercise a reasonable control over his passions".
80
 
 
 
Provocation developed from providing a defence to those subjected to affronts of their 
honour, to those who fully lost their self-control and were no longer guided by reason 
and then to those who reasonably lost their self-control. This journey altered the 
rationale of the defence, the circumstances which the defence covered and how the 
                                           
76 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 298: "Judges began to leave this question of degree to the jury, and it 
was natural that the judges should call upon that jack-of-all-trades, the concept of the reasonable man, to express 
the required degree of seriousness." 
77 R v Welsh (1869) 2 Cox CC 336 
78 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility, 98 
79 Ibid 98. See 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n17-26) as this fits into the explanation of loss of self-control, that D 
acts with desire to retaliate rather than his better judgement. 
80 Kirkham (1837) 8 C & P 115, 119. The judgment goes on to state that grave provocation can "stir up a man's blood 
[so] that he can no longer be his own master … in a moment of overpowering passion, which prevented the exercise 
of reason." This is somewhat in line with the Walters and Oneby cases (n66-7). This shows that even though the 
defence no longer allowed for reason in the act of retaliation it was more understanding of what could cause a loss 
of self-control. 
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conduct of the provoked and provoking party were viewed. It was the role of reason 
which had most significantly altered; previously, reason drove the entire defence, 
however, the position following the implementation of the loss of self-control element 
was that reason could only fuel the emotion and it could not play any part in the 
response. 
 
Limitations in the common law provocation defence 
Before the Homicide Act 1957 was enacted a number of common law limitations were 
developed, this mainly involved preventing the question of provocation from being 
considered by the jury. An alteration on this position was intended when drafting the 
1957 Act as it was perceived that the provocation defence was too narrow and "the 
judges rode the doctrine very hard".
81
 Therefore, even though the jury were given the 
role of arbiters of the defence through the reasonable man test the judge still held a grip 
on whether the defence was even permitted to be considered.
82
 As will be outlined, in 
the common law there were four categories which developed to limit the defence: 
provocation must be done by V to D, words alone were not usually sufficient, there was 
no cooling-off period allowed and aspects of the reasonable man test. It is also important 
to note how these categories were dealt with following the implementation of the 1957 
Act, discussed in Chapter 2, as they were assimilated into the gravity and control tests. 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century a series of judgments discussed the role of the 
judge and jury (the sufficient evidence test). Hopper was the most influential case on 
whether the defence should go to the jury and it was stated that there merely had to be 
                                           
81 P. Brett, 'The Physiology of Provocation' (1970) Crim LR 634, 634-5: "provided too many instances in which the 
judges rode the doctrine very hard and prevented the jury from considering clear cases of killing in rage as being 
possible manslaughter." 
M.J. Allen, 'Provocation's Reasonable Man: A Plea for Self-Control' (2000) 64 JCL 216, 220: "The enactment of the 
Homicide Act 1957 ... permitted an escape from the strait-jacket imposed by the common law's prescription of 
categories of conduct which could amount to provocation." 
See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n7-11) 
82 M. Spencer, 'Provocation and the Reasonable Man', (1978) New Law Journal 615: "At common law these 
limitations were of primary importance, as the judge was not required to leave the question of provocation to the 
jury if he considered that it was not available to the accused". 
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"some evidence – we say no more than that".83 The cases of Clinton (1917),84 Ball and 
Hall give further insight into the sufficient evidence rule at this time. In Ball it was not 
thought that the issue would succeed if it went to the jury but it still ought to have been 
considered by them as there was some evidence.
85
 In the same vein, in Hall 
manslaughter was substituted for murder as it was "impossible to say" what the verdict 
of the jury would have been.
86
 The approach adopted at the beginning of the twentieth 
century for the sufficiency of evidence was therefore quite relaxed as the judge just had 
to be convinced that there was some evidence of provocation. 
 
The issue of the "respective functions of judge and jury"
87
 was discussed in Holmes in 
relation to whether the trial judge was correct in not leaving the question of provocation 
to the jury as he found that a confession of adultery was not sufficient as provocation. 
D's solicitor argued that the judge should let the jury hear the case: 
 
"A judge should be very slow to take on himself to decide what a 
reasonable jury would find a reasonable man would do. The right of the 
accused to have his case determined by a jury should depend as little as 
possible on the personal views of a particular judge."
88
 
 
                                           
83 [1915] 2 KB 431, 435: despite D stating that he was not angry at the time there was some evidence of 
provocation. Both parties were drunken soldiers and V was involved in a fight with D over a bottle of whiskey which 
D claimed V had stolen. Later, V refused to hand over his bayonet, he threatened D and whilst V was struggling with 
another D shot V. 
84 Clinton (1917) 12 Cr App R 215: was distinguished from Hopper as there was no evidence of provocation as, 
essentially, D's claim was that the killing was an accident: "We are not saying anything in conflict with the decision 
in R v Hopper ... This case is a different one for the reasons we have given. The defence never raised the question, 
but, what is more important, on the facts it cannot be said that the appellant has any grievance" (at 218). It was, 
therefore, implied that manslaughter could be considered even if it was not argued by the defence. 
85 Ball (1925) 18 Cr App R 149, 150: D's wife lied to him about where she was going. D followed her to a field where 
she was meeting another man, who was attempting to seduce her, and after an altercation D shot him. It was stated 
that "it would be ludicrous to suggest that in this country the knowledge that a man's wife has been debauched by 
another man is an excuse for shooting the offender." 
86 Hall (1930) 21 Cr App R 48, 55 
Cf Thorpe (1925) 18 Cr App R 189: there were "words of reproach which were accompanied by pushing and jostling" 
(at 191), but "there was no duty on the judge to leave that defence to the jury" (at 192). 
87 Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588, 596 
88 Ibid 
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However, this argument was not successful and the Privy Council's summing up of the 
Holmes decision in Phillips was correct, they interpreted Holmes as requiring the judge 
to make "a preliminary ruling" on the reasonable man question and if this was successful 
it then ought to go to the jury.
89
 Holmes therefore took away the duty on the judge that 
was founded in Hopper to leave the issue to the jury where there was "some evidence" 
of provocation. As already alluded to, the reform in the 1957 Act was in response to this 
but the Act did influence all the limitations which existed in the common law provocation 
defence. 
 
a) provocation must be done by V to D 
In the Duffy judgment Devlin J stated that "[p]rovocation is some act, or series of acts, 
done by the dead man to the accused".
90
 However, there were authorities which 
supported that the provocation did not have to be done to D (indirect provocation) and 
that the defence would still be available if it was someone other than V who was the 
provoker (misdirected retaliation). 
 
Regan argues that there were authorities which showed that D could rely on the defence 
if he was indirectly provoked by an attack on a family member or, possibly, a friend.
91
 In 
the Fisher case
92
 there was no bar on the defence because of the fact that it was D's 
son who had been abused and D was merely informed about what had happened; D 
was therefore provoked indirectly by the wrong that was committed against his son.
93
 
Also, in Harrington Cockburn CJ was open for the defence to be applied in a case where 
D saw his daughter's husband assault his daughter.
94
 Regan highlights that Cockburn 
                                           
89 Phillips v The Queen [1969] 2 AC 130 
90 [1949] 1 All ER 932 
91 R.S. Regan, 'Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation' (1968) Crim LR 319 
92 See (n69) 
93 The defence was not, however, available to D because he had not witnessed the event take place and this was a 
separate rule which was established in sexual infidelity cases to ensure that D killed in heated blood and not 
revenge. See (n44). Owing to the decision in the Maddy's Case the defence was not available if D had not witnessed 
the provocative event, in that case it was an act of adultery (n42 & 60). 
C.f. In a similar case, Royley's Case, the defence stood even though D did not see the incident (n36). 
94 (1866) 10 Cox CC 370. The severity of the assault, however, was deemed insufficient. 
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CJ described this case as raising "a somewhat novel point."
95
 It is possible, however, to 
see that two out of the four categories of adequate provocation outlined in the 
Mawgridge case by Lord Holt CJ could be described as cases of indirect provocation;
96
 
the sight of a friend or relative being beaten and the sight of a citizen being unlawfully 
deprived of his liberty are both cases where the provocation is not, in the words of Devlin 
J, above, "done by the dead man to the accused". 
 
Two cases show that where retaliation was misdirected D could still successfully rely on 
the defence. In Brown
97
 D killed a passer-by who he mistakenly believed to be one of 
the group which were provoking him and in Gross,
98
 whilst aiming at her husband, D 
shot and accidently killed another. However, in a subsequent case, Simpson,
99
 the 
defence was denied as despite being provoked by his wife D killed his child. It was found 
that under the common law there was "no authority" to rely on to find that another could 
be the source of the provocation.
100
 
 
It is possible that the best way to reconcile Simpson and the Duffy judgment with the 
Brown and Gross decisions is to state that in the latter cases D killed whilst attempting to 
kill his provoker and in Simpson D was taking out his anger against another. Fontaine 
raised a similar point when discussing US provocation cases and found that there was a 
category of cases which could be labelled as "Unintentional Misdirection" and another 
category which could be labelled as "Knowing/Intentional Misdirection".
101
 This does 
raise the issue over the amount of rationality which D was expected demonstrate in 
these circumstances when at the same time the defence demands that he lost his self-
                                           
95 Ibid 371 
96 (n26) 
97 (1776) 1 Leach 148 
98 (1913) 23 Cox CC 455 
99 [1914-15] All ER Rep 917 
100 Ibid 917 -8: "The proposition put forward by the defence is that provocation by one person, leading to the 
homicide of another person by the person provoked, is sufficient to reduce the crime of murder to that of 
manslaughter. There is no authority for that proposition." 
101 R. G. Fontaine, 'Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification' (2009) Arizona Legal 
Studies, Paper 08-07, 12-3 
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control.
102
 This is evidence of the uncertain rationale which existed prior to the 1957 Act 
and the conflict between the established rules of the reasonableness-based objective 
element and the loss of self-control-based subjective element which did not work in 
conjunction with each other to provide a satisfactory basis for mitigation. 
 
b) words alone were not usually sufficient 
In the Mawgridge case Lord Holt CJ stated that words alone were not sufficient as 
provocation.
103
 Later, however, a series of cases demonstrated that this position had 
altered as confessions of adultery were found to be valid provocation: 
 
"As a general rule of law, no provocation of words will reduce the crime of 
murder to that of manslaughter, but under special circumstances there 
may be such a provocation of words as will have that effect; for instance, if 
a husband suddenly hearing from his wife that she had committed 
adultery, and he having had no idea of such a thing before, were 
thereupon to kill his wife, it might be manslaughter."
104
 
 
The case of Jones
105
 fits this description: D killed V after a sudden confession of adultery 
and the view expressed in Rothwell was followed. This rule only applied to married 
couples though. In Palmer
106
 a distinction was made between a confession of an 
unfaithful sexual act for a married couple and an engaged couple and in Greening
107
 the 
rule did not include unmarried couples who lived together. 
 
                                           
102 R.S. Regan, 'Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation' 323: "Once an accused loses his self-control it is 
unreal to insist that his retaliatory acts be directed only against his provoker." 
103 (n27). See Sherwood (n33) 
104 R v Rothwell (1871) 12 Cox Crim C 145, 147 
105 (1908) 72 JP 215 
106 [1913] 2 KB 29 
107 [1913] 3 KB 846 
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The decision, previously referred to,
108
 in Holmes
109
 is in some ways a restatement of 
the position taken in Rothwell, finding that "in no case could words alone, save in 
circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character, so reduce the crime."
110
 
The power left to the judge to decide in which cases words alone could be sufficient was 
demonstrated in Holmes itself where confessions of adultery were ruled out as valid 
provocation,
111
 this is where Holmes can be distinguished from Rothwell as in that case 
a confession was sufficient. D's defence raised the concerns with the role of the judge 
on this issue: 
 
"Nothing can justify the court in laying down a rule for all time, since what 
may provoke one generation may not provoke another ... 
It is safer to trust to the good sense of ordinary reasonable men than to 
attempt to limit the operation of the principle by excluding certain matters 
as matters of law."
112
 
 
 
One instructive point which was made was when Viscount Simon provided a distinction 
between taunts and informational words, this distinction could assist in the decision as to 
whether the words were of the most extreme and exceptional character: 
 
"It may mean provocation by insulting or abusive language, calculated to 
rouse the hearer's resentment ... There is, however, a different sense 
which may sometimes attach to the meaning of 'mere words', for they may 
                                           
108 (n87-9) 
109 Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588 
110 Ibid 600: "When words alone are relied upon in extenuation, the duty rests on the judge to consider whether 
they are of this violently provocative character, and if he is satisfied that they cannot reasonably be so regarded, to 
direct the jury accordingly." 
111 Ibid 600: "In my view, however, a sudden confession of adultery without more can never constitute provocation 
of a sort which might reduce murder to manslaughter." 
112 Ibid 591-2. See (n88) 
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be used, not as an expression of abuse, but as a means of conveying 
information of a fact, or of what is alleged to be a fact."
113
 
 
Therefore, abusive language or taunts may be viewed as being more likely to be 
provocative to D than informational words and thereby be more likely to provide 
sufficient evidence that D reasonably lost his self-control. This is a valuable distinction 
and one which will have relevance when discussing the sexual infidelity exclusion in the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 as that exclusion does not differentiate between taunts 
and informational communication.
114
 
 
c) no cooling-off period allowed
115
 
In Mancini Viscount Simon LC stated it was important "to consider whether a sufficient 
interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool"
116
 
and similarly in the Duffy case Devlin J stated that an important element of the common 
law provocation defence was "whether there was what is sometimes called time for 
cooling".
117
 The limited role of the jury, in comparison to the judge, was highlighted in 
Fisher when it was held that "whether the blood has had time to cool or not, is a question 
for the court, and not for the jury".
118
 
 
The no cooling-off period requirement is an objective question as Viscount Simon LC's 
comments in Mancini, above, demonstrate. It is a question about whether the 
reasonable man would have cooled in that time, so whether D ought to have cooled, and 
                                           
113 Ibid 598-9 
114 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n112) 
115 Details of the subjective element are discussed in 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n22-33), including a more 
in depth discussion of Duffy and the specific requirements. 
116 Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1, 9 
117 [1949] 1 All ER 932: "that is, for passion to cool and for reason to gain dominion over the mind. That is why most 
acts of provocation are cases of sudden quarrels ... where there has been no time for reflection." 
118 (1837) 8 C & P 182: the role for the jury was merely "to find what length of time elapsed between the 
provocation received and the act done." 
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it is not a part of the subjective question asking whether D did in fact cool.
119
 The case of 
Royley demonstrates that delay between the provocation and the killing has always 
been an issue.
120
 The no cooling-off period requirement was in place to remove revenge 
killings from manslaughter but also highlights that even if D did, in fact, kill in heated 
blood there was a potential the defence would not succeed; for instance, those whose 
temperament meant that they remained out of control for a long period could have 
suffered when a comparison to a reasonable man was made. 
 
How delay impacts on provocation cases is quite possibly the most significant aspect of 
the defence as it reflects the debate over gender bias and recognising emotions such as 
fear where it may be natural to expect a certain amount of delay. The modern approach 
towards the matter of delay has also been to wrap it up in the ordinary person question, 
as well as the factual subjective element, and through giving greater context to the 
killings in the objective test it is possible that greater amounts of time between the last 
provocative act and the killing will be afforded to D.
121
 Delay, therefore, is relevant to 
whether the jury believe that D acted with the genuine emotion (subjective test) and 
whether D should have responded in the manner which they did (control test). Delay 
also requires us to examine if the loss of self-control requirement is necessary in order 
for mitigation to take place.
122
 The cooling period was originally a used as a limitation in 
order for the defence not to proceed to the jury, however it is an equally key issue in the 
modern defence because it relates to how we expect people to react when they are in 
such an emotional state. 
 
d) the reasonable man test 
Before the reasonable man test was reformed into the ordinary person test in the post-
1957 defence it was comprised of a control test which contained a rule demanding a 
                                           
119 The subjective element was still required. For example, Hayward (1833) 6 Car & P 157, 159: D must have killed 
"whilst smarting under a provocation so recent and so strong". 
120 See (n36). This case will be discussed further with regards to the modern approach to delay in 'Chapter 2 - The 
Post-1957 Defence' (n27). 
121 It will be advanced in Part IV how this could be achieved. 
122 These issues will be discussed extensively in 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' and will be the foundation for the 
preferred outlook of the defence outlined in Part IV. 
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proportionate response. In the Duffy judgment Devlin J stated that it was of "great 
importance" that the 
 
"mode of resentment bears some proper and reasonable relationship to 
the sort of provocation that has been given. Fists might be answered with 
fists, but not with a deadly weapon".
123
 
 
Previously, in Hall "the weapon that was chosen" was viewed as a consideration,
124
 but 
the 'mode of resentment rule' or the 'reasonable relationship rule' was established in 
Mancini, where D used a double-edged blade in a fist fight.
125
 
 
In Mancini it was stated that it was important 
 
"to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected, 
for to retort, in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a simple 
blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a 
concealed dagger. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be reduced to 
manslaughter".
126
 
 
This limitation may be at odds with the underpinnings of the defence, given that at this 
point D has lost his self-control; it is difficult to understand how D can only be expected 
to strike out in an 'appropriate' manner.
127
 Regan cites Baron Parke's earlier judgment in 
                                           
123 [1949] 1 All ER 932 
124 Hall 55. See (n86) 
125 Mancini 10: "this followed Distleman's [V's] coming at him and aiming a blow with his hand or fist. Such action by 
Distleman would not constitute provocation of a kind which could extenuate the sudden introduction and use of a 
lethal weapon like this dagger" 
126 Ibid 9 
127 A similar point was made about the limit placed on D, in that he must kill his provoker and not another party 
(n102). 
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Thomas as reflecting the reality of the situation more accurately: the defence could be 
available "[i]f a person receives a blow, and immediately avenges it with any instrument 
that he may happen to have in his hand".
128
 Such a finding properly reflects that at the 
time D is suffering from loss of self-control and his reaction may be even more 
excessive. Also, striking out in an inappropriate manner, or a 'frenzied' attack, may be a 
better indicator of a loss of self-control. Nevertheless, for a short time this was an 
essential part of the reasonable man test and in McCarthy it was described as 
"undoubted law".
129
 McCarthy highlights that it was not only the instrument D used but 
the nature of the entire violence which needed to be considered as the continuance of 
the beating was viewed unreasonable.
130
 
 
When the Mancini rule was combined with the Holmes judgment it meant that the judge 
also had to be satisfied that for the defence to go to the jury there had to be evidence as 
"to the degree and method and continuance of violence".
131
 Much like the no cooling-off 
period requirement, this placed added restrictions on how D should act when provoked if 
the defence was going to be available to them. Therefore, it was a substantial hurdle for 
the defence to go to the jury and, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, these limitations 
brought about the desire to reform the defence. 
 
Another aspect of the reasonable man test is the debate over whether the jury should be 
able to consider any of D's peculiarities. The position before the 1957 Act was laid down 
in Bedder,
132
 the standard of self-control expected from the reasonable man should not 
be altered: 
 
                                           
128 (1833) 7 Car & P 817, 818 
129 R v McCarthy [1954] 2 QB 105, 109: "it is undoubted law that the violence used must have some reasonable 
relation to the provocation." 
130 Ibid 112: "If a man who is provoked retaliates with a blow from his fist on another grown man a jury may well 
consider, and probably would, that there was nothing excessive in the retaliation even though the blow might cause 
the man to fall and fracture his skull, for the provocation might well merit a blow with the fist. It would be quite 
another thing, however, if the person provoked not only struck the man, but continued to rain blows upon him or to 
beat his head on the ground". 
131 Holmes 597 
132 Bedder v DPP (1954) 38 Cr App R 133 
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"this makes nonsense of the test. Its purpose is to invite the jury to 
consider the act of the accused by reference to a certain standard or norm 
of conduct and with this object the 'reasonable' or the 'average' or the 
'normal' man is invoked. If the reasonable man is then deprived in whole or 
in part of his reason, or the normal man endowed with abnormal 
characteristics, the test ceases to have any value."
133
 
 
The Bedder decision was based on two earlier cases where such arguments put forward 
were rejected. In Alexander
134
 D argued that his mental deficiency ought to be 
considered; it was pointed out that this was the first time that this issue had been argued 
but the defence was denied. In Lesbini Lord Reading CJ summed up the alterative view 
as being that "the Court ought to take into account different degrees of mental ability"
135
 
and then rejected this as "it would not be provocation which ought to affect the mind of a 
reasonable man."
136
 It would be the mental deficiency, not severe provocation, which 
would explain the killing. This is an argument which has gone on to shape the 
provocation defence and its relationship with diminished responsibility.
137
 
 
In Bedder there was a failure to grasp that this was not an attempt to rely on a mental 
deficiency, so that a lower standard of self-control was to be expected from D, but a 
desire for the factual situation to be taken into account: the argument was not that 
different degrees of mental ability should be taken into account but that physical defects 
which are the subject of the provocation ought to be considered, such as the taunts 
which were in reference to D's impotence. It was seen that it would be "plainly illogical" 
to recognise such "unusual physical characteristic[s]" but ignore "unusually excitable or 
pugnacious temperament".
138
 
 
                                           
133 Ibid 142 
134 (1914) 9 Cr App R 139 
135 R v Lesbini [1914] 3 KB 1116, 1120 
136 Ibid 1120 
137 This is one of the major themes that is explored in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n143-5). 
138 Bedder 141 
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English has stated that the earlier case of Raney
139
 was ignored on this issue, where a 
man being one-legged was viewed to be a relevant consideration for the jury.
140
 D being 
one-legged is clearly not a 'normal' characteristic, yet despite the position taken on such 
characteristics it was viewed as being relevant in assessing the provocation. The 
restriction in taking into account the characteristics of D was in order to keep the 
reasonable man test as 'objective' as possible and not allow a variable standard based 
on D's peculiarities, however when the jury was not allowed to consider such physical 
defects it meant that their judgements on the reasonableness were not able to properly 
reflect the actual circumstances of the incident. How far the characteristics of D are 
admitted into the objective test has been proven to be a challenging and inconsistent 
issue and much of the discussion on the post-1957 defence in Chapter 2 will be 
dedicated to this area. 
 
Conclusion 
The limitations discussed above helped to maintain judicial control over the defence but 
also enforced the concept of reasonableness; there were authorities, often conflicting, 
which held it was only 'reasonable' for D to kill the provoker, when the provocation is 
something more than words, without delay, in an appropriate manner and when it did not 
stem from a peculiarity in any way. Much of this, however, goes against the nature of the 
defence which existed since the adoption of the loss of self-control requirement. 
Therefore, D was in a highly emotional state but must still have acted in a reasonable or 
appropriate manner on these fronts for the defence to have succeeded or not respond at 
all to certain provocations which a normal person may have found to be highly 
provocative. 
 
                                           
139 (1944) 29 Cr App R 14, 17: "To a one-legged man like the appellant, who is dependent on his crutches, it is 
obvious that a blow to a crutch, whether it is a blow that knocks the crutch away or not, is something very different 
from mere words. It seems to us that, if the Judge had repeated that part of the appellant's evidence, it would have 
been very proper to do so, because a blow to a one-legged man's crutch might well be regarded by a jury as an act 
of provocation." 
140 P. English, 'What DID Section Three do to the Law of Provocation?' (1970) Crim LR 249, 253 
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Chapter 2 looks at the impact of the Homicide Act 1957. The defence had loss of self-
control at its heart and can somewhat be seen to deal with the contradiction of 
demanding reasonableness and loss of self-control at the same time. The limitations 
which were discussed above were incorporated into the objective element, in what 
became the ordinary person test, allowing them to be considered or ignored by the jury 
depending on their significance and this was without the judge having such an influence. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE POST-1957 DEFENCE 
This Chapter will explore the impact of the Homicide Act 1957; it will detail how the 
defence was ultimately interpreted in a manner which was consistent with the 1957 Act 
but by doing so was unable to bring about mitigation appropriately. Before the reform 
which took place in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 the defence was left in the 
position where its rationale and its elements were consistent with the concept of partial 
excuse and excusable loss of self-control.
1
 The post-1957 defence is interesting and 
complicated as there were many contradictory rulings and interpretations of the law. The 
Chapter will explore how even though the aims of the 1957 Act were limited to resolving 
the concerns of judicial control and the definition of provocation the impact of reform was 
great as it was interpreted in a manner which went beyond this owing to the vagueness 
of the text and the impact of hard cases. 
 
The 1957 Act was heavily influenced by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 
and English describes how there was "no doubt" that it was the government's intention 
to follow their recommendations from a 1953 Report.
2
 The following shows that there 
was only two intended consequences stemming from the 1957 Act's implementation. In 
a House of Commons debate the Home Secretary stated, almost verbatim to the 1953 
Report,
3
 that "the nature as distinct from the degree of the provocation should be 
immaterial" and that "words alone" would be sufficient if it could be considered "grave 
provocation".
4
 Furthermore, the Attorney-General stated that the "whole object" of the 
reform "is to make clear that a jury can take into account all kinds of provocation".
5
 The 
1957 Act was not intended to alter any other element of the defence, as, for example, 
                                           
1 These concepts will be discussed in detail in 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' where the foundations of the defence will be 
explored. 
2 P. English, ‘What DID Section Three do to the Law of Provocation?’ 250-1: from the Parliamentary debates there is 
"no doubt" that it was the "intention of the government that clause 3 should implement the recommendations on 
provocation" by the Royal Commission.  
3 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) 56 [156]: "the nature (as distinct from the degree) 
of the provocation should be immaterial and it should be open to them to return a verdict of manslaughter." 
4 Major Lloyd George, 15th November 1956, HofC Debate, Vol 560, 1156: the Home Secretary also stated that they 
were following "the recommendation of the Royal Commission" on this matter. 
5 Reginald Manningham Buller, 15th November 1956, HofC Debate, Vol 560, 1166 
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the Attorney-General also stated that "[t]here is no intention at all of altering the other 
tests of what can amount to provocation."
6
 Therefore, the only substantive reform which 
was intended was that words alone could be considered as valid provocation. 
 
The only other intended consequence of the 1957 Act was to alter the sufficient 
evidence test, the freedom for the jury to consider the provocation defence was 
appreciably increased at the cost of the judge’s ability to limit the defence. English states 
that this was "overshadowed" by the discussion to allow 'words alone' as valid 
provocation.
7
 These limited intentions in the 1957 reform will be contrasted with how the 
law was applied and interpreted, but, also, it will be shown that these two intentions, no 
concern for the nature of the provocation and there being a weak sufficient evidence 
test, led to some of the most damning criticisms of the pre-2009 defence which will be 
discussed in Part II. 
 
Consequently, the 1957 Act ensured that all the elements of the defence were jury 
questions and it was interpreted that if there was evidence that D lost his self-control 
owing to him feeling provoked the defence had to be put before the jury.
8
 Even if D did 
not argue that he was provoked and even if the judge did not think that the defence 
ought to succeed it had to be put to the jury: 
 
                                           
6 Ibid 
Also, see R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 157: "This section plainly changed the law in two ways." Then the two 
matters referred to are discussed in the judgment. 
7 P. English, ‘What DID Section Three do to the Law of Provocation?’ 254 
Note that this point was referred to at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n81): Brett stated that "the judges rode the 
doctrine very hard" and Allen stated that the 1957 Act "permitted an escape from the strait-jacket imposed by the 
common law ...". 
8 R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319, 326: "That matter is, in our view, imposed by Parliament upon the jury, not 
upon a judge, and the common sense of juries can be relied upon not to bring in perverse verdicts where the facts 
do not justify the conclusion." 
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"It does not matter from what source that evidence emerges or whether it 
is relied on at trial by the defendant or not. If there is such evidence, the 
judge must leave the issue to the jury.
9
 
 
This approach reverted back to the stance in Hopper
10
 as the language used in Porritt is 
similar: "[t]he jury in considering the matter, if it had been left, might, and it is 
unnecessary to say more".
11
 
 
Even though provocation remained a common law defence, its role defining and 
interpreting the concepts involved, its provisions were outlined in section 3 of the 
Homicide Act 1957: 
 
"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find 
that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by 
things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question 
whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he 
did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that 
question the jury shall take into account everything both done and said 
according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a 
reasonable man." 
 
                                           
9 R v Acott [1997] 2 Cr App R 94, 102: If there is no such evidence, but merely the speculative possibility that there 
had been an act of provocation, it is wrong for the judge to direct the jury to consider provocation." 
R v Porritt [1961] 1 WLR 1372, 1376: "it is incumbent upon the judge trying the case, if the evidence justifies it, to 
leave such issue to the jury." 
R v Mann [2011] EWCA Crim 3292 [25]: in this case D did not provide evidence to support that he was provoked into 
losing his self-control and the Court of Appeal stated that whether he was provoked would be "a matter of 
speculation, and it was not for the jury to speculate." 
Also, at [26]: "This merely serves to underline the importance of recognising that the need to leave provocation to 
the jury only arises when there is evidence of some conduct which the jury might find had provoked, i.e. caused him 
to lose his self-control, and in order to be able to address that question it is critical that the conduct is first 
identified." 
10 [1915] 2 KB 431, 435: "some evidence – we say no more than that". See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n83) 
11 Porritt 1378 
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This sets out three requirements: D must be provoked, lose self-control and the 
reasonable man test. It is important to note that, in line with the intentions of the drafters, 
the 1957 Act did not directly impact too greatly on the definition of the loss of self-control 
or reasonable man requirements, they were developed in the common law in response 
to sets of 'hard cases'. The following discussion on the post-1957 defence highlights how 
the vagueness of the 1957 Act gave an opportunity, which was taken, for the defence to 
reformed in various ways; however, the structure and basic requirements of the defence 
meant that the defence was not salvageable through common law developments and 
ultimately statutory reform was needed for it to appropriately deal with the most 
problematic cases. 
 
a) was D provoked? 
What this element required will be explored in more depth in Part II,
12
 but, put briefly, this 
was a subjective test over whether the event caused D to feel as if he was provoked and 
was a part of the sufficient evidence test. It was commonly seen that only provocation 
leading to anger would suffice as a valid cause and there were no restrictions on what 
constituted valid provocation. Following the intention of the drafters, the statute extended 
the span of what could provoke D from the common law by including anything done 
and/or said. The main change of this was from the Holmes judgment,
13
 in that words 
alone were allowed to be sufficient without the explicit demand that they be especially 
severe in nature. This meant that words alone could go to the jury and the jury would 
decide on their sufficiency in the reasonable man test. 
 
The interpretation of the 1957 Act ensured that the source of the provocation did not 
have to be V: the source could be anything.
14
  The vagueness of the Act allowed this 
interpretation.
15
 In Davies it was made clear that the common law position on this issue 
                                           
12 See 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation'. 
13 Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588. See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n87-89). 
14 The approach adopted in Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319 will be further discussed in 'Chapter 4 - Adequate 
Provocation'. 
15 R.S. Regan, ‘Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation’ 324: The 1957 Act "does not expressly refer to 
indirect provocation or misdirected retaliation but section 3 of the Act is sufficiently general to include these 
concepts." 
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was not definite but that the wording of section 3 ought to be interpreted in such a 
manner as to allow the source of the provocation to come from a third party: 
 
"it seems quite clear to us that we should construe section 3 as providing a 
new test, and on that test that we should give the wide words of section 3 
their ordinary wide meaning. Thus we come to the conclusion that 
whatever the position at common law, the situation since 1957 has been 
that acts or words otherwise to be treated as provocative for present 
purposes are not excluded from such consideration merely because they 
emanate from someone other than the victim."
16
 
 
This allowed the admission of cases which often previously fell outside of the defence, 
as, for example, the contrast with the Simpson case demonstrates.
17
 Pearson
18
 
highlights that indirect provocation was valid as D was provoked by his father’s words 
and conduct towards himself and his brother, both were deemed to be valid provocation. 
On the issue of misdirected retaliation, under the 1957 Act D could rely on the defence 
not just if he accidently killed another once provoked but if he retaliated against a third 
party intentionally.
19
 In Porrit, similar to the cases of Brown and Gross,
20
 D missed and 
killed another when he tried to kill his provoker; D shot his step-father whilst aiming for 
the person his step-father was in a struggle with and it was ruled that the issue ought to 
have gone to the jury. 
 
It is consistent with the loss of self-control requirement that D can be provoked by 
conduct carried out against another, particularly if they have a close relationship with 
that person, and, also, that D may make mistakes in such a state. All of this improves on 
the position before the Act; even though there were exceptions, it was stated that D 
must only be provoked by V, ignoring the possibility that he could be provoked by 
                                           
16 R v Davies [1975] QB 691, 701 
17 See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n99-100) 
18 [1992] Crim LR 193 
19 R v Twine [1967] Crim LR 710: "Under the Act the provocation did not necessarily have to come from the victim." 
20 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n97-8) 
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wrongs to others and in the state of a loss of self-control he could find it difficult to curb 
his impulse and only retaliate against a specific target.
21
 The impact of this change alone 
was drastic as it indicated that the defence would be more concerned with the impact of 
the provocation on D, losing his self-control, rather than the nature of the provocation 
itself. 
 
b) loss of self-control 
For the defence to have succeeded D must have felt provoked, the loss of self-control 
must have stemmed from the provoking events and D must have killed whilst he had lost 
his self-control.
22
 
 
It became clear that the defence developed into recognising that D retains a certain level 
of control over his actions. The early cases of Walters and Oneby
23
 describe the 
subjective element in terms of a complete loss of self-control but by time of the Homicide 
Act 1957 what was required may be most accurately described as a partial loss of self-
control; it is seen as a matter of degree and this was concluded by the Privy Council 
when stating that the argument that "there is no intermediate stage between icy 
detachment and going berserk" is "false".
24
 
 
A definition of the loss of self-control element was provided in the pre-1957 case of Duffy 
by Devlin J, a definition which was consistently cited post-1957 as the Act did not re-
define the concept:
25
 
 
                                           
21 Such problems with the pre-1957 defence were outlined at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n101-2) 
22 Provoking event > D feels provoked > D loses self-control > D kills whilst under a loss of self-control. 
Therefore, all that ought to matter is the build up to the killing. Cf. in Clarke [1991] Crim LR 383 it was assumed that 
D had lost his self-control when he strangled V but had regained it after the killing as he attempted to cover it up. It 
was ruled that the conduct after the strangulation ought to be considered too. 
23 See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n66-7) 
24 Phillips [1969] 2 AC 130, 137-8 (Lord Diplock). 
25 [1949] 1 All ER 932 
R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 157: this statement from Duffy was "afterwards treated as a classic direction to 
the jury". 
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"a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so 
subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his 
mind." 
 
As will be further discussed in Part II,
26
 "master of his mind" continues the subjective 
element’s reliance on metaphor to describe the necessary psychological impact of the 
provoking event and this does not bring about clarity or understanding. 
 
Through this definition adding the "sudden and temporary" requirement it would seem to 
ensure that cases where delay between the last provocative event and the killing were 
no longer in the scope of the defence. It is clear, as the case of Royley demonstrates,
27
 
that the issue of delay has been problematic for the defence since its origins. In that 
case it was questioned whether D was still acting under heated blood: 
 
"[F]or he going upon the complaint of his son, not having any malice 
before, and in that anger beating him, of which stroke he died, the law 
shall adjudge it to be upon that sudden occasion and stirring of blood, 
being also provoked at the sight of his son’s blood, that he made that 
assault, and will not presume it to be upon any former malice, unless it be 
found. And although the distance of the place where his son complained 
was a mile, it is not material, being all upon one passion." 
 
The logic of this judgment, similar to the findings in Baillie,
28
 is that as long as D stays 
out-of-control until the time when he killed it ought to be considered a valid loss of self-
                                           
26 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' 
27 (1612) Cro Jac 296. D killed the person who had beaten his son, D had to travel a long distance in order to find V. 
See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n36 & n120) 
28 [1995] 2 Cr App R 31 
R v Mann [2011] EWCA Crim 3292 [32]: D's case was distinguished from Baillie as D did not kill his ex-wife with any 
proximity to the provoking incident and it was adjudged that D acted entirely normally before the killing, therefore 
his loss of self-control did not stem from him being provoked: "The facts of the present case are very different. This 
is not a case in which there is evidence that the appellant fell into a rage and there was an unbroken sequence of 
events commencing with the conduct which caused him to fall into a rage and ending with the killing." 
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control. In Baillie a drug dealer was threatening D's son, D lost his self-control, armed 
himself and drove to V’s house. It was adjudged that D remained out-of-control all of this 
time. This can be directly contrasted with the case of Ibrams
29
 where planning and 
deliberation took place over a period of days. In that case the last provocative act was 
on the 7
th
 October, a plan to kill V was formulated on the 10
th
 October and the killing took 
place, according to plan, on the 12
th
. 
 
The decision in Baillie, however, came about because of a need for the partial defence 
to attempt to deal with killings which involved delay in another scenario, 'battered 
women' who kill their partners. Duffy changed the law, before there was no necessity to 
find that the loss of self-control was "sudden and temporary". The approach taken in 
Ahluwalia,
30
 making the factor of delay merely evidential as to whether D killed whilst 
suffering from a loss of self-control, takes the sting out of the Duffy judgement: 
 
"Time for reflection may show that after the provocative conduct made its 
impact on the mind of the defendant, he or she kept or regained self-
control. The passage of time following the provocation may also show that 
the subsequent attack was planned or based on motives, such as revenge 
or punishment, inconsistent with the loss of self-control and therefore with 
the defence of provocation. In some cases, such an interval may wholly 
undermine the defence of provocation; that, however, depends entirely on 
the facts of the individual case and is not a principle of law."
31
 
 
This helped to deal with cases which involved victims of long-term abuse who, as in 
Ahluwalia and Thornton,
32
 killed after a delay between the killing and the last provocative 
act. The finding in Ahluwalia is helpful to the success of such cases but it also reflects 
                                                                                                                                   
Also, at [29]: "on what basis could any jury have concluded that conduct which had plainly not caused him to lose 
his self-control over a period of several hours, later caused him to do so?" 
29 (1982) 74 Cr App R 154 
30 R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 
31 Ibid 897–8 (Lord Taylor CJ) 
32 [1992] 1 All ER 306: D went out of the room, sharpened a knife and went back to kill V. 
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that this is a subjective test and objective constraints, such as delay, ought not to have a 
bearing if there is evidence which supports D’s claim that she was genuinely in this 
state. This finding is also supported owing to the vagueness of the 1957 Act, even 
though Duffy was the leading authority at the time the wording of the Act did not 
explicitly state that the killing had to be spontaneous or go into any detail in order to 
explain the concept. 
 
The provocation defence remained a common law defence after the passage of the 
1957 Act and given the historical background of the defence it is within its spirit that the 
concepts involved evolve over time to deal with the issues of the day; however, whether 
loss of self-control can be understood to extend to cases which involve delay is highly 
debateable.
33
 The issue of delay will always be problematic as the greater the time lapse 
between the last provocative act and the killing the greater the chances that the act will 
be interpreted as stemming from revenge and not from the provocation. This view is 
even highlighted in the above passage from Ahluwalia, but the benefit of that decision 
was that there was an understanding that delay did not have to destroy a claim for 
provocation even if it does still make the chances for the jury believing D killed whilst 
under a loss of self-control less likely. 
 
c) Would a reasonable man have done as D did? 
i) mode of resentment rule 
Pre-1957, in Mancini, there was another layer added to the reasonable man test 
requiring a reasonable relationship between the provocation and the violence D used. 
However, after the 1957 Act this requirement turned into being a factor for the jury to 
consider within the wider reasonable man/ordinary person test. 
 
The Privy Council in Phillips made the most significant judgment on the mode of 
resentment test after the 1957 Act and it was not entirely consistent. It was found that 
Mancini laid down that the mode of resentment was merely a "relevant factor" and not a 
                                           
33 This is an issue that will be explored in greater depth in 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' 
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rule.
34
 However, Mancini clearly stipulated that it was mandatory.
35
 In Phillips there was 
a clear attempt to ensure that they did not interpret the 1957 Act beyond the intention of 
the drafters as it was stated that the "the only changes in the common law doctrine of 
provocation" from the 1957 Act were to do with the words rule and the role of the 
judge.
36
 It was expressly stated that Holmes was the decision which the drafters sought 
to move away from: "[i]t was this decision [Holmes], not that in Mancini which was 
reversed by the English legislation of 1957."
37
 In Phillips therefore there is an 
understanding that the 1957 Act does not touch upon the mode of resentment rule 
established in Mancini yet they still found that since the enactment its role was reduced 
from being a rule to a factor:  
 
"Since the passing of the legislation it may be prudent to avoid the use of 
the precise words of Viscount Simon in Mancini ... unless they are used in 
a context which makes it clear to the jury that this is not a rule of law which 
they are bound to follow, but merely a consideration which may or may not 
commend itself to them."
38
 
 
Later, Walker
39
 and Brown
40
 followed Phillips. If Phillips had interpreted the 1957 Act in 
line with the intentions of the drafters then, as English states,
41
 the mode of resentment 
                                           
34 Phillips 137 
35 Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1, 9: "the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation" 
(emphasis added). See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n123-31) 
36 Phillips 137: reversing the Holmes decision to mean that the judge no longer had to make a "preliminary ruling" 
on the reasonable man test. 
See (n2-8) for the intention of the drafters. 
37 Phillips 137 
38 Ibid 
39 R v Walker [1969] 1 WLR 311, 316: the argument that the 1957 Act removed the Mancini rule "may well be 
correct, although for the purposes of this case we do not think it is necessary to give a final decision upon it. Plainly, 
one vital element for the jury's consideration in all these cases is the proportion between the provocation and the 
retaliation". 
40 R v Brown [1972] 2 QB 229, 232: an issue was "whether this was a statement of legal principle or whether it was 
intended as a guide to one of the considerations which a jury has to take into account ... It seems to this court that 
this was not a statement of legal principle". 
41 P. English, ‘What DID Section Three do to the Law of Provocation?’ 255: "The jury have been given a task that 
formerly could be performed by the trial judge. They and not he are to be the new arbiters of whether the 
requirements of the law have been satisfied. The law itself remains the same." 
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test would have been a mandatory test but it would have just been for the jury to decide 
and not the judge.
42
 
 
There is a great similarity between how Mancini and Duffy, above, were viewed as 
factors rather than rules, this exhibits that the judges were going beyond the intention of 
the drafters and modifying the provocation defence. The post-1957 provocation defence 
remained a common law defence, so they were entitled to do this, but the best 
justification for this, along with the expansion of the definition of 'provoked' in Davies, is 
that all these decisions were in line with an excusatory loss of self-control rationale 
where the previous rules, many justificatory in nature or inconsistent with the loss of self-
control concept, were being removed. Despite the Phillips judgment going against the 
intentions of the drafters, and at the same time pronouncing that they were upholding 
them, its finding on the mode of resentment rule was therefore both in line with the 
rationale of the defence and more understanding of the circumstances which the 
defence covers. 
 
Ashworth has stated that "any direct comparison between the retaliation and the 
provocation is indefensible",
43
 this is because D cannot be expected to react to 
provocation in an appropriate manner whilst he has lost self-control. Demanding both at 
the same time is illogical, for example, in Phillips it is acknowledged that if there is a 
dangerous weapon to hand it might be expected that D, in such a state, could use it.
44
  
Ashworth goes on to find "that the form and style of the retaliation may provide evidence 
as to whether there was a sudden loss of self-control and, if so, its degree."
45
 This is 
                                           
42 In his concluding remarks (ibid 267), English states that even though he does not support the Mancini rule he 
finds that it still existed after the 1957 Act: "It might have been better if it had been abolished in 1957, but it was 
not. In such a situation the proper course for its opponents is to seek fresh legislation to achieve that end ... [T]he 
present mode of attack on the Mancini rule which seems to involve hope that as the years go by distance will lend 
enchantment to the Homicide Act 1957 so that any desired change in the law of provocation can be attributed to 
section 3." 
43 A. Ashworth, ‘The Doctrine of Provocation’ 292, 306 
44 Phillips 138: "The average man reacts to provocation according to its degree with angry words, with a blow of the 
hand, possibly if the provocation is gross and there is a dangerous weapon to hand, with that weapon." 
45 A. Ashworth, ‘The Doctrine of Provocation’ 292, 306 
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correct, in so far as deliberation or a frenzy on the part of D could imply what actually 
occurred, but in making such judgements there needs to be caution, as with how delay 
is interpreted in the subjective element.
46
 Evaluating D's behaviour became a part of 
what has been described as the control test and, in line with the rationale of the defence, 
instead of looking for a proportionate or reasonable response it was ultimately an 
ordinary response. 
 
ii) the reasonable man/ordinary person and the tests of gravity and control 
The following discussion is to do with the make-up of the objective test and how far the 
characteristics of D were allowed to be considered. The reasonable man/ordinary person 
test is made up of two separate but related tests, the gravity test and the control test; the 
gravity test asks how provocative the events would be for an ordinary person but the 
control test, to an extent, takes on board the Mancini rule and asks whether D met the 
expected standard of behaviour of an ordinary person. As will be illustrated in the 
discussion over the debate in how far D’s own characteristics are considered, definitions 
of the reasonable man are capable of significantly altering the basis of the defence and 
the extent to which characteristics are considered impacts on both the gravity and 
control tests. 
 
For a jury it has long been acknowledged that the objective element is more a matter of 
opinion and it "must be left to the collective good sense of the jury".
47
 Even though since 
that pre-1957 statement was made more structure has been given to the reasonable 
man/ordinary person it is still quite a loose term which requires the jury to use their 
judgement and life experience: it is "more realistically as a matter of opinion".
48
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
Ashworth has stated (at 302-3) that "the concept of proportionality plainly remains an important element in the 
doctrine of provocation" and he views that the "do as he did" wording of the Act as a reference to proportionality, 
but only in so far as a consideration and not a mandatory requirement for a jury. 
46 (n31) 
47 McCarthy 81 
48 Acott 100 
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Even though the term 'reasonable man' was used in the common law and the statute it 
did not reflect the objective criteria which a loss of self-control-provocation defence 
ought to require because of the clash between reasonableness and losing self-control;
49
 
reasonableness implies that D is justified in acting in such a manner and as a provoked 
killing is always excessive it is not the best term.
50
 It is often stated that a reasonable 
man would not kill in such circumstances, no matter what provoked him,
51
 and Lord 
Diplock’s clarification sums up this as the standard of evaluation was reframed as the 
ordinary person rather than the reasonable man. He stated that the reasonable man is 
used as the "embodiment of the standard of self-control required by the criminal law",
52
 
but also that 
 
"[i]t means an ordinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or 
pugnacious, but possessed of such powers of self-control as everyone is 
entitled to expect that his fellow citizens will exercise in society as it is 
today."
53
 
 
Lord Hobhouse has stated that the term, reasonable man, "is better avoided"
54
 and Lord 
Nicholls saw that correct test is the 'ordinary person test'.
55
 
 
How far the characteristics of D ought to be considered by the jury when they make their 
assessment has caused much uncertainty and the position has altered over time. The 
characteristics of D may be considered in two ways and Fitzpatrick and Reed have 
                                           
49 The issue was introduced at the conclusion of the Chapter 1 when summing up the common law limitations. 
50 This point will be central in 'Chapter 3 - Rationale'. 
51 For example, R v Campbell [1997] 1 Cr App R 199, 207 (Lord Bingham CJ): "it is not altogether easy to imagine 
circumstances in which a reasonable man would strike a fatal blow with the necessary mental intention, whatever 
the provocation". 
52 DPP v Camplin [1978] AC 705, 714 (Lord Diplock) 
53 Ibid 717 
54 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 205 (Lord Hobhouse) 
55 Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580, 589 (Lord Nicholls) (PC): "The statutory reference to a 
'reasonable man' in this context is, by common accord, not the best choice of words ... Rather, the phrase is 
intended to refer to an ordinary person, that is, a person of ordinary self-control." 
The terms 'ordinary' and 'normal' will be explored in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'. 
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described them as being either 'response characteristics' or 'control characteristics';
56
 
response characteristics relate to the gravity test whereas control characteristics relate 
to the control test. 
 
Gravity Test 
To truly assess the gravity of the provocation the standard must share those 
characteristics which made the words or actions provocative to D (response 
characteristics). For example, if D is taunted about his impotence then no meaningful 
assessment can be made unless the ordinary person possesses such a characteristic, 
otherwise a jury would unable to measure how a person placed in that situation would 
react. A ordinary person would not be impotent, so insulting remarks about this would 
not produce the same impact as a person who was impotent. Without reference to 
response characteristics much of what is commonly viewed as being provocative could 
not be considered as there would be no sting to the words or actions which provoked D. 
 
In Bedder it was held that no characteristics of D could be considered as it would be too 
difficult for the jury to apply and the test would lose its strength by losing its total 
objectivity.
57
 However, in Camplin the approach to response and control characteristics 
was altered. Lord Morris stated that it would be "unreal"
58
 for all the relevant response 
characteristics of D not to be considered as there is a need to contextualise the 
provocation. In Camplin D was a fifteen year-old boy claiming that V had raped him and 
then V had laughed at him afterwards. Therefore, when the jury applied the gravity test 
they would have to take into account the rape and the subsequent laughing as these 
would be the factors which made the incident provocative.
59
 
 
                                           
56 B. Fitzpatrick & A. Reed, ‘Sound of Mind and Body: Psychological Characteristics and the Reasonable Man Test in 
Provocation’, (1999) 63 JCL 365, 366 
57 See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n132-3). 
58 Camplin 721 (Lord Morris): "A few examples may be given. If the accused is of particular colour or particular 
ethnic origin and things are said which to him are grossly insulting it would be utterly unreal if the jury had to 
consider whether the words would have provoked a man of different colour or ethnic origin - or to consider how 
such a man would have acted or reacted." 
59 With regards to the gravity test, the age of D would have no bearing on how provocative the incident was but it 
was relevant as a control characteristic. See (n71-2). 
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The next development was to produce a definition of a characteristic. In New Zealand 
the case of McGregor
60
 North J gave a definition of a characteristic and the Court of 
Appeal in Newell
61
 cited extensively from his judgment: 
 
"The characteristic must be something definite and of sufficient 
significance to make the offender a different person from the ordinary run 
of mankind, and have also a sufficient degree of permanence to warrant its 
being regarded as something constituting part of the individual's character 
or personality."
62
 
 
The House of Lords in Morhall
63
 disagreed with the requirement from Newell, for a 
characteristic to have sufficient degree of permanence: "Newell may have placed too 
exclusive an emphasis on the word 'characteristic'".
64
 It was rightly stated that other 
factors exist "which do not strictly fall within the description 'characteristics'" and D's 
"history" or his general "circumstances" were cited as such examples.
65
 In Lord Millett’s 
dissenting opinion in Smith (Morgan) he highlighted that "history, experiences, 
background, features and attributes of the accused" should all be considered.
66
 
 
What is important is that the provocation is given its proper context. However, Camplin 
ought to have been interpreted in this manner anyway as it was intended that more than 
just characteristics should be considered: 
 
                                           
60 (1962) NZLR 1069 
61 (1980) 71 Cr App R 331 
62 Ibid 339. Following this reasoning in Newell only D’s chronic alcoholism was seen as a characteristic: "The 
appellant's drunkenness, or lack of sobriety, his having taken an overdose of drugs and written a suicide note a few 
days previously, his grief at the defection of his girl friend, and so on, are none of them matters which can properly 
be described as characteristics. They were truly transitory in nature, in the light of the words and reasoning of North 
J., in McGregor's case." (at 340) 
63 [1996] AC 90 
64 Ibid 100 
65 Ibid 98 
66 Smith (Morgan) 210 (Lord Millett) 
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"in determining whether a person of reasonable self-control would lose it in 
the circumstances, the entire factual situation, which includes the 
characteristics of the accused, must be considered."
67
 (emphasis added) 
 
Camplin ought to have been interpreted as allowing everything to be considered and 
characteristics should have been just one aspect of this.
68
 
 
Control Test 
The second aspect of the make-up of the ordinary person is how far D’s power to 
maintain his self-control is considered in the control test (control characteristics). For 
example, the question in Luc Thiet Thuan was whether D should have been judged by 
his own standard, that of a person who had suffered brain damage, or by a 'normal' 
standard.
69
 The consequences would be that D's own proclivity towards violence, 
stemming from his control characteristic, would be favourable to his chances as the jury 
would have to consider it in their assessment. It has become apparent that the answer of 
this question is greatly significant; whether provocation makes exception for 'abnormal' 
levels of self-control is at the heart of the debate. 
 
The law's position has developed from the initial approach in Alexander, Lesbini and 
Bedder and the theory behind the possible approaches will be further discussed when 
exploring the objective element in Chapter 5.
70
 In Bedder it was decided, as with 
response characteristics, that no control characteristics were to be considered. However, 
Camplin split the characteristics into these two categories, response and control 
characteristics; for the gravity test all the characteristics of D could be considered and for 
the control test the ordinary person would have 'normal' powers but the jury were able to 
take into account D’s age and sex by attributing them to the ordinary person: 
 
                                           
67 Camplin 727 (Lord Simon) 
68  In 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' and 'Part IV' the significance of the gravity test being able to bring this 
contextual evidence out will be made evident. 
69 Luc Thiet Thuan v The Queen [1997] AC 131 (PC) 
70 Those cases were discussed previously at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n132-7). 
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"a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary 
person of the sex and age of the accused, but in other respects sharing 
such of the accused's characteristics as they think would affect the gravity 
of the provocation to him".
71
 
 
The reason for this was that age and sex were factors which were seen to be 'normal' 
and 'ordinary'.
72
 In Camplin D was a fifteen year old boy, therefore he was not only male 
but adolescent and this would have meant that he belonged to a set of people who 
would naturally be expected to be more easily provoked than any other set of people. If 
a jury were to apply the ordinary person standard to such facts the standard expected 
would be lower and the test would be easier for D to satisfy. As will be further 
discussed,
73
 the reason for this approach, including age and sex, is that it is only normal 
and natural that a person's self-control could be altered by these factors and not only do 
they not go against the concept of ordinariness but through their inclusion they add 
greater meaning to that concept. To allow the jury to consider these factors would allow 
them to give a more informed answer as to whether D’s response was ordinary.74 
 
A good example of the distinction made between response characteristics and control 
characteristics, owing to the necessity for a compartmentalisation to exist, is when D is 
taunted about being an alcoholic or addicted to drugs but was intoxicated at the time of 
the killing. The decision in Morhall was made on a similar basis as D was taunted about 
his glue-sniffing. Taunts of such a nature could be considered as response 
characteristics in the gravity question,  however, D's intoxication must be ignored as a 
control characteristic as the ordinary standard is not to be deviated owing to the fact that 
                                           
71 Camplin 718 (Lord Diplock) 
72 D's solicitor's argument in Camplin [1978] QB 254 (CA) 261 was that "all the defects which the 'reasonable man' 
test is designed to exclude are abnormalities, but youth, and the immaturity which naturally accompanies youth, 
are not deviations from the norm; they are norms through which we must all of us have passed before attaining 
adulthood and maturity." 
73 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' 
74 Smith (Morgan) 205 (Lord Hobhouse) (dissenting): "Where relevant the age or gender of the defendant should be 
referred to since they are not factors which qualify the criterion of ordinariness." 
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D was more 'provocable' because of his intoxication.
75
 The distinction allows context to 
be given to the events which surround the killing but it does not let standards of 
expected behaviour to be lowered. 
 
However, following Camplin, the position on this issue altered again by allowing more 
control characteristics to be considered. Firstly, Lord Steyn, in his dissenting opinion in 
Luc Thiet Thuan, saw that by not allowing conditions such as D’s brain damage it would 
lead to "crude and unfair results" through murder convictions which were "wholly 
inappropriate."
76
 Following this, the case of Smith (Morgan) extended the control 
characteristics which could be considered. What is crucial is that the basis for this was 
that the Camplin decision was re-interpreted: 
 
"It seems to me clear, however, that Lord Diplock was framing a suitable 
direction for a case like Camplin ... and not a one-size-fits-all direction for 
every case of provocation."
77
 
 
Camplin was therefore interpreted as highlighting that age and sex were control 
characteristics "by way of illustration rather than exclusive itemisation."
78
 Through 
extending the control characteristics beyond age and sex in such a manner it meant that 
D's illness in Smith (Morgan), a depressive illness which meant that he erupted into 
violence, could be attributed to the standard of self-control expected from the ordinary 
person. 
 
Smith (Morgan) made a radical change as it would allow control characteristics which 
were not 'ordinary' and 'normal' to impact on the objective test and in doing so it allowed 
                                           
75 J.C. Smith, 'Case Comment' (1995) Crim LR 890, 891: "the jury must still be directed to consider the effect of the 
provocation on a sober person. Suppose that D, an alcoholic, is taunted by P with his addiction and instantly 
responds with a fatal blow. However drunk D may have been at the time, the jury must be instructed to consider 
the effect of the taunts on an alcoholic of D's age, sex, etc., who, at the time, is sober." 
76 Luc Thiet Thuan 150 
77 Smith (Morgan) 166 (Lord Hoffmann) 
78 M. Burton, 'Intimate Homicide And The Provocation Defence – Endangering Women? R V. Smith' (2001) 9 
Feminist Legal Studies 247, 250 
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more power to be given to the jury to decide what was relevant. The jury could consider 
any control characteristic so long as it would be "unjust" not to consider it, with the 
qualification being that "characteristics such as jealousy and obsession should be 
ignored in relation to the objective element":
79
 
 
"So the jury may think that there was some characteristic of the accused, 
whether temporary or permanent, which affected the degree of control 
which society could reasonably have expected of him and which it would 
be unjust not to take into account."
80
 
 
Lord Clyde saw that, along with self-induced control characteristics, "exceptional 
pugnacity or excitability" also ought not to be considered.
81
 
 
It was not long, however, before the law returned to the Camplin position on this issue. 
In Smith (Morgan) there were two dissenting opinions to this expansion of control 
characteristics, both finding that it would allow deviation from provocation’s ordinary 
person: 
 
"language which qualifies or contradicts such ordinariness must be 
avoided. It is the standard of ordinary not an abnormal self-control that has 
to be used. It is the standard which conforms to what everyone is entitled 
to expect of their fellow citizens in society as it is."
82
 
                                           
79 Smith (Morgan) 169 (Lord Hoffmann) 
80 Ibid 173-4 (Lord Hoffmann). The freedom given to the jury was further clarified: "The jury is entitled to act upon 
its own opinion of whether the objective element of provocation has been satisfied and the judge is not entitled to 
tell them that for this purpose the law requires them to exclude from consideration any of the circumstances or 
characteristics of the accused." (at 166) 
81 Ibid 179 (Lord Clyde): "include all the characteristics which the particular individual possesses and which may in 
the circumstances bear on his power of control other than those influences which have been self-induced. Society 
should require that he exercise a reasonable control over himself, but the limits within which control is reasonably 
to be demanded must take account of characteristics peculiar to him which reduce the extent to which he is 
capable of controlling himself. Such characteristics as an exceptional pugnacity or excitability will not suffice. Such 
tendencies require to be controlled." 
82 Ibid 205 (Lord Hobhouse) (dissenting) 
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Their argument, similar to the judgments in Alexander and Lesbini,
83
 was that individuals 
would set their own standard of expected self-control: it would be D's own peculiarity and 
not an ordinary reaction stemming from provocation which would be the primary cause 
for the killing. It has been stated that in Smith (Morgan) the "majority is shown to have 
misinterpreted the most important case", Camplin, and "brushed aside" other important 
decisions such as Morhall.
84
 In Holley the Privy Council decided in favour of the Camplin 
direction over Smith (Morgan).
85
 It must be noted that they did not find that Smith 
(Morgan) was wrong because in extending the scope of control characteristics this was 
incompatible with the provocation defence but that they were wrong in their 
interpretation of Camplin.
86
 Lord Nicholls stated that the Camplin direction "was clearly 
intended to be a model direction, of general application in cases of provocation"
87
 and it 
was therefore a one-size-fits-all direction. 
 
Following on from Holley, in Mohammed it was stated that the proper test was based on 
the Camplin distinction: "a narrow and strict test of a man with ordinary powers of self-
control rather than the wider test".
88
 In that case D stabbed his daughter after seeing a 
man climbing out of his daughter's bedroom. The jury could consider that D was a 
devout Muslim, therefore the incident was severely provocative to him as sex outside 
                                           
83 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n132-7) 
84 ‘Case Comment: Homicide - Murder - Provocation - Characteristics of Reasonable Man’, (2000) Crim LR Dec, 1004, 
1005-6 
85 Note that the Privy Council overturned a House of Lords decision by a six to three majority. Holley was confirmed 
by the Court of Appeal in R v James and Karimi [2006] EWCA Crim 14 despite the fact that the House of Lords 
decision should have been binding. The justification for this being that the Privy Council in Holley was primarily 
made up of members of the House of Lords, even though Privy Council decisions should only be merely persuasive 
for English courts. 
86 That interpretation at (n77-8). 
87 Holley 591 
The Smith (Morgan) is one interpretation of how the objective element can be in provocation, this will be discussed 
further in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' 
K. Z. Csefalvay, ‘Taunts , Chapati Pans And The Case Of The Reasonable Glue-Sniffer: An Examination Of The 
Normative Test In Provocation After Smith And Holley’ (2006) Cambridge Student Law Review 45, 50: on this point it 
has stated been stated: "the House of Lords had overstepped the boundaries of its authority. This is because it had 
construed a statute so radically differently from the literal meaning that it constituted an outright departure from, 
and usurpation of, the intention of Parliament ... Thus the reason for the overruling is not that Morgan Smith was 
an 'inherently wrong' decision, against public policy, common-sense morality and judicial applicability, but that it 
was a 'procedurally wrong' decision, against Parliament’s intention." 
88 [2005] EWCA Crim 1880 
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marriage went against his faith. However, the fact that D suffered from depression since 
his wife had died and had violent mood swings could not be attributed to the ordinary 
person. Also, in Moses
89
 the objective standard of self-control was not lowered owing to 
D suffering from clinical depression or having an "an over-controlled personality". D had 
killed his former girlfriend after she had told him that she had had better lovers than him. 
D was overly sensitive about his masculinity so taunts about his sexual ability could only 
be relevant to the gravity test. 
 
Conclusion 
In order to identify if the problems with the provocation defence have been resolved 
following the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 it is necessary to understand the pre-2009 
defence and how fell into such a state. Part I has detailed the history of the provocation 
defence and outlined the development of the concepts which will be discussed 
throughout. Also, how the entire nature of the defence evolved from being based on a 
partial justification to a partial excuse has been described. At the beginning of Part I it 
was stated that provocation had to be a useful defence, it had no set definition and had 
issues which simply could not be resolved; these factors go right to the heart of why the 
partial defence exists but also why it was so problematic. Provocation was constantly 
adapted in order to attempt to resolve the demands of the day; dealing with those with 
'abnormal' levels of self-control, delayed responses and excluding or admitting certain 
scenarios are some of the key problems which have presented a constant challenge. 
Provocation, therefore, has not been a consistent defence and has often took missteps 
but ultimately has to be judged on its ability to provide mitigation appropriately. 
 
Part II deals with the areas of concern: provocation's rationale, adequate provocation, 
the objective element (gravity and control tests) and the subjective element. The 
fundamental problem was that the defence ended up not really being concerned with 
provocation but instead with D losing his self-control owing to conduct and how the 1957 
Act was interpreted imposed this outlook. The pre-2009 defence, therefore, mainly 
because of the impact of the 1957 Act, was left in a state where statutory intervention 
was necessary. 
                                           
89 [2006] EWCA Crim 1721 
Chapter 3 - Rationale    54 
 
PART II: CRITIQUE OF PROVOCATION 
Through identifying the problems with the pre-2009 defence it helps to understand the 
reasons for reform, how these shaped the reform and thinking about the defence and, 
also, it is necessary in determining whether the reform ultimately resolves these 
problems. The pre-2009 defence required D to be provoked into causing him to suffer a 
loss of self-control and the reasonable man/ordinary person would have shared this 
reaction. Each of these three elements were a source of criticism and there was a more 
general criticism over the uncertainty of its rationale. Therefore, the criticisms of the pre-
2009 provocation defence fall under these four categories and each of these will be 
addressed in the following set of chapters. 
 
The critique of provocation and the suggested approaches stem from a position which 
was outlined in the Introduction. The defence is concerned with how the individual 
responds emotionally to the situation they face, therefore an understanding of the mental 
processes involved and how this relates to choice is necessary. Also, the defence is 
grounded in expectations relating to behaviour  and values to do with the severity of the 
provoking event; these flow from society and the terms used in the defence, such as 
warrant and ordinary, need to reflect this. It should, also, be the jury's role to make these 
evaluative judgments as they are best placed. From this perspective, in the course of 
Part II it is advanced that the defence should focus on the core emotions to best reflect 
the circumstances; ordinary reactions which stem from these core emotions; and, in 
assessing the severity of the provocation or threat, the comparative standard ought to 
only deal with what it is acceptable to find provocative or threatening and this is informed 
by liberals values, such as respecting other's freedoms and disregarding intolerance. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RATIONALE 
The Law Commission stated that the pre-2009 defence's rationale was "elusive".
1
 
Defences are not explicitly categorised as being justificatory or excusatory based, but for 
                                           
1 Law Commission – Partial Defences to Murder: Final Report (2004) 33 [3.21] 
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provocation it seems that finding an appropriate rationale is essential in order to 
understand and support the defence because of the nature of the circumstances which it 
covers and the peculiarity of it being a partial defence. If the foundations of a defence 
are apparent then the scope and content of the defence can be more easily be 
interpreted, but also it has implications for how society views D and the circumstances 
as it is helps to reflect the judgements that ought to be made. It is submitted that the 
criticism over the rationale should not have been that it was "elusive" but that owing to 
the interpretation of the defence following the Homicide Act 1957 it meant that the 
defence followed a flawed approach, and most of the other criticisms of the defence flow 
from this. 
 
There have been many interpretations of provocation but it is most accurately viewed as 
a partial excuse. It will be shown that this is the correct rationale but, also, that there are 
many approaches to bringing about a partial excuse for provocation; for the pre-2009 
defence it was the form that the partial excuse took which was wrong. The thrust of this 
argument is that the defence was no longer able to provide sufficiently stringent 
evaluative judgements over the provocative conduct which is necessary in order for the 
defence to represent the views of society and provocation is very much a defence that 
rests on such social views. Social views shape what we find provocative according to the 
values we share, or at least respect, and the expectations which we place on provoked 
people to control themselves. Through exploring the pre-2009 defence's rationale it will 
help to explain why the approach adopted was flawed and this will link to the other 
criticisms of the defence. It is also necessary to explain how a justificatory element can 
be contained within a partial excuse as the form of partial excuse which is advanced 
requires this. 
 
a) provocation's rationale and its necessary requirements 
Justifications and excuses can be regarded as explanations for harmful conduct. Where 
they provide such an explanation they are seeking to extinguish any blame and 
punishment which would otherwise be forthcoming. Justificatory and excusatory 
defences function to recognise when these reasons should be valid and are exceptions 
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in the circumstances when harm is caused. The labels of 'justification' and 'excuse' have 
moral significance. Whereas excuses only focus on the agent justifications judge the 
value of the conduct. If conduct is justified then it is regarded as the right thing to do in 
the circumstances; a justified agent has undertaken conduct which society approves of, 
or at least tolerates, as a lesser evil is produced, so the agent's harm is the better 
outcome in comparison to the harm anticipated. Excuses, on the other hand, are an 
admission that the conduct was the wrong thing to do; it is disapproved of and not 
encouraged as the agent was incapable or unable to make the correct choice in the 
circumstances. The moral significance between the concepts is great. From a 
justification an agent gets a sense of vindication from showing that they were right, from 
an excuse the agent is able to rely on understanding and forgiveness. These labels 
reflect how society views the agent and the event. 
 
The rationale of provocation is, therefore, an important issue and provocation is an 
important defence as it is a mechanism to avoid the mandatory life sentence for murder 
and it leads to the provoked defendant not being labelled as a murderer. By classifying 
provocation's rationale it not only helps us to decide on its scope and content but it says 
much about how we view such cases. Whether to characterise provocation as a 
justification, excuse or some sort of mixed rationale is what this Chapter will explore. 
 
The question becomes more difficult because provocation, unlike most other defences, 
only provides a partial defence, this means that the agent faces blame but to a lesser 
degree than an unprovoked murderer. So, those explanations of the defence must 
account for this. Hart describes provocation as a form of formal mitigation,
2
 and partial 
defences and mitigation share a close relationship.
3
 For provocation to properly fit into 
                                           
2 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, 1968), 'Prolegomenon to the Principles of 
Punishment' 15 
3 D.N. Husak, 'Partial Defences', (1998) 11 Can JL and Jurisprudence 167, 168: "Partial justifications and excuses are 
kinds of mitigating circumstances. In the broadest sense, a circumstance mitigates if it alleviates, abates or 
diminishes the severity of a punishment imposed by law." 
Basically, a partial excuse is "if the defendant got into a bit of a state" and partial justification is if "the victim made 
a significant contribution by his/her own behaviour to the killing." (P. Alldridge, 'Self-Induced Provocation in the 
Court Of Appeal', (1991) 55 JCL 94, 94-5) 
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this category, to reduce the offence to voluntary manslaughter, the reason has to be 
sufficiently strong enough to warrant the reduction but not so strong that D deserves 
exoneration. The existence of partial defences and manslaughter can be put down to 
proportionality:
4
 D should not be blamed or punished to the extent of a murderer but it 
still should be substantial.
5
 
 
Provocation is very much to do with emotion and self-control. It is a principle of the 
criminal law that agents must maintain their self-control and there is an acceptance "that 
individuals endowed with the capacity to control their behaviour are at all times expected 
to do so."
6
 However, at the same time it must also be acknowledged that we cannot 
expect too much from individuals and we "must take account of normal human failings or 
weaknesses".
7
 Therefore, it is proper that the defence recognises the impact of severe 
provocation on 'normal' human beings and this is reflected in how provocation is cited as 
being a general concession to human frailty.
8
 
 
                                           
4 D.N. Husak, 'Partial Defences' 169: "Only a rejection of the principle of proportionality – that the severity of 
punishment should be proportionate to desert – would authorize the discretion to disregard a partial justification or 
excuse." 
"In order to qualify for a partial defense, either the blame of the defendant or the wrongfulness of his act must also 
be less than that of the paradigm or standard offender or offense." (at 171) 
J. Tolmie, 'Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish Provocation' [2005] NZLR 25, 
38: "The partial defences are designed to deal with a grey area of criminal culpability: cases where the choice 
between outright acquittal and a murder conviction is too stark." 
5 J.H. Krause, 'Tolerating the Loss of Self-control' in P.H. Robinson, S.P. Garvey & K.K. Ferzan (ed), Criminal Law 
Conversations (Oxford University Press, 2009) 331, 332: "Although portraying provocation as an excuse does send 
the message that the defendant's conduct is not 'right', it nonetheless tolerates that conduct - by offering the 
defendant not only our sympathy, but also a significant reduction in punishment." 
Cf. C. Lee, 'Reasonable Provocation and Self-defence: Recognizing the Distinction Between Act Reasonableness and 
Emotion Reasonableness' in P.H. Robinson, S.P. Garvey & K.K. Ferzan (ed), Criminal Law Conversations (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 427, 428: "We do not want others to emulate the behaviour. We mitigate the charges only 
because we feel sympathy for the provoked killer." 
6 F.McAuley, 'Anticipating the Past: the Defence of Provocation in Irish Law' (1987) 50 MLR 133, 134 
7 Ibid 136 
8 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 212 (Lord Millett) "The defence of provocation should be reserved for those 
who can and should control themselves, but who make an understandable and (partially) excusable response if 
sufficiently provoked." 
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Aside from any 'provocation' or 'provoked' requirement, there ought to be three 
necessary elements for all provocation defences:
9
 the provoked agent must act 
emotionally (subjective test), this must be brought about by severe provocation (gravity 
test) and the agent must meet a level of expected behaviour (control test). An anger-
based defence where the agent may receive mitigation where they have lost self-control 
for any reason cannot be supported as citizens should demonstrate self-control at all 
times
10
 and, also, a defence where the agent kills in 'cold blood' and carries out 
retributive punishment cannot be supported.
11
 In the pre-2009 provocation defence the 
subjective elements involved showing that D was provoked to lose his self-control and 
the objective element was that the provocation was enough to make a reasonable 
man/ordinary person do as he did. 
 
By exploring justifications and excuses it will be shown that not only ought the pre-2009 
defence be considered as a partial excuse but all provocation defences should be, 
therefore any criticism over the defence's rationale being "elusive" was incorrect.
12
 
Throughout Part II it will be demonstrated that the approach taken to providing a partial 
excuse in the pre-2009 defence was wrong and this meant that the subjective and 
objective elements were unable to provide mitigation appropriately. 
                                           
9 Law Commission, 'Partial Defences to Murder: Overseas Studies' Consultation Paper No 173 (Appendices) 
J.Burchell, 'Appendix F - Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and the Use of Excessive Force in Self-Defence in 
South African Law' 188: South African's approach to provocation has been described as having "little resonance" to 
the traditional common law defence. South Africa treat provocation not as a defence but as a factor within the 
normal rules of the elements of offences, effecting capacity and intent. Since Mokonto (1971) 2 SA 319(A) it is 
considered subjective, but, despite this, a resemblance can be viewed as objective factors have some significance; 
evidence is inferred from expectations of ordinary behaviour ("inferences of individual subjective capacity from 
objective, general patterns of behaviour" (J.Burchell, 192)) and it is considered that a 'subjectivised' control test 
"was always implicit" (J.Burchell, 205)). 
10 Kirkham (1837) 8 C & P 115, 119: "though the law condescends to human frailty, it will not indulge to human 
ferocity. It considers man to be a rational being, and requires that he should exercise a reasonable control over his 
passions." 
11 E.O. Isedonmwen, A Requiem For Provocation [1988] 32 Journal of African Law 194, 206: "provocation provides 
one of those rare where self-help is allowed by the law. There is therefore observable a marked reluctance to grant 
the defence readily." 
12 (n1) 
Cf. P. Alldridge, 'Self-Induced Provocation in the Court Of Appeal' 94: "there has never been total clarity as to why" 
provocation reduces murder to manslaughter. Part I does demonstrate, though, that in the course of the 
development of provocation the rationale was not always appreciated and it was not until post-1957 that there was 
more consistency in the excusatory approach. 
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b) justifications 
When conduct is sought to be justified it is appropriate to make arguments to show that 
the conduct was right, good, proper and warranted in the circumstances.
13
 A judgement 
has to be made: on balance, the conduct was the right thing to do. The conduct remains 
harmful but given the correct context, all things considered, it was not wrongful. 
Robinson argues that the role of justifications is to remove such cases from blame and 
punishment as no net harm has been caused and the criminal law should not be 
concerned with these cases.
14
 However, the harm caused "remains a legally recognised 
harm" and this still must "be avoided wherever possible."
15
 It is described as a lesser evil 
as, overall, it brings about a better outcome.
16
 Therefore, the harm involved in 
committing some offence is outweighed through the circumstances of the justification. 
The actor would have to be protecting an interest which is valued highly within society.
17
 
The overall benefit means society regards this as, at least, acceptable: "while the actor 
satisfies the elements of an offence, his conduct should be tolerated or even 
encouraged because of the benefit it brings."
18
 Justified conduct can be performed by 
anybody as it does not matter who brings the outcome about and justified conduct 
should not be prevented as it will stop the right outcome being produced. 
 
 
                                           
13 However, justifications may include merely tolerable conduct (n29-30). 
14 P. Robinson, 'A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability' (1975) 23 UCLA 272: 
"the role of the principle of justification is to compensate for the limitations of a written code". 
15 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 95 
16 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 769: "The modern claim is that all 
justificatory arguments can be reduced to a balancing of competing interests and a judgment in favor of the 
superior interest." 
For example, the US Model Penal Code defines a lesser evil as "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such 
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged." 
17 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 95: "any interest recognised by the society, whether that 
interest is individual, collective, institutional, tangible, or intangible." 
18 Ibid 69 
Robinson (at 71) goes on to discuss how justifications can be split up into three categories: a) "defensive force 
justifications", b) "public authority justifications" and c) "the general justification of lesser evils". If one were to 
argue that provocation is a justification then it must be founded under the third category as provocation is an 
aggressive act and not defensive. 
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i) lesser evil 
For D's killing under provocation to be justified it needs to be shown that the act of killing 
produced a lesser evil. At the heart of a justificatory provocation defence would be that D 
is wronged by V because wrongful conduct is the only conduct which can sufficiently 
provoke an agent.
19
 It is clear that what is wrongful is based on society's views as "it is 
the prevailing cultural climate ... that determines what people define as offensive and 
how they react".
20
 As will be further expanded in the discussion, such a theory would rely 
on the assumption that through V wronging D it allows the killing to become the superior 
interest to V's right to life as V's life becomes less valuable in the balance of interests.
21
 
 
As discussed,
22
 a theory of lesser evils does not concede that an agent acted wrongly by 
causing an evil, but shows that in the circumstances the right choice was made. This 
balance of interests, between the harm caused and the harm avoided, is common with 
all justifications but this is one of three conditions within the internal structure of a 
justification: "Triggering conditions permit a necessary and proportionate response."
23
 
Firstly, a triggering condition would show that the circumstances are present for a 
justification to exist, so that, on balance, the conduct was in fact a lesser evil, meaning 
that "the present value of the harm avoided is greater than the present value of the harm 
anticipated".
24
 Secondly, the necessity requirement means that the conduct must "avoid 
an imminent and impending danger of harm"
25
 and this "demands that the defendant act 
only when and to the extent necessary to protect or further the interest at stake."
26
 
Thirdly, the proportionality requirement shows that there must not be an "alternative 
reasonable means for avoiding the threatened harm"
27
 and this "places a maximum limit 
on the necessary harm that may be caused in protection or furtherance of an interest."
28
 
                                           
19 F. McAuley, Anticipating the Past 137 
20 Ibid 138. Also, Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 243. 
21 The balance of interests was introduced earlier (n13-8). 
22 (n13-4) 
23 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 98 
24 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 775 
25 Ibid 
26 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 99 
27 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 775 
28 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 99 
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The pre-2009 provocation defence did not produce a lesser evil, nor should any form of 
the defence. For a provoked killing to be a lesser evil it would have to be successfully 
argued that V's life is less worthy of protection owing to the wrongful conduct which they 
carried out and that D has an interest in carrying out retributive justice because of the 
sense of injustice they experienced. The problem for such an argument is that the wrong 
suffered by the agent does not outweigh his victim's right to life, therefore, this does not 
satisfy the first condition, that the triggering conditions for a lesser evil actually exist. This 
is implicit from the fact that the lesser offense of manslaughter has traditionally been 
imposed as it signifies that the killing is always excessive no matter what the provocation 
is; we should not recognise that hurt feelings, anger and a desire to retaliate as interests 
which are deserving of protection over protecting a victim's right to life. 
 
The basis of a justified killing in self-defence allows a direct contrast with the provocation 
defence. Self-defence is about an agent preventing serious unjust harm from an attacker 
and therefore such defensive conduct has great societal value, it is about protecting the 
physical well-being of innocents over aggressors. Even so, self-defence is not 
overwhelmingly rightful conduct because of the serious harm, an intentional killing, which 
is caused in bringing about the most desirable outcome.
29
 A provoked killing does not 
have the same power as defensive conduct in the balance, the fact that the agent is 
merely seeking to 'right' a wrong, and does so through the intentional killing of another, 
does not create a compelling argument for it to be considered a lesser evil. The interests 
that the agent is seeking to protect, most likely self-respect and self-worth, do not 
outweigh the value of a provoker's life.
30
 A killing in provocation is an impulsive killing 
                                           
29 J. Dressler, 'New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking 
and Rethinking' (1984) 32 UCLA LR 61, 84: "do we as a society consider the intentional taking of human life, even of 
an aggressor, morally good? Or do we only tolerate it as non-wrongful?" 
G. Fletcher, 'The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson' (1975) 23 UCLA LR 293, 306: "It is 
harder to argue that repelling an aggressor is intrinsically good ... Self-defense appears to be better conceived as a 
necessary evil rather than as the bringing about of a state of affairs that is affirmatively desirable." 
30 J. Dressler, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defence in Search of a Rationale' (1982) 73 JCL and Crim 421, 458: "Are 
we to say that immoral conduct, albeit non-life endangering, should make a person's life less deserving of society's 
protection? ... It runs counter to the high value we place on life, as developed in self-defense theory, wherein we 
only justify killing of deadly aggressors when it is necessary to do so to protect the lives of innocent persons." 
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where the injustice which D feels from being wronged makes him seek retribution 
against his tormentor. Even though in such circumstances D may feel that the only way 
that he can rid himself of such injustice is through retaliation it does not make his killing a 
necessary evil. Also, in cases of provocation the harm to D has already occurred, even 
though it could be argued that the harm is a continuing harm until retribution occurs. It is 
not necessary because we would see it as preferable that V remains alive; any form of 
necessity that D may feel is an impulse to commit a wrongful act, therefore not 
justifiable, only potentially excusable. 
 
A provoked killing is not proportionate because of the similar reasons that we find that it 
is not a lesser evil: the value we place on life, even the life of a provoker, outweighs D's 
desires for homicidal retaliation: 
 
"It is under this same principle that deadly force is rarely if ever permitted 
against a non-aggressor, suggesting that an innocent's life is a near 
absolute interest that can almost never be outweighed."
31
 
 
The potential value in a provoked killing, the agent has rid society of someone who has 
committed wrongful conduct against another and that it allows the agent retribution, 
simply does not outweigh the life of a provoker. 
 
The pre-2009 provocation did not operate with the outlook of justifying the provoked 
killer's actions, as was demonstrated by the fact that it is was partial defence and the 
loss of self-control requirement, but it is important to show that the act of killing is in no 
way justifiable under a provocation defence in any circumstances. In Duffy Devlin J 
made it clear that the provocation defence is only concerned with the wrong D suffered 
in so far as it helps to explain his retaliation and it is not striving to blame the provoker: 
 
                                           
31 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 100: "such a commitment to proportionality – as in the 
valuation of human life over property alone, even the life of a law-breaker – is the mark of a civilised society." 
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"you are not concerned with blame here - the blame attaching to the dead 
man. You are not standing in judgment on him. He has not been heard in 
this court. He cannot now ever be heard. He has no defender here to 
argue for him. It does not matter how cruel he was, how much or how little 
he was to blame, except in so far as it resulted in the final act of the 
appellant."
32
 
 
Provocation is not a justification because, unlike self-defence, it does not seek to blame 
victims for their own death and Renke is correct to state that "it would not belong in our 
criminal law" if that were the case.
33
 Nevertheless, inspecting V's conduct is a necessary 
part of the defence and if the rationale is not understood or appreciated then this 
perception can exist. 
 
The provocation defence requires that the retaliation has a reason and this stems from 
the provocative conduct. It is not possible to avoid the fact that the victim's role needs to 
be inspected to evaluate the severity of the provocation,
34
 but as long as it is clear that 
the killing was excessive and V did not deserve to be killed then the defence can exist. 
That is why the basis of human frailty to provocation is appealing as it appreciates the 
                                           
32 [1949] 1 All ER 932 
A. Howe, 'Mastering Emotions or Still Losing Control? Seeking Public Engagement with "Sexual Infidelity" Homicide' 
(2013) 21 Fem Leg Stud 141, 146: The author asks if the Devlin took this approach more easily because the case was 
that of a woman killing a man whilst the man was asleep, and he asserts that blame is often attached to women in 
infidelity cases: "What a far cry it is from the far more common wife-killing case where the victim is always blamed". 
33 W.N. Renke, 'Calm Like a Bomb: An Assessment of the Partial Defence of Provocation' (2009-2010) 47 Alta LR 729, 
750: "If provocation were a justification, the law would, in effect, be saying that homicidal violence was right - 
whether the victim was an abused spouse, a person who made a homosexual advance, or someone who insulted 
the accused in a bar. Provocation would blame victims. If that were provocation's meaning and effect, it would not 
belong in our criminal law." 
34 C. Wells, 'Provocation: The Case for Abolition' in A. Ashworth & B. Mitchell, Rethinking English Homicide Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2000) 101: "Neither dead men nor women tell tales. Provocation invites the defamation of 
the dead person." 
R.B. Mison, 'Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation' (1992) 80 Cal L 
Rev 133, 147: "No matter which theory [justification or excuse] one uses to rationalize the provocation defense, 
however, the analysis still focuses on the victim's behavior." 
O. Quick & C. Wells, 'Partial Reform of Partial Defences: Developments in England and Wales' (2012) 45 Australian & 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 337, 340: "Provocation has been controversial because it deflects some 
attention away from the defendant's behaviour onto the victim's, and can play to ugly notions that 'he or she asked 
for it'". 
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role that the victim had to play, in terms of evaluating the gravity of the provocation, but it 
is focused on D's own fault for retaliating when he should not have done so. Problems 
also arise when it is forgotten that the defence is based on D getting provoked by 
something substantial and the nature and evaluation of the provocation is ignored, 
provocation can then be viewed as akin to diminished responsibility. Looking at the role 
of the victim is not ideal but it is essential for provocation as D does not get angry in 
isolation. There must still be strong reasons for the maintenance of the defence and this 
is based on proportionality which stems from the understanding of the circumstances.
35
 
 
There are many elements of the pre-2009 provocation defence which are not consistent 
with a justificatory basis. The fact that the source of the provocation did not have to stem 
from V is an element of the defence which highlights that it was not the wrong which D 
suffered that was the focus but the impact this had on D. Any argument that a 
provocation defence is justificatory relies on the fact that the provocation must stem from 
V in order to influence the balance of interests. Even before the Homicide Act 1957 the 
statement made in Duffy
36
 by Devlin J that "[p]rovocation is some act, or series of acts, 
done by the dead man to the accused" has been demonstrated to be not entirely 
accurate.
37
 Post-1957, in Davies,
38
 it was made clear that anything could be the source 
of the provocation and indirect provocation
39
 and misdirected provocation
40
 are not 
excluded from consideration.
41
 
 
The Mancini rule is as close as the modern defence has got to using justificatory 
language and this was even out of step with the defence. The Mancini rule, that the 
mode of resentment had to be proportionate to the provocation received, was also 
interpreted as only being "merely a consideration" since the implementation of the 1957 
                                           
35 This point will be advanced after showing that the rationale of the defence is partial excuse, not just that this is its 
basis but that it ought to be recognised because of the existence of common human frailty when provocation occurs 
(n93-109). 
36 [1949] 1 All ER 932 
37 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n90-102) 
38 [1975] QB 691 
39 Pearson [1992] Crim LR 193 
40 Porrit [1961] 3 All ER 463 
41 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n18-21) 
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Act and was subject to much criticism for being a unrealistic expectation whilst the 
defence demanded that D lost his self-control.
42
 The reasonable man test was equated 
to the ordinary person test and this was in no way looking the raise the required level of 
conduct to a standard where one could forcefully argue that D was warranted in their 
response.
43
 It may have been that D could have made such arguments in favour of 
retribution
44
 but these ought not to be found in the provocation defence, as is 
demonstrated with the contrast with self-defence. Provocation is founded on that the 
killing was an over-reaction and excessive.
45
 The essential elements of the defence, the 
subjective, gravity and control tests, have all been highlighted in how they support this 
conclusion. 
 
ii) partial justification 
Owing to its inability to produce a lesser evil, if provocation is based on a justificatory 
standing it must be shown that partial justifications can exist and, if so, they can go on to 
explain provocation. Conduct can be described as either being good or bad, but there 
are degrees to this. As alluded to,
46
 a killing in self-defence may be seen as something 
that is merely tolerable or as having a greater net value, it is, however, justifiable even if 
the degree of its value can be debated. Just as one would go about to construct an 
argument in favour of provocation being a justification a partial justification relies on 
showing that V lessened the value of his life through provoking D:
47
 
 
"the defence entails a denial that the defendant's actions were entirely 
wrongful in the first place, in the sense that it implies that the defendant 
                                           
42 Phillips v The Queen [1969] 2 AC 130, 138. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n34-46) 
43 Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580, 589 (Lord Nicholls) (PC): "the phrase is intended to refer to 
an ordinary person, that is, a person of ordinary self-control." 
44 For example, the discussion of the case of Fisher at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n69): D claimed that by killing 
V he had done what any man in England would have done. 
45 (n49-52) 
46 (n29-30) 
47 A basic definition of partial justification was given at (n3): "the victim made a significant contribution by his/her 
own behaviour to the killing." 
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was partially justified in reacting as he did because of the untoward 
conduct of his victim."
48
 
 
There is, therefore, an acknowledgement that D's conduct is unable to become the 
lesser evil and there remains a degree of wrongfulness; so, a partially justified killing 
would be deemed to be excessive. 
 
The argument for provocation as a partial justification is that a provoked killing is not as 
bad as an unprovoked killing.
49
 In the discussion of the seventeenth century provocation 
defence it was shown that the killing was always seen to be excessive or an over-
reaction, but by having adequate provocation
50
 it meant that the killings were seen as 
closer to the mean (the proportionate response): it should be murder when there is 
inadequate provocation because of the "(great) extent of the departure from the mean" 
and it should be manslaughter where "the defendants have not in anger gone too far 
beyond the mean."
51
 In other words, a provoked killing should never be seen as 
proportionate but it should be distinguished from murder as it is less wrong than it 
otherwise would be.
52
 
 
Partial justifications suffer from their inability, as do justificatory theories of lesser evils, 
to explain the subjective limb of provocation, the loss of self-control requirement. 
Therefore, so that partial justification can have a role in the provocation defence, the 
pre-2009 defence has been interpreted as having a mixed rationale, the concepts of 
partial justification and partial excuse have been used to explain the elements of the 
                                           
48 F. McAuley, 'Anticipating the Past' 139 
49 M.N. Berman & I.P. Farrell, 'Provocation as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse' (2010) U of Texas Law, Public 
Law Research Paper No 166, 28: "Killing in response to adequate provocation is wrong—seriously wrong, and 
deserving of heavy punishment. But it is less wrong, all else being equal, than killing in the absence of provocation." 
50 In the form of the four categories from Mawgridge discussed in 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n26-31) 
51 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 54 
52 D.N. Husak, 'Partial Defences' 185: "If a complete justification arises whenever the wrongfulness of an offense is 
outweighed, a partial justification arises whenever the wrongfulness of an offense is reduced, but is not outweighed 
altogether." 
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defence independently
53
 or cooperatively.
54
 Ashworth has stated that the pre-2009 
defence "rests just as much on notions of justification as upon the excusing element of 
loss of self-control."
55
 He finds that a provoked killer can be differentiated from an 
unprovoked killer through a partial justification as "an individual is to some extent morally 
justified in making a punitive return against someone who intentionally causes him 
serious offence".
56
 The partial excuse is, though, the sole explanation of the loss of self-
control requirement as it would be unnecessary under a partial justification because of 
its exclusive focus on the value of the conduct.
57
 
 
As has been demonstrated,
58
 the concept of partial justification cannot truly explain the 
pre-2009 defence as it was applied in a fashion where anything could be viewed as 
provocative and, as McAuley states, "a plea of justification cannot succeed unless it is 
shown that the victim was the author of the provocation", unless the value of V's life 
remains unaltered in the balance of interests.
59
 Through admitting cases where D is 
indirectly provoked or misdirects his retaliation it highlights that the focus is not on V 
wronging D but on the impact that feeling provoked had on D. The discussion of 
justifications, above,
60
 can equally be applied to partial justification in how the focus of 
the defence is not to blame V. 
 
It is submitted that the argument for partial justification in provocation fails in the same 
manner as the argument for lesser evils: provoking does not impact on the value of V's 
                                           
53 M.N. Berman & I.P. Farrell, 'Provocation as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse' 29: "partial excuse and partial 
justification each independently provide mitigation." Their argument is one that is a mixed rationale, where a partial 
justification and a partial excuse exist separately, in order to properly explain how adequate provocation and loss of 
self-control can both be a part of provocation. 
54 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 317-8: "The law's subjective condition operates to ensure that it was 
not a revenge killing, but rather a sudden and uncontrolled reaction to perceived injustice. The objective condition 
looks to the element of partial justification and, inevitably, to the conduct of the provoking party." 
55 Ibid 307 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid 314: Ashworth rightly finds, though, that the function of the loss of self-control requirement is to "distinguish 
between an uncontrolled reaction to provocation and deliberate revenge". 
58 (n32-42) 
59 F. McAuley, 'Anticipating the Past' 139 
60 (n13-21) 
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life.
61
 However, there is a more fundamental argument, which is that it does not hold that 
justifications work in this manner. Partial justification is an incoherent concept as 
justifications are all or nothing; if conduct does not reach the standard of being seen as 
right, all things considered, then one cannot say it was partially right. This is the 
approach taken by Uniacke: 
 
"Justification can be a matter of degree: something can be arguably 
justified, barely justified, amply justified, etc. But conduct described in a 
particular way is either justified – permissible or right – or it is not. Thus a 
particular act ... cannot be partially justified."
62
 
 
The argument that partial justifications can exist, that it is wrong but less wrong, is not a 
justification in any way and is a misuse of the term. In the balance of lesser evils if some 
conduct does not tip into being classified as a justification then it is simply wrong, and, in 
Uniacke's terminology, it does not matter if it is barely wrong as it is nevertheless 
classified as wrongful. When conduct is classified as wrongful the agent's reasons are 
insufficient and the conduct, all things considered, should be condemned. The language 
of justification does not allow for partiality; the concept of partial justification is therefore 
incoherent as the agent's argument is seeking to attribute value to their conduct but, 
also, admits wrongfulness. 
 
It has been demonstrated that a justification was not the basis for the pre-2009 defence, 
but it is also possible to go further and state that justifications cannot explain any form of 
provocation defence if the value of the victim's life is to be respected: the value of the act 
of killing cannot be enhanced through displaying that D was provoked, even if it was V 
who provoked him. A more convincing argument would be that where the agent has 
                                           
61 See, in particular, Devlin J's judgment in Duffy (n32). 
61 R. G. Fontaine, 'Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification' (2009) Arizona Legal 
Studies, Paper 08-07, 22: "Surely, many, if not most, successful heat of passion cases involve a killer whose 
emotional outrage, though not homicidal behavior, appears to be at least somewhat warranted. It may be that the 
ease with which we identify with the outrage leads us, at times, to view the reactive killing as partially justified." 
62 S. Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide (Cambridge University Press, 1994) 13 
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made such an admission, to avoid or reduce blame and punishment, they should look 
towards being excused as this better reflects the circumstances. The pre-2009 defence, 
and all forms of the provocation defence, can be explained through the rationale of 
partial excuse. 
 
c) excuses 
To successfully argue that provocation would only lead to a partial excuse it must be 
demonstrated that full excuses do not apply, but throughout the course of the argument 
it will become apparent why evidence of such circumstances does have some 
excusatory power. 
 
When an excuse is sought it is admitted that there was a wrong but it is possible to 
provide a reason for why D should not be blamed and punished. Excuses are based on 
the circumstances and the actor's capacity: 
 
"What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they 
acted, the normal capacities, physical or mental, for doing what the law 
requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to 
exercise these capacities. Where these capacities and opportunities are 
absent ... the moral protest is that it is morally wrong to punish because 
'he could not have helped it' or 'he could not have done otherwise' or 'he 
had no real choice.'"
63
 
 
In a sense, such an agent acts involuntarily and their conduct can be put down to the 
existence of an excusatory element: with the absence of "meaningful choice there can 
be no blame and ought to be no liability or punishment."
64
 An excused agent commits a 
                                           
63 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 'Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility' 152 
M. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) Chapter 13: Choice Character & 
Excuse 554, "One relates to the equipment of the actor: does he have sufficient choosing capacity to be 
responsible? The other relates to the situation in which the actor finds himself: does that situation present him with 
a fair chance to use his capacities for choice so as to give effect to his decision?" 
64 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 81 
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wrongful act, the excuse only works to show why we should not blame the agent and 
does not seek to add value to the quality of the act as a justification does.
65
 Excuses 
can, however, also be relied upon when an agent makes a mistake of fact.
66
 As will be 
shown, provocation does not lead to an absence of capacity or opportunity, nor does it 
fall under a mistake of fact.
67
 Provocation is not a conventional excuse and does not fall 
under the definition set out by Hart as it only works as a form of mitigation, the agent is 
still blamed and punished albeit less severely.
68
 
 
i) absence of capacity 
An excuse based on the absence of capacity would show that the agent did not have the 
capability to make a meaningful choice, without this no blame can be attributed. For 
example, application of the M'Naghten
69
 rules would show that the agent's choice is not 
one which blame can be associated with; the act is the sort which we can condemn but 
the candidate's capacity means that he is fully excused (or possibly exempt from 
criminal responsibility). 
 
In provocation the agent has capacity to make the decision to do otherwise. The external 
conduct is perceived by D to be provocative, therefore D makes judgements of 
wrongdoing, and this perception creates a sense of injustice and anger.
70
 Emotions in 
the provocation defence are not seen to incapacitate the agent.
71
 Moore highlights that 
the extent which emotions are included in a choice theory of excuse is problematic and 
states that there are concerns that by "recognising fears, cravings, instinctual desires, 
                                           
65 The language of justification relates to the act (n13). 
66 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 83, "the actor should not be punished because in fact he or 
she has acted in a way that anyone else would have acted in the same situation. That is, the actor's mistake is 
reasonable; any reasonable person would have made the same mistake." 
67 Mistake of fact is often relevant but is incorporated into the test by judging the agent from the facts that they 
honestly believed in. For example, in the US case of State v Yanz 74 Conn 177, 50 A 37 (1901) D found his wife in a 
forest with another man and D killed the man finding this provocative, however, it was disputed over whether they 
were actually engaging in an affair. 
68 H.L.A. Hart acknowledges this, see (n2). 
69 (1843) 10 C&F 200, 8 ER 718: an agent may only be found insane if there is a defect of reason emanating from a 
disease of the mind causing an agent to be unaware of the nature and quality of his act or causing an agent not to 
know that his act was wrong. 
70 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 60 
71 This and emotions in provocation cases will be more fully discussed later on in 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element'. 
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strong passions, or other internal states as excuses unduly reduces one's true 
responsibility."
72
 An emotion like anger in a normal person should not have the impact of 
completely overriding their choosing system and such anger may actually be seen as a 
guiding emotion and ought to be controlled: 
 
"Our emotions are both products and causes of the judgements we make 
as we decide what to do. When we get angry, for example, our anger can 
itself be caused by judgement ... Such anger reflects our judgement that 
something immoral has just taken place. Further, such anger at unjust 
treatment need not make reasoned choice more difficult. It may instead 
make choice easier by highlighting what we otherwise might have 
missed."
73
 
 
The criminal law recognises that anger in provocation cases does not take away the 
agent's intent.
74
 Also, provocation can help to show the desire of the agent, to strike his 
provoker, therefore provocation can be seen to "magnify" the intent rather than "negate" 
it.
75
 
 
The pre-2009 defence required a loss of self-control but still acknowledged that the 
agent retained a sufficient level control.
76
 More accurately, it is only a partial loss of self-
control that is required for provocation
77
 and the agent is seen to have sufficient control 
                                           
72 M. Moore, Placing Blame 556 
73 Ibid 559 
74 If D, for example, loses their self-control owing to inadequate provocation it will be murder and this requires 
intent. 
As has been demonstrated though, the defence had been previously interpreted as removing intent. See 'Chapter 1 
- The Early Defence' (n72-5). 
75 J. Dressler, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion' 462: "Provocation not only causes anger; it motivates the actor to want to 
kill the provoker. Proof, then, of adequate provocation does not negative intent. It magnifies it." 
In South Africa, since Mokonto (1971) 2 SA 319(A), evidence of provocation is acknowledged to have two differing 
consequences: it can either remove intent, and mean D is likely to be liable for culpable homicide, or confirm it (for 
more on the South African law see (n9)). 
76 Phillips [1969] 2 AC 130, 137-8 (Lord Diplock): the argument that "there is no intermediate stage between icy 
detachment and going berserk" is "false". See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n24). 
77 J. Dressler, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion' 466 
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over his choice.
78
 Below, this partial loss of self-control concept and the relationship 
between emotion and D's capacity helps to establish partial excuse as the foundation for 
the defence. 
 
ii) absence of opportunity 
Excuses which focus on the absence of capacity involve looking at psychological 
matters whereas excuses which focus on the absence of fair opportunity involve looking 
at objective constraints.
79
 There must be a factor which is substantial to excuse an 
agent. Using Hart's definition,
80
 the circumstance must have prevented the agent from 
exercising his own free choice to the extent that he is free of blame ('he could not have 
done otherwise' or 'he had no real choice'), therefore, Moore is correct to state that it 
must be that "[o]ur opportunities to avoid wrongful action are not unfairly diminished 
simply because they are diminished."
81
 Duress is a clear example of such a case, where 
the agent's own choice to do otherwise is being unfairly diminished through the threat of 
harm, the agent cannot be blamed as his ability to make "meaningful choices" are 
"dramatically reduced".
82
 
 
Provocation is to do with emotion creating the motivation for retribution.
83
 If it was 
argued that the wrongful conduct was the source of an unfair opportunity to choose, 
equivalent to the threat in duress, then it would be necessary to see that there is some 
                                           
78 W.N. Renke, 'Calm Like a Bomb' 760. The author contrasts automatism and provocation (partial loss of self-
control) to show that D does act with choice and has sufficient capacity in order to be partially blamed: "Although 
the influence of emotion is very strong, it cannot have made choice impossible." 
In German law excessive self-defence is viewed as being a full excuse, s33 of the German Criminal Code reads: "A 
person who exceeds the limits of self-defence out of confusion, fear or terror shall not be held criminally liable." 
Pedain explains that a "a criminal conviction would be inappropriate in view of the pressure with which the agent 
was confronted" (see Law Commission (2003), 'The Law of Murder: Overseas Comparative Studies' Consultation 
Paper No 173, A. Pedain, 'Intentional Killings: The German Law' 2). However, this, obviously, does not lead to an 
absence of capacity akin to what has been discussed and ought to be viewed as a partial excuse as it is more like a 
difficulty act to a standard, see section iii). 
79 M. Moore, Placing Blame 561: "fair opportunity is not measured by his psychological difficulties, but rather by the 
objective facts of the matter. Objectively D2 had a fair opportunity not to rob the bank, even if subjectively he 
experienced it as a hard choice." 
80 (n63) 
81 M. Moore, Placing Blame 560 
82 J. Dressler, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion' 461 
83 See (n70), where the impact of emotion is discussed. 
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level of compulsion to retaliate and this is not the case. In this sense, there is no direct 
link between the provocation and the retaliation, it is a process which takes place for D 
to feel provoked.
84
 In duress the agent's choice is substantially limited by the threat. In 
England and Wales duress is unavailable as a defence for murder and it is probably 
because the agent has some choice.
85
 This is an uncomfortable situation as the criminal 
law should not ask too much of citizens, but for murder this is being balanced with the 
importance with which we place on human life; as long as the agent has an opportunity, 
no matter how much it is reduced, he is required not to kill an innocent. It is asked of the 
threatened agent that he acts 'heroically' and accept the harm rather than carrying out 
the killing.
86
 A provoked agent has the choice not to kill too, but the objective 
circumstances provide no reason why he lacks a fair opportunity; it is a mixture of 
emotional difficulty and a desire to retaliate which drives the killing. 
 
iii) partial excuse 
Provocation is a partial defence so it is not surprising that it does not fit into such 
definitions. When an agent is partially excused he is still to blame albeit to a lesser 
degree, the reason is not strong enough to exonerate but works to show why he should 
not face the normal level of blame and punishment.
87
 This is why Hart's description of 
provocation as a type of formal mitigation works because a partial defence is essentially 
a matter of mitigation.
88
 The reason why a partial excuse should be considered is that it 
makes a lesser but fairly substantial impact on choice. Unlike justifications, which have 
an all-or-nothing quality, there is no reason why excuses are unable to recognise 
                                           
84 (n70) 
85 A. P. Simester & G. R. Sullivan et al, Simester and Sullivan's Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (4th ed, Hart 
Publishing, 2010) 736: "the decision to commit the crime is a product of deliberation. It is her choice, albeit a 
constrained choice." 
86 J. Dressler, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion' 463: "With duress, only Actor's choice-opportunities are reduced. As such, 
we demand that the unlucky Actor accept his unenviable choices, and make the morally 'right' decision, to die or 
turn upon the coercer. He is capable of making such a decision." 
87 Proportionality in blame and punishment of provocation cases was introduced earlier on to demonstrate the 
reason behind partial defences (n4). 
88 (n2-3) 
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degrees of blameworthiness as the ability for the actor to make a choice can be reduced 
even if it is not eroded entirely.
89
 
 
In provocation D intentionally kills another with capacity and a fair opportunity to do 
otherwise, yet a defence has traditionally been available. The reason behind this, for 
some time,
90
 has been that provocation has been viewed as a concession to human 
frailty, a general human frailty that individuals in exceptional circumstances form strong 
emotions when they are wronged which impact on their ability to control themselves and 
the sense of injustice can motivate them to react and kill. As discussed, it is expected 
that citizens maintain their self-control but in such circumstances it is recognised that it is 
often difficult to do so and would ask a lot of the individual to curb this impulse.
91
 
Therefore, mitigation is offered and it is the role of the objective limb to link the emotion 
in the circumstances of a provocation case to these standards. The objective limb is an 
evaluative element which must distinguish between emotions which are deserving of 
mitigation from emotions which are not. The elements of the defence come together to 
show that sufficient provocation causes a difficulty to do otherwise. The agent still faces 
blame because even though it is difficult he should have shown greater restraint: "choice 
is not impossible but practically very difficult."
92
 
 
It still needs to be explained why human frailty is recognised. The reason for a 
provocation defence is essentially that it allows for the acknowledgement of emotions in 
situations where it is known that it is difficult for a person to act with normal restraint. 
Human frailty means that D acted wrongly but acted like anyone else might have done: 
                                           
89 D.N. Husak, 'Partial Defences' 170: "a partial excuse reduces the blame of the agent who performs the act – but 
not to a degree sufficient to preclude liability altogether." 
Cf. Garvey argues that partial excuses cannot exist: "... the idea of a partial incapacity is incoherent. With respect to 
any particular task at any particular point in time an actor either does or does not have the capacity to accomplish 
the task." (S.P. Garvey, 'Passion's Puzzle' (2005) 90 Iowa LR 1677, 1705) 
The basis for partial excuses has and will continue to be discussed in this section. This basis does recognise that D 
has the capacity to do otherwise. 
90 It has been discussed, in Part I, how the defence was previously about responding with honour to affronts and 
how this basis changed to be human frailty. 
91 (n6-8) 
92 W.N. Renke, 'Calm Like a Bomb' 760 
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"the human courier is accompanied by the luggage of imperfection."
93
 It is that D "act[ed] 
unreasonably when presented with a substantial provocation"
94
 and this is 
"understandable, though still reprehensible".
95
 All this means that proportionality 
demands that a case of provocation needs to be distinguished from murder and a partial 
excuse allows for this on a basis which is appropriate in relation to the circumstances. 
There are four important points which lead from this. 
 
Common human frailty 
Firstly, the defence is about common human frailty, when a defence is about individual 
weaknesses it rests on completely different foundations and that is the basis of 
diminished responsibility.
96
 A common human frailty can only be found when the 
expected level of self-control is consistent with that of an ordinary person, yet there are 
characteristics which can be considered, such as D's age, which enhance and do not 
compromise the test's ability to compare D to the ordinary standard.
97
 Also, the 
relationship between the objective and subjective elements is highlighted when 
discussing common human frailty, the difficulty that D faces when being provoked is not 
sufficient to warrant mitigation without it being a difficulty that all people may experience. 
 
There are arguments that a subjective element alone could be the basis for 
provocation.
98
 In that case the defence would merely be providing mitigation for anger 
and extreme emotions and there would be no need to judge D by the ordinary standards 
which society expects, in terms of controlling these passions and only responding when 
                                           
93 K. Bennardo, 'Of Ordinariness and Excuse: Heat-Of-Passion and the Seven Deadly Sins' (2007) 36 Cap ULR 675, 678 
94 R.G. Fontaine, 'The Wrongfulness Of Wrongly Interpreting Wrongfulness: Provocation, Interpretational Bias, And 
Heat Of Passion Homicide' (2009) 12 NCLR 1, 69, 75 
95 L.J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense 
(1985-1986) 33 UCLA LR 1679, 1679 
96 This is an important point and will be discussed throughout 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'. 
97 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 205 (Lord Hobhouse): "they are not factors which qualify the criterion of 
ordinariness." See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n69-89). 
98 J.K. Weber, 'Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary Manslaughter Law', (1981) 10 Comm L World R 159, 160: "It 
must be remembered that we are speaking of a man who is excited out of reason, and who has perpetrated the act 
in an abnormal state of mind ... 
All in all, though with an attitude of caution, it seems possible to conclude that heat of passion alone would be 
justification for reducing an offence from murder to voluntary manslaughter." 
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the provocation is severe. The common human frailty basis for the defence shows how 
important making these judgements are and the defence should not exist without them.
99
 
 
Focus on D 
Secondly, whilst the act is condemned it must be acknowledged that the defence is 
about understanding, and maybe even showing a degree of compassion and sympathy, 
for the circumstances D was in. When discussing this it needs to be clear that the 
language establishes this and does not justify. For example, Nourse states that 
provocation "condemns the killings, but with sympathy for the defendant's situation"
100
 
but then goes on to state that "[it] is not simply a claim for sympathy; it is a claim of 
authority and a demand for our concurrence."
101
 When the role of warrant and 
justification is discussed in relation to the gravity test it is about ensuring that it is 
possible to understand why D got angry, D is saying: 'I was angry for a substantial 
reason. I know I was wrong but you can understand why I felt like that at the time'. It will 
be advanced that warranted emotion has a role in the defence but it needs to be 
expressed carefully, not as, for example, to blame the victim.
102
 
 
Expected level of behaviour 
Thirdly, human frailty extends only as far as provocation and does not provide a basis for 
revenge killings, so, for example, when retaliation is substantially delayed it is less 
                                           
99 V. Bergelson, 'Justification or Excuse? Exploring the Meaning of Provocation' (2009-2010) 42 Tex Tech LR 307, 
314: "The fact that the law asks not only how badly the actor was distressed, but also why he was so badly 
distressed, implies that the rationale for the defense lies in the source of provocation, not merely in the resulting 
emotional disturbance." 
T. Macklem & J. Gardner, 'Provocation and Pluralism' (2001) 64 MLR 6 815, 819: "An excuse for an angry action, qua 
angry, depends on the justification of the anger itself. Even in the realm of excuse, therefore, the analysis is moral 
and not merely causal, for the question of the justification of the anger (and hence the excuse of the angry action) is 
a moral question. Those who take the opposite view fall into the trap of confusing excuses with denials of 
responsibility. People who are not responsible for their actions admittedly face no justificatory questions." 
100 V. Nourse, 'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense', (1997) Yale LJ Vol 106, No 5, 
1331, 1331 
101 Ibid 1393 
102 A point discussed above (n32-5). 
Warranted emotion will be discussed later in this Chapter (n113-28). 
Chapter 3 - Rationale    77 
 
certain that D acted whilst provoked.
103
 Bennardo has stated, with regards to delay and 
temporal issues, that the defence sets "aspirational limitation[s], focusing on how 
humans should act ... rather than how humans do act" and this is "effectively removing 
entire 'passions' from protection".
104
 The defence does set standards of behaviour that 
people have to meet, but these standards, rather than being "aspirational", need to be 
about ensuring that the killing can be somewhat understood and are therefore realistic 
standards of expected behaviour. Normal people are able to control themselves to an 
extent
105
 and the human frailty level is the point where it becomes possible to 
sympathise with D for reacting.
106
 
Proportionality 
Finally, understandable anger from a common human frailty may be the basis but the 
link between human frailty and intentionally killing another could be viewed as being 
unclear: 
 
"it may be morally understandable that defendants lose their self-control; 
but the 'naturalness' of the relationship between this loss of self-control 
and the consequent deliberate infliction of harm is morally much more 
contentious."
107
 
 
By basing the defence in human frailty it requires a finding that ordinary people find the 
decision not to kill more difficult when substantially provoked.
108
 The pre-2009 defence 
found that people can partially lose their self-control at these times and act irrationally or, 
as Fontaine states,
109
 "unreasonably". It is not inaccurate to state that it is expected or 
understood that people can lose their temper, show less restraint or maybe lose control 
                                           
103 See quote from R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 at 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n31). 
104 K. Bennardo, 'Of Ordinariness and Excuse' 682 
105 (n6-8) 
106 This is to do with the objective element, in setting the correct standard, and the subjective test, in ensuring it 
embraces all provocation cases where human frailty is present. These issues will be discussed in the relevant 
chapters of Part II. 
How to construct a test for ordinary standards for self-control will be explored in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'. 
107 J. Horder, 'Autonomy, Provocation and Duress' (1992) Crim LR 706, 711 
108 (n89-95) 
109 (n94) 
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when they have been wronged by another and, following on from this, to provide 
mitigation to a substantial offence, like manslaughter, is not inappropriate as it 
recognises proportionality and the distinction from murder. For there to be a partial 
defence which rests on the basis of killing owing to anger there needs to be a strong 
reason and human frailty provides this and, also, limits its reach. 
 
d) the type of partial excuse 
i) three alternatives 
Provocation is a partial excuse owing to its ability to produce an impact on the agent's 
choice, when provoked there is a difficulty in making the decision not to respond 
violently. However, the defence rests on more than anger and extreme emotion as its 
links to a common human frailty demonstrate and the basis for why D got into this state 
must rest on something substantial. What should give the defence standing is that in 
evaluating the gravity of the provocation the views of society on the seriousness of 
wrongs and insults are essential in making this judgement. Therefore, it is the 
relationship between the subjective and objective elements which provides the footing 
for the partial excuse.
110
 
 
There are three formulations of a partial excuse which could be adopted which are the 
most compelling as they would satisfy the necessary subjective and objective 
requirements of a provocation defence, however each promotes a different view of the 
defence. The pre-2009 provocation defence followed the excusable loss of self-control 
approach, it focused on D's mental state, his loss of self-control, but still required that an 
ordinary person too would have been provoked. Chapter 2 outlines how the Homicide 
Act 1957 was interpreted removed any element of justification in the defence and how 
the objective criteria came through a reasonable/ordinary person test. The flaws with the 
excusable loss of self-control approach will be discussed throughout the remainder of 
Part II as it provides the foundation for critiquing of the pre-2009 defence. 
 
                                           
110 The essential elements of a provocation defence will explored in each of the remaining chapters in Part II. 
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The other two formulations which could be adopted for a provocation defence, warranted 
loss of self-control
111
 and warranted excuse,
112
 will be introduced here but will be 
discussed in more depth in Parts III and IV as requiring warranted emotion has been the 
basis for the reform of provocation and, also, it is the approach that will be advanced. 
These approaches require that beyond the mental state and the control test what 
constitutes valid provocation, in the gravity test, ought to be justifiable. These 
approaches differ on the subjective limb but they seek to raise the standard by 
demanding severe provocation, in this manner, from the perspective of society. 
 
ii) separation of the act and the emotion 
Justificatory language, with regards to provocation, has a flaw in that it naturally focuses 
on the conduct, showing that the killing has greater value than an ordinary killing. As has 
been demonstrated,
113
 such language should not be associated with provocation; 
showing that a killing was provoked adds no value to the conduct and the value of V's 
life is not altered by wronging D.
114
 A provoked killing must find its basis in a partial 
excuse as the agent's behaviour is neither justifiable nor fully excusable. It is possible, 
though, to separate the act and the emotion and to rely upon a warranted emotion 
standard in the gravity test whilst maintaining partial excuse as the rationale for the 
defence. 
 
Nourse has outlined a theory of warranted excuse for the provocation defence. For this 
to work the act, which is wrongful, needs to be separated from the emotion, which is 
                                           
111 Warranted loss of self-control – this formulation requires that there is a loss of control but is more focused on 
the objective questions, the loss of self-control must come from a justifiable source. This is seems to reflect the 
basis for the reform of provocation in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (see 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' & 
'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009'). 
112 Warranted excuse – without a strong subjective element, requiring that the agent was merely provoked and that 
this stemmed from a justifiable source. This seems to reflect the basis for the Law Commission's proposal (see 
'Chapter 7 - Law Commission') and the approach that will be advanced throughout. 
113 (n29-31) 
114 J. Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion 458: "Put simply, we value life too much to justify, even partially, a 
person's death, on the grounds of that individual's immoral conduct." 
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justified,
115
 for example, "my reacting angrily towards a colleague might be justified, but 
not my kicking him".
116
 D may have legitimate reasons to feel anger or fear but the use 
of violence must be labelled as excessive. If D's anger is warranted it allows 
acknowledgment of why D acted as he did but at the same time allows for condemnation 
of the killing: 
 
"the degree to which one's emotions or feelings are justifiable have no 
bearing on the justifiability of the behavior which said emotions may inspire 
... justifiable emotions do not (and cannot) make otherwise wrongful 
behaviors justifiable."
117
 
 
Therefore, even though this brand of partial excuse uses the words 'justifiable' and/or 
'warrant' it is only in reference to the emotion and does not alter how the act ought to be 
viewed.
118
 
 
Neither is requiring warranted emotion another way of expressing a partial justification; it 
does not seek to alter the value of the conduct, nor blame V for provoking D.
119
 The 
purpose of using the warranted emotion in the gravity test is to raise the standard in a 
                                           
115 V. Nourse, 'Passion's Progress' 1338: "we are evaluating the defendant's emotional claims, not his acts. In this 
world, it is perfectly consistent to say that the act is unjustified overall and, at the same time, that the emotion may 
be 'warranted'." 
At 1390: it is "a theory that speaks explicitly to the reasons why defendants claim that they have killed." 
Also, at 1393: "protecting emotion does not require us to protect the deed." 
116 S, Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide 13 
117 R. G. Fontaine, 'Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification' (2009) Arizona Legal 
Studies, Paper 08-07, 22 
C.B. Hessick, 'Is an Act Reasonableness Inquiry Necessary?' in P.H. Robinson, S.P. Garvey & K.K. Ferzan (ed), Criminal 
Law Conversations (Oxford University Press, 2009) 434, 435: "By asking jurors to determine to determine whether 
the intensity of a defendant's emotion was reasonable, rather than whether the defendant's action was reasonable, 
we might receive more palatable juror verdicts". 
118 V. Nourse, 'Passion's Progress' 1394: "Indeed ... we may easily say that  passionate killings are not justified even 
if we believe that the emotions causing some killings are, in some sense, the 'right' emotion." 
C. Lee, 'Reasonable Provocation and Self-defence: Recognizing the Distinction Between Act Reasonableness and 
Emotion Reasonableness' in P.H. Robinson, S.P. Garvey & K.K. Ferzan (ed), Criminal Law Conversations (Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 427, 427: there is "a difference between reasonable emotions (fear, anger, outrage) and 
reasonable action ... this does not mean that acting on that emotion by using deadly force is also reasonable." 
119 (n32-35) 
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way which is consistent with the common human frailty understanding. The flaws of 
using the ordinary person standard, as the pre-2009 defence did, will be discussed in 
the following chapters, but, put briefly, the defence was not able to reflect the views of 
society on the seriousness of provocations. For a common human frailty to be properly 
recognised it requires a warranted emotion from D, it must be that the stimulus is severe 
in nature from the outlook of society and thereby such an emotional response could be 
commonly felt. 
 
It also must be made clear that an enquiry into the severity of D's emotion is essential, a 
killing in revenge, for example, could not be mitigated on the basis of a warranted 
excuse. Human frailty does not occur if the emotion does influence D and impact on his 
choice: the warranted of the emotion, tested in the gravity test, must have brought about 
the provoked anger, tested in the subjective test. It is the subjective test where the 
fundamental differences between proposals for reform, which will be discussed in Parts 
III and IV, lie. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 requires warranted emotions and a 
loss of self-control. This approach works under the framework discussed, but it is simply 
that the end result is a loss of self-control. The approach which will be advanced finds 
that a greater set of responses to warranted emotion should be permitted within the 
defence; killing in fear would be consistent with the basis of the defence and killing in 
different types of anger, for example, in outrage, could be permissible.
120
 
 
iii) framing warranted emotion 
An important issue is how to frame the question in the defence. A definition of warrant 
which can be embraced has been provided by Baker and Zhao in their discussion of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009: 
 
"the defendant's sense of being seriously wronged must be one that 
accords with contemporary society's norms and values. In other words, it 
must be shown that a normal person in contemporary Britain would have 
                                           
120 It will be argued that the loss of self-control requirement, even if it includes provisions for delay, limits the scope 
of the defence too narrowly to spontaneous reactions in anger, see 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element'. 
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felt seriously wronged in the same situation. This is judged according to 
the normative standards of a normal person communally situated in 
Britain."
121
 
 
Also, Yeo stated that the 2009 Act requires "an objective test based on contemporary 
community values and standards by which to measure the provocation".
122
 What is key 
is that the standard not only raises the bar but that it is representative so that it properly 
tracks the views of society and that it is flexible enough for change to be recognised. 
Furthermore, it needs to enable the jury to express the views of society but be put in the 
exact circumstances which D faced in order to properly assess the gravity and the 
nature of what occurred.
123
 Chapter 5 will contain a more detailed explanation of the 
gravity test and will demonstrate that this outlook builds on the positive developments 
which were made to contextualise events in the pre-2009 defence but remedies the 
flaws of assessing the severity of the provocation by an ordinary standard. 
 
Warranted emotion is about trying to reflect what is generally thought to be a substantial 
provocation and therefore finding in what circumstances it is acceptable to get angry. It 
is firstly an objective test but there is no reason for why it should not require D to feel 
that in acting out the retaliation he was correct to feel such an emotion;
124
 in fact, it 
should be that the emotion is driven by D's own feelings of warrant. Therefore, it is 
advanced that the warranted emotion enquiry should contain an objective and a 
subjective element in order to ensure that D was provoked by something which was 
substantial in accordance with the views of society and that he understood the severity 
of the circumstances and this informed his decision; thereby meaning that his choice 
was made more difficult by something which he understood to be substantial. This would 
                                           
121 D.J. Baker & L.X. Zhao, ' Contributory Qualifying and Non-Qualifying Triggers in the Loss of Control Defence: A 
Wrong Turn on Sexual Infidelity' (2012) 76 JCL 254, 262 
122 S. Yeo, 'English Reform of Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Whither Singapore?' (2010) Sing JLS 177, 
183 
123 The gravity test will be discussed further in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' and this will explore how to include 
response characteristics and how to build on the developments made in Camplin. 
124 In Part III it will be discussed how the trigger in the 2009 Act does not require that D believes that he was 
warranted in feeling the emotion. 
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underline the defence's excusatory footing as by creating this link, which shows that the 
circumstances motivated his decision-making, the impact which the stimulus made on 
his choice is guaranteed. Such a requirement would also respect the relationship which 
the objective and subjective elements ought to share, that they feed into each other in 
order to provide a suitable basis for mitigation. 
 
Much the discussion on the reform of provocation will be about how efforts have been 
made to create exclusions and in Part IV the use of exclusions and presumptions will be 
suggested. Dressler has made an important point regarding the differences in dealing 
with justifications and excuses in provocation. Basically, if provocation is a justification 
then it is proper to set categories which include or exclude certain types of provocations, 
however, if it is an excuse then decisions such as these need to made in a 
reasonableness test: 
 
"It is entirely appropriate for the legislature, as society's representative, to 
determine which classes of killing are less undesirable than the usual 
homicide, and to codify those judgments. If heat of passion is a 
justification, then it is appropriate for the legislature to adopt clear lines 
determining what is adequate provocation ... Under an excuse theory ... 
the issue is whether the actor lived up to a standard of how 'reasonable' 
people act. Although a legislature may properly codify an objective 
excusing component, it is more plausible to leave its definition (ie., what is 
adequate provocation) to jurors, who represent that objective standard."
125
 
 
The question is over how a defence based on a partial excuse but requiring warranted 
emotion should deal with categories of disagreeable cases. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 9, the 2009 Act, which has an objective warranted emotion standard, contains 
exclusions for provocations based on sexual infidelity and certain self-inducement 
cases. As the defence rests on this basis there is no reason why specific exclusions 
cannot be set out which limit the scope of the defence but only if they contradict the 
                                           
125 J. Dressler, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion' 446-7 
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warranted emotion standard; these exclusions must, however, be indisputable. The 
exclusion for self-induced provocation works because of how it is phrased,
126
 it only 
excludes when D's "purpose" is to use the inducement as a reason to feel 'provoked'. 
This exclusion is incontrovertible but there are 'broader' cases of self-induced 
provocation which are rightly not covered by this exclusion and for those the question 
ought to be, and is, left to the jury.
127
 The sexual infidelity exclusion,
128
 on the other 
hand, could be disputed as much depends on the facts of the case; if D is subjected to 
repeated taunts on the subject then such an exclusion would be harsh and leaves the 
potential for deserving cases to be excluded without them being tested in the normal 
gravity test. 
 
Conclusion 
The provocation defence must rest on a partial excuse. Provocation does not work to 
justify the conduct, even partially, and it does not excuse the individual as capacity and 
opportunity of choice are in place. Provocation creates a difficulty in choice and links to a 
common human frailty in such circumstances gives the defence grounding as the 
defence can only be recognised when society would find that the conduct which D faced 
could be deemed to be provocation. The use of the warranted emotion standard, rather 
than the ordinary person test, is consistent with partial excuse and better reflects what 
ought to be required in the gravity test.
129
 
 
The aim of this Chapter was to broadly discuss the rationale of the provocation defence 
in order to aid the discussion in Parts III and IV, but to also pinpoint what form of partial 
excuse the pre-2009 defence rested upon so that the consequences of this can be 
appreciated in the rest of Part II. At the beginning of the Chapter it was stated that the 
Law Commission's criticism, that the rationale of the pre-2009 defence was "elusive", 
was incorrect;
130
 the pre-2009 defence was based on the excusable loss of self-control 
                                           
126 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n153-65) 
127 Ibid (n160) 
128 Ibid (n112) 
129 This will be further discussed in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'. 
130 (n1) 
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rationale and the requirements of the defence were ultimately interpreted in that 
manner.
131
 The problem was that this rationale was the wrong form of partial defence for 
provocation to rest upon. In the rest of Part II will be shown that not all of pre-2009 
defence's problems stemmed from its rationale but that this gave it the structure 
whereby the views of society on the seriousness of provocations could not be properly 
applied and that it limited the scope of the defence to killings which took place whilst D 
suffered a loss of self-control even though provoked reactions have the potential to be 
much broader. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
131 See, for example, the way in which misdirected provocation (in R v Porritt [1961] 1 WLR 1372) and indirect 
provocation (in R v Davies [1975] QB 691) were dealt with at (n37-42). 
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CHAPTER 4 
ADEQUATE PROVOCATION 
In order to successfully rely on the pre-2009 provocation defence D had to show that he 
was "provoked". This could be "by things done or by things said or by both together".
1
 It 
is therefore necessary to understand what exactly constitutes being provoked as the 
Homicide Act 1957 invalidated any other situation where a loss of self-control occurred. 
By properly defining and understanding the impact of the word 'provoked' it brings out a 
key flaw in the pre-2009 law. If D showed that he was provoked into losing his self-
control, both subjective requirements, then the defence had to go to the jury and this will 
be referred to as the sufficient evidence test.
2
 It will be advanced that the judge was not 
able to act effectively as a filter and the defence dealt with cases which it should not 
have. This ultimately led to the Law Commission's criticism that "blameless or trivial" 
conduct was allowed to be the basis for the defence.
3
 
 
This looks into the role of the judge. It will be advanced that the judge should only permit 
the defence to be presented to the jury where there is evidence that the subjective 
element is satisfied and D faced provocation, rather than he merely felt provoked. One 
outlook, which was commonly proposed in light of the problems with the pre-2009 
defence,
4
 was that the judge should be given greater powers to control the defence at 
the expense of the jury, however it will be argued that this goes against the main 
purpose of the 1957 Act and such concerns are just as valid today.
5
 The main objective 
elements,
6
 the gravity test and the control test, are questions which ought to be left to 
the jury. The role of the judge, therefore, ought to be to test if the circumstances of 
provocation have arisen, but it is up to the jury to evaluate D's claim. 
                                           
1 s3 Homicide Act 1957 
2 The sufficient evidence test was discussed at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n83-89) and 'Chapter 2 - The Post-
1957 Defence' (n7-11) 
3 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 46 [3.65]. See 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' 
(n2). 
4 W. Gorman, 'Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence' (1999) 42 Crim LQ 478, 484: a "significant threshold test 
should be imposed". 
5 The aims of the 1957 Act in giving the jury greater power over the judge were outlined at 'Chapter 1 - The Early 
Defence' (n81) and 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n7-11). 
6 The gravity and control tests will be explored in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'. 
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How the sufficient evidence test is defined is highly significant as it sets the scope for 
what sort of cases can fall into the defence and how much control a judge will have. With 
regards to the pre-2009 defence there are three important questions on this matter: 
Could emotions other than anger provoke? Did what provoked D have to be provocative 
by society's standard? Is all that provokes D deserving of consideration? By answering 
these questions it gives greater understanding as to why the provocation defence 
needed reform and what shape a reform should take. 
 
a) could emotions other than anger provoke? 
Ashworth states that the wording of the Homicide Act 1957 means that a "loss of self-
control caused by fear, panic or mental instability cannot be brought within the defence 
of provocation"
7
 and this is because these causes fall outside what it is to be provoked.
8
 
With this understanding, anger was the sole emotion which the defence was concerned. 
As will be discussed further,
9
 the question as to whether D felt provoked is subjective, 
this means that all that is being examined here is whether D can actually be provoked by 
an emotion other than anger, not whether it can cause a loss of self-control or whether it 
is of sufficient gravity. 
 
Being provoked could conceivably be interpreted to cover a wider set of circumstances; 
the word 'provoked' holds connotations with something drawing out the emotion of anger 
but it could interpreted as being comparable to 'causing' or 'giving rise to' if it were seen 
as an equivalent to 'incite' or 'evoke'. Therefore, as Gough states, 'provoked' could 
simply mean the giving of a "reason" for a response.
10
 If A is said to provoke B it would 
                                           
7 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' (1976) 35(2) Cambridge Law Journal 292, 297 
8 Accott [1997] 2 Cr App R 94, 102 (Lord Steyn): a "loss of self-control caused by fear, panic, sheer bad temper or 
circumstances ... would not be enough." 
9 See the section entitled 'Did what provoked D have to be provocative by society's standard?' 
10 S. Gough, 'Taking the Heat out of Provocation' (1999) 19 OJLS 481, 481: "The defence has always been associated 
with anger, although the ordinary meaning of the word provocation is not bound to that emotion: conduct that may 
provoke anger can as easily provoke fear, laughter or hatred, just as it can provoke unemotional responses like 
thought or conversation. Provocative conduct simply gives others reason to respond in some way, and it is an 
interest in the reasons for which defendants reacted rather than their emotional state that characterizes many of 
the earliest provocation cases." 
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most commonly be thought that A caused B to be angry, but with this understanding it 
could just as easily mean that A stirred another emotion or response, such as fear, in B. 
If it were accepted that D could be provoked into other emotions then all that is required 
is that the defence embraces these other emotions. Against this, the history of the 
defence tells us that provocation is about anger and ordinary responses to it, it is 
therefore not consistent with the historical context of the defence that fear or despair are 
valid as being able to provoke.
11
 
 
Another view could be that there was a growing will to include fear as a valid emotion
12
 
but that the loss of self-control requirement prevented this, and this is partly what 
motivated the Law Commission to modify the defence.
13
 In Smith (Morgan) Lord 
Hoffmann stated that "the law now recognises that the emotions which may cause loss 
of self-control are not confined to anger but may include fear and despair."
14
 As was 
discussed,
15
 the case was controversial and it was overruled, but that did not stem from 
this issue. The string of cases
16
 which involved 'battered women' and victims of long-
term abuse highlighted that the defence's focus on an anger-based version of loss of 
self-control led to victims who were fearful for their safety not being able to rely on the 
defence; these cases, such as Ahluwalia, demonstrate that the emotion of fear is not 
properly respected and when discussing the subjective element in Chapter 6 it will be 
highlighted that even though delay has been incorporated into the defence, in a fashion, 
it is essentially at odds with the concept of loss of self-control. It is therefore not certain 
                                           
11 For example, the four categories of provocation in the seventeenth century from Mawgridge (1707) Kel 119, at 
'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n26), were all to do with anger. 
12 L.J. Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense' 
(1985-1986) 33 UCLA LR 1679, 1682: "the legal definition of heat of passion should incorporate the reactive 
passions of fear and terror as fully as it includes the aggressive passion of rage in order to recognize a close 
relationship between heat-of-passion manslaughter and imperfect self-defense." 
13 Law Commission: Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) No304, 81 [5.18]: "In addition, the requirement of 
a loss of self-control has been widely criticised as privileging men's typical reactions to provocation over women's 
typical reactions. Women's reactions to provocation are less likely to involve a 'loss of self-control', as such, and 
more likely to be comprised of a combination of anger, fear, frustration and a sense of desperation. This can make it 
difficult or impossible for women to satisfy the loss of self-control requirement, even where they otherwise deserve 
at least a partial defence." 
14 R v Smith (Morgan), [2001] 1 AC 146, 168 
15 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n84-7) 
16 These cases, including R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889, will be discussed in the remaining chapters of Part II. 
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as to why fear and anger were not viewed as on par as it could be to do with fear not 
being seen as a valid emotion to provoke D or it could be to do with the fact that fear and 
the loss of self-control requirement were incompatible.
17
 
 
If a strict interpretation of the Homicide Act 1957 is made then Ashworth is probably 
correct to state the text would support anger being the sole emotion which ought to be 
considered, however as provocation remained a defence which was driven through the 
common law encapsulating social change it must be acknowledged that attempts were 
made to make such advances: "Fear, too, can undermine self-control ... Legal opinion is 
turning to recognize this."
18
 
 
b) did what provoked D have to be provocative? 
As D could be provoked "by things done or by things said or by both together" the span 
of 'provocative' conduct was great as anything had the potential to be considered. The 
enquiry into whether D was provoked was interpreted as being purely subjective.
19
 D 
had to demonstrate that the external event caused a judgement of wrongdoing creating 
a sense of injustice which led to the emotion,
20
 the defence was not concerned with the 
nature of the external event in deciding whether D felt provoked; there is no need to 
show that the 'provoker' acted unlawfully, intentionally provoked, that the provocation 
could be considered substantial or that V was the one who provoked D.
21
 However, 
there must have been evidence which showed that D felt provoked. 
 
As was outlined in Part I, the development of this position took place over a long period 
of time. In the seventeenth century only four categories of provocation existed
22
 and the 
                                           
17 S. Edwards, 'Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control', (2010) JCL 74.3, 223, 224: The 
provocation defence "prioritised anger as its clearest expression, [and] excluded anxiety, fear, panic and horror, as 
impassioned states somewhat outside the conventional sign/signifier of loss of self-control." 
18 R. Holton & S. Shute, 'Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence', (2007) 27 OJLS 1, 49, 72 
19 (n26-9) 
20 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1992) 60 
21 For example, in 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n14-21) it was discussed how misdirected retaliation and 
indirect provocation were allowed to be included. 
22 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n26) 
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language associated with the defence was that of partial justification as the focus was on 
near-proportionate retaliations relating to affronts of honour.
23
 However, as the defence 
developed into requiring a loss of self-control reasonableness eventually became the 
test for ensuring that provocation was not trivial.
24
 Therefore, the defence became more 
focused on the reasonableness of the loss of self-control and less on the nature of the 
provocation; this is consistent with the rationale being an excusable loss of self-control, 
the only objective criteria coming through the reasonable/ordinary person test.
25
 
 
An example which highlights the pre-2009 defence's position on merely requiring 
conduct that provoked D, no matter if it was severe provocation or natural and normal 
human behaviour on the part of the 'provoker', is the case of Doughty.
26
 A fatigued 
father, whose baby cried persistently, lost his temper and tried to silence his baby by 
covering the baby's head with cushions and kneeling on them. D claimed that he lost his 
self-control and it was found that even conduct as natural and normal as a baby crying 
had to be considered as being capable of provoking D as it merely had to be shown that 
there was a causal link between the conduct and the loss of self-control: 
 
"There is no doubt, and it is not in dispute, that there was here evidence 
upon which the appellant was – I use the word loosely 'provoked' to lose 
his self-control ... 
[T]here was evidence which linked causally the crying of the baby with the 
response of the appellant. Accordingly, in our view, it seems inevitable that 
that being so the section is mandatory and requires the learned judge to 
leave the issue of the objective test to the jury."
27
 
 
The case of Doughty not only demonstrated that any conduct can be interpreted as 
being capable of provoking D but also that once it was shown that there was evidence 
                                           
23 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n46-52) 
24 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n76-80) 
25 This was introduced at 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n110-2). 
26 R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319 
27 Ibid 326 (Stocker LJ) 
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that D lost his self-control owing to this the issue must have been left to the jury. If there 
was a causal link it does not matter if the judge was "strongly of the opinion that there is 
no basis for the defence"
28
 or, as Russell LJ stated, it was a jury question "however 
tenuous [the provocation] may be."
29
 Therefore, 'provoked' was viewed as the equivalent 
to 'cause'.
30
 
 
Some have suggested that the Homicide Act 1957 has been wrongly interpreted and the 
'provoked' requirement may have been able do more work, in terms of requiring 
'provocative' conduct rather than merely conduct. Ashworth has stated that if we pay 
"close attention to the wording" it shows us that the loss of self-control "must have been 
caused (in some sense) by provocation."
31
 Macklem and Gardner have gone on to 
assert that "the courts have increasingly suppressed the difference" between the 
meanings of the words 'provoked' and 'cause'
32
 and that the test for the jury is similar to 
seventeenth century provocation defence but simply less restrictive on what passes as 
provocation: 
 
"The jury still needed to ask itself, and still needs to ask itself today, much 
the same question that judges used to ask at common law: Were these 
deeds or words that caused the defendant to lose her self-control capable 
of amounting to provocation, such that she was not just caused but 
provoked to lose her self-control?"
33
 
 
There is therefore an argument to suggest that the wording of the Homicide Act 1957 
required that "there must at least have been something intelligible as a provocation".
34
 
Feeling provoked, however, is subjective. The interpretation of the 1957 Act was 
                                           
28 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 254 
29 R v Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752 
30 This ought to have made including fear as a valid emotion in the defence easier as if anger could cause a loss of 
self-control then all that should have needed to be shown was that fear could also cause such a response too, see 
(n10). 
31 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 297 
32 T. Macklem & J. Gardner, 'Provocation and Pluralism' (2001) 64 MLR 6 815, 818 
33 Ibid 819 
34 Ibid 820 
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consistent with the ordinary meaning of term; the test was not whether there was 
provocation in any objective sense but whether D felt wronged and this then went on to 
cause such an effect on D. The impact of this, as Doughty highlights, was that this 
provision did not provide much of a filter in the sufficient evidence test. With this 
disconnect, between provocation and the language used in the 1957 Act, the defence 
would better be described as being concerned with causes of a loss of self-control rather 
than provocation. 
 
c) is all that provokes D deserving of consideration? 
The discussion in Part I shows that the role of the judge was a significant issue and one 
which influenced the drafters of the 1957 Act.
35
 However, if all that provokes D into 
losing his self-control was allowed to be considered then it raises concerns as to 
whether this was the correct approach; there is force in the argument that not all which is 
capable of provoking D deserves mitigation and, not only this, but whether all such 
factors deserve to be considered at all. The problem was that the defence was able to 
become a platform for certain cases and whether they succeeded was wholly depended 
on the ordinary person test; there was no point in the sufficient evidence test where the 
nature of what provoked D could be tested to avoid the defence reaching so far. It is 
important to state that in this Chapter the emphasis of the criticism is not that the 
judiciary lost their power to exclude cases from the jury but that the sufficient evidence 
test did not relate to requiring provocation and therefore was unable to act as an 
appropriate filter. 
 
The solution is not simple if a strong role for the jury is going to be maintained. It is 
advanced that the jury ought to be the principle guardians of the objective element as 
the gravity and control tests are meant to represent the views of society on the issues of 
the severity of a provocative event and the expected level of self-control a citizen should 
display in the face of such provocation. In order for the defence to go to the jury it should 
be required that there is evidence that D experienced the emotion (the subjective 
element) and that this stemmed from provocation, not that D was merely provoked; the 
                                           
35 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n7-11) 
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phrase which Macklem and Gardener use, that there must be "something intelligible as a 
provocation",
36
 sums this up and shows that there ought to be an element of objectivity 
even at this stage. The set of cases below are some of the key problematic cases from 
the post-1957 defence and are examples of where what occurred may not be classified 
as provocation and therefore should not proceed to the jury under the approach which is 
advanced. 
 
i) self-induced provocation 
An area which demonstrated the problems with the pre-2009 defence was self-induced 
provocation. When D was provoked in such a fashion the case went to the jury in the 
same manner as if it were a normal case, the inducement of the provocation was merely 
a factor to be considered. There were conflicting judgments on this issue. In Edwards
37
 
D was attempting to blackmail V when V swore and attacked D with a knife inflicting 
several wounds. D wrestled the knife from V and stabbed him in a rage. The Privy 
Council stated that "a blackmailer cannot rely on the predictable results of his own 
blackmailing conduct" and in that case there was "[n]o authority" cited in favour of D.
38
 
However, it was stated that if V's conduct went to "extreme lengths" and this was beyond 
"a considerable degree of hostile reaction" in such a case then whether V's conduct 
could be considered as sufficient provocation would be "a question of degree to be 
decided by the jury".
39
 Therefore, the principle of this decision was that self-induced 
provocation could only be considered if V's response to the inducement went beyond 
what is reasonable. 
 
Following this, the case of Johnson
40
 demonstrates that under the pre-2009 defence if D 
was provoked owing to provocation which was self-induced this was valid. The main 
concern was not on the reason behind the anger but on whether the loss of self-control 
                                           
36 (n34). The advances made in Camplin, to give context to the circumstances that D was in, would apply to this test 
as well as the gravity test in the main objective element (See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n58-9). 
37 Edwards v The Queen [1973] AC 648 
38 Ibid 658 
39 Ibid 
40 [1989] 1 WLR 740 (see below for the facts of the case) 
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would be genuine and sufficient in such a case.
41
 On appeal,
42
 the literal interpretation of 
the Act revealed that self-induced provocation is not barred: 
 
"we find it impossible to accept that the mere fact that a defendant caused 
a reaction in others, which in turn led him to lose his self-control, should 
result in the issue of provocation being kept outside a jury's 
consideration."
43
 
 
The case moves away from the principle outlined in Edwards but this decision is 
consistent with the excusable loss of self-control rationale of the pre-2009 defence; it 
therefore led to the finding that the self-induced provocation cases should not be taken 
from the hands of the jury.
44
  
 
Johnson shows that self-induced provocation may cause a genuine loss of self-control 
and that the objective element can be interpreted as allowing it. Johnson also provides 
grounds for suggesting that there needs to be a stronger layer which ensures that not all 
causes of a loss of self-control may be considered. It may be that a case such as 
Johnson could still succeed on this basis as the facts suggest that what provoked D was 
somewhat removed from the inducement. In Johnson D made threats of violence against 
X. After this, D was insulted by X and as he tried to leave V poured beer over his head. 
V removed his own jacket and pinned D against a wall by placing his arm across D's 
chest or throat. X then punched his head and pulled his hair. V then smashed his glass. 
D fearing of being 'glassed', as he had been on a previous occasion, stabbed V. 
 
                                           
41 P. Alldridge, 'Self-Induced Provocation in the Court Of Appeal', (1991) 55 JCL 94,  
96: "the fact that it was to be expected means that the claim of the defendant to have been moved to white-hot 
fury by it is less credible than otherwise it would have been." 
42 Johnson 742: the trial judge stated that "[i]t is rather difficult to see how a man who excites provocative conduct 
can in turn rely upon it as provocation in the criminal law." 
43 Ibid 744 
44 P. Alldridge, 'Self-Induced Provocation in the Court Of Appeal' 101: Alldridge explains that this was consistent with 
the judiciary's interpretation of the defence. 
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It is not satisfactory that cases of self-induced provocation were allowed to be treated in 
the same manner as normal provocation cases. If D intends to offend another in order to 
rely on the defence then these cases need to be excluded.
45
 However, in cases such as 
Johnson a principle similar to that in Edwards seems appropriate, that it depends on 
how far the provocation is removed from the 'inducement' and that it is a matter of 
degree that only the jury should decide. Put simply, where D acts with this purpose in 
mind then this cannot be described as a case of provocation and in any reform of the 
defence these cases either should be viewed as outside of the sufficient evidence test, 
therefore outside of the definition of provocation, and/or there should be a specific 
exclusion dealing with intentional inducement. 
 
ii) non-violent homosexual sexual advances 
If D felt provoked owing to a sexual advance there was potential for the pre-2009 
defence to have succeeded. On top of this, non-violent homosexual advances 
demonstrate that the defence could be used to provide mitigation for intolerance and 
prejudice.
46
 Much of the argument on this issue relates to the ordinary person, whether 
the ordinary person can be attributed homophobic characteristics,
47
 however the issue 
ought to be resolved before this point through finding that there is no provocative 
conduct for D to rely on. 
 
If there are any differences between how heterosexual and homosexual advances are 
dealt with it highlights that the issues which surround 'adequate provocation' go beyond 
D being allowed to rely on trivial provocation but becomes about what values the 
defence stands for. Mison states that if these cases are viewed differently it "reinforces 
                                           
45 In Part III each of the chapters, which are concerned with the various efforts at reforming the defence, will be 
inspect this issue. 
46 R.B. Mison, 'Homophobia in Manslaughter' 158: "The homosexual-advance defense capitalizes on the social and 
individual responses of fear, disgust, and hatred with regard to homosexuals." 
A homosexual advance was the basis for the defence's argument in the pre-1957 Act case of R v McCarthy [1954] 2 
QB 105: "While this provocation would no doubt have excused (when we say 'excused' we mean enough to reduce 
the killing to manslaughter) a blow, perhaps more than one" (at 109). The defence did not succeed as mode of 
resentment test (which had to be applied at this time) was not met as the violence used by D was viewed as 
excessive. 
47 This issue will be discussed in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'. 
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... that revulsion and hostility are natural reactions to homosexual behavior."
48
 On this 
point, Justice Kirby, in the Australian case of Green, stated that  
 
"[this] would sit ill with contemporary legal, educative and policing efforts 
designed to remove such violent responses from society, grounded as 
they are in irrational hatred and fear ... 
The law must acknowledge extreme violence is never a reasonable 
response to an unwanted sexual advance, homosexual or otherwise. 
Community values and attitudes towards homosexuality and homosexuals 
have evolved to the point today that society demands it."
49
 
 
The point here is that if a non-violent heterosexual sexual advance is not viewed to be 
provocative then a homosexual one needs to be treated the same. For all non-violent 
sexual advances V has committed no wrong against D and all these circumstances 
should not be labelled as provocative. 
 
Dressler makes two points important points which relate to sexual advances and these 
help to explain how such cases could succeed. Firstly, he states that the provocation 
defence is predominately a male defence, therefore making non-violent homosexual 
advance cases more likely to receive mitigation in comparison to a heterosexual 
scenario.
50
 By finding that the defence tends to deal with men, and their more 
aggressive reactions when subjected to such situations, it becomes easier to understand 
how the provocation defence based on such a rationale mitigates. Also, if this is 
understood then it may not entirely be down to treating homosexuality differently from 
heterosexuality but that it is a male which is subject to the advance in a case of non-
violent homosexual advance; it is possible to see that gender is the real reason why 
                                           
48 R.B. Mison, 'Homophobia in Manslaughter' 136 
49 Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334 (Austl) 408-9 (Justice Kirby) 
50 Ibid 735: "while women are often the victims of provoked killings or the stimulus for them (e.g., a party in a sexual 
triangle, a 'seduced' young daughter, or a rape victim whose mistreatment stirs retaliation), men are the 
predominant beneficiaries of a doctrine that mitigates intentional homicides to manslaughter." 
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there is a difference as women are less likely to kill: "the difference may be that he is a 
he and she is a she."
51
 
 
The second point which Dressler draws out is that a sexual advance is often combined 
with an assault, meaning that the basis for the mitigation could be found in the 
combination of these factors or by the assault alone.
52
 A case which illustrates this is 
Howard.
53
 In that case V made homosexual advances (grasped him gently by the 
testicles and stated: "I want you") and D struck V on the head with a hammer, which he 
had a legitimate reason to have with him. V got up and advanced towards D. D, fearing 
another assault and shouting abuse, struck V four times over the head. Cases such as 
this do not involve straightforward judgements and creating hard rules for these 
situations would be difficult as any sexual advance may be combined with an assault 
which could be a legitimate basis for mitigation.
54
 As with many provocation cases, but 
especially sexual advances owing to the nature of these circumstances, the jury have to 
rely on D's account of the events and if D claims that V made some effort at physical 
contact then the case may no longer be a non-violent homosexual advance but a violent 
one. 
 
Dressler responds to Mison's criticisms of the defence by stating that these cases are 
simply consistent with the defence's rationale, excusable loss of self-control. However, 
this argument underlines that this rationale of the provocation defence is flawed. 
Dressler states: 
                                           
51 Ibid 754 
52 J. Dressler, 'When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, 
and the 'Reasonable Man' Standard', (1995) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 3, 726, 742. On discussing 
multiple US cases which included NHA and a fight Dressler states: "The defendants' rebuffs of the advances in these 
cases might have been motivated by fear or hatred of homosexuals, although such a conclusion is speculative. And, 
of course, the defendants may have lied about what actually occurred. But, based on the testimony presented, 
these were not NHA cases 'in and of themselves'. This fact is significant because mutual combat or a hard battery, 
even in the absence of another provocative act, traditionally justifies a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. 
Therefore, the instructions in these cases would have been proper on the basis of the fisticuffs alone." 
53 (1985) 7 Cr App R 130 
54 Another similar case is Green (n49): V, a friend & father-figure to D, invited D over for dinner and asked him to 
stay the night in different beds. V entered the bedroom and started touching D. D repeatedly stabbed V with nearby 
scissors and rammed his head against the wall. V claimed to have lost control and acted in that manner as he 
believed his father had abused his sisters. 
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"doubtless, the message that gay men deserve less respect than 
heterosexual men is an immoral one. But if the heat-of-passion defense is 
a partial excuse, not a justification, then a verdict of voluntary 
manslaughter sends an entirely proper message regarding the defendant's 
actions: the provoked homicide was entirely unjustifiable."
55
 
 
Even though Dressler is correct to state that as the defence is a partial excuse it is 
implicit that what D did is wrong this scenario highlights how the defence's rationale did 
not reflect the standards of society as it did not demand severe provocation through a 
strict gravity test. For the purpose of this Chapter it also demonstrates that it did not 
require something intelligible as provocation at all, the nature of the provocative conduct 
does not come into question. If what provokes D is made up of natural and blameless 
conduct then D should not be able to cite this as the basis for mitigation. By defining 
provocation in the sufficient evidence test as it is advanced it ensures that the defence 
would strictly deal with provocation cases and not those cases where D merely gets 
angry at events which take place. 
 
iii) possessive partners 
The discussion of non-violent homosexual advance cases shares similarities with 
concerns over cases which involve male possessiveness of their sexual partners. There 
were concerns that the pre-2009 defence allowed for gender bias and, owing to the 
defence's roots, predominately provided mitigation for male violence.
56
 The roots of the 
defence may have been more concerned with male-on-male spontaneous violence but 
how the defence became available for circumstances relating to the killing of partners or 
ex-partners became problematic and controversial.
57
 The discussion of the pre-2009 
                                           
55 J. Dressler, 'When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men' 750 
56 L.J. Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women' 1679: "the legal standards that define adequate provocation 
and passionate 'human' weaknesses reflect a male view of understandable homicidal violence. Homicide is 
overwhelmingly a male act." 
57 Note the Law Commission summing up this issue (n13). 
Also, see the introduction in 'Chapter 10 - Contextualising and Presumptions' for more on this. 
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defence in Part I lays bare how the defence has always been concerned with male 
violence and in the remainder of Part II it will be discussed how the objective and 
subjective elements were designed in a way which were built on such "ingrained cultural 
judgment[s]", meaning that women struggled with the defence "whether as victim or 
offender".
58
 
 
Often the provocation for such cases relied on female partners leaving the relationship, 
finding new partners themselves or circumstances of sexual infidelity. Many of these 
cases show that normal behaviour, where often V was demonstrating her freedom, was 
capable of amounting to valid provocation and that jealousy and possessiveness were 
providing grounds for mitigation. In such cases D may feel anger and that his partner 
ending the relationship or committing the infidelity is the cause of this but, again, the 
defence should demonstrate its values by not finding that there is anything here capable 
of being described as being provocation. 
 
On this issue Nourse claims that "the decision to send the case to a jury itself has legal 
meaning" and this is central to the criticism of the provocation defence.
59
 The possibility 
that the defence could succeed in such cases, without provocation being present, is 
consistent with the defence's rationale and this is especially so when the ordinary person 
standard is lowered by taking into account male proclivity towards violence: 
 
"few people would disagree that M may be excused for being disturbed by 
the sighting [of his partner committing a sexual act with another]. His 
emotions are excusable because an ordinary person, with an ordinary 
temper and ordinary feelings, would likely become emotionally 
overwrought in such circumstances. Therefore, if M kills W while he is 
overwrought (assuming, of course, that M did not have reasonable time to 
cool off), the homicide may be partially excusable."
60
 
                                           
58 S.Bandalli, 'Provocation - A Cautionary Note' (1995) 22 Journal of Law and Society 398, 398 
59 V. Nourse, 'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense', (1997) Vol 106, No 5, 1331, 
1357 
60 Dressler, 'When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men' 748 
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Many would argue, and correctly, that within the defence tougher standards ought to be 
set: "We should, and in fact do, have more control over our passions than the defense 
and the prevailing scholarship assume."
61
 The ease at which Dressler finds that such a 
killing is partially excusable in the framework of an excusable loss of self-control 
highlights that the nature of what provoked D was not scrutinised effectively. By labelling 
a circumstance such as infidelity or, more alarmingly, where V leaves her partner as 
provocative conduct the defence does not respect V's freedom and, consequently, the 
scope for where violence can be used in the defence is not appropriately restricted. 
 
There is a concern in reforming the provocation defence that if the balance between 
gender is addressed through extending the defence to make it easier for women then 
the defence will also be even easier for men to use.
62
 It is advanced that if the defence 
can rest on the severity of the provocation and such tests are adjusted to take into 
account social realities then this balance can be readdressed without this problem 
arising.
63
 It would, however, require a great change for the defence not to display gender 
bias towards males. By the defence making allowances for male possessiveness it fuels 
the gender bias as the violence used becomes more understandable, but by not viewing 
these circumstances as provocation, which they are not, then it becomes more 
straightforward for the defence to uphold expectations that violence used against women 
in these circumstances is wholly inexcusable. 
 
There may be potential for certain scenarios involving infidelity to progress beyond the 
sufficient evidence test if the defence required provocation as it would depend on the 
circumstances and a distinction such as that outlined by Viscount Simon in Holmes 
                                                                                                                                   
How the defence allows the jury take into account gender differences in the expected levels of self-control will be 
discussed in 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'. 
61 S.D. Rozelle, 'Controlling Passion: Adultery And The Provocation Defense' (2005-6) 37 Rutgers LJ 197, 199 
R. Bradfield, 'Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on the Jealous Husband 
and the Battered Wife' (2000) 19 U Tas L Rev 5, 5: "the requirements of the defence have traditionally reflected 
male standards of behaviour and male responses. The narrative of provocation recounts the familiar story of 
jealousy, betrayal and infidelity - the story of the jealous husband." 
62 L.J. Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women' 1721: "Those who advocate change in the substantive law must 
safeguard against endangering women by more readily excusing their male killers." 
63 This is central to the proposal in Part IV. 
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could be adopted, a distinction between taunts and informational words.
64
 In discussing 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 Norrie finds a similar distinction as he states that it 
would be difficult to exclude all cases which are based on sexual infidelity from the 
defence as some cases could involve "one partner habitually taunt[ing]... another with 
the example of their infidelity, either by itself, or as part of a range of taunts."
65
 Simply 
because this issue just happens to be sexual infidelity it does not mean that it must be 
barred from the defence. Again, as with self-induced provocation and sexual advances, 
this highlights that creating strict rules may be difficult as there will be hard cases which 
are on the boundaries if exclusions, for example, were adopted. 
 
Conclusion 
With the defence being allowed to be a platform for such cases it highlights that there 
ought to be greater limits on what can satisfy the sufficient evidence test, this 
requirement should not be entirely subjective. Instead of asking whether D was 
provoked, as the pre-2009 defence did, the defence ought to require that the event, 
which is the basis for the claim, can be described as provocation; this would remove the 
scenarios where the provoking event can be adjudged to regard natural, normal and 
blameless conduct. 
 
Once the rationale is appreciated then reforming the sufficient evidence test is the next 
step in resolving the issues with the defence; it is about ensuring that the partial defence 
deals with cases which ought to be within its ambit and restricting those outside the 
definition of provocation. It should ultimately be down to the jury to determine if D the 
provocation was sufficient (gravity test) and if D lived up to the expected level of 
behaviour of an ordinary person (control test). The role of the judge in the sufficient 
evidence test, therefore, ought to be to test if the circumstances of provocation have 
arisen, but it is up to the jury to evaluate D's claim. 
                                           
64 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n113) 
65 A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 - partial defences to murder (1) Loss of control', (2010) 4 Crim LR 
275, 288-9: "should it be the case that one somehow excludes the one taunt and admits the others? In such cases, it 
is surely the campaign of taunting that is significant and not the substance of individual taunts." 
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CHAPTER 5 
OBJECTIVE ELEMENT 
This Chapter will look at the evaluative standards which the jury had to apply following 
the sufficient evidence test being satisfied. Through the objective element in the pre-
2009 defence the jury were required to evaluate the severity of what provoked D in the 
gravity test and to examine D's behaviour in the control test. Despite the 1957 Act 
referring to the reasonable person both of these tests were ultimately interpreted as 
setting the standard of comparison as the ordinary person.
1
 The rationale of the defence 
has been described as being excusable loss of self-control,
2
 meaning that the evaluative 
element of the defence was entirely relying on this ordinary person standard. It has 
already been advanced that the rationale of the defence ought to be warranted emotion
3
 
and this Chapter will detail how that test could be formulated. 
 
Deciding what the objective standard ought to be was evidently, from Part I, not 
straightforward. Defining the objective standard in different ways, as has been done in 
Bedder, Camplin and Smith (Morgan), is capable of significantly altering the types of 
cases which the defence admits. Each interpretation had at its core the aim of producing 
a platform for providing mitigation based on human frailty and can be supported with 
legitimate reasons. It will be argued that the Camplin distinction between the gravity of 
the provocation and the powers of self-control ought to be maintained.
4
 However, the 
gravity test ought to focus on warranted emotion rather than a comparison to 
ordinariness, but the control test ought to judge D by an ordinary standard.
5
 In support of 
this, the gravity and control tests and the scope to which D's characteristics involved in 
those tests will be discussed. Also, through this discussion it will become clear why the 
objective standard for self-control in a provocation defence ought to have such links with 
ordinariness as there is a need to justify this approach against claims that the defence 
                                           
1 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n71) 
2 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n110-2) 
3 Ibid (n113-31) 
4 DPP v Camplin [1978] AC 705, 717-8 (Lord Diplock). See the contrast in what was allowed to be considered in the 
tests at 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n67-71). 
5 This would set an expected level of behaviour which is obtainable and consistent with common human frailty, 
discussed at 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n93-109). 
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ought to be a partial denial of responsibility, akin to diminished responsibility, rather than 
a partial denial of wrongdoing.
6
 
 
a) the standard of self-control and ordinariness 
The case to rely on an objective standard to evaluate D's claim to the provocation 
defence has been made out in the Chapter 3:
7
 the objective element is a way to test 
"adequacy of the compulsion".
8
 Neither the objective element nor the subjective element 
alone can provide a basis for mitigation, only through both working together can it be 
shown that there was difficulty for D not to react and the provocation was adequate so 
that it is understandable that D reacted. It is how to define both of these elements which 
is the issue. Ultimately, following Camplin,
9
 the objective element of the pre-2009 
defence required that D's response was that of an ordinary person. Why the required 
level of self-control is measured by ordinariness and then how to define ordinariness 
needs elaboration. 
 
The objective standard could be judged as an "ideal" to "aspire" towards.
10
 Requiring a 
reasonable man standard, as the 1957 Act text did, would seem to go along with this 
view, but this is inconsistent with the idea of a common human frailty as reasonableness 
                                           
6 B.J. Mitchell,  R.D. Mackay & W.J. Brookbanks, 'Pleading for provoked killers: in defence of Morgan Smith' (2008) 
124 LQR  675, 691: "those who support the ... more objective approach ought to be able to justify the claim that, 
notwithstanding the characteristic differences between us, there is a minimum level of self-regulation which 
everyone (including the defendant and whatever his individual characteristics) should exercise in the 
circumstances." 
7 See, in particular, 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n96-9) 
8 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 89. Also, (at 90) "It simply is not the 
case that we intuitively excuse every person who can show pressure or temptation or disadvantage in resisting the 
same. Our blaming and excusing judgements are more complex. We want to know: how strong was the pressure or 
temptation? How difficult was it for the actor to resist? Inevitably, we try and put ourselves in the actor's situation 
and imagine whether we would have been able to resist the violation in similar circumstances." 
W. Gorman, 'Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence' (1999) 42 Crim LQ 478, 480: "We have a societal right to 
demand certain minimum standards of conduct. The objective element of provocation should be its cornerstone." 
9 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n71) 
10 R.B. Mison, 'Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation' (1992) 80 Cal L 
Rev 133, 147 
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suggests that D acted correctly in the circumstances.
11
 The excessive nature of the act 
coupled with the human frailty basis means that the defence deals with human action 
which is wrong but an allowance is made as "the defendant is, unfortunately, just like 
other ordinary human beings."
12
 The defence should rest on the concept of the ordinary 
person; this standard would take into account that an ordinary person can lose his self-
control and act in a way which is incorrect but owing to the circumstances and the 
knowledge of how normal people may react it is somewhat understandable:
13
 the 
ordinariness of human weakness is taken into account.
14
 
 
It needs to be appreciated that the ordinary person is not intended to reflect a real 
person but an average reaction of a person within the community. The pre-2009 defence 
often got bogged down in trying to define the reasonable man and discussing what this 
fictional person would have done.
15
 In the Australian case of Moffa v The Queen Justice 
Murphy stated that 
 
"The objective test is not suitable even for a superficially homogeneous 
society, and the more heterogeneous our society becomes, the more 
inappropriate the test is ... It is impossible to construct a model of a 
reasonable or ordinary South Australian for the purpose of assessing 
                                           
11 After exploring justifications it has been expressed that a provoked killing can never be justified and any rationale 
of the defence must be based on the understanding that the act was wholly wrong. See 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n29-
30 & n61). 
J.K. Weber, 'Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary Manslaughter Law', (1981) 10 Comm L World R 159, 162: For 
instance, Weber states that provocation should not be concerned with the reasonable man as it "implies society's 
approval of the course of conduct". 
12 J. Dressler, When 'Heterosexual' Men Kill 'Homosexual' Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, 
and the 'Reasonable Man' Standard, (1995) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 3, 726, 753 
13 S.P. Garvey, Passion's Puzzle (2005) 90 Iowa LR 1677, 1731: "the reasonable loss of self-control requirement 
cannot mean what it says. Instead, a provoked actor's loss of self-control can be described as 'reasonable' only in 
the limited sense that losing self-control is an all-too-ordinary human failing." 
14 The common human weakness basis for the defence was explored in 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n93-109). 
15 P. Brett, 'The Physiology of Provocation' (1970) Crim LR 634, 367: "the reasonable man ... is a figment of the 
imagination" and "[p]lainly we cannot sensibly talk of the ordinary man in any meaningful way." 
A. Samuels, 'Excusable Loss of Self-Control in Homicide' (1971) 34 MLR 163, 167: "There is no readily identifiable 
concept of the reasonable, average, ordinary or normal man, he is unreal because he is an amalgam of real people, 
but unlike any real person for that very reason." 
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emotional flashpoint, loss of self-control and capacity to kill under 
particular circumstances."
16
 
 
Even though these are issues which need to be discussed, as control characteristics,
17
 
too much emphasis was placed on defining this character and not enough on discussing 
the standard which the defence imposed. For instance, Ashworth states that the test "is 
to ascertain whether the accused showed a reasonable amount of self-restraint" but that 
"the words 'reasonable' and 'man' have unfortunately diverted attention from this 
fundamental requirement."
18
 
 
From this it is possible to recognize that there is a range of conduct which an ordinary 
person could be expected to undertake and an appropriate point on that range must be 
selected.
19
 The provocation defence should only require the minimum from a provoked 
agent.
20
 Colvin described provocation as "the clearest example of an objective test being 
geared to a minimal standard of ordinary behaviour."
21
 The defence deals with people 
who have been provoked and as a result people who are acting in a highly emotional 
way, by requiring a minimal ordinary standard it is a reflection that human frailty is the 
                                           
16  (1977) 138 CLR 610, 626 
17 See section 'c) control test & control characteristics'. 
18 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' (1976) 35(2) Cambridge Law Journal 292, 299: "The word 'reasonable' 
indicates quantity in the phrase 'reasonable self-control', whereas in combination with the word 'man' it begs 
questions about the age, sex, marital status, race, colour, religion and other personal characteristics of a 
hypothetical individual." 
R v Morhall [1996] AC 90, 97-98 (Lord Goff): "The function of the test is only to introduce as a matter of policy, a 
standard of self-control which has to be complied with if provocation is to be established in law." 
G. Orchard, 'Provocation - Recharacterisation of 'Characteristics'' (1996) 7 Canterbury LR 202, 209: "The objective 
test is not concerned with how or why an actual person might behave. Rather the purpose of the test is to impose a 
standard, and to deny the defence when, in the view of the jury, the provocation was not calculated to so stir the 
accused's emotions that a level of self-control which is 'ordinary', or normal, might be overcome." 
19 E. Colvin, 'Ordinary and Reasonable People: The Design of Objective Tests of Criminal Responsibility' (2001) 27 
Monash ULR 197, 200: "The idea of 'ordinariness' sets limits to the range but does not itself provide a single point of 
comparison for the conduct of an accused. If an objective test is to be used, a point within the range must be 
selected as the standard against which the accused is measured." 
20 T. Macklem & J. Gardner, 'Provocation and Pluralism' (2001) 64 MLR 6 815, 824: "It is true that reasonable people 
vary somewhat in their reactions. But for the purposes of the provocation defence we are presumably interested 
only in the lowest possible level of self-control that any reasonable person would have." 
Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312 (Australia), 329: "The lowest level of self-control which falls within those limits or that 
range is required of all members of the community." 
21 E. Colvin, 'Ordinary and Reasonable People' 209 
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basis for the defence. Such a standard sets a realistic expectation and one which if D 
fails to meet it would then be correct to find that he should have shown greater restraint. 
 
It must be determined what the minimum level of self-control for an ordinary person is 
when they are exposed to severe provocation and it has been questioned if this is 
possible: 
 
"In theory, the concept may seem attractive, but acquiring a proper 
understanding of its true meaning may be more difficult than has generally 
been assumed."
22
 
 
A standard definition of 'ordinary' would mean it could be equated to 
mean commonplace, average, not outstanding nor exceptional, being expected, uniform 
and normal. Two points need to be noted which will support why and how this standard 
is applicable when one kills another. Firstly, ordinariness takes into account human 
frailty, meaning that the defence deals with exceptional moments and it is within the 
range of human behaviour, at the lowest end, that a person may strike out. Secondly, 
the gravity and control tests take this on board and help to make this determination. 
What is seen as ordinary depends upon the gravity of the circumstances; a violent killing 
is not an ordinary occurrence but given context it is possible to understand what led to 
this event. This all feeds into the control test and this functions to determine if D's 
response was ordinary; by taking the normal into consideration, with this appreciation of 
human weakness, it ultimately becomes possible to find that D's conduct reached the 
minimum expected level.
23
 
 
Yeo has stated that the objective element "functions to restrict the scope of provocation 
rather than to reflect the rationales underlying the defence."
24
 However, this is not the 
                                           
22 B.J. Mitchell,  R.D. Mackay & W.J. Brookbanks, 'Pleading for provoked killers' 693 
23 The gravity and control tests are to be discussed separately and have been distinguished throughout, and this has 
been stressed because of the different purposes of each test, but they have this relationship. 
24 S. Yeo, 'Power of Self-Control in Provocation and Automatism' (1992) 14 Sydney LR 3, 4 
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case with the understanding which has been discussed: the gravity test, with the 
warranted standard, and the control test, with the ordinary standard, upholds the 
underlying rationale of a common human frailty to severe provocation. 
 
b) gravity test & response characteristics 
In the pre-2009 defence the gravity of the provocation was ultimately measured against 
the ordinary person standard. To do this the jury had to consider the "entire factual 
situation"
25
 and this included D's characteristics, circumstances, history and the like. For 
example, in Morhall
26
 D was taunted about his addiction to glue sniffing and therefore 
this was a part of his background which had to be considered. This was a move away 
from the strictly objective test previously laid down in Bedder, where the reasonable man 
was not bestowed with D's characteristic of impotence.
27
 When these characteristics
28
 
are applied they can be described as response characteristics,
29
 in that they only apply 
to the gravity question (how provocative), and can be distinguished from control 
characteristics, which have the ability to alter the ordinary person's expected level of 
self-control (how provocable).
30
 
 
A critique of the gravity test can come in two parts. Firstly, in the need to contextualise 
the provoking incident the distinction between response characteristics and control 
characteristics can become harder to maintain. Secondly,
31
 links to the ordinary person 
in the gravity test do not bring about results which are attractive and this also concerns 
the application of undesirable characteristics, such as racist views, to the objective 
standard. The separation of provocativness and provocability is necessary as the 
ordinary person test should be exclusively for the objective standard of self-control in the 
control test and the gravity test should require warranted emotion. 
                                           
25 Camplin 727. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n67). 
26 R v Morhall [1996] AC 90 
27 Bedder v DPP (1954) 38 Cr App R 133. See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n132-3). 
28 The term 'characteristic' will be used but will include these other factors. 
29 B. Fitzpatrick & A. Reed, 'Sound of Mind and Body: Psychological Characteristics and the Reasonable Man Test in 
Provocation', (1999) 63 JCL 365, 366 
30 The extent that these characteristics should apply is debateable. See J.C. Smith, 'Case Comment' on Morhall: "It is 
suggested that increased provocativeness is relevant, increased provocability is not." 
31 See 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n115-20). 
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i) distinguishing response characteristics from control characteristics 
The position of the pre-2009 provocation defence was that as long as the characteristic 
was relevant it ought to be considered as it helps the jury to assess the true gravity of 
what occurred. It has already the discussed how Camplin extended the scope of the 
response characteristics which could be considered as it would be "utterly unreal" not to 
contextualise the meaning of the provocation.
32
 The example stated in Camplin, that 
"'[d]irty nigger' ... is obviously more insulting when said by a white man to a coloured 
man",
33
 highlights that the surrounding circumstances may give the conduct greater 
sting. 
 
What is important is that the response characteristic is actually relevant to the incident 
which took place, it may seem to add weight to the gravity but be unconnected to the 
emotion behind the killing. Newell
34
 is a good example of this as D was a chronic 
alcoholic whose girlfriend had recently left him. He was drinking with V and V criticised 
his ex-girlfriend, suggesting that D ought to go to bed with him. D struck V on the head 
repeatedly and killed him.
35
 It was made clear, from the exchanges which took place 
between the parties, that the reason why D was angered was to do with V's comments 
about his ex-girlfriend: 
 
"'Why don't you forget that fucking bitch; she's no fucking good for you. 
Why don't you come to bed with me,' his exact words. I hit him with the 
ash tray on the table. I have just explained why, because of what he said; 
it was the effect on me; I was so angry my only thought was to hit him. My 
reaction was instantaneous. It was what he said about Amalia which 
caused my reaction."
36
 
                                           
32 Camplin 721 (Lord Morris). See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n58). 
33 Ibid 726 
34 R v Newell (1980) 71 Cr App R 331 
35 The Newell judgment, however, can be criticised for its narrow definition of a characteristic, see 'Chapter 2 - The 
Post-1957 Defence' (n60-6). 
36 Newell 333 
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Newell highlights the need for the characteristic to be relevant and therefore "some 
direct connection" must exist between the characteristic and the reason for the anger to 
rule out superfluous factors which had no impact on D;
37
 the sexual advance and D's 
alcoholism which were present in the case "had nothing at all to do with the words by 
which it is said that he was provoked."
38
 
 
The requirement for relevance and a distinction between response and control 
characteristics is even more apparent when the characteristic in question is a mental 
one or when it is related to cumulative provocation. In Humphreys
39
 D was in an abusive 
relationship. D cut her wrists in front of V and he responded by taunting her, stating that 
she had not made a very good job of it. D was emotionally immature for her age, 
explosive and attention-seeking. The difficulty is to determine which response 
characteristics, if any, are relevant to the gravity test and to ensure that they are only 
considered in this side of the objective element. It was decided that the jury could 
consider the abnormal immaturity and attention seeking by wrist slashing. However, it is 
difficult to see how this is consistent with the approach on response characteristics as 
Horder is correct in stating that "the provocation given by the deceased directly related 
only to one of these characteristics, namely the attention-seeking."
40
 The attention-
seeking characteristic adds weight to the gravity as D's conduct, cutting her wrists, was 
related to that characteristic and the taunt was therefore connected. In this case if a jury 
were to apply abnormal immaturity to the objective element they could only do it with 
regards to the powers of self-control as it has no relevance to the gravity question. 
Therefore, when dealing with response characteristics it has to be ensured that the jury 
understands the extent to which they can include them in their judgement of how 
provocative the incident was. 
 
                                           
37 Ibid 339 
38 Ibid 340 
39 (1995) 145 NLJ 1032 
40 J. Horder, 'Provocation's "reasonable man" reassessed' (1996) 112 LQR 35, 37-8 
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In a wider point about the gravity test Humphreys also shows how an innocuous act can 
be considered provocative given the proper context; D was subjected to violence and 
being raped over a period of time, this meant that when V undressed it was provocative 
to her because of the context of their violent history: she knew what this signified. 
 
In Dryden
41
 D had shot and killed a planning officer on the day of demolition of his 
bungalow. There was evidence which suggested D was eccentric, had obsessive 
personality traits, had a depressive illness and suffered from paranoid thinking. The trial 
judge did not allow any of these mental characteristics to be considered and the Camplin 
direction and her judgment, according to Lord Taylor CJ, were "almost verbatim".
42
 
 
The Court of Appeal, however, found that these mental peculiarities ought to be 
considered. From the judgment, like in Humphreys, it is not clear as to whether they 
were found to be relevant and were then limited to be considered only in the gravity test: 
 
"this was a characteristic - the obsessiveness on the part of the appellant 
and his eccentric character - which ought to have been left to the jury for 
their consideration. We consider that they were features of his character or 
personality which fell into the category of mental characteristics and which 
ought to have been specifically left to the jury."
43
 
 
The 'provocation', or, more accurately, the cause of the loss of self-control, was not 
directed at these mental characteristics but that was not what the law required; what was 
required was that they were relevant: would the characteristic make the incident 
sufficiently grave if it was shared by the ordinary person? As D was obsessed with his 
                                           
41 [1995] 4 All ER 987: The planning officer and the police had informed D that they were going to attempt to gain 
access to the property. D went inside and when he returned he had taken his jacket off, put on a holster and was 
armed with a revolver. 
42 Ibid 996: "Now, a reasonable man, members of the jury, is a person having the powers of control to be expected 
of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the defendant ... [A] reasonable man is not exceptionally excitable or 
exceptionally eccentric or, indeed, eccentric at all, or obsessed, but is possessed of such powers of self-control as 
everyone is entitled to expect of his fellow citizens, to expect that they will exercise in society as it is today." 
43 Ibid 998 
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land, and evidence in the case backs up the severity of this obsession, such a 
characteristic helps us to understand why the incident was so provocative to D. The trial 
judge's description of the ordinary person and the similar one given in Camplin only 
refers to his powers of self-control, no restriction is placed on what may be considered in 
the gravity test. Therefore, if the mental characteristics included in Dryden only apply to 
the gravity test this is a correct finding, however the distinction needs to be made 
clearer. D's obsession over his land is the equivalent to the attention-seeking in 
Humphreys, however, like in that case, with regards to the abnormal immaturity, it would 
be incorrect to consider the other characteristic, eccentricity, in the gravity test. 
 
What is important, therefore, is that these mental characteristics are being considered 
for the correct reason, not altering the standard of self-control but giving the jury the 
opportunity to give proper weight and background to applicable factors in the gravity 
test. In Smith (Morgan) it was stated that the ambiguity which a case like Dryden, and 
other cases which involve mental characteristics, demonstrated shows that this 
distinction is not clear and a jury may find it difficult to understand: 
 
"the jury should have been directed to have regard to these characteristics 
only in so far as they might have affected the gravity of the provocation 
and not in so far as they may have affected the accused's power of self-
control. No doubt this omission was for the very good reason that, on the 
facts of both cases, no jury would have understood what such a distinction 
meant."
44
 
 
It is likely that this distinction is the most difficult in the cases of prolonged abuse and 
cumulative provocation where D's power of self-control is acknowledged to be lowered 
owing to this but the abuse and the history of violence is also the reason why the 
provocation is grave. For example, where D suffers from battered women's syndrome 
the circumstances which contribute to the existence of that condition have the potential 
to make the incident both more provocative and to make D more provocable. If the 
                                           
44 Smith (Morgan) 170. The cases referred to are Dryden and Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889. 
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ordinary person's powers of self-control are constant
45
 then only consideration of the 
abuse in the gravity test could have been relevant. It must be acknowledged that there 
are cases where sufferers of abuse kill because of their illness
46
 and cases where they 
kill because of the gravity of the situation. 
 
As will be advanced in Part IV, the gravity test needs to be constructed in a manner 
where context for provoking events is ensured; this will allow the distinction between 
response and control characteristics to be respected and guarantee that mitigation is 
being provided only where the provocation is severe and not where D was more prone 
to act violently. A key case in this area was Ahluwalia
47
 where D suffered from domestic 
abuse for ten years. V threatened D and later that night, while her husband was 
sleeping, D fetched petrol and poured it over the bed and set it alight. What is clear is 
that if the gravity test is applied properly and the context of persistent violence and the 
threat of future violence is taken into account then such cases could pass the objective 
element. Like in Humphreys,
48
 thought must be given to the fact that "past abuse 
influenced their perception of future danger".
49
 In the New Zealand case of Oakes this 
was given consideration and the reasoning, to an extent, will form the basis for the 
suggested reform advanced in Part IV: 
 
"provocation may be in the form of threatening words or actions, and the 
heightened awareness of or sensitivity to threats or threatening behaviour 
                                           
45 The potential of dealing with such cases within the diminished responsibility will be discussed when discussing 
control characteristics, this would allow lower levels of self-control to have relevance in that defence instead. 
46 B.J. Mitchell,  R.D. Mackay & W.J. Brookbanks, 'Pleading for provoked killers' 679: "we would argue that the 
battered spouse, who, in an outwardly calm manner, gets a knife from the kitchen drawer and then fatally stabs her 
sleeping partner, should be treated with some leniency by the law to the extent that she is no longer able to 
exercise her capacity to think, reason and judge normally." 
47 [1992] 4 All ER 889: the violence included physical violence, food deprivation and marital rape. D had failed in 
attempts to leave her husband. On the night of the killing V had threatened to hit her with an iron and told her if 
she did not provide him with money he would beat her the next day. 
48 (n39-40). V undressing had significance to D as it related to past abuse and signified future abuse. 
49 L.J. Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense' 
(1985-1986) 33 UCLA LR 1679, 1716 
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that is a feature of the syndrome may be a relevant characteristic in the 
light of which the accused's response is to be judged."
50
 
 
It is possible with this outlook to distinguish the factual situation from the issue of control 
characteristics and to ignore any mental abnormality caused by the abuse. Ultimately, if 
the provocation was not sufficient and/or if D killed because of her abnormality where an 
ordinary person would not have done so then this falls outside the scope of the 
provocation defence. If a proper context is given, allowing for the relevant factors which 
can contribute to the building of a full picture of D's circumstances, it may be viewed that 
the victims of abuse have acted like an ordinary person in those circumstances: "they 
may not be exceptional women; they may be ordinary women pushed to extremes."
51
 
 
ii) the ordinary person to the warranted person 
The gravity test, to an extent, can be praised for how it has developed into being 
inclusive and giving greater context to the provocative conduct but, on the other hand, 
this approach can be criticised for not setting the required standard for mitigation at an 
acceptable level. The gravity test must be sensitive enough to not set the standard too 
high, thereby removing sets of cases which may develop to be 'hard cases' from its 
scope, but, at the same time, ensure that the defence is consistent with the values of the 
culture and society which shapes it. It must be noted that it has been stated that 
"provocation's instability ... is built into the defence's very structure" owing to the fact that 
it must adapt with society's values,
52
 as culture moves on how severely provocative an 
incident is will alter. Therefore, the gravity test needs to be flexible enough to cope with 
these demands but the bar needs to be raised to a sufficient level. 
 
A discussion of the gravity test leads back to the problems discussed in Chapter 4, that 
'provocation' which was trivial or not deserving of recognition was allowed to proceed to 
the jury and be the basis for a defence, meaning these cases were consequently tested 
                                           
50 [1995] 2 NZLR 673, 676 
51 L.J. Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women' 1697 
52 H. Power, 'Provocation and culture' (2006) Crim LR 871, 876: "Culture is not static, monolithic and uncontested 
and the law's attempts to accommodate it as a source of excuse for crime fail to satisfy for any length of time." 
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in the ordinary person test. At the heart of this is the need to be ensure that the defence 
does not give "legitimacy to superficial explanations of violence".
53
 If the standard is 
maintained at the level of ordinariness this means sometimes there will be 
circumstances which are not entirely acceptable for the defence to allow as people get 
angry when they ought not to, but these surely must be viewed as sufficient in the pre-
2009 defence as ordinariness includes a degree of fallibility and shortcomings. Infidelity 
is the classic example as it is uncomfortable to see a defence provide mitigation for that 
scenario but if in the defence the adequacy of the provocation is assessed by the 
standard of ordinariness it is hard to argue against its applicability and arguments 
against this ignore that this standard must include human weakness. Dressler, for 
example, refers to "an ordinary person, with an ordinary temper and ordinary feelings" 
finding a killing stemming from infidelity being sufficiently severe.
54
 
 
In Chapter 3 the rationale of the defence was described as being an excusable loss of 
self-control,
55
 meaning that the gravity test used ordinariness as the standard of 
comparison instead of warrant; such a standard embraces human weakness rather than 
upholding the values of society. Such a gravity test simply cannot be an adequate test 
for severe provocation.
56
 
 
If the standard is to be raised to that of warrant, as outlined in Chapter 3,
57
 then an 
interesting set of cases to inspect are those where the provocation is made more severe 
because D's response characteristics are his intolerant views. It was debateable if the 
ordinary standard incorporated such undesirable response characteristics:  
 
                                           
53 C. Wells, 'Provocation: The Case for Abolition' in A. Ashworth & B. Mitchell, Rethinking English Homicide Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2000) 86 
54 J. Dressler, When 'Heterosexual' Men Kill 'Homosexual' Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, 
and the 'Reasonable Man' Standard, (1995) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 3, 726, 748 
55 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n110-2) 
56 A similar argument was made in Chapter 4 when Dressler supported that the pre-2009 defence ought to allow for 
mitigation in the circumstances of a homosexual advance, see 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n55). 
57 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n113-31) 
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"the provocation defence is bound to encourage and exaggerate a view of 
human behaviour which is sexist, homophobic, and racist."
58
 
 
The gravity test sought to find how provocative something was and in doing that it 
allowed everything which may be considered that was relevant to be taken into account 
in order to give context.
59
 If D holds intolerant views towards a certain group then this 
had to be considered, and Horder has stated that this approach seemingly "dictate[s] 
that the jury should suspend commitments to fundamental liberal values".
60
 The 
standard can be distorted if, for example, the jury is asked to considered whether the 
ordinary racist would be provoked by the event. 
 
Dressler, on the other hand, has argued that the ordinary standard does not really allow 
for mitigation in these circumstances. He states that if society is made up of people who 
are homophobic it does not necessarily mean that the ordinary standard is compromised 
by such prejudice and intolerance: 
 
"the Ordinary Man may not possess 'idiosyncratic moral values' that 
manifest the actor's moral depravity and which render the person 
abnormally likely to take affront and lose self-control. This means that ... 
the Ordinary Man is not racist, anti-Semitic, or prejudiced against any 
class of persons. Thus, too, the Ordinary Man is not homophobic."
61
 
 
The question becomes whether the ordinary person standard rejects the attribution of 
these undesirable characteristics because the standard undeniably requires tolerance. 
As with self-control and how provocable we are,
62
 the ordinary standard requires 
minimum expectations with regards to what provokes us. Ordinariness must take on 
                                           
58 C. Wells, 'Provocation: The Case for Abolition' 85 
59 (n32) 
60 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1992) 143 
61 J. Dressler, When 'Heterosexual' Men Kill 'Homosexual' Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, 
and the 'Reasonable Man' Standard, (1995) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 3, 726, 757 
62 (n7-24) 
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board human weakness and this may include things which we should really not get 
provoked by as it is shaped by human experience and not an ideal. The pre-2009 law 
may have been wrong to find that everything must be considered by the jury in the 
gravity test but this was consistent with the more inward rationale of the defence. This 
became a fundamental problem as it was increasingly more interested in what people 
found provocative rather than upholding a standard and rejecting instances where 
people should not have lost their self-control.
63
 
 
As is outlined in Part IV, a warranted emotion standard could be constructed which 
allows for the contextualisation of the surrounding events but rejects the consideration of 
instances which are inconsistent with society's values. If the gravity test instead relies on 
warranted emotion it allows a straightforward question to be asked: was it right for D to 
get angry or fearful in the circumstances? This, as has already been discussed Chapter 
3, is consistent with the demands of mitigation in the provocation defence. It provides an 
evaluative element which ensures that the reason behind the killing deserves such 
understanding and the use of a justification in this manner still insists that the act of 
killing is to be condemned. 
 
c) control test & control characteristics 
The control test evaluates the conduct of D by comparing his behaviour to a standard 
and that standard ought to be that of the ordinary person. With the understanding which 
was given to the defence in Chapter 3
64
 there is the acknowledgement that D's conduct 
was excessive but mitigation is given because ordinary people can react in such manner 
when they are provoked; the control test has to account for this. Control characteristics 
are factors which help to describe D's own power of self-control but depending on which 
theory is followed on this matter the extent over how far these characteristics can be 
taken into account by the jury and attributed to the objective standard differs. This 
                                           
63 In 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' the central theme was the difference between the words 'provoked' and 
'provocation', this is the key indicator of this inward move. 
64 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n93-109) 
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section will explore the extent to which such characteristics should be able to alter the 
standard. 
 
Control characteristics have the ability to alter the question being asked to the jury. For 
example, in Camplin
65
 D was a fifteen-year-old boy. In a case like this the issue is 
whether a jury should judge D by the standards of self-control of a boy of fifteen years of 
age or an adult, who through maturity has greater self-control. Another example, as was 
given in Chapter 2,
66
 is that of Luc Thiet Thuan. In that case evidence suggested that D 
suffered from brain damage and was prone to respond to minor provocation by losing 
his self-control and acting explosively. If control characteristics were considered to a 
greater extent then the consequences of D's brain damage could potentially distort the 
ordinary person standard in the control test. 
 
It has already been discussed how the ordinary person test can be applied.
67
 The jury 
ought to be concerned with the minimum expected standards of behaviour which an 
ordinary person could demonstrate in the circumstances. It must be remembered that 
the ordinary person is not an ideal, it takes into account normal human frailty to 
provocation, and it is a standard and not meant to reflect an actual person. For example, 
in Camplin the jury were seeking to establish if a normal fifteen-year-old boy would have 
acted in a similar manner, not D himself; this allows for a comparison and not a re-hash 
of the subjective element. 
 
There are three theories which set out the approaches to the objective standard of self-
control.
68
 Chapter 2 outlined that the approach in Camplin was ultimately followed,
69
 that 
'normal' control characteristics of D, such as age and sex, could be attributed to the 
ordinary person. As Mitchell, Mackay and Brookbanks
70
 have stated, this approach, 
                                           
65 See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n58-9). 
66 [1997] AC 131 (PC). See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n76). 
67 (n7-24) 
68 These theories are outlined in J. Horder, 'Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility' (1999) 10 KCLJ 143 
69 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n71) 
70 (n6) 
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which demands D reaches this level of behaviour, needs to be justified. Through the 
discussion of these theories the greater merits of the Camplin approach will be shown. 
Each theory is a legitimate approach but if 'abnormal' control characteristics are 
considered then the defence moves further away from the common human frailty basis. 
 
i) strong excuse theory 
The strong excuse theory demands that the expected level of self-control does not 
fluctuate at all,
71
 everyone is judged by the standards of the ordinary person without 
taking into account any of D's control characteristics.
72
 This was the approach taken in 
Bedder.
73
 Bedder was incorrect on the issue of response characteristics,
74
 but the basis 
of the decision on control characteristics upheld previous findings which were consistent 
with a focus on demanding severe provocation:
75
 
 
"[T]he Bedder rule was itself designed to uphold the classical principle that 
provocation must be serious ... The flaw in the rule was the assumption 
that it was necessary to exclude evidence of personal characteristics in 
order to guarantee this result, when a rule excluding evidence of 
temperament would have sufficed."
76
 
 
 
The main thrust of the objection to the attribution of characteristics to the objective 
standard was that the whole purpose of the test was to make the comparison to a 
standard which showed that D's lack of restraint was not an individual difficulty but a 
                                           
71 J. Horder, 'Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility' 144: "defendants should be judged by an ordinary 
standard of conduct, whatever their individual capacity to reach that standard." 
72 Ibid: "no individual characteristics affecting someone's levels of self-control can be taken into account" 
73 In Part I Bedder was discussed in detail at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n132-40). 
74 Bedder also required that no response characteristics could be considered but this theory and the other two, 
below, are consistent with Camplin on that matter. Each of the three theories would permit contextual factors to be 
considered in the gravity test. 
75 The previous case law is further discussed at (n83-6). 
76 F.McAuley, 'Anticipating the Past: the Defence of Provocation in Irish Law' (1987) 50 MLR 133, 152 
 Chapter 5 - Objective Element    119 
 
frailty which is commonly possessed.
77
 Through creating a distinction between response 
and control characteristics and by appreciating that the gravity and control tests are 
linked but separate tests it is possible to contextualise the provocation but, at the same 
time, maintain an ordinary standard of behaviour. 
 
The reasons which support the ordinary person standard are twofold and both reasons 
can be contrasted to the outlook of the weak excuse theory, which is discussed later. 
Firstly, it is alleged that by holding all to the same standard it brings about equality in the 
assessment of D's reaction and such control characteristics would move the objective 
element away from common reactions to provocation to individual ones.
78
 Secondly, the 
defence of diminished responsibility ought to, and was designed to, be present for those 
who are unable to reach this standard, therefore there should be no pressure on the 
provocation defence to deal with such control characteristics. 
 
In the Canadian case of Hill the reasons which supported the ordinary person were set 
out: 
 
"The objective standard, therefore, may be said to exist in order to ensure 
that in the evaluation of the provocation defence there is no fluctuating 
standard of self-control against which accused are measured. The 
governing principles are those of equality and individual responsibility, so 
that all persons are held to the same standard notwithstanding their 
distinctive personality traits and varying capacities to achieve the 
standard."
79
 
                                           
77 Bedder 142 (Lord Simonds LC): "But this makes nonsense of the test. Its purpose is to invite the jury to consider 
the act of the accused by reference to a certain standard or norm of conduct ... If the reasonable man is then 
deprived in whole or in part of his reason ... the test ceases to have any value." 
Note that this is in line with the rationale of a general concession to a common human frailty. 
78 Ibid 145: "principles of justice and equality demand that we are all to be held to the same standards of conduct 
those that would be maintained by the ordinary adult." 
79 Hill (1986) 27 DLR (4th) 187, 210-211: "It is evident that any deviation from this objective standard against which 
an accused's level of self-control is measured necessarily introduces an element of inequality in the way in which 
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Judging all by the same standard, thereby producing a formal equality for D,
80
 is 
important for the provocation defence owing to the nature of the circumstances it covers, 
these are killings stemming from extreme emotions where the killing is not justified but 
condemned; D is seeking to be partially excused as he was provoked, the severity of the 
provocation and the natural impact which this would have on a person are the reasons 
why mitigation is offered.
81
 
 
Determining how far D's control characteristics ought to be considered is the equivalent 
to determining whether we offer mitigation because we are concerned with D responding 
to provocation like we would expect the ordinary person to or whether we offer mitigation 
because, taking into account his frailties, we understand that he personally would 
struggle to maintain his self-control even though the provocation would not produce such 
a reaction from an ordinary person. The former relying on the basis that we should hold 
all to account at the same level and the latter on that D should only be responsible for 
what he could actually be expected to do. Provocation having its place as a defence 
based on a partial denial of wrongdoing rather than responsibility, like diminished 
responsibility, relies on this standard being met. Failing to reach this standard shows that 
the killing stemmed from D's own failings and any move from this standard radically 
alters the defence which was outlined in Chapter 3. Allen is correct to state that "the 
whole raison d'être for the defence is undermined" if the ordinary person standard is not 
followed.
82
 
 
The second point which supports that provocation ought to rely on the ordinary person 
standard is that diminished responsibility exists to deal with those who are unable to 
meet such standards owing to abnormal control characteristics. Such agents should be 
                                                                                                                                   
the actions of different persons are evaluated and must therefore be avoided if the underlying principle that all 
persons are equally responsible for their actions is to be maintained." 
This is in reference to a moderate excuse theory, discussed below, but the principles of equality and justice support 
both theories. 
80 Arguments against this, that it perpetuates inequality, will be discussed below. 
81 A general or a normal human frailty to provocation was discussed at 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n93-109). 
82 M.J. Allen, 'Provocation's Reasonable Man: A Plea for Self-Control' 240 
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catered for in the capacity defence if these characteristics are sufficient. In the early 
twentieth century two cases, Alexander
83
 and Lesbini,
84
 held the position that D's mental 
abnormalities were not consistent with the defence.
85
 It would not be in line with the 
ordinary person to attribute such characteristics but also the provocation would not be 
severe enough, as has been discussed above, it would be the abnormality which was 
the real reason behind the killing:
86
 
 
"if the provocation was objectively slight, this suggests that the substantial 
cause of the loss of control was not the provocation but rather some 
weakness (or wickedness) in the accused's character, and the case, then 
becomes one of murder or mental abnormality – not provocation."87 
 
Diminished responsibility, on the other hand, is designed to deal with such abnormalities 
as it partially excuses because D is unable to reach a certain level of behaviour. 
Substantial impairment
88
 of powers of self-control are dealt with in this defence and at 
the time of drafting it was intended that this would be the route for such cases: 
 
"It has to be borne in mind in considering the law of provocation that a 
person with a disability of such a nature and degree as to make him 
acutely sensitive might be able to show that the provocation upon him had, 
because of his sensitivity, led to him having at the particular moment a 
disability amounting to a serious abnormality of mind. I simply draw 
attention to the fact that that type of situation might come within clause 
2."
89
 
                                           
83 (1914) 9 Cr App R 139 
84 [1914] 3 KB 1116 
85 These cases were discussed at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n134-7). 
86 Lesbini 1120: "it would not be provocation which ought to affect the mind of a reasonable man" 
87 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 308 
88 s2 Homicide Act 1957: Where a person kills or is party to a killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder 
if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental 
responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing. 
89 Attorney-General - HC Deb 1956-57, vol 561, col 505 
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In Smith (Morgan), where the majority went against this approach in order to follow a 
more inclusive or 'subjectivised' approach,
90
 the dissenting judgments were adamant 
that the standard of self-control ought to be the ordinary person and this distinction 
between provocation and diminished responsibility was based on these standards being 
met.
91
 
 
The arguments against such an approach will be brought out when discussing the other 
two theories, below, but mainly the weak excuse theory as it offers a direct contrast in 
approach to the strong excuse theory. The moderate excuse theory can be viewed as a 
more advanced form of this theory and most of what has been discussed here can 
equally be applied to that theory as they both rest upon a similar understanding and 
outlook of the defence. 
 
ii) moderate excuse theory 
The moderate excuse theory does not allow the attribution of any control characteristics 
which would compromise the ordinariness of the ordinary person.
92
 This was a similar 
approach to that taken in Camplin where it was viewed that age and sex were such 
                                                                                                                                   
'Case Comment: Homicide - Murder - Provocation - Characteristics of Reasonable Man', (2000) Crim LR Dec, 1004, 
1007: "In section 2, the Act deals with the person suffering from an abnormality of mind, in section 3 with the 
reasonable person." 
90 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n77-81) 
91 Smith (Morgan) 212 (Lord Millett) (dissenting): "persons who cannot help what they do are intended to be 
catered for by the defence of diminished responsibility. The defence of provocation should be reserved for those 
who can and should control themselves, but who make an understandable and (partially) excusable response if 
sufficiently provoked." 
"The potential availability of this defence in these cases underlines the importance of not viewing the defence of 
provocation in isolation from the defence of diminished responsibility. These two defences must be read together 
to obtain an overall, balanced view of the law in this field." (Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580, 
594) One reading of this is that provocation deals with the normal characteristics and diminished responsibility 
deals with the abnormal characteristics. That would also be consistent with the supporting of the Camplin 
approach. 
92 J. Horder, 'Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility' 145: "defendants should be judged by an ordinary 
standard of conduct, unless their capacity to reach the standard is inhibited by a natural and normal factor, such as 
age." 
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characteristics.
93
 In that case the objective standard was altered and the adequacy of 
the provocation was judged by the effect it would have on a fifteen-year-old boy rather 
than an adult. In contrast, in a case like Luc Thiet Thuan, D's brain damage would not 
succeed as it is not an ordinary factor and it would allow for a fluctuating standard of 
self-control in the test.
94
 The moderate theory seeks to built on the strong theory by only 
including limited variables.
95
 For example, the quotation from the Canadian case of 
Hill,
96
 which discusses the need for objectivity to bring about equality, was in reference 
to a moderate excuse theory where age was being employed as a control characteristic. 
 
The approach taken in Camplin was strongly influenced by Ashworth; he stated that 
"provocation is for those who are in a broad sense mentally normal"
97
 and that 
"individual peculiarities" should only be relevant in the gravity test and not the control 
test.
98
 Therefore, by following this approach it is possible to draw a clear distinction 
between response and control characteristics. This was forcefully advanced by the 
judgments which favoured this approach as the dissent in Smith (Morgan) by Lord 
Millett
99
 and Lord Hobhouse demonstrates: 
 
"Where relevant the age or gender of the defendant should be referred to 
since they are not factors which qualify the criterion of ordinariness. But 
language which qualifies or contradicts such ordinariness must be 
avoided."
100
 
                                           
93 Camplin 718 (Lord Diplock): "a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of 
the sex and age of the accused". 
94 J. Horder, 'Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility' 145: "broadly speaking ... mental infirmities or 
abnormalities are characteristics which must be ignored when considering what standard of self-control D could 
reasonably be expected to meet, in the face of the provocation in issue." 
95 S. Christie, 'Provocation-Pushing the Reasonable Man Too Far?' (2000) 64 JCL 409, 415: "insists that certain 
standards of self-control are met, with very limited concessions to universal characteristics which affect ability to 
achieve such a standard. Any extension to this test subjectivises the concept of the reasonable man too much." 
96 (n79) 
97 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' 292, 312 
98 Ibid 300 
99 (n91) 
100 Smith (Morgan) 205 (Lord Hobhouse): "It is the standard of ordinary not an abnormal self-control that has to be 
used. It is the standard which conforms to what everyone is entitled to expect of their fellow citizens in society as it 
is." 
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The control characteristics which are able to be considered by the jury are not therefore 
peculiarities or abnormalities but can be described as 'normal', 'natural' and 'universal' 
factors which influence the levels of self-control which a person possesses. It will be 
argued, however, that age and sex ought to only have a limited role and their inclusion 
should be narrowly defined in order to maintain a stringent objective standard which only 
deviates because of one factor: natural immaturity; both of these control characteristics 
have a role to play in setting an appropriate level of self-control for young people. 
 
Age 
In Camplin age was described as "a universal quality not a personal idiosyncrasy".
101
 
The Court of Appeal found that young people "are given special privileges by the law" 
and it would be contradictory if the provocation defence "should be construed as putting 
youth at a special disadvantage."
102
 In the House of Lords it was stated that "to require 
old heads upon young shoulders is inconsistent with the law's compassion to human 
infirmity".
103
 The former being a policy issue and the latter ensuring that the reasons why 
this is done is to do with it being consistent with the defence's rationale. It is clear that it 
would be inappropriate to define youth as an abnormality
104
 in comparison, for example, 
to an adult who lacks normal levels of maturity for a person of his age. The real 
characteristic which is being considered through age is the expected maturity of 
someone who is D's age and this was explained in the Court of Appeal: 
 
                                           
101 Camplin 724 (Lord Simon) 
102 Camplin (CofA) 262 (Bridge LJ) 
An example of treating young people differently comes from the case of Gillick [1986] AC 112. In Gillick it was 
decided the age for effective consent is determined by the "child’s maturity and understanding and the nature of 
the consent required." 
103 Camplin 717 (Lord Diplock) 
104 J. Horder, 'Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility' 145: "youth - with all its occasional 
unpredictability - is no mental abnormality" 
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"youth, and the immaturity which naturally accompanies youth, are not 
deviations from the norm; they are norms through which we must all of us 
have passed before attaining adulthood and maturity."
105
 
 
To consider maturity rather than age would undermine the objective approach taken in 
Camplin and would allow personal peculiarities regarding under-developed maturity to 
alter the expected standard of self-control.
106
 On this point, the Law Commission 
confirms that it "would be complicated and would go a significant way to undermining the 
objective test".
107
 Age has been described as "a rough and ready way of marking 
maturity"
108
 and this supports its inclusion as a control characteristic under this approach 
as for an ordinary person a level of maturity ought correspond to their age.
109
 Therefore, 
age is both consistent with the rationale of human frailty and does not compromise the 
ordinary person standard. 
 
If special consideration is being given to maturity through age then there is a point at 
which there is no longer a need to give it such consideration. When a person reaches a 
certain age then they are expected to behave in a manner which is befitting of an adult 
and ought to exhibit such restraint. At this point it is not appropriate for the objective 
standard to make such allowances. In Ali
110
 D was aged twenty but it was found that the 
expected level of self-control of a person aged twenty was the same as any adult 
male.
111
 At 18 a person is expected to behave like an adult and the reason why maturity 
                                           
105 Camplin (CofA) 261 (Bridge LJ) 
106 Camplin 724 (Lord Simon): "If youth is to be considered (and, presumably, advanced years too), what about 
immaturity in a person of full years or premature senility? These would seem to fall on the other, on the Bedder, 
side of the line [and be viewed as a 'personal idiosyncrasy']." 
107 Law Commission: Partial Defence to Murder – Final Report (2004) 60 [3.130] 
108 A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 - Partial Defences to Murder (1) Loss of control, (2010) 4 Crim LR 
275, 281 
109 T. Macklem & J. Gardner, 'Provocation and Pluralism' 836: "Notice that the answer is not a function of the self-
control that he actually has, nor of the self-control that people of his age generally have, but rather of the self-
control that he and they ought to have if they are to be fit to call themselves proper, self-respecting teenagers." 
110 [1989] Crim LR 736 
111 Ibid. "It is in our judgment inconceivable that the jury would have found any difference in answering that 
question by considering a reasonable man of 20 or a reasonable man of any other age." 
A benefit of this approach is that it makes the objective element more straightforward by not including erroneous 
factors: "There may well be occasions when a direction to the jury about considering an ordinary person of the sex 
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is considered, a greater human frailty, is not present. In the next section it will be argued 
that consideration of sex does have a role when taking into account maturity through 
age. 
 
Sex 
In Camplin, alongside age, sex was considered as a control characteristic which could 
be considered by the jury to vary the ordinary person standard. Therefore, in that case 
the ordinary person was attributed with the age, and accompanying maturity, of a fifteen-
year-old and being male. In the judgment not a lot was said to justify sex's inclusion as a 
control characteristic but reference was made to "the 'reasonable woman' as a standard" 
and its equivalency to age as a factor which was normal and natural: 
 
"It could be said that the law, in distinguishing from personal idiosyncrasy 
something universal like age, was doing no more than it had already done 
in distinguishing implicitly something universal like sex."
112
 
 
Sex does fit the criteria of being a normal characteristic, however whether it does impact 
on levels of self-control and, even if it does, if it ought to be considered are issues which 
suggest its inclusion is not clear cut. Authorities have suggested that its inclusion could 
go against a key principle of the moderate control theory: equality. The Law Commission 
have stated that "the criminal law should be gender neutral unless it is absolutely 
necessary to depart from that principle"
113
 and the Western Australian Law Commission 
have stated that "recognising 'these differences would breach the principle of equality 
before the law'."
114
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
and age of the accused ... will be totally unnecessary and as likely as not distract them from the other matters which 
they have to consider and which are of importance." 
112 Camplin 724 (Lord Simon) 
113 Law Commission: Partial Defence to Murder – Final Report (2004) 49 [3.78] 
114 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia – Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report, (2007) No 97, 
Chapter 4, 207 
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Sex's inclusion makes it more difficult for women to succeed in meeting the objective 
standard of self-control as it is commonly held that women do not lose their self-control 
as easily as men. The provocation defence favours male violence
115
 and with this being 
considered it can only add to concerns over gender bias as it acknowledges that there 
are differences which need to be taken into account by a jury.
116
 The difficulties in 
considering sex as a control characteristic mean that it ought not to be normally taken 
into account. The objective standard has at its core the principle of equality and 
assessing all D's by a fairly inflexible standard. If sex is included then the two halves of 
the population have a different standard and there seems no necessity, as the Law 
Commission see fit to demand, for differences based on sex to be considered. 
 
Also, there is the view that sex does not impact on provocability but provocativeness, in 
that sex helps to shape the factual situation in terms of, for example, the strength of the 
parties and their ability to defend themselves:
117
 
 
"Whilst men and women may evaluate the gravity of particular 
provocations in different ways, it seems unlikely that their powers of self-
control when responding to these provocations are different."
118
 
 
In Ahluwalia, discussed above,
119
 it is difficult to appreciate the relevance of considering 
that D was a woman when determining the expected level of self-control. If we would not 
expect a man to maintain his self-control in a scenario it simply cannot be found that the 
                                           
115 For example, the quote from Dressler used previously at 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n50): "men are the 
predominant beneficiaries of a doctrine that mitigates intentional homicides to manslaughter." 
A. Howe, 'Mastering Emotions or Still Losing Control? Seeking Public Engagement with "Sexual Infidelity" Homicide' 
(2013) 21 Fem Leg Stud 141, 148: "it can only serve to reinforce the notion, clearly illustrated in hundreds of years 
of case law, that men have less self-control than women in the face of 'infidelity'." 
116 S. Yeo, 'Ethnicity and the Objective Test in Provocation' (1987-88) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 67, 72: 
Yeo has asserted that "it is difficult to appreciate why this characteristic should be relevant at all" and as women 
would be "unfairly disadvantaged" it should not be considered. 
117 L.J. Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women' 1701: "a woman's reasonable response to physical violence is 
likely to be different from a man's because of her size, strength, and socialization." 
118 J. Horder, 'Provocation's 'Reasonable Man' Reassessed', 39: "There is, then, clearly life left in the debate over the 
applicability of the 'Camplin distinction'." 
119 (n47) 
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defence imposes a conviction for murder instead of manslaughter on a woman simply 
because of her sex. To contrast, with regards to the gravity test, sex can help to 
contextualise what occurred as it is a factor which may add to the vulnerability of a 
person's position. If considerations are made about a woman's expected level of self-
control then it can only prejudice women and there does not seem to be any reason to 
depart from the objective standard that all should be judged equally. 
 
There should, however, be a limited role for sex when taking into account maturity. The 
defence gives special consideration to maturity through age. In the process of gaining 
maturity there are differences based on sex in how boys and girls go through puberty. 
Girls reach a state of maturity more quickly, therefore when taking into account age 
consideration should be given to the lower expected level of self-control of boys. In 
Camplin the standard was that of a fifteen-year-old boy, this ought to be considered the 
most provocable group which can fall within the ordinary standard. This limited level of 
flexibility over teenagers, particularly male teenagers, would make the control test more 
realistic by accommodating uncontroversial views which exist over maturity. 
 
Culture and ethnicity 
A control characteristic which was not incorporated into the objective standard was 
culture and ethnicity.
120
 It would be wrong to describe culture as a personal peculiarity as 
it is an ordinary factor in shaping a person's ability for self-control. Yeo states that to 
describe culture as akin to being "unusually excitable or pugnacious" goes "well beyond 
what was contemplated in cases such as Lesbini."
121
 He goes on to state that ruling out 
abnormal control characteristics has been to do with "mental deficiencies of individuals 
and not whole communities."
122
 Nevertheless, it is clear that this factor is not as apparent 
or as straightforward as age. Immigration means that different groups are a part of the 
same society and this means that questions such as the one Brown asked become 
                                           
120 In Australia the case of Masciantonio (1995) 183 CLR 58 found that ethnicity and cultural background could 
potentially be included as control characteristics. 
121 S. Yeo, 'Ethnicity And The Objective Test In Provocation' 73 
122 Ibid 
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important: "should the test of a 'reasonable Englishman' give way in such cases to that 
of the 'reasonable Jamaican' and the 'reasonable Italian' who is living in England'?"
123
 
 
If a group did have a different temperament to the minimum expected by society then to 
hold them to a higher standard than they can fairly be expected to meet may create a 
problematic situation, and possibly the equivalent situation to holding a teenager to 
account at the same level as adult.
124
 However, finding that culture is an applicable 
control characteristic creates two issues which mean it is unsuitable under a moderate 
excuse theory. Firstly, similarly to including sex, it is a sensitive matter and to recognise 
differing levels of self-control may be incorrect: "any assertion that one cultural group 
has a different capacity for self-control than another is mere speculation and potentially 
offensive."
125
 Secondly, culture is difficult to define accurately,
126
 so it would compromise 
the objective standard and move away from the formal equality which is the basis of this 
approach. Christie asserts that whilst "they are not peculiar to the individual" they are not 
"universal", meaning that they are factors which are "relatively indeterminate and 
therefore unsuitable for inclusion".
127
 
 
It is possible to hold certain groups to a lower expected level of self-control than the 
majority. During the 1950s in the Northern Territory, Australia KriewaIdt J consistently 
found that Aboriginal groups should not be judged by the Anglo-Saxon standards.
128
 For 
                                           
123 B. Brown, 'The "Ordinary Man" In Provocation: Anglo-Saxon Attitudes And "Unreasonable Non-Englishmen"' 
(1963) 13 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 203, 225 
124 S. Yeo, 'Ethnicity and the Objective Test in Provocation' 72: "A migrant to England or Australia would, in most 
cases, have already been deeply conditioned by the customs and traditions of his native land. These customs and 
traditions would have moulded his emotions and personality to such a degree that altering them in any significant 
manner would be extremely difficult." 
125 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia – Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report, (2007) No 97, 
Chapter 4, 207 
126 R. Cotterrell, 'Law in Culture' (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 1, 8: "What are the conditions for, and limitations on, the 
invocation of 'culture'? What defines the specificity of any particular culture and what should determine when 
'cultural' considerations should apply or not apply? The difficulty is ultimately that of the vagueness of the concept 
of culture." 
127 S. Christie, 'Provocation-Pushing the Reasonable Man Too Far?' 415 
128 H. Douglas, 'Assimilation And Authenticity: The 'Ordinary Aboriginal Person' and the Provocation Defence' (2006) 
27 Adelaide LR 199, 207 
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example, in Muddarubba
129
 the standard for D was that of a member of the Pitjintjara 
tribe. Douglas explains that this separate standard was with the aim of assisting 
assimilation between Aboriginal groups and the wider population: 
 
"The judge accepted that one role of the law was to assist Aboriginal 
people to learn civilised ways of behaving so that they would gradually 
become 'useful' members of society."
130
 
 
These views were expressed in the 1950s and the language seems to be based on 
stereotypes. If this sort of approach was being justified today, for it to have legitimacy, it 
would need to focus on real, scientifically proven differences between cultures. Despite 
the argument in favour of assisting assimilation Douglas goes on to state that instead 
this approach encourages and highlights differences.
131
 In order to fall under the 
definition of an 'ordinary Aboriginal person', and therefore the lower standard, D must 
have demonstrated that the culture of the majority had not impacted on him and that he 
is authentically Aboriginal by relying on stereotypes of that culture: the case can become 
a test of D's authenticity. 
 
The grounding for the moderate excuse theory is in providing formal equality, holding 
everyone to the same standard but making allowances which are consistent with 
ordinariness. It has been discussed how culture is not a peculiarity but nor is it a factor 
which would not compromise the ordinary objective standard as it is not universal; it is 
therefore difficult to place. There may be sympathy for recent immigrants being judged 
by a higher standard when they have been brought up in a different culture.
132
 It is 
possible to view that in this scenario there is room within the concept of human frailty to 
                                           
129 [1951-1976] NTJ 317 
130 H. Douglas, 'Assimilation And Authenticity' 201-2: "Kriewaldt J assumed that Aboriginal Defendants, in their 
current state of assimilation and civilisation, were more likely than others to retaliate with violence and that they 
might be slower to 'cool down'". 
131 Ibid 207: "it often becomes caught up in attempts to essentialise culture, by relying on cultural stereotypes. The 
concept of Aboriginal authenticity is related to the idea of being uncivilised or unassimilated." 
132 S. Yeo, 'Ethnicity And The Objective Test In Provocation' 79: "the recent adult immigrant has not been given the 
same opportunity of exposure ... [T]he principle of equality demands that the law should take this factor into 
consideration." 
 Chapter 5 - Objective Element    131 
 
consider culture and ethnicity. The difference with this and differences based on maturity 
is that ordinariness is advanced through these considerations, by including culture and 
ethnicity it creates uncertainty and it is a factor which, unlike immaturity, is not applicable 
to all. It would be a move away from formal equality.
133
 Therefore, in much the same way 
as a general control characteristic for sex would be, the purpose of making an allowance 
for culture is not strong enough to outweigh the considerations against as it would lead 
to a highly contestable ordinary standard which could be seen to be offensive. 
 
iii) weak excuse theory 
The weak excuse theory is a standard which incorporates D's abnormalities, therefore D 
would still have to reach a standard but it would not be an ordinary one;
134
 it would be a 
standard of self-control which D could be fairly expected to reach and this is the force 
behind the theory, that the strong and moderate theories demand a level that some 
people simply cannot meet, or would find it very difficult to do so, and this is too harsh, 
especially given the seriousness of offence and punishment which is involved.
135
 Lord 
Steyn stated that expecting ordinary standards from all created "crude and unfair 
results".
136
 In Smith (Morgan) it was stated that, put simply, "[t]he purpose of the 
objective element in provocation is to mark the distinction between (partially) excusable 
and inexcusable loss of self-control."
137
 A weak excuse theory finds that a partially 
excusable loss of self-control can stem from when D is provoked but kills when an 
ordinary person would not, this is because the reason can be attributed to his 
abnormality. 
 
It is important to note that not all abnormalities or peculiarities are considered under the 
weak theory. In Chapter 2 it was discussed how only characteristics which were viewed 
as just could alter the objective standard in order to reject factors which are wholly 
                                           
133 Equality will be further discussed, below, in the section relating to the weak excuse theory. 
134 J. Horder, 'Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility' 145: "defendants should be judged by the 
standard of what could be reasonably be expected of the individual in question." 
135 Ibid 158: "the theory that judges a defendant in the light of the standards he could, as an individual, be expected 
to reach, however inadequate they may be." 
136 Luc Thiet Thuan 150 (Lord Steyn) 
137 Smith (Morgan) 169 (Lord Hoffmann) 
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inconsistent with the defence,
138
 for example, self-induced control characteristics and 
"exceptional pugnacity or excitability".
139
 The thrust of this approach is that D is not 
responsible for these abnormalities
140
 and he should not be excluded from the defence if 
D met 'his' objective standard: 
 
"some persons may be incapable of attaining a common standard or may 
face such severe difficulties in attaining it that, even if it is conceivably 
within their reach, it would be unjust to blame them for having failed to 
grasp it ... 
[Therefore,] it is necessary to construct personalised standards under 
which comparisons are made with other people who have the relevant 
handicap".
141
 
 
Samuels stated, before Smith (Morgan), that the test ought to incorporate everything 
that we know about D in order to set an expected level of self-control which "that man" 
could conform to.
142
 
 
A critique of the weak excuse theory comes from looking at the role of standards and 
equality in the defence and, also, inspecting provocation's relationship with diminished 
responsibility. Viewing the objective element in this manner, replacing the concession to 
human frailty from a general to an individual one, means that the footing of the defence 
                                           
138 B. Fitzpatrick & A. Reed, 'Sound of Mind and Body' 368: "How does one go about rationalising a list of control 
characteristics? What is it that makes battered wife syndrome, obsessive traits and attention-seeking behaviour 
akin to age and sex? ... It is something to do with the inherent 'reasonableness' of exhibiting these characteristics 
(which may be akin to the unavoidable reasonableness of being of a particular age and sex)?" 
139 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n79-81) 
140 B.J. Mitchell,  R.D. Mackay & W.J. Brookbanks, 'Pleading for provoked killers' 51: "If age (and perhaps sex) can 
justify different levels of self-control the same should be true of other characteristics which, through no fault of the 
individual, affect the ability to regulate his or her response when provoked." 
141 E. Colvin, 'Ordinary and Reasonable People' 202. Also, at 227: "Allowance should be made for relevant cognitive 
or volitional handicaps for which an accused cannot be held responsible. Justice demands this flexibility." 
And, at 205: "justice demands that objective tests be sufficiently flexible to accommodate handicaps for which an 
accused cannot be held responsible." 
142 A. Samuels, 'Excusable Loss of Self-Control in Homicide' 168-9: "What the jury should be required to do is to fix 
upon the proper norm of behaviour to be expected from that man in that situation and then to judge whether or 
not he acted in conformity with it." 
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changes. It brings provocation closer to diminished responsibility
143
 in the way which D 
no longer has to reach the ordinary standard and trivial provocation can be the basis for 
the defence; taking into account peculiarities only helps to secure mitigation for those 
who kill when restraint or reason is lacking. Throughout, it has been stressed that 
mitigation requires understanding in light of the general human frailty and, in doing so, 
D's reasons and level of behaviour need to meet society's standard. To highlight the 
differences, it has been stated that provocation tells an "everyman's story" and in 
contrast diminished responsibility tells "a very personal story",
144
 and, as Da Souza 
states, it is the difference between creating a vacuum and striking a chord with 
society.
145
 
 
If D's abnormality is so severe that it is necessary for it to be considered then it is up to 
the capacity defence to admit the abnormality. Macklem and Gardner's discussion of 
battered women's syndrome highlights this, a provocation defence based on the weak 
excuse theory is essentially diminished responsibility and by following this theory we 
lose the merits of the provocation defence and distort what has actually occurred, that D 
has killed owing to his abnormality not because he faced adequate provocation: 
 
"[By abandoning] standards altogether ... there is no question of judging 
the reactions of battered women, of seeing whether they are up to scratch, 
of assessing them as reasonable ... This is, of course, quite literally to 
diminish their responsibility by abandoning any claim that they are people 
who can be judged by standards, in this case by standards of self-control. 
This makes the whole exercise of accommodation self-defeating, however, 
                                           
143 B.J. Mitchell,  R.D. Mackay & W.J. Brookbanks, 'Pleading for provoked killers' 703: "provocation ought properly to 
be recognised as a plea of partial responsibility and as such operates in a manner broadly similar to diminished 
responsibility." 
144 S.P. Garvey, Passion's Puzzle (2005) 90 Iowa LR 1677, 1740 
C. De Souza, 'Diminished Responsibility: A Less Vindicatory Excuse Than Provocation' (2005) 17 SAcLJ 793, 793: 
"Within the sphere of diminished responsibility, law and psychiatry work together by matching wrongful acts with 
the actor's appropriate level of culpability." However, in provocation it "focuses on an objective enquiry into the 
reason why the killer lost self-control." 
145 C. De Souza, 'Diminished Responsibility' 817: "This creates a vacuum between society and the defendant who 
argues diminished responsibility – the reasonable man is not present to 'strike a chord' with the defendant, and this 
detachment generates less societal-vindication." 
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since the whole point of pleading provocation rather than diminished 
responsibility is to garner the respect and self-respect that flows from 
being judged by the proper standards."
146
 
 
The weak excuse theory strives to remove the formal equality which is imposed under a 
strong or moderate excuse theory and replace it with substantive equality, where 
individuals differences are taken into account in objective standards. For some, formal 
equality is argued to be "illusory" and may serve "to perpetuate inequality":
147
 "because it 
ignores differences in capacities to meet the standard, [it] generates substantive 
inequalities".
148
 
 
Provocation is a peculiar defence in that it regulates such behaviour by comparing D's 
act with how a person would act whilst at the same time also condemning the act. 
Mitigation is available only because of the understanding that an ordinary person may 
over-react and kill when subjected to severe provocation, this common human frailty is 
outside of the scope of murder. It is only by making such a comparison with the act of an 
ordinary person in the control test that the defence has any standing. With diminished 
responsibility in place there is no reason to follow a weak excuse theory and thereby 
lose the reasoning of the provocation defence. It is better to maintain a distinction 
between provocation and diminished responsibility and respect the purpose and 
qualities of each defence; it is only if they are understood correctly that they can then 
operate appropriately and cohesively. 
 
The idea of merging provocation and abnormal control characteristics together would be 
problematic. As provocation demands severe provocation, as outlined in the discussion 
on the gravity test above,
149
 including such control characteristics would be inappropriate 
                                           
146 T. Macklem & J. Gardner, 'Provocation and Pluralism' 827 
C. Morgan, 'Loss of Self-control: Back to the Good Old Days' (2013) 77 JCL 119, 130: "the underlying rationale for 
both defences is entirely different." 
147 D.A. Donovan & S.M. Wildman, 'Is The Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and 
Provocation' (1981) 14 Loy LALR 435, 465 
148 E. Colvin, 'Ordinary and Reasonable People' 225-6 
149 A weak excuse theory would be inconsistent with basing the anger or fear on a justification as has been outlined. 
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when D is claiming that they faced severe provocation. In the Australian case of Green 
the unsuitability of a weak excuse theory was stated: 
 
"[This would allow] jury verdicts and outcomes which would seriously 
offend the community's sense of justice by apparently indulging, or 
condoning, unrestrained 'human ferocity'. It would sanction excessive 
conduct which allowed head-strong, violent people to take the law into 
their own hands in a way which no civilized society could permit."
150
 
 
It has been stated that the weak excuse theory stems from "a judicial concern for greater 
fairness"
151
 and that "cognitive—and not just emotional—dysfunction has considerable 
moral relevance".
152
 If a proper distinction is made between provocation and diminished 
responsibility then it is possible for diminished responsibility to deal with cases of 
cognitive dysfunction and for the basis of provocation not to be destroyed. De Souza 
supports the finding that there is a link between the provocation and society through the 
objective test, by meeting the required standards it "cultivates more empathy for the 
offender".
153
 Formal equality is necessary for provocation but it is with the understanding 
that diminished responsibility is present to handle these cases which are outside its 
scope. 
 
In the US case of Maher it was stated that by taking into account the higher provocability 
of a person "a bad man might acquire a claim to mitigation which would not be available 
to better men."
154
 The point of the distinction between the two partial defences is not to 
state that those who cannot reach the standard are bad men who deserve no sympathy, 
it is that a different set of rules needs to be applied to their cases. There is no point in 
applying normal criteria to those who struggle to reach it, but for those who can then by 
reaching this standard it means that they killed owing to human frailty: "For the 
                                           
150 (1997) 148 ALR 659 (Kirby J) 
151 M.J. Allen, 'Provocation's Reasonable Man: A Plea for Self-Control' 239 
152 R.G. Fontaine, 'The Wrongfulness Of Wrongly Interpreting Wrongfulness: Provocation, Interpretational Bias, And 
Heat Of Passion Homicide' (2009) 12 NCLR 1, 69, 71 
153 C. De Souza, 'Diminished Responsibility' 816 
154 Maher v People (1863) 10 Mich 212, 221 
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excusatory logic of the provocation defence is not the logic of lowering standards but the 
logic of upholding them."
155
 
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter demonstrates that the objective element can be split into two tests and that 
certain characteristics or circumstances can be applied to each: the gravity test is 
concerned with relevant response characteristics and the control test is concerned with 
ordinary control characteristics. The gravity test and its links to ordinariness help to 
explain the problems with the pre-2009 defence, in that it is actually necessary to ask if 
the emotion was warranted unless there are cases in which requiring ordinary anger is 
simply not a strong enough test to ensure mitigation should take place. The control test, 
however, needs this link to ordinary standards of behaviour as the test cannot ask too 
much of agents and it should also not take into account any of D's abnormalities or 
peculiarities as the defence is not seeking to mitigate based on D's level of responsibility 
but on their level of wrongdoing. 
 
A moderate theory was the correct approach for the pre-2009 defence to take as it only 
allows normal control characteristics to alter the standard. Normal immaturity is the only 
control characteristic in which a clear case can be made through including age up to the 
point of adulthood and when this is considered differences based on sex in teenagers 
could be taken into account. Therefore, a narrower role for control characteristics in the 
control test compared to the pre-2009 defence, originally in Camplin and then eventually 
after Holley, would be more appropriate. 
 
In Chapter 3 the rationale of warranted emotion was introduced and this would allow for 
the gravity test to enforce a warranted standard but for the control test still to be based 
on ordinariness.
156
 This solution ensures that the correct framework can exist in the 
objective element but greater detail still needs to be given to the gravity test so that it 
can operate appropriately and uphold society's standards on what valid provocation 
ought to be.
157
 
                                           
155 T. Macklem & J. Gardner, 'Provocation and Pluralism' 830 
156 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n113-31) 
157 This will be discussed in Part IV. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT 
The final area of critique for the pre-2009 provocation defence regards the subjective 
element. It has previously been demonstrated, in the preceding chapters of Part II, that 
the rationale, the sufficient evidence test and the objective element required reform in 
order to bring about a better functioning partial defence. Along with the gravity and 
control tests which form the objective element, the subjective enquiry is one of the three 
necessary requirements;
1
 D must experience an emotion which stems from being 
provoked, a reaction which is commonly described as the formation of 'heated blood'.
2
 
 
The pre-2009 defence asked whether D had lost his self-control. There was an 
understanding that D's loss of self-control was merely partial,
3
 it was not irresistible and 
D was not compelled to kill. This description of the concept fits into the rationale of 
partial excuse and form of partial excuse which the pre-2009 defence adopted, 
excusable loss of self-control.
4
 Provocation is a partial excuse because its impact on 
choice brings about a difficulty for D to have done otherwise. The loss of self-control 
concept is an apparent form of this difficulty, by D demonstrating that the impact of the 
provocation was that he was no longer in control of his actions it is an obvious signifier 
that D's reaction stemmed from the provocation and not, for example, a part of a plan to 
kill V. 
 
The pre-2009 defence dealt with the subjective element in two areas. Firstly, one of the 
key criticisms was that the judge's sufficient evidence test was entirely subjective, 
meaning that anything which provoked D and caused a loss of self-control could 
                                           
1 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n9) 
2 All these three elements are required in order for mitigation to be appropriate and fulfil the human frailty 
understanding which the defence rests on, see 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n93-109). 
3 Phillips [1969] 2 AC 130. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n24). 
4 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n110-2). It was stated that there were three possible versions of the partial excuse which 
contained all the necessary elements, the others being warranted emotion/excuse and warranted loss of self-
control. 
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proceed to the jury.
5
 Secondly, the task for the jury was to then determine if D had, in 
fact, lost his self-control at the time of the killing. 
 
This Chapter will explore whether the loss of self-control requirement was able to 
function in a correct fashion. It is not necessary that loss of self-control is a part of the 
defence, it is just required that there is some form of subjective test which reflects the 
difference between when D is wronged and then kills because he was provoked and 
when D is wronged, reflects on this, and then decides to engage in a reprisal. The line 
between the two concepts, provocation and revenge, can be thin
6
 and is summed up in 
commonly used terms 'heated blood' and 'cold blood'. In psychology the terms 
instrumental violence and reactive violence attempt to represent this distinction
7
 and this 
is basically the foundation of the seventeenth defence where implied malice was 
removed by the finding that the killing was not based on a long standing ill-will towards 
the victim.
8
 In concurrence with the Law Commission, which saw loss of self-control as 
"a valiant but flawed attempt to encapsulate" the distinction between provocation and 
revenge,
9
 in this Chapter it will be advanced that that the loss of self-control element, 
which only took hold in the provocation defence in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries,
10
 was not able to make this distinction and a much simpler subjective test 
ought to be used. There are three inter-related lines of criticism for the use and retention 
of loss of self-control. 
                                           
5 See, in particular, 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n26-9). It was advanced that there ought to be an objective 
component to this test, rather than a purely subjective test it ought to be asked if there was anything which could 
be described as provocation instead of asking whether D felt as if he was provoked. 
6 R. Holton & S. Shute, 'Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence', (2007) 27 OJLS 1, 49, 63: "It is often said 
that loss of self-control is inconsistent with motives of revenge or punishment. We suspect, however, that a desire 
for revenge or punishment is present in almost every case in which self-control is lost as a result of provocation." 
7 R.G. Fontaine, The Wrongfulness Of Wrongly Interpreting Wrongfulness: Provocation, Interpretational Bias, And 
Heat Of Passion Homicide (2009) 12 New Criminal Law Review 1, 69, 79: "Whereas instrumental (or proactive or 
predatory) violence is typically premeditated, goal-driven, and committed in cold blood, reactive (or hostile or 
affective) violence is characterized as hot-blooded, emotional, and enacted in retaliation to social stimuli that are 
perceived to be provocative and wrongful." 
8 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n2-14) 
9 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 36 [3.30]: "a judicially invented concept, 
lacking sharpness or a clear foundation in psychology". 
10 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1992) 2:"Most commentators thus make this 
conception of anger [loss of self-control] their theoretical lynchpin. That is a mistake." It is only a fairly modern term 
used to mitigate killings and Chapter 1 shows that provocation did not initially rest on such a basis. 
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a) loss of self-control is imprecise 
A criticism of loss of self-control was that it was not precise enough. In an effort to 
describe it there was a need to resort to metaphor and this obviously did not bring about 
clarity, in terms of the psychological processes and effects which needed to take place.
11
 
It would be expected that such a requirement, being a specific type of reaction, would 
have rested on a proper understanding rather vague terms. The judgment in the case of 
Duffy
12
 is the most significant example of this: 
 
"a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so 
subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his 
mind."
13
 (emphasis added) 
 
The loss of self-control element developed from being something close to temporary 
insanity into being described as a partial loss of self-control;
14
 this ensures that D can be 
considered an agent and does not fall outside criminal responsibility. In his judgment in 
Duffy Devlin J also went on to discuss that this would rule out revenge from the defence 
as it removes opportunity for time for reflection,
15
 and this highlights the underlying 
function of the subjective element.
16
 Therefore, the subjective element's function is 
merely to demonstrate where the provocation has taken effect on the agent. 
 
                                           
11 G. Orchard has stated that "positive descriptions of what is required always employ highly metaphorical 
language" ('Provocation – Recharacterisation of 'Characteristics'' (1996) 6 Canterbury LR 202, 202) and J. Horder has 
stated that "it might be thought to be more metaphorically than psychologically descriptive" ('Reshaping the 
Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence' (2005) OJLS  25 (1) 123, 126). 
12 [1949] 1 All ER 932 
13 Ibid 933 
14 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n65-9) 
15 [1949] 1 All ER 932: "whether there was what is sometimes called time for cooling, that is, for passion to cool and 
for reason to gain dominion over the mind. That is why most acts of provocation are cases of sudden quarrels ... 
where there has been no time for reflection." 
16 A. Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of Provocation' (1976) 35(2) Cambridge Law Journal 292, 314: "the subjective 
condition operates to distinguish between an uncontrolled reaction to provocation and deliberate revenge." 
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The following section attempts to define and describe the concept as far as it is possible 
to do so and after that another concept, emotional disturbance, will be discussed, as this 
has been adopted as the subjective element in some jurisdictions. 
 
i) loss of self-control 
There have been attempts to show that the subjective element can be defined and 
understood in more detail.
17
 However, in order to maintain the concept's relationship with 
the emotion of anger the loss of self-control in provocation had to take the form of D 
losing his temper. In Cocker
18
 D's wife was dying of a terminal illness and she constantly 
asked him to end her life. When D killed he had lost his self-restraint but not his temper. 
Loss of self-control is best understood, as Horder states, "by its nature" as "a sudden 
and immediate reaction" to provocation.
19
 Loss of self-control has been kept in a 
simplified state to mean that 'D's mind went blank' or 'many blows without thought'.
20
 
There must be greater meaning in the subjective element if such errors are to be 
avoided, especially as this removes many defendants from the ambit of the defence who 
do not react to provocation in this manner.
21
 
 
Holton and Shute's explanation of the subjective element explains how provocation 
impacts on choice and how desires for retaliation take hold of D: 
 
"It does not require that the agent 'goes berserk', loses control of her body, 
or fails to know what she is doing. The agent will still be an agent when 
                                           
17 Part I demonstrated that such understanding has not taken hold in the defence, though. 
18 [1989] Crim LR 740 
19 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 68 
20 B.J. Mitchell,  R.D. Mackay & W.J. Brookbanks, 'Pleading for provoked killers: in defence of Morgan Smith' (2008) 
124 LQR  675, 677-8: "The tendency is to think of the loss of self-control in rather crude, graphic terms where the 
defendant's actions visibly reflect a lack of control - blows are rained down one after another on the victim ... Some 
defendants in provocation cases say that at the critical moment they were not thinking, their mind 'went blank', or 
they were not thinking clearly." 
S. Gough, 'Taking the Heat out of Provocation' (1999) 19 OJLS 481, 486: "provocation has more in common with 
automatism than with excessive defence, and is naturally intolerant of conduct that lacks an appropriately reflexive 
character." 
21 Agents that do not kill spontaneously and those whose killing indicate that there was a certain amount of reason 
in the method. These types of killings, sometimes in fear, will be discussed throughout. 
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self-control is lost, and her acts will still be intentional, driven by a desire 
for revenge, or whatever. What is lost when one loses self-control is 
control over which mental elements drive one's actions".
22
 
 
D remains an agent as his loss of self-control can be described as partial; what D really 
does lose control over is the ability to follow his considered judgements of what would be 
the best thing to do in the situation. Maintaining self-control is a faculty that relies on D 
doing "what they judge [is] best in the face of strong inclinations to the contrary"
23
 and 
therefore following such "considered judgments in the face of changing desires."
24
 When 
control is 'lost' D finds it difficult to restrain himself from following his desires. In this 
moment of extreme emotion D acts upon his desire to retaliate, to strike out against his 
perceived wrongdoer: "What they would lose is the ability to control those inclinations: to 
bring their actions into line with what they judged best."
25
 The power of this emotion is to 
"undermine" self-control to the point that D follows these desires over his judgements.
26
 
 
Looking at self-control from this perspective it is possible to see that there is a process 
which occurs. Once D has judged that they have been wronged and is angry then it is 
possible to see how he could lose his self-control:
27
 it is the overpowering desire to 
retaliate which ensures that D finds it difficult to do anything other than act upon this 
desire. This way of looking at the subjective element supports the rationale of the 
defence which has already been discussed, that the decision not to kill is not impossible 
                                           
22 R. Holton & S. Shute, 'Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence' 51-2 
23 Ibid 55. This was a point that was initially made at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n79), when citing J. Horder 
(Provocation And Responsibility, 98): D does not "follow the inclinations of a less compelling emotion". 
24 Ibid 57 
25 Ibid 57 
26 Ibid 57-8: the anger is able to weaken "the very thing that is supposed to control it". 
Also, (at 58) "it is only in cases in which this undermining has occurred that we can properly speak of an agent losing 
her self-control as a result of the provocation." 
27 W.N. Renke, 'Calm Like a Bomb: An Assessment of the Partial Defence of Provocation' (2009-2010) 47 Alta LR 729, 
755: "provocation does not occur until the accused reacts emotionally to the external act. The external act must be 
embraced within the subjective for it to function as provocation." Also, "[p]rovocation is the result of the accused's 
interpretation and reaction to the events, and the victim controls neither process." 
J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 61: "Anger is properly seen as compromised of sensation, desire and 
reason in the sense of moral judgement." 
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but made more difficult because of the provocation and this is a normal process when D 
is faced with such provocation.
28
 
 
Horder, similarly, stated that there is a judgement of wrongdoing which is followed by a 
desire for retaliation, this desire then takes hold of D in the form of a loss of self-control 
where D is not able to judge what would be an appropriate response.
29
 An implication of 
this is that if D's initial judgement of wrongdoing is incorrect then his response will be, 
there will be no opportunity to check the impulse.
30
 Once the judgement of wrongdoing is 
made there is no room for reason, this then means that "everyone is rendered akratic by 
the experience of anger",
31
 meaning that all act against their better judgement. This 
constricts the defence to a certain type of impulsive killing where there is no room for 
rational thought about what is done. So, the early case law on the loss of self-control 
concept, where phrases such as "an ungoverned storm" and "deprives him of his 
reasoning faculties" were used,
32
 seem to be correct: the impact on D is total, but D can 
still be considered an agent as only his desires have taken over.
33
 Therefore, a key 
element of this loss of self-control-based defence was that we are in fact able to blame D 
for the judgement of wrongdoing and the following desire for retaliation.
34
 It is possible to 
evaluate the reasons for why D lost his self-control and this is how the subjective and the 
objective tests are able to work together:
35
 the subjective test explains why it was difficult 
for D not to kill and the objective test evaluates the reason for why D got into that state. 
 
                                           
28 (n1-4) 
29 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 108 
30 Ibid: "This desire will impel them". 
31 Ibid. Also, at 81: "The akrates' anger 'boils up straight away' on being informed, by reason or imagination, of an 
insult" and "the law holds generally to be true what Aristotle thought true only of the quick-tempered who lack self-
control." 
32 See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n65-9) and (n22), above. 
33 The use of the term 'partial loss of self-control' would only be correct if it acknowledges that once D is in that 
state he cannot be expected to have any control over his actions, it is partial because it is his own desire for 
retaliation which is the cause of the state. 
34 J. Horder, Provocation And Responsibility 108: "The failure to make a correct judgement of wrongdoing must 
clearly be the failure". 
35 S. Gough, 'Taking the Heat out of Provocation' 489: "Anger may modify a defendant's view of the reasons for 
mounting a violent attack but ... people also become angry for reasons, and reasons that are as subject to 
evaluation as reasons for action." 
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ii) emotional disturbance 
Another significant attempt to explain the subjective element is to do away with the loss 
of self-control requirement and focus on an emotional disturbance instead. Emotional 
disturbance would have closer links to diminished responsibility than provocation and 
Mitchell, Mackay and Brookbanks have expressed their desire for the two defences to be 
merged into a plea based on this concept.
36
 An emotional disturbance is based on the 
idea that thinking has been disturbed or distorted, there is a "disturbance of reasoning".
37
 
To contrast, loss of self-control is about desire: desire overtakes rational thought and 
self-control is undermined. 
 
An emotional disturbance has been described as "diminished rationality" and must be 
committed with an "extreme emotional dysfunction": 
 
"The emotion that the killer experiences while committing the homicide has 
to be substantial enough that it prevents rational thought and reasoned 
behavior. In other words, the actor's rationality is diminished as a direct 
result of his emotional dysfunction."
38
 
 
If emotional disturbance replaced loss of self-control in a traditional provocation defence 
then it could have certain advantages as it would be natural for it not to have as strict 
temporal strains and a reliance on an 'explosive' act from D. An emotional disturbance 
could show how abuse over a long period of time can alter D's ability to control 
themselves through a valid 'dysfunction'; it would lend itself to the idea of battered 
women's syndrome and similar conditions which result from domestic abuse. Therefore, 
                                           
36 B.J. Mitchell,  R.D. Mackay & W.J. Brookbanks, 'Pleading for provoked killers' 703: "If the emotional disturbance 
has so inhibited D's capacity for rational thought and judgment, his claim to reduce liability is based on his reduced 
responsibility for action. In our view it is vital again to emphasise that provocation ought properly to be recognised 
as a plea of partial responsibility and as such operates in a manner broadly similar to diminished responsibility." 
37 Ibid 680 
38 R.G. Fontaine, 'The Wrongfulness Of Wrongly Interpreting Wrongfulness' 75-6: "The emotion is necessarily 
dysfunctional because it so significantly impairs the actor's rationality that he becomes able to wrongfully kill, and 
indeed wrongfully kills, another human being." 
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if emotional disturbance was adopted it would draw in diminished responsibility cases as 
it would not seek to base mitigation on ordinary responses to being provoked.
39
 
 
If emotional disturbance was adopted it would not be correct to find that this defence 
required provocation at all. An emotional disturbance would remove rationality not just 
from the decision to retaliate but from the decision to get angry too, therefore no true 
evaluation of the decision to kill is possible and the objective test would become 
insignificant: 
 
"The disturbance undermining self-control may be mental as well as 
emotional, and the emotional or mental disturbance need not arise from 
provoking conduct at all."
40
 
 
Emotional disturbance is interpreted as turning the situation of provocation into a denial 
of responsibility by treating a killer who is not capable of making correct judgements of 
wrongdoing the same as those who are. The focus of this type of defence is entirely 
different from the one which has been discussed so far; an emotional disturbance could 
be independent and not need a stimulus: all that matters is that the emotional 
disturbance was extreme. Emotional disturbance would turn the defence from being 
based on an understandable reaction, a reaction which was in the range of normal 
human emotion given the severity of the provocation, to one in which D must act in a 
                                           
39 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, Appendix F: 'The Model Penal Code's 
Provocation Proposal and its Reception in the State Legislatures and Courts of the United States of America, with 
Comments Relating to the Partial Defenses of Diminished Responsibility and Imperfect Self Defense' 271 [9]: the US 
Model Penal Code relies on an extreme emotional or mental distress (EMED) and when it was adopted it shared the 
aim of the Homicide Act 1957, in that its impact was intended "to enlarge the freedom of the jury and to confine 
the role of the courts." 
40 M.N. Berman & I.P. Farrell, 'Provocation as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse' (2010) U of Texas Law, Public 
Law Research Paper No 166, 11-12 
C.B. Ramsey, 'Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law Reform' (2010) 100 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 33, 56: "the victim-as-provocateur does not need to have played a catalytic role. 
Indeed, no triggering event is required." 
Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, Appendix F 271 [3]: "there are no limitations on 
when a jury is permitted to return a manslaughter verdict that derive from how the defendant came to be disturbed 
... Thus the traditional limitations as to what acts could constitute adequate provocation ... are gone." 
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way which is unbalanced and, consequently, is set apart from others.
41
 For example, as 
emotional disturbance is labelled as a "dysfunction"
42
 it means that the reaction cannot 
be considered ordinary. With regards to this argument, loss of self-control, by showing 
how desire can take over from better judgement to not kill the 'provoker', is a better 
reflection of what occurs. 
 
There are important points which can be taken from looking at the subjective element in 
this manner. It is clear that loss of self-control has not been properly defined in the pre-
2009 law but it is possible to give it greater understanding. The loss of self-control 
element demands a lack of rationality and a certain type of reactive killing, thereby 
removing many cases from the ambit of the defence. Loss of self-control is different from 
emotional disturbance as it requires proper evaluation for the reasons for why D got 
angry and subsequently got into the emotional state. Also, this emotional state, which 
stems from a mental process relating to being provoked, is a common human frailty, not 
an individual peculiarity, and should be treated as such. Loss of self-control fits into the 
framework of a provocation defence as it relates to reactions when wronged but still the 
defence should not rest upon such a concept because it is neither necessary nor able to 
respond to all the circumstances which need to be covered. 
 
b) loss of self-control is inessential 
By requiring D to lose his self-control it means that only a certain type of killing will 
suffice, a killing which is reactive and D is not able in any way to consider his actions. 
This section will discuss whether a loss of self-control adds weight to a claim that D 
deserves mitigation. It will be argued that even though a subjective element is required 
to show that the killing was not done in revenge a killing stemming from a loss of self-
control does not have any special significance beyond this. 
 
                                           
41 This draws similar criticisms as allowing abnormal control characteristics in the control test, see 'Chapter 5 - 
Objective Element' (Da Souza was cited at (n146): it is the difference between creating a vacuum and striking a 
chord with society). 
42 (n37-8) 
Chapter 6 - Subjective Element 146 
 
There are arguments which support that loss of self-control has value, that this sort of 
anger is more deserving of mitigation and by establishing this condition it is not merely 
proof that the killing was, firstly, provoked and, secondly, not based on other factors, 
such as revenge or greed: 
 
"there might be thought to be little excusatory weight to a claim that one 
was moved intentionally to kill another by a punitive retaliatory urge, even 
if it was provoked, were it not for the fact that it is claimed that the 
provocation in question led to an un-looked for loss of control of that urge, 
making the defendant's reaction almost (albeit, obviously, not truly) 
'instinctive' or only quasi-voluntary."
43
 
 
A loss of self-control became the only type of reaction which the law could accommodate 
as its presence was seen to signify the human frailty to provocation. Obviously, the 
question then becomes whether other reactions or situations are capable of fulfilling the 
rationale.
44
 However, it is also significant to consider whether the defence ought to rely 
on D losing his self-control or whether a more straightforward subjective element is what 
should be required. The cases, in particular, regarding 'battered women' and victims of 
abuse, demonstrate that an agent who has lost her self-control is not more deserving of 
mitigation but, also, the cases which involve male violence should not be viewed more 
sympathetically because of its presence. 
 
In Holley
45
 D struck his girlfriend with an axe seven or eight times after she had told him 
that she had just had sex with another man. It is clear from the facts that D had lost his 
self-control. However, beyond showing that he genuinely was provoked the loss of self-
control element does not support any reason for mitigation; if D had struck V once in 
anger, and not exhibited a loss of self-control, then the case for mitigation would be 
equal. The existence of multiple blows makes his story more easily believable as it is 
                                           
43 J. Horder, 'Reshaping the Subjective Element' 126 
44 Discussed in the next section: 'c) loss of self-control is inadequate' 
45 Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580 (PC) 
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often only from the outward expression of anger that it is possible to assess D's state of 
mind. Such a reaction conforms to the most common understanding of the pre-2009 
defence, that 'D's mind went blank' and he struck out with 'many blows without 
thought'.
46
 It has been stressed that if mitigation is to track common human frailty and 
understandable reactions to provocation it must focus on the reason behind the killing; 
the reason remains the same if D struck the victim once or eight times. Loss of self-
control might be the clearest example of a provoked killing but it does not mean that it 
adds value to the claim for mitigation, it can only be the equivalent to showing that D 
acted in provoked anger. 
 
Loss of self-control is not necessary in order to provide mitigation but inhibits the 
defence from properly dealing with anything other than uncontrolled anger. Cases which 
involve domestic abuse are examples which show that a loss of self-control is not 
required for mitigation to be warranted. If the severity of the abuse is properly made out, 
as has been described when discussing context in the gravity test,
47
 then there are 
strong merits for the provocation defence to deal with such cases so long as a provoked 
emotion can be established.
48
 However, if loss of self-control is relied upon the defence 
is not only about the genuine existence of provoked anger but also a spontaneous, 
reactive killing; in this case context will be less important in showing a loss of self-control 
took place as how D carried out the killing will be the primary indicator. 
 
In Ahluwalia
49
 D suffered from domestic abuse for ten years and there was a threat of 
future violence. The strength of the provocation in this case was great, however there 
were difficulties with the subjective element as there was a delay between the last 
provocative act and the killing. The loss of self-control element was altered making the 
factor of delay merely evidential.
50
 Even though this is helpful to a claim of provocation in 
                                           
46 (n20) 
47 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n47-51) 
48 In order for the provoked emotion to be established it will mean that context should be an important 
consideration for the jury in the subjective element too, see Part IV. 
49 [1992] 4 All ER 889. The facts are outlined at 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n47) 
50 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n30-32) 
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some cases
51
 it does not sit easily with the standard interpretation of loss of self-control 
and the judgment itself shows the difficulty of drawing conclusions on this matter from 
the facts of the case as delay may be interpreted both ways.
52
 
 
Ahluwalia allows one to question whether it matters if D had lost her self-control or not. It 
is clear that D killed owing to the reasons of anger and fear and this stemmed from the 
victim's conduct which can legitimately be described as provocative and threatening. 
The killing was carried out emotionally but it was not a clear example of D losing her 
self-control and then remaining out-of-control.
53
 There was an undeniable element of 
rationality, as there are in many similar cases,
54
 as D kills when V is in a weak position; 
deciding to kill when D is asleep, for example, is at odds to how the loss of self-control 
element was described above. Overall, it is difficult to argue that D lost her self-control, 
but, also, that the killing was anything other than an excessive killing in anger and/or 
fear. If D had lost her self-control she would have satisfied the subjective element of the 
pre-2009 defence but it would not have altered the merits behind the reason for her 
mitigation. 
 
The early provocation defence
55
 relied on showing that malice did not exist, in other 
words showing that D did not plan or set-out to kill his provoker; this is the actual 
function of the subjective test, however the loss of self-control requirement has blurred 
this. What matters is to show that D killed because of the existence of provocation and in 
that moment he found it difficult to resist the impulse. What we know about provocation, 
from the understanding that has been provided, above, is that the common process that 
a person goes through is anger leading to a desire to retaliate leading to a person being 
able to control this instinct. However, normal people may fail at this last hurdle and 
respond in a manner which is wrongful but somewhat understandable because of what 
                                           
51 R. Holton & S. Shute, 'Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence' 64: "It is perfectly possible to smoulder for 
a long time before finally losing control." 
52 Ahluwalia 897–8 (Lord Taylor CJ). See quote at 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n31). 
53 For example, Royley (1612) Cro Jac 296 and Baillie [1995] 2 Cr App R 31. 
54 For example, in Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306 D went out of the room, sharpened a knife and went back in and 
killed V. 
55 As was described at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n2-14). 
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we know about the circumstances. To deny the defence to a person because he has not 
lost his self-control is not consistent with this because we are not concerned with this; it 
is the genuineness of the emotion and lack of revenge which signifies that D was 
provoked, there is no reason to rely on a certain type of anger. 
 
c) loss of self-control is inadequate 
Loss of self-control should not be a necessary condition of a provocation defence. The 
defence most comfortably deals with male violence
56
 and it has been difficult for it to 
progress beyond this with the subjective test resting on spontaneous and reactive anger. 
There is a need to find a defence for cases which involve anger where D does not 
respond like this and where D kills in circumstances similar to excessive self-defence, 
involving fear of violence.
57
 It is natural, with provocation's rationale and there being no 
other similar partial defence available, to incorporate these cases within provocation as 
they have their basis in being excessive killings but D reaches a certain standard where 
they can be distinguished from a murderer. 
 
i) fear 
Loss of self-control was developed for cases of reactive anger and it not really 
applicable to other emotions in a manner which respects their qualities: 
 
"much of the criticism of the former law on provocation was concerned that 
this behaviourally specific outward expression of loss of self-control which 
prioritised anger as its clearest expression, excluded anxiety, fear, panic 
and horror, as impassioned states somewhat outside the conventional 
sign/signifier of loss of self-control."
58
 
                                           
56 See the four categories of Mawgridge (1707) Kel 119 at 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n26). 
57 K. Fitz-Gibbon, 'Replacing Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control' 
(2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society 2, 280, 291: the author states that there is a "gap" between provocation and 
self-defence, an act which is calm but not justifiable is not covered under any defence. 
In Part III the relationship between the two emotions will be inspected. 
58 S. Edwards, 'Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control', (2010) JCL 74.3, 223, 224 
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The key point about the relationship between loss of self-control and the emotion of fear 
is that fear does not seem to be an emotion where a loss of self-control is necessary for 
it to be genuine. Also, by the pre-2009 defence requiring a loss of self-control it meant 
that cases involving fear, if they were going to have any chance of succeeding, had to 
be framed in a manner which went against the natural expectations for how somebody 
would respond to a threat, often a defensive and somewhat reasoned response. By 
doing this it compromised the strong position for providing mitigation in such cases. 
Therefore, cases which involved fear struggled to fulfil the subjective requirement and 
this did not even represent the true circumstances or the reason why mitigation ought to 
occur. 
 
Just like killing in anger, killing in fear can be dragged in two directions; either 
justificatory reasons are looked for or there is a focus on D's inability to act to normal 
standards. For situations where the killing is deemed excessive there is no reason why 
the law cannot take into account both views by making provocation available to those 
who kill emotionally with a valid reason and making diminished responsibility available to 
those who suffer from mental illness.
59
 For some, battered women syndrome can be 
used as "a medicalized specialist term"
60
 and the law can then treat some "battered 
women as 'psychologically impaired' victims",
61
 but this does not apply to all. Decisions 
to kill through fear, whilst allowing for the possibility of an overlap with anger, are often 
                                                                                                                                   
Also, at 228: "Instead of an eruptive moment, as is anger, fear is an enduring underlying state ... Fear, therefore 
does not sit comfortably with loss of self-control as an eruptive moment." 
R. Bradfield, 'Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on the Jealous Husband 
and the Battered Wife' (2000) 19 U Tas L Rev 5, 23: "The loss of self-control still must manifest in an explosive loss 
of self-control culminating in the fatal act. At the time of the killing, the brooding emotion must erupt (like a 
volcano) ... As such 'since the battered woman's final action is often devoid of frenzy and passion, women fail to 
meet the standard required of the reactive response'." 
59 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n46) 
60 C. Wells, 'Provocation: The Case for Abolition' 94 
61 C. Cookson, 'Confronting Our Fear: Legislating Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome and the Law of Self-Defense In 
Vermont' (2009-10) 34 Vt LR 415, 418 
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seen to be a rational decision, though.
62
 There may be a rationality which surrounds the 
killing by a victim of abuse and there is a definite relationship with self-defence in this 
regard, this being why such cases are often described as excessive self-defence. A 
provocation defence which does not require a loss of self-control could satisfy the 
demand for mitigation in these cases by being a step down from the full defence.
63
 
 
However, some have pressed for these killings to be viewed as justificatory; there is 
therefore a need to show that the killing was not excessive. Botterell discusses 
jurisdictions which have viewed wives killing their husbands owing to fear of future 
violence as justificatory and he states that this sends a "very different message" as 
sometimes abused women will be "entitled to act."
64
 Similarly to the discussion about 
appreciating contextual evidence,
65
 this view relies on showing that "a reasonable 
assessment" was made, but, also, that the response was neither an "overreaction" nor 
"excessive".
66
 In order to do this then the reality of the woman's position needs to be 
brought out within this test, otherwise women will continue struggle in these objective 
assessments: 
 
"the law continues to treat women homicide defendants, as if they were 
indeed men in respect of size, strength, ability to box, spar, and land a 
punch. So when women defend themselves against male violence with an 
instrument as they are inclined to do ... and as a result kill, their 'mode of 
resentment' is treated for all legal purposes as 'excessive'."
67
 
 
                                           
62 Ibid 427: "Attempting to convey reasonableness through pathology ignores the possibility that any rational 
woman in the same circumstance might take the same drastic measures upon weighing her options to escape 
alive." 
63 This will be discussed further below at (n81-4). 
64 A. Botterell, 'A Primer on the Distinction between Justification and Excuse' (2009) 4(1) Philosophy Compass 172, 
177 
65 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n47-51) 
66 S. Edwards, 'Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control' 233 
67 S. Edwards, 'Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self Defence - The Law Commission's Options for Reform' 
(2004) Crim LR 181, 189-90 
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The discussion in Chapter 3 displays the high standards which are set in order for the 
intentional killing of another to be justifiable.
68
 There is no reason why self-defence 
should not be open to abused parties if they have justifiably killed, however, in cases 
such as Ahluwalia and Thornton it is difficult to view the killings as anything but 
excessive, even though their circumstances evoke sympathy the acts of killing lack 
necessity. The partial defence therefore remains necessary because there are cases 
where the killing ought to be mitigated even if the act does not fall into the scope of a 
justification. 
 
The rational, but wrong, decision to kill an abuser is based on the circumstances which 
the abused party faced and there are many factors which allow sympathy for the killer: 
there may be little opportunity to escape; D may feel compulsion to act owing to the 
possibility of future abuse; D may have experienced the abuse for a long time and her 
knowledge of this means that she feels as if this pattern of violence will not end; D 
knows that she is physically weaker and if she is going to strike she needs to put herself 
at an advantage by using a weapon or striking when V cannot defend himself. Such 
decisions often require delay to take place between the last provocative event and the 
killing and this implies deliberation and demonstrates that the killing did not take place 
whilst D had lost her self-control. However, if the agent deliberated it does not mean that 
the agent was not genuinely fearful:
69
 
 
"alternative options are recognized but are seen as unrealistic ... Thus, 
killing the abuser can be a rational response to the victim's predicament ... 
In cases in which they acted for reasons of self-preservation with a 
genuine belief in the necessity of the action, mitigation may be thought to 
be deserved even if the perception of the danger or of the options for 
escaping it was wrong."
70
 
                                           
68 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n29-31) 
69 A. Clough, 'Loss of Self-Control as a Defence: The Key to Replacing Provocation' (2010) 74 JCL 118, 119: in cases of 
fear "a person might appear to be acting rationally". 
70 E. Colvin, 'Abusive Relationships and Violent Responses: The Reorientation of Self-Defense in Australia' (2009-10) 
42 Tex Tech LR 339, 340-1 
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The above section supports that if D does kill her abuser without losing her self-control 
there remains a strong argument for a partial defence to be available if the emotion is 
present and if the objective component of the defence is satisfied. Part IV will address 
how contextual evidence could be tailored to support both the subjective and objective 
elements in support of a claim. 
 
ii) anger 
There are also different types of anger and Horder is able to draw the distinction 
between anger as loss of self-control and anger as outrage.
71
 Therefore, a loss of self-
control requirement should mean that the defence is only responding to this type of 
anger, however, it ought to be required to do much more work and is not able to respond 
to circumstances which may deserve recognition.
72
 Anger as outrage differs as when D 
is outraged he makes a judgement that he has been wronged, as in anger as loss of 
self-control, but then he responds with what is an emotional response but what he 
believes to be appropriate, not a response that is out-of-control.
73
 Therefore, outrage is 
like loss of self-control as there is a "desire for retaliatory suffering" but with outrage the 
response is "largely determined by reason".
74
 
 
Reason is the key to understanding this type of anger and genuine demonstrations of it 
rely on D maintaining the ability to judge what he is doing; it is still an excessive and 
emotional response but it is a different expression of anger. This is not to say that anger 
as loss of self-control does not exist and should not be mitigated, it means that there are 
                                           
71 J. Horder, Provocation and Responsibility 68: he finds that action stemming from anger as loss of self-control "has 
a distinctive spontaneity and immediacy that outraged action may not."  
72 C. Morgan, 'Loss of Self-control: Back to the Good Old Days' (2013) 77 JCL 119, 121: "there is no decisive evidence 
that a loss of self-control actually occurs when humans kill as a result of provocation, which weakens the theory's 
accuracy." 
73 J. Horder, Provocation and Responsibility 68: "outrage may be the product of simply reflecting on some event or 
events now judged to involve grave wrongdoing (working oneself up into a 'lather'), rather than being, like loss of 
self-control, the product of some immediately preceding provocative stimulus." 
74 Ibid 60 
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different types of anger and they need to be respected in the defence: provocation ought 
to apply "whatever the form that anger takes."
75
 
 
For the modern provocation defence anger as outrage is alien but if the focus of the 
defence is to change to demanding 'good' reason for why D got angry with a softer 
subjective test then how to deal with outrage needs to be explained as these type of 
cases could easily be understood to be revenge.
76
 The following example will be used to 
illustrate that a simple approach regarding 'provoked anger' can distinguish where the 
defence should operate. All that matters in the subjective element is that D had a 
genuine and highly emotional response to being wronged. 
 
D is a father who saw his child being abused by V and D legitimately used 
non-lethal force against V to stop the attack. Moments later D strikes V 
once in anger and V is killed. D had not lost his self-control but struck in 
anger because he desired retaliation as V had committed a gross wrong 
against his child. 
 
This is an excessive killing, like all killings in the provocation defence,
77
 and this is even 
so when instead of losing his self-control D was guided by reason and judgement. D felt 
a desire to strike V and it is possible to sympathise with this as it may be viewed as an 
understandable reaction to such circumstances, however, the rationale is only fulfilled if 
the provocation made the decision not to retaliate more difficult. What is clear is that this 
is not a case of revenge, yet D did not lose his self-control. This approach, of only relying 
the existence of the guiding emotion, has the advantage of not misrepresenting 
scenarios to fit the concept of loss of self-control.
78
 
 
                                           
75 Ibid 67 
76 S. Gough, 'Taking the Heat out of Provocation' 488: "The more reasons in favour of the defendant's retaliation, 
the less emotional disturbance he need invoke to explain his decision to act." 
77 (n68) 
78 This has long been a problem for the defence as was referenced when discussing the case of Fisher (1837) 8 C & P 
182, see 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n69): D stated that he was justified in what he did because of the wrong he 
had suffered but had to claim that he lost his self-control. 
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This would allow for a broader defence which covers a lot more which is deserving of 
mitigation on the basis which has been discussed throughout Part II. Even though this 
approach can itself be criticised for being imprecise, like loss of self-control was above, it 
is a concept that is closer to what is trying to be achieved. From the beginning, it has 
been stressed that the subjective element's function is to provide the distinction between 
when D acts owing to provocation and when he acts owing to revenge. This approach 
simply enquires into what motivated D to kill, and this is something which the loss of self-
control requirement only blurs by masking the question behind one type of anger which 
is merely the most obvious signifier of whether D killed because of the provocation or 
not. Horder has stated that to find that loss of self-control is the only form of acceptable 
anger and to view outraged killers as the equivalent to revenged or cold blooded killers 
relies on a "poor grasp of the doctrine's history".
79
 Part I helps to demonstrate this 
point,
80
 by showing how the defence has not had a consistent definition, and this 
Chapter has outlined how loss of self-control unnecessarily constricts the defence and 
makes arguments in favour of a different approach. The best approach in enquiring as to 
whether D acted because he was provoked or threatened would be to simply require the 
corresponding emotion: provoked anger or genuine fear. 
 
iii) self-defence 
Another issue which supports the point that loss of self-control is inadequate stems from 
its impact on the relationship between the full defence of self-defence and the partial 
defence of provocation. The Law Commission considered there to be a significant 
problem when running a loss of self-control provocation defence alongside self-
defence.
81
 Self-defence is a full defence and involves fear of violence, so they clearly 
                                           
79 J. Horder, Provocation and Responsibility 70 
80 See (n10). 
81 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 51-2 [3.88-90] 
R v Van Dongen [2005] [2005] EWCA Crim 1728 [4]: "Whether or not to rely on a defence of provocation is a 
dilemma which often faces those representing defendants in murder trials whose main defence is self-defence or 
lack of intent. A defence of provocation may be intrinsically inconsistent with, or may otherwise weaken, other 
defences. But it is well established that the judge should direct the jury to consider a defence of provocation, even if 
it is not the defendant's overt case, if there is some evidence from whatever source from which the jury could find 
that there was provoking conduct which resulted in the defendant losing his self-control". 
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have a relationship if provocation is to be expanded to include such cases.
82
 An 
argument for loss of self-control will imply a lack of reasonableness in the agent's 
actions, which is understandable given the previous discussion of loss of self-control and 
the irrationality which it demands from D. Given this, it would mean that self-defence is 
unavailable, but if an agent argues self-defence and fails without arguing provocation he 
risks being liable for murder. Also, by arguing that he acted reasonably in self-defence 
an agent would undermine that he lost his self-control as it would be inconsistent.
83
 
 
Being asked to make this sort of choice is not necessarily illustrative of the events but 
more an attempt to bring about the best outcome for D;
84
 it involves this 
misrepresentation of what has occurred in order to fit into the loss of self-control 
requirement if D chooses that manslaughter is his best option. By the defence 
acknowledging that anger can cause a rational but emotional response or an irrational 
response it could allow a more sound approach to the question of whether D killed 
because of the provocation and allow for a relationship between provocation and self-
defence. It would be preferable if D could argue self-defence and if that fails then he 
could go on to argue provocation, so he could have the option of falling back on a partial 
defence if his full defence fails. 
 
iv) delay 
The subjective element in any form has problems with delay; if the last provocative act 
and the killing are not relatively close to each other then it is less believable that D 
responded because he was provoked than if the killing had followed on from the 
provocative incident. The pre-2009 defence dealt with delay by finding that D can often 
stay out of control for a long time
85
 or that D can simmer and then lose self-control at a 
                                           
82 It was previously discussed that there is a desire to put victims of abuse within the provocation defence rather 
than it resting on the basis of diminished responsibility (n59-68). 
83 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 51 [3.89]: the Law Commission cited the case 
of Osborn, where D had to make this decision. 
84 S. Edwards, 'Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control' 229: "It must also be understood that 
expressions of anger and fear are linguistic devices, and represent attempts by the defendant to negotiate the legal 
outcome, rather than a true reflection of an underlying inner state." 
85 Baillie [1995] 2 Cr App R 31. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n28). 
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later point,
86
 and this is possibly because the last provocative act was not particularly 
severe.
87
 These solutions offered a way of maintaining the loss of self-control element, 
as is explicitly required in the Homicide Act 1957, but stretch the meaning of the concept 
in light of the explanation of it, above. The loss of self-control is really about 
spontaneous, reflex responses to a provoking stimulus and delay brings with it time for 
reason to enter in D's decision-making. 
 
If in the above example the father instead of killing his child's abuser near to the time of 
the incident kills him at a later point this presents even greater problems for a 
provocation defence which is not based on loss of self-control. Advancing that the 
defence ought to rest merely on requiring provoked anger means that the subjective 
element would be quite broad, but it is intended to be. In contrast, however, to the loss 
of self-control element, a potential problem could be that it may be difficult to prove; if D 
kills when he has lost his self-control he can often point to some evidence that there was 
a point where he had actually lost control. For provoked anger it may have taken the 
form of a loss of self-control but if it did not then it may become difficult to prove; the 
subjective test becomes whether the jury believes in D's account rather than it being an 
act of revenge. This still does not mean a loss of self-control requirement is preferable, it 
is still better to rely on the existence of the core emotion for the reasons previously 
discussed but it simply may be difficult to prove where there is delay. 
 
In cases which involve an abused party and the emotion of fear the circumstances 
around the killing will support that D acted because of a genuine fear of violence,
88
 but 
for anger as outrage this would understandably be difficult to establish. There is a need 
for the defence to include more than uncontrolled anger but there needs to be caution as 
it must not mean that revenge is mitigated. Advancing such a subjective element means 
that the objective element becomes more central to the enquiry but such a subjective 
                                           
86 S.Bandalli, 'Provocation - A Cautionary Note' (1995) 22 Journal of Law and Society 398, 398: In Ahluwalia it was 
"conceded that provocation was not negatived as a matter of law simply by delay, a concession to slow-burn 
anger." 
87 Then cumulative provocation is required to show that the objective test is satisfied. 
88 (n69-70) 
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element is more focused on and consistent with its purpose: to allow the distinction 
between a provoked killing and a vengeful killing to be exposed. Establishing that there 
were strong reasons to get angry by requiring warranted anger is only half of the 
defence and it still must be shown that the subjective element is satisfied in order for the 
defence to fulfil its rationale of a common human frailty. 
 
Conclusion 
The Law Reform Commission of Victoria have stated that the loss of self-control concept 
fails to "provide a sufficient reason, moral or legal" to distinguish between provocation 
and murder and this Chapter supports this finding.
89
 It has been demonstrated that it is 
difficult to give meaning to the concept and the pre-2009 case law failed to give a 
satisfactory definition which meant that it was viewed as a metaphorical term. It was also 
established that the concept was neither necessary for mitigation to be worthy nor able 
to function as a satisfactory subjective element. 
 
The issue of delay and finding a balance for such cases seems to be one which is 
insolvable; the longer it takes for D to respond the less likely it seems that D reacted 
because of the emotion and the more likely it was a deliberate and vengeful response. 
The best which can be achieved is having a subjective element which is open to delayed 
killings. The loss of self-control concept should have meant that delayed killings were 
outside the defence and it was only because the concept was stretched for convenience 
that it operated in such a fashion. 
 
Beyond critiquing the loss of self-control concept this Chapter has also advanced that 
the subjective element ought to rest on merely finding that the core emotion was 
present: provoked anger or a genuine fear. The benefits of having a defence which is 
more receptive to what actually occurred and is able to have a relationship with self-
defence in cases of fear means that the defence could respond to victims of abuse who 
kill more effectively. Loss of self-control functions to mitigate one type of angry killing 
where the partial defence should be equipped to do more. 
                                           
89 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Homicide Report No 40 (1991) [156] 
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PART III: REFORM OF PROVOCATION 
Part III explores the how the provocation defence was reformed at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century by examining Parliamentary debates, the Law Commission's reports, 
the government's response to those reports and the reform which ultimately took place in 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Various proposals will be inspected and reference 
will be made to the issues brought up in Parts I and II in order to see how those matters 
were dealt with. The following discussion helps to give insight to the reform which 
ultimately took place, whether certain aspects of the various proposals were adopted or 
not the responses to them give an understanding to the general intentions behind the 
reform and into the individual provisions. 
 
CHAPTER 7 
LAW COMMISSION 
In Part II the Law Commission's reports were used to support the findings that were 
made. To summarise, the Law Commission found that the defence contained a gender 
bias, it dealt with men who killed in anger but it struggled with women who killed in fear.
1
 
Also, it was reported that the defence was being used in circumstances which relied on 
conduct by V which was "blameless or trivial".
2
 The Law Commission sought to clarify the 
ordinary person test after a period of uncertainty over the extent to which D's control 
characteristics may be considered and ultimately supported the Camplin distinction 
which follows a similar approach to the moderate excuse theory.
3
 The loss of self-control 
requirement was vehemently criticised in the reports and it was viewed as not 
representing the true function of the subjective element, that it did not distinguish 
between emotional and vengeful killings.
4
 
 
This Chapter will deal with the Law Commission's proposal for reforming the provocation 
defence. The Law Commission were first asked to report on just reforming partial 
                                           
1 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n13) 
2 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 46 [3.65] 
3 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'  (n4) 
4 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n6-10) 
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defences
5
 and subsequently were asked to report on the entire structure of homicide 
law.
6
 The proposal
7
 to reform provocation was to create three limbs and one of these 
would need to be satisfied; the limbs were "gross provocation", "fear of serious violence" 
and "a combination" of the former limbs. For the "gross provocation" limb D must have "a 
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged". D, also, had to satisfy an ordinary person 
test. 
 
Two exclusions were included which meant that the defence could not be used where D 
purposely relied on self-induced provocation and where D had a "considered desire for 
revenge". The proposal outlines that there is no requirement for the judge to leave the 
defence to the jury "unless there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly 
directed, could conclude that it might apply." The proposal does not require a loss of self-
control, in its place the limbs require the core emotion, a feeling of being seriously wrong 
and/or fear, and, also, there is the revenge exclusion. The proposal's rationale rests on 
warranted excuse,
8
 the killing is viewed as wrong and excessive but the emotion which 
was behind the killing must be warranted. The Law Commission refer to Nourse's view,
9
 
which is addressed in Chapter 3,
10
 and the limbs reflect this: "It is the justification of the 
sense of outrage which provides a partial excuse for their responsive conduct."
11
 
 
In the 2004 Report the Law Commission did not recommend any change to diminished 
responsibility from the Homicide Act 1957.
12
 However, in the 2006 Report
13
 it was 
suggested that the defence ought to be "modernised, so that it is both clearer and better 
                                           
5 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290 
6 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304 
7 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 70-1 [3.168] 
The proposal is contained in Appendix A. 
8 This was discussed in 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n111-31) 
9 Nourse is discussed at Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 42-44 [3.52-9] and the 
Law Commission express its view at 45-6 [3.60-4] 
10 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n115) 
11 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 44 [3.59] 
Also, at 46 [3.68]: "the defendant had legitimate ground to feel strongly aggrieved at the conduct of the person at 
whom his/her response was aimed, to the extent that it would be harsh to regard their moral culpability for 
reacting as they did in the same way as if it had been an unprovoked killing." 
12 Ibid 105 [5.86]: "There appears to be no great dissatisfaction with the operation of the defence". 
13 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 102-3 [5.112] 
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able to accommodate developments in expert diagnostic practice".
14
 The proposal 
involved looking at D's capacity "to understand the nature" of his conduct, "to form a 
rational judgment" or "to exercise self-control". These three abilities must be 
"substantially impaired by an abnormality of mental functioning", this must arise from a 
"recognised medical condition", "developmental immaturity in a defendant under the age 
of eighteen" or a "combination of both". These factors must provide "an explanation" for 
D's part in the killing. This proposal would go on to form the basis for the Ministry of 
Justice's proposal and, ultimately, the reform contained in the 2009 Act.
15
 As will be 
discussed further, the outlook of the two proposals supports the view that the partial 
defences ought to be designed to deal with entirely different types of circumstances.
16
 
The main focus of this Chapter is to explore the Law Commission's proposal as it sought 
to put the provocation defence on a new path. 
 
The Call for Reform 
There have been various calls for reform, both before and after the Homicide Act 1957, 
and the key reasons for this have been outlined in the Part II.
17
 Key cases discussed 
previously have shown that there were fairly recent attempts to reform the defence at 
common law, the decisions of Smith (Morgan)
18
 and Ahluwalia
19
 were attempting to 
enlarge the scope of the defence to deal with gender bias and 'battered women'.
20
 
 
A suggested reform was put forward in 1879. The Criminal Code Bill Commission 
published the English Draft Code of 1879 and a provocation defence was outlined: 
 
                                           
14 Ibid 101 [5.107] 
15 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n8) and 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n6-9). 
16 (n42-50) 
17 The focus of the individual chapters of Part II will be referred to in order to evaluate the various reform proposals 
discussed in Part III. 
18 [2001] 1 AC 146. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n76-81). 
19 [1992] 4 All ER 889. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n30-3). 
20 It has been stated, in the introduction to 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence', that the common law could not 
have suitably reformed the defence because of the structure which the 1957 Act imposed: the defence "was not 
salvageable through common law developments". 
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"s176 - 'Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to 
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control may be provocation, 
if the offender acts upon it on the sudden and before there has been time 
for his passion to cool.'"
21
 
 
Both the objective and subjective elements are stated plainly. Provocation is defined and 
the use of the word 'insult' helps to limit the span of the defence to what would commonly 
be interpreted as instances of provocation. It contains a reference to the ordinary person 
and the expected standard of self-control is determined by this. The subjective element 
relies on suddenness and heat of passion, without a loss of self-control requirement; 
'sudden' is a term better avoided and heat of passion is a mere metaphor. For this to be 
workable definitions of 'wrongful act', 'insult', 'ordinary person' and 'passion to cool', 
would be required.
22
 The positives are that it sets a bar for provocation, it has a standard 
of comparison that is sought after in modern reform and it has a realistic subjective 
element which reflects the circumstances of provocation. Many of the problems with the 
common law defence would have been remedied if a proposal such as this was enacted 
instead of the 1957 Act, however, much depends on the definitions which would be given 
to the terms referred to above. This proposal has been highlighted because it 
demonstrates that even in the nineteenth century there were calls to move away from 
some of the aspects of the traditional common law defence and there were various ways 
in which provocation can be defined. 
 
Part I discussed the problems which existed with the common law and the aims behind 
the reform which took place in the 1957 Act. Mainly this involved removing common law 
restrictions and handing greater powers to the jury at the expense of the judge. However, 
problems with the 1957 Act were apparent and have been outlined in Part II; the 
rationale, the definition of 'provoked' and the objective and subjective elements were 
                                           
21 Criminal Code Bill Commission, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to 
Indictable Offences (1879) Cmnd 2345 
22 In Canada 'wrongful act or insult' has been defined in R v Taylor [1947] SCR 462, 475: "an act, or the action, of 
attacking or assailing; an open or sudden attack or assault without formal preparations; injuriously contemptuous 
speech or behaviour; scornful utterance or action intended to wound self-respect; an affront; indignity." 
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areas where the defence required clarity or improvement. Since the 1957 Act calls for 
reform of provocation have been made with the issues of gender bias, sexual jealousy, 
battered women and violence against women in mind. In 1994 a House of Lords debate 
took place where Harry Cohen stated that "[t]he injustice that I seek to remove is the 
blatantly sexist application of the law in homicide cases and the availability of the plea of 
provocation".
23
 Making the defence more difficult for men to use and easier for women is 
a point which has been discussed.
24
 
 
The Law Commission Proposal 
The Law Commission's review was initially limited to just partial defences;
25
 therefore, 
specific routes to avoid murder and the mandatory life sentence had to be laid out in the 
form of partial defences and they could not rely on sentencing reform, for example, the 
possibility of avoiding the life sentence if there were extenuating circumstances. In 2006 
the Law Commission would be given greater scope to suggest proposals to alter the 
entire structure of homicide law. The proposal for reform of the provocation defence 
remained the same.
26
 Both reports will be used below to explain the proposal. 
 
In the 2004 Report the Law Commission were also "asked to have particular regard" for 
"domestic violence".
27
 The Commission recommended "reform rather than abolition"
28
 
and desired for provocation to be designed in a way to include fear of future violence. It 
found that the defence should be "recast" to include scenarios "which involve excessive 
use of force in self-defence" and because of this there would be no necessity to 
                                           
23 Harry Cohen, May 17, 1994, HL Deb, col 688 
Ibid 688-90: "It has been obvious for years that the law operates two different systems when deciding what is 
provocation for men and what is provocation for women ... 
It is obvious that, unless Parliament protects these women by amending the provocation law, the judiciary will 
continue to hand out uneven and unequal justice. I stress that the Bill is not a licence for women to commit 
murder." 
24 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n13) 
25 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 1 [1.2] 
26 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 76 [5.1]: however, its effect, 
because D forms the necessary intention for murder, would not be to reduce the offence to manslaughter but to 
second degree murder. 
27 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 1 [1.1] 
28 Ibid 3 [1.8] 
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recommend a new defence of excessive self-defence.
29
 The reasons they gave for 
provocation dealing with these cases were that they believed deserving cases fell 
outside self-defence and by providing a partial defence "nothing is lost but much 
gained".
30
 This was the Law Commission's view despite finding that self-defence was 
already "generous"
31
 in allowing the objective questions to be asked from D's 
perspective.
32
 Also, the proposal did not include loss of self-control as the subjective 
element, therefore provocation would be available to a calm, fearful D. The reasoning for 
reforming the partial defence in this manner will be important in highlighting the flaws 
with the 2009 Act in Chapter 9. Before discussing the specific provisions of the proposal 
there are important broader points which come from the reports. 
 
Patchwork reform 
Firstly, the Law Commission were well aware that the 2004 proposal would be limited in 
its effectiveness by the constraints placed on them, in particular the maintenance of the 
mandatory life sentence would create pressures on the partial defences just like they 
faced before. Judge and jury may seek to avoid injustice through their interpretation of 
the law and possibly distort the terms. The partial defences were described as a 
"patchwork" and "a product of piecemeal development and reforms, rather than 
systematic thought".
33
 The Law Commission also found that their proposals, without a 
broader reform to the law of homicide, "would not be satisfactory in the long term and 
                                           
29 Ibid 6 [1.15] 
30 Ibid 80 [4.27] 
31 Ibid 75 [4.12] 
Palmer [1971] AC 814 (PC), 832: "it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the 
exact measure of his necessary defensive action. If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person 
attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent 
evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken." 
32 Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All ER 411 and Owino (1996) 2 Cr App Rep 128 both demonstrate that the facts are 
judged as D honestly believed them to be and the jury assess reasonableness based on this. 
33 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 33 [3.19] 
German homicide law, however, shows that problems can still exist where the law is structured. Murder is narrowly 
defined, requiring a qualifying condition, and there is a mandatory life sentence for such cases. A 'battered woman' 
could fall under murder if her killing is viewed as being "devious", one of the conditions, e.g. kills whilst V was 
asleep. Pedain explains that in rare cases judges have got around this by stating that they are "constitutionally 
authorized" to impose a lesser sentence if it would otherwise be disproportionate (see Law Commission (2003), 'The 
Law of Murder: Overseas Comparative Studies' Consultation Paper No 173, A. Pedain, 'Intentional Killings: The 
German Law' 5 (available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Murder_comparative_studies.pdf)). 
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would leave the law still subject to the same pressures".
34
 A counterpoint to this is the 
view, which was expressed by the Ministry of Justice,
35
 was that a provocation defence 
should be able to stand on its own merits. Despite there being some truth in this, 
provocation ought to have a well-functioning relationship with both self-defence and 
diminished responsibility; self-defence is for justifiable killings in fear, diminished 
responsibility is for 'abnormal' actors and provocation is for excessive emotional killings. 
It is submitted that provocation can only work effectively if it is limited in its scope and the 
other defences can deal with the cases which come under their ambit. 
 
Abolishment and sentencing 
Secondly, as provocation was been debated in Parliament it become apparent that the 
case for abolishing the mandatory life sentence has gained much support: 
 
"Abolishing the mandatory life sentence would give judges the ability to 
take all the circumstances of each case into account and to graduate their 
sentences accordingly, passing determinate sentences where appropriate 
and reserving life sentences for the most heinous cases."
36
 
 
On one level the necessity for partial defences would no longer exist if such a measure 
was taken,
37
 however, there is still the argument for correct labelling and maintaining 
structure in the homicide law.
38
 If the mandatory life sentence was removed and the 
                                           
34 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 33 [3.19] 
35 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n9) 
The Ministry of Justice's proposal and the 2009 Act only dealt with the partial defences and did not alter the wider 
structure of homicide law as the Law Commission's 2006 Report suggested. 
36 Lord Dholakia, March 1, 1997, HL Deb, col 1698 
37 Lord Thomas of Gresford, March 1, 1997, HL Deb, col 1717: "Diminished responsibility and provocation would not 
be necessary as partial defences if we did not have the mandatory sentence distorting the criminal law of murder." 
For example, since 1994, when a new Criminal Code was adopted, France no longer has a provocation defence; 
neither meurtre nor its aggravated form have a mandatory sentence but instead have maximum sentences, 30 years 
and life, respectively (see Law Commission, Law Commission (2003), 'The Law of Murder: Overseas Comparative 
Studies' Consultation Paper No 173, J.R. Spencer, 'Intentional Killings in French Law'). 
38 The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Scotland of Asthal), March 1, 1997, HL Deb, col 1722: "I am glad that 
there has been no suggestion in this debate to abolish entirely those partial defences, because it is recognised that 
they provide us with an important way in which to differentiate levels of culpability." 
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issue of provocation was left to sentencing then the problems discussed in Part II may 
still exist but they would be much more hidden.
39
 By containing these issues within a 
defence "there is no discretion as to whether the issue will be considered as a mitigating 
factor" and "the shape of the defence is fixed".
40
 Therefore, by having a defence set out it 
is clear what is acceptable for mitigation to take place and enables such cases to be 
dealt with in a fairly consistent manner. Tomlie goes on to state that sentencing is less 
likely to be scrutinised and the process is not as open to review.
41
 
 
Diminished responsibility 
Finally, the Law Commission were clear that the defences of provocation and diminished 
responsibility are "essentially different"
42
 and they "rest on entirely different moral 
bases".
43
 This supports the theme which was discussed in Chapter 5,
44
 that provocation 
is about judging D's reaction by the common standards of society whereas diminished 
responsibility is about testing whether D's incapability to reach that standard is sufficient. 
In response to Mackay and Mitchell's
45
 suggestion to merge the partial defences of 
provocation and diminished responsibility the Law Commission stated that there was 
"very little support" for it.
46
 An important point behind Mackay and Mitchell's view is that 
provocation "sends out the wrong message ... as it is likely to focus attention on the 
behaviour of the victim."
47
 As has been discussed,
48
 this may be inescapable for a 
provocation defence as the conduct of the party who committed the wrong is going to be 
                                           
39 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 39 [3.42]: "the problems about what should or 
should not be regarded as provocation would not disappear by abolishing the defence of provocation, but would be 
faced at a separate stage of the proceedings." 
40 J. Tolmie, 'Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish Provocation' [2005] NZLR 
25, 35 
41 Ibid 36: "If injustices occur - like those that have historically taken place in relation to battered defendants or 
battered victims - it is difficult to know what is taking place and what might be done." 
42 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 45 [3.63] 
Also, at 70 [3.166]: "A merger of the two defences would not be compatible with our present thinking about the 
way in which the defence of provocation should be reshaped, and we do not recommend it." 
43 Ibid 108 [5.99] 
44 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n143-55) 
45 This basis for the defence was introduced at 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n36-7). 
46 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 107 [5.98] 
47 R.D. Mackay & B.J. Mitchell, 'But is this provocation? Some thoughts on the Law Commission's report on partial 
defences to murder' (2005) Crim LR 44, 55 
48 'Chapter 3: Rationale' (n32-5) 
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reviewed. However, with the proposal resting on the rationale of warranted excuse it will 
limit the scope of the defence and it will not apply like before, where V's conduct could be 
"blameless or trivial".
49
 The provision which increases the judge's role in filtering cases 
will also prevent the defence from dealing these types of cases.
50
 
 
The rest of this Chapter will go through the Law Commission's proposal and define the 
terms used and explain the provisions in reference to the previous chapters. Firstly, all of 
the three limbs in section 1 will be discussed. After, the revenge exclusion, the self-
induced provocation exclusion and the role of the judge and jury will be explored. Even 
though the Law Commission's proposal should be viewed in a favourable manner, as 
what it attempted to achieve was broadly correct, there are many issues where there is a 
lack of clarity. 
 
s1) (a) Gross Provocation 
Anything has the potential to amount to being provocation, the phrase "words or conduct 
or a combination" means that any situation is capable of providing a foundation for the 
defence. This is the correct approach as much of the criticism of the defence before 1957 
was to do with exclusions of this sort, for example how in Holmes words alone could only 
be considered in exceptional circumstances.
51
 There is no reason why words of a 
provocative nature, such as repeated taunts or racist abuse, for example, should not be 
viewed as being equivalent to an assault. 
 
i) subjective element 
Requiring D to have a 'sense of being seriously wronged' is a subjective test. Therefore, 
the subjective element, rather than being heat of passion or loss of self-control, is the 
existence of the core emotion. For D to feel wronged means that he is either angry or 
outraged at what has occurred and therefore has the potential to include a greater set of 
circumstances than a loss of self-control requirement.
52
 The difference between 
                                           
49 (n2) 
50 This provision will be discussed below, at (n132-45), but it will not be supported. 
51 Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588. See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n109-114). 
52 At 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n71-80) the different types of provoked anger are discussed. 
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'wronged' and 'seriously wronged' is unclear but it can be inferred that it would take 
something severe. This would help to avoid cases such as Doughty,
53
 where a baby 
crying was the source. In that case there was no feeling of D being wronged in any way 
or that D was actually subjected to provocation, it was merely how the pre-2009 defence 
was interpreted in that 'provoked' was viewed as the equivalent to 'cause'.
54
 By 
stipulating "gross provocation" and defining the limb in this way it helps to ensure that the 
limb only deals with cases which can truly be described as provoked anger. 
 
ii) gravity test 
The Law Commission also state that the jury must find it to be "gross provocation" 
through the objective element, which relies on the term 'justifiable': "we do not intend the 
test to be purely subjective".
55
 Below, it will be discussed how the lack of further 
explanation of the 'justifiable' term means that the nature of the limb is not wholly clear 
from the text. 
 
The developments in the pre-2009 defence from Camplin have been built on in this 
proposal. With regards to response characteristics, the Law Commission made an effort 
over the concerns with considering racist, sexist and homophobic characteristics by 
requiring that the objective standard is to have 'ordinary tolerance'. If the "provocation 
demonstrated an outlook (e.g. religious or racial bigotry) offensive to the standards of a 
civilised society" then it should not be considered by the jury.
56
 The inclusion of "ordinary 
tolerance" shows that the Law Commission understood a problem with the ordinary 
standard, that it allows prejudices to be relied on.
57
 The proposal refers to 
'circumstances' rather than 'characteristics', this is preferable as it gives greater scope to 
                                           
53 R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319. See 'Chapter 4: Adequate Provocation' (n26-30). 
54 'Chapter 4: Adequate Provocation' (n31-4) 
55 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 46-7 [3,69-3.70]: [T]he jury must of course 
consider the situation in which the defendant found him or herself and take into account all the characteristics of 
the defendant which they consider to be relevant. Taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the 
defendant does not mean that if the defendant considered it to be gross provocation, the jury must therefore 
accept that it was gross provocation." 
56 Ibid 47 [3.70] 
57 Ordinariness, by definition, would include prejudices which society hold. See 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n57-
63). 
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contextualise the events leading up to the killing, but the term 'characteristic' was 
previously given such meaning in the common law anyway.
58
 
 
iii) control test 
The ordinary person test follows a similar approach to the moderate excuse theory by 
only referring to normal and ordinary control characteristics as the ordinary person must 
have an "ordinary temperament" and "self-restraint".
59
 Further explanation is given in s2 
of the proposal and the Report clearly states that the Camplin and minority position in 
Smith (Morgan) is being taken.
60
 Whilst age remains sex is removed from consideration 
in this test. Sex was applied incorrectly in the pre-2009 defence and is commonly viewed 
as controversial, nevertheless, as Chapter 5 demonstrates,
61
 there may be a place for it 
in a broader discussion about maturity. 
 
The language used in the proposal does not state their view of the moderate excuse 
theory as plainly as it could have been done.
62
 It has even been questioned if a moderate 
excuse theory has been followed at all and authors have suggested that this was done 
unintentionally.
63
 On this reading of the provision, it is found that where the circumstance 
is not only relevant as a control characteristic it can be considered in the control test. For 
example, if the provision was applied to the Morhall case, where D was a glue sniffer and 
was taunted about his habit, his drug addiction could be considered as a control 
characteristic.
64
 D's drug addiction is not only relevant to his general capacity for self-
control as it is also relevant as a response characteristic in the gravity test, meaning in 
these scenarios where a characteristic is potentially applicable in both tests it may be 
                                           
58 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n63-8) 
59 The moderate excuse theory was described at 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n92-6). 
60 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 55 [3.110] 
61 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n112-9) 
62 s2: "the court should take into account the defendant’s age and all the circumstances of the defendant other than 
matters whose only relevance to the defendant’s conduct is that they bear simply on his or her general capacity for 
self-control." 
63 C.M.V. Clarkson, H.M. Keating, S.R. Cunningham, Criminal Law: Text and Materials (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2010) 686: "it would seem that this provision has (perhaps unintentionally) opened the door to a wide variety of 
characteristics being taken into account ... [T]here is no reason why the defendant's impotence, pregnancy, physical 
disability, sensitivity or even mental disability cannot be taken into account" in certain cases. 
64 [1996] AC 90. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n75). 
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considered as a control characteristic too. From the wording a control characteristic is 
only unavailable to consider if its "only relevance" is as a control characteristic. Even 
though the wording could be interpreted in such a manner it is clear that this was not the 
intention of the Law Commission and given this it seems surprising that the 2009 Act 
adopts similar language in their equivalent provision.
65
 The Report makes it very clear 
the Camplin distinction is being followed
66
 and to underline this s1 of the proposal refers 
to a person of "ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint". It may 
have been better to state straightforwardly that 'D's age is the only factor which can be 
considered with regards to the general capacity for self-control.' 
 
iv) critique 
There are two main points about this limb of the Law Commission's proposal. Firstly, 
there is not a subjective element akin to loss of self-control. Instead the proposal seeks 
to define what it is to be provoked, sets a higher standard, and then the defence merely 
requires the core emotion. The gross provocation limb therefore includes serious cases 
of anger and outrage, this means that the proposal caters for a greater set of provocation 
cases as it is not restricted to spontaneous and out-of-control reactions.
67
 Also, it restricts 
those cases which were admitted into the pre-2009 defence as the provision does not 
allow for 'cause' to be seen as the equivalent of 'provoked';
68
 it means D must feel 
wronged by an identifiable source which is adjudged to be of a provocative nature. All 
this means that the limb is tailored to archetypal provocation cases. 
 
Secondly, the Law Commission, as they acknowledge,
69
 placed a greater emphasis on 
the objective questions owing to its abandonment of loss of self-control. Considering that 
the importance of the term 'justifiable' in the proposal the Law Commission can be 
criticised for not elaborating on its meaning in their reports. It was merely stated that the 
                                           
65 s54(3) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
66 (n60) 
67 See the discussion of the loss of self-control concept at 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n17-35). 
68 (n53-4) 
69 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 56 [3.115]: "Moreover our proposals involve 
abandoning the loss of self-control test, which has proved very unsatisfactory, and this makes the need for an 
objective test still greater." 
Chapter 7 - Law Commission   171 
 
limb has "two aspects":
70
 the subjective element is that the 'provocation' must caused D 
to have a "sense of being seriously wronged" and the objective element is that it was 
"justifiable", a determination which requires D's response characteristics to be 
considered.
71
 There was no definition provided, meaning that the impact of the term is 
not as clear as could have been as without further explanation it is more difficult to 
appreciate how far they were intending to narrow the scope of the defence. This is 
especially so given that the term has not been associated with the defence in this 
manner before and greater clarification by such an authority could have aided its 
application. 
 
In Part II it was stated that the Camplin approach, combined with a provision to exclude 
undesirable characteristics, ought to be applied to a warranted standard for the jury to 
apply.
72
 Therefore, the Law Commission's proposals are, on the whole, in line with what 
has been advanced. The one point at which it differs is that in Chapter 3 it was stated 
that D himself ought to believe that his sense of being provoked was warranted too;
73
 this 
ensures that D's emotion is driven by the provocation which he appreciated to be 
substantial and through this the defence is on a more satisfying platform as the warrant 
informs both the objective (for the jury) and the subjective (for D) elements. 
 
s1) (b) Fear of Serious Violence 
The provocation defence had become under increasing pressure to deal with cases 
which fell outside self-defence and did not involve diminished responsibility.
74
 Rather 
than create a separate partial defence of excessive self-defence the Law Commission 
sought to combine provocation and fear as the emotions can be seen to be somewhat 
similar
75
 and in both D "acknowledges" that their conduct was "unlawful" but they stem 
from "from an external source",
76
 a provoker or someone who threatens. The Law 
                                           
70 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 46 [3.68] 
71 Ibid 47 [3.70]. See (n55-8). 
72 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n156) 
73 'Chapter 3: Rationale' (n124) 
74 (n29-35) 
75 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 52 [3.97] 
76 Ibid [3.95] 
Chapter 7 - Law Commission   172 
 
Commission felt they were able to do this as their proposal did not include a requirement 
for D to lose his self-control.
77
 
 
i) subjective element 
The Law Commission referred to Lord Hoffmann in Smith (Morgan) and how he stated 
that provocation may include cases of fear.
78
 However, this proposal is evidently a very 
different defence from the one which Lord Hoffmann was referring to as is shown when 
comparing the structure and rationale.
79
 The subjective test in this proposal is, quite 
simply, that D feared serious violence. Chapter 6 discussed how losing self-control was 
at odds with the emotion of fear, it is possible that D can genuinely fear, and act upon it, 
whilst being in control and acting somewhat rationally: "D should not be prejudiced 
because he or she over-reacted in fear or panic, instead of overreacting because of an 
angry loss of self-control."
80
 Such an agent's actions, under the influence of this emotion, 
in those circumstances, may understandably consist of an excessive response which 
differs from an anger-based response. 
 
The Law Commission envisioned two types of cases arising under this limb. Firstly, 
situations where the killing was excessive as D used too much force. An example given 
was a householder killing an intruder where it was not necessary to do so but D over-
reacted.
81
 Secondly, where the killing was "insufficiently imminent" to a threat of violence, 
the best example being the case of a 'battered woman';
82
 for instance, in the case of a 
victim of abuse who kills V when he is sleeping there is sympathy with her situation and 
murder "would be overly harsh".
83
  Therefore, this shows that the Law Commission 
                                           
77 (n80) 
78 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 52 [3.90]. See R v Smith (Morgan), [2001] 1 AC 
146, 168 and 'Chapter 4: Adequate Provocation' (n14). 
79 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 51 [3.85]: "the proposed partial defence 
would go beyond the traditional limits of provocation." 
80 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 89 [5.54] 
81 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 77 [4.17]: "... where the force used is 
unlawful, because it is excessive, even though the circumstances are such that some use of force would have been 
lawful in self-defence." 
82 Ibid: "where the threat of attack was insufficiently imminent to attract any possible defence of self-defence." 
83 Ibid [3.92] 
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intended a true relationship between their proposal and self-defence, where the full 
defence was not available as one of the elements was not present the partial defence 
could ensure that D did not fall under the scope of murder. 
 
As with the provocation limb, it is not altogether clear what the difference is between 
violence and serious violence. The Law Commission stated that it included "sexual as 
well as other physical violence" and the seriousness would depend upon the "context of 
the relationship between the defendant and the victim":
84
 D's past experiences will shape 
her future expectations harm. A problem with this requirement is that there may be 
borderline cases and D may fear a certain amount of future violence but is excluded from 
the partial defence owing to its insufficiency. Also, another consideration is that this term, 
'serious', was introduced to the gross provocation limb to raise the bar on what could be 
admitted into the defence. It is not apparent that the same problems exist with regards to 
the fear limb. This is partly because of what will be discussed when examining the 
'combination' limb, that killing excessively in fear ought to be viewed as being on a 
greater standing than killing excessively in anger.
85
 Ultimately, this means that the rules 
do not have to be so strict in comparison with the first limb and this, in part, may explain 
the extra layer of requiring a 'justifiable' serious wrong in the 'provocation' limb as if D felt 
fear of serious violence this emotion could be construed as being warranted already. 
 
ii) control test 
For all the limbs of the proposal the same control test applies as sections 1 and 2 refer to 
a person of "ordinary temperament". How appropriate it is for same the control test being 
used to deal with both cases of provocation and fear is questionable. It has been stated 
that 'tolerance and self-restraint' fit the enquiry into whether mitigation it was suitable for 
a killing in anger but the "terms do not fit neatly ... with excessive force in self-defence to 
a fear of serious violence."
86
 
 
                                           
84 Ibid 53-4 [3.102] 
85 (n106-7) 
86 C.M.V. Clarkson, H.M. Keating, S.R. Cunningham, Criminal Law: Text and Materials 686-7 
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The Law Commission supported the fact that a fearful D must still show a similar level of 
restraint as an ordinary person: "Ordinarily it would not be even partially excusable for a 
person in fear, but not in imminent danger, to take the law into his or her own hands."
87
 
This explanation by the Law Commission, even though this passage later refers to 
"criminal gangs",
88
 seems at odds with extending the defence to include victims of abuse 
and 'battered woman' scenarios; the sorts of cases which the Law Commission imagined 
would fall into the fear limb include killings where the threat was "insufficiently 
imminent".
89
 Therefore, there is a lack of clarity with regards to this limb in how far it is 
intended to reach; whether the limb would deal with 'battered women' who kill with delay 
or not is unclear as the control test may bar reactions which are not responding to 
imminent threats as they could be viewed as being outside the scope of an ordinary 
reaction. Designing a limb to deal with excessive killings in fear would be a pointless 
exercise if the problem cases are outside the ambit of the defence as the tests imposed 
have not been adapted to specifically deal with the emotion of fear. 
 
iii) contextual evidence
90
 
Unlike the provocation limb, the fear limb is entirely subjective, this means that there is 
no reference to judging the severity of the threat by objective standards. Therefore, the 
consequence of these two limbs operating in differing manners means that there is no 
specific gravity test for the fear limb akin to provocation. The issue is that sections 1 (the 
final paragraph) and 2, which deal with how to apply the objective standard, are equally 
applicable to the fear limb and both of these sections refer to "the circumstances of the 
defendant", meaning response characteristics and contextual evidence. The question 
becomes how should this phrase be interpreted. Above,
91
 reference was made to how 
the Law Commission rightly supported that contextual evidence could be used to support 
D's fear of serious violence in the subjective element. Also, as Chapter 5 discussed,
92
 by 
allowing contextual evidence it gives the jury the opportunity to show more 
                                           
87 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 56 [3.112] 
88 Ibid 
89 See (n82-3). 
90 Part IV will deal with how contextual evidence could be used more appropriately. 
91 (n84) 
92 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n48-51) 
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understanding to the emotion which D experienced. In terms of any objective enquiry, the 
only way contextual evidence may therefore be applicable to the fear limb is in giving 
greater understanding to the jury in their assessment of the control test, it in no way has 
any significance in assessing the gravity of the threat. 
 
iv) critique 
This proposal, owing to the removal of loss of self-control from the subjective element, 
allows this defence to have a relationship with self-defence: this proposal would be a 
natural step-down.
93
 It would be very difficult for D to simultaneously argue that he acted 
proportionality and that he lost his self-control.
94
 The way which the proposal would 
function is as ideal as these cases could possibly be dealt with: 
 
"Under our proposal, the jury would first consider whether D acted in lawful 
self-defence. If the jury is satisfied that the killing was unlawful, they would 
then consider whether D was entitled to a partial defence of provocation 
under either limb."
95
 
 
It is important to note that despite self-defence being considered generous, in allowing 
the defence to be judged from D's perspective, the partial defence was still proposed 
because of the desire to provide mitigation for excessive responses.
96
 A downside to this 
approach, removing the 'all or nothing' consequence, is that a risk emerges that juries 
will see this defence as a "'compromise'" and they could "return a manslaughter verdict, 
whereas presently they would acquit on grounds of self-defence".
97
 It is submitted, 
however, that the benefits of the fear limb outweigh this drawback; the utility of a defence 
                                           
93 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 80 [4.28-9] 
N. Wake, 'Battered women, startled householders and psychological self-defence: Anglo-Australian perspectives' 
(2013) 77(5) JCL 433, 436: "A commendable outcome of the Law Commission's recommendations was that, in the 
absence of the loss of control requirement, the partial defence could be cogently aligned with the law on self-
defence". 
94 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n81-4) 
95 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 52 [3.90]: "We believe that this represents a 
coherent and just approach. D would not be in the dilemma identified". 
96 (n29-32 & n76) 
97 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 79 [4.24] 
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which operates in the middle-ground could be valuable for cases which do involve 
excessive killings and such cases will finally have a tailored partial defence. 
 
There are forceful arguments which exist which seek to brand many of the 'battered 
woman' cases as justifiable if objective questions are allowed to be refocused to 
recognise that women act differently to men and that from their perspective the act of 
killing is necessary to avoid future violence.
98
 Self-defence rules could be tweaked to 
make the defence more receptive to these types of cases; there are ways of re-defining 
self-defence as, for example, in Australia the Victoria Law Commission's proposals 
described the required threat, attempting to include 'battered women' within self-defence, 
as needing to be "not immediate, but ... inevitable."
99
 On this issue, however, concerns 
have been expressed about considering these cases as self-defence rather than being 
considered as excessive killings and a matter for partial defence,
100
 this is from a 
standpoint where immediacy is a necessary requirement for it to be a justification.
101
 
 
Despite there being issues with regards to how the provision was drafted the Law 
Commission were correct to recognise that people could kill in fear without losing self-
control and without responding to an immediate and necessary threat and still deserve 
some form of defence in the face of being labelled as a murderer. 
 
s1) (c) A combination and s4) 
i) anger and fear 
A great concern with the proposal is that there is not enough detail in how the 
combination limb, which deals with both emotions, would operate.
102
 There seems to be 
an essential difference between the two limbs and the reasons why mitigation ought to 
be available; killing in anger is an aggressive act whereas killing in fear is a defensive 
act. One of the points, therefore, that the Law Commission had to respond to was why 
                                           
98 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n64-68) 
99 Victoria Law Reform Commission (2004) Defences To Homicide: Final Report, 80 [3.60] 
100 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n68) 
101 'Chapter 3: Rationale' (n22-8) 
102 Ibid 54-5 [3.104-8] 
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anger and fear were joined in one defence in their proposal rather than each having its 
own partial defence. The three arguments which were used were that the situations and 
emotions are in fact similar,
103
 there was a wish to keep the defence "as broad and 
simple as possible"
104
 and "from a moral viewpoint, there is a common element namely a 
response to unjust conduct".
105
  
 
The rationale for a fear-based limb ought to be construed as being far more compelling 
than provocation's as it could act as a step-down from the justificatory defence, the 
partial defence could cover those cases which did not quite fit into the full defence. In 
Chapter 3 the rationale of self-defence was discussed in order to contrast it with 
provocation,
106
 to highlight how far provocation is from resting on a justificatory basis. 
Even so, there still must be a reason to offer a partial defence, a reason why we show 
compassion to somebody who killed excessively out of fear. The two emotions do find a 
common ground in human frailty, extreme emotions and highly charged situations where 
an excessive reaction, given the gravity of the stimulus, can be distinguished. This is 
consistent with the Law Commission stating that the fear limb is not meant to be 
excessive self-defence as D makes no claim that their conduct was in any way 
proportionate to the threat.
107
 Through experiencing the emotion and with the application 
of the control test it is possible to link D's behaviour to common standards in a similar 
manner to the provocation defence. 
 
On one hand, there needs to be a purpose to put them together in a single defence and, 
on the other, it must be possible to separate them because of the different standings of 
the two emotions. A benefit to the proposal is that the operative emotion can be identified 
from its separate limb. Anger and fear have been labelled separately, therefore the 
                                           
103 Ibid 53 [3.99] 
Law Commission (2005) A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? Consultation Paper No 177, 175  [6.139]: 
"there seems to us to be no reason to distinguish sharply between the excusatory element in limb (a) (gross 
provocation) and the excusatory element in limb (b) (a fear of serious violence). Anger and fear are often mixed in 
people’s responses. In some cases, it may be almost impossible to say whether the defendant’s reaction was in 
essence predominantly fearful or predominantly angry. A jury should not have to distinguish between the two for 
the purposes of reducing first degree murder to a lesser offence." 
104 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 53 [3.100] 
105 Ibid [3.101] 
106 'Chapter 3: Rationale' (n29-30) 
107 (n76) 
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reasons why mitigation is offered is clear and there will be an ability to punish D 
proportionately as killing out of fear deserves less punishment. There should be therefore 
quite clear gradations of blame and punishment within the defence when the individual 
limbs are relied upon. 
 
Combining the two emotions, however, may wrongly put these emotions on par with 
each other but it may also allow the lines between defensive and aggressive action to be 
blurred within the combination limb. 'Battered women', for example, may kill justifiably in 
self-defence. But they may also kill excessively because they have found the abuse they 
have suffered to be provocative or because they fear future violence from their abuser 
despite at the time facing no threat (or they may kill owing to a mental abnormality in 
diminished responsibility). Not all 'battered women' cases will be dealt with through 
arguing that D acted in a defensive manner.
108
 Therefore, combining the emotions in one 
defence has value owing to the complexities of the key scenario, the 'battered woman' 
case, which the Law Commission were attempting to deal with. However, how the two 
emotions relate to each other in the case of the combination will mean the jury is being 
asked to consider mitigation for defensive and aggressive reasons together. The anger 
limb, especially, could undermine the fear limb. 
 
ii) critique 
The Law Commission at no point identifies how the combination limb ought to operate. 
The best understanding is that both the provocation and the fear limbs must be satisfied 
in full; this interpretation is that the combination does not mean that D can be 
insufficiently angry and fearful but combine them together to make a successful limb; if D 
shows she killed because of gross provocation and fear then it will make her argument, 
in the control test, that an ordinary person might have killed too and, also, that she did 
not kill in revenge more forceful. The rationale for the combination limb is therefore that if 
D is able to demonstrate that he experienced both of these emotions at the time then he 
will be more likely succeed with a combination limb but the two emotions, even though 
similar, have the potential to work against each other. 
                                           
108 J. Tolmie, 'Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence?' 42: she could argue that she was "responding to an 
emotional rather than a physical abuse at the time she killed him." 
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Section 4 of the proposal adds an interesting contribution to the discussion on the 
relationship between anger and fear. It states that D shall not be viewed to have killed in 
revenge if she killed out of fear but was angry at the same time. The Law Commission 
state that a jury should be able to spot a D "who was not truly killing out of fear for their 
future safety (or that of the children) but for other reasons."
109
 The purpose of this section 
means that the presence of anger or outrage will not damage the subjective element of 
the fear limb. It will also help to isolate fear from anger in standalone fear cases, if D's 
anger does not satisfy the provocation limb then the fear limb, in theory, should not be 
disturbed. By allowing the fear limb to be isolated from the anger limb in such a way only 
exemplifies how the combination limb does not sit right. It creates another balancing act 
for the jury: the decision to ignore the anger, which could possibly be construed as 
revenge, or to find that even though D was fearful she acted in revenge would become a 
difficult task for a jury. It highlights the differences between the two emotions and 
acknowledges that they can work against each other, proof that D was angry at the time 
might make arguments in favour of the fear limb less creditable: if there are two different 
reasons behind the killing then it may undermine D's argument. The benefit of the 
combination limb is that it could strengthen D's claim that they acted like an ordinary 
person but by putting the two emotions in the same limb it forces the jury to consider 
contrasting reasons behind the killing. 
 
s3) (b) Considered desire for revenge 
i) removal of loss of self-control 
The Law Commission's proposal does not rely on a subjective element such as loss of 
self-control, instead it merely requires the core emotion of anger and/or fear. The loss of 
self-control concept was described as being "unnecessary and undesirable".
110
 It has 
been stated that the key function of a subjective element is to ensure that D was acting 
                                           
109 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 63 [3.137] 
110 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 80 [5.17]: "For 250 years or 
more, the law took the uncomplicated view that the defence of provocation could be pleaded whenever D was 
provoked into a towering rage or temper and killed before the rage or temper subsided. In the 19th century, this 
subjective requirement was turned into a requirement that D 'lost self-control' at the time of the killing. Judges 
have since struggled to interpret and apply this notion as a description of the necessary state of mind." 
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emotionally, "on impulse or in fear or both",
111
 and not owing to revenge.
112
 The 
provocation defence has never been designed in a way to include revenge killings, 
mitigation is available because D is shown to have got carried away in the moment and 
because of the strength of the emotion and its link to common standards the killing can 
be distinguished from murder. The Law Commission stated that their preference was to 
express the subjective element "negatively, avoiding reliance on a positive requirement 
of loss of self-control" and all that matters is that the emotion is genuine and not 
"'engineered'".
113
 
 
The Law Commission's reports plainly criticise the loss of self-control element.
114
 Loss of 
self-control has been ill-defined, distorted and its necessity can be called into question. If 
its function is to distinguish between 'hot blooded' provoked killers and 'cold blooded' 
vengeful killers then it failed. The Law Commission reported of "undesirable side 
effects",
115
 that the concept had been stretched in order to do justice by allowing a 
certain amount of delay for 'battered women' and therefore was unable to exclude cases 
such as Baillie.
116
 There are those cases which involve outrage rather than a loss of self-
control, they involve extremely provocative scenarios but were outside of the pre-2009 
defence. Also,
117
 if fear is included as a valid emotion then loss of self-control simply 
should not be required as it would exclude those scenarios where D kills excessively and 
acts rationally under the influence of fear or despair. Strong links with self-defence would 
be lost too.
118
 
 
Section 3)(b) expressly rules out where D acts with a 'considered desire for revenge'. 
The Law Commission stated that "[t]here may be borderline cases on the facts" but "a 
jury would be able to recognise and apply" the provision.
119
 The advantage of this over 
requiring a loss of self-control is evident: the underlying emotions are more successfully 
                                           
111 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 62 [3.135] 
112 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n6-10) 
113 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 81 [5.20] 
114 See, in particular, 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n9). 
115 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 63 [3.136] 
116 [1995] 2 Cr App R 31. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n28). 
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Chapter 7 - Law Commission   181 
 
brought out in the tailored limbs, there is no need to rely on a concept which does not 
function effectively and the scope for undeserving cases is limited with specific 
provisions, such as s3)(b), which restrict the defence from unmeritorious cases. 
 
ii) critique 
A few points can be raised from this terminology though. The difference between a 
considered desire for revenge and a desire for revenge is not straightforward, for 
example, Card has stated that "one cannot desire something without giving the matter 
some consideration".
120
 As has been discussed,
121
 this is only true in part; in the process 
of becoming provoked the desire for retaliation only comes after a judgement of 
wrongdoing has been made. Even though 'consideration' is required before all desires 
can exist the provision actually states that considered desires are excluded, not 
judgements over whether D has being wronged. The consideration which is referred to 
therefore is to do with how to carry out the killing; a vengeful killing is a calculated 
decision where the emotional impulsiveness is removed. The provision does therefore 
make it implicit that a certain amount of revenge can exist but it must not cross over the 
threshold as to be considered, a plan could not take form in D's mind of how to proceed 
in carrying out the feeling of revenge but a feeling of resentment could exist.
122
 This is 
most likely what is at the core of section 4 of the proposal too, that D's anger does not 
necessarily invalidate D's fear of serious violence.
123
 
 
As with any defence which enquires into emotional killings the issue of delay would 
remain a major concern. It is interesting to consider how differently these cases would be 
treated given that a loss of self-control is not required. The greater the delay without 
overt signs to demonstrate that the killing was not done in 'cold blood' would make it 
difficult for juries. These are the borderline cases and where there is some evidence of 
preparatory actions, no matter how slight, the subjective element may prove to be a 
difficult obstacle. The 'considered desire for revenge' exclusion would put the proposal 
                                           
120 R. Card, Criminal Law (20th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) 259-60 
121 'Chapter 3: Rationale' (n70) 
122 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n6): R. Holton & S. Shute suspect that revenge is present in most provocation 
cases. 
123 (n109) 
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closer to the true rationale of this type of defence but as a substantive rule, when there 
are so many factors which could be relevant, it could be difficult for a jury to apply.
124
 
 
s3) (b) Self-induced Provocation 
The Law Commission included another exclusion, that self-induced provocation cannot 
be relied upon by D in certain scenarios. Under the pre-2009 defence, in Johnson,
125
 
self-induced provocation was seen to be consistent with the defence's rationale, all that 
was required was that D needed to feel provoked into losing his self-control and this then 
needed to be inspected through the ordinary person test: the nature of the provocation 
did not matter. The main question was whether a loss of self-control could be genuine in 
such a case.
126
 
 
The Law Commission reported that self-induced provocation could either be defined 
narrowly or broadly but decided they should only exclude the narrow circumstances.
127
 
The excluded narrow definition is a situation where D purposely uses the 'provocation' 
scenario as a guise. The broader definition, on the other hand, could include all 
situations where D puts himself into a position where he is likely to be provoked; so, for 
example, D going to a place where he knows it is likely that his presence will cause an 
affront to another is not explicitly excluded under this proposal. These cases would need 
to fulfil the standard elements of the defence.
128
 
 
The wording of the provision would indeed limit the exclusion to a narrow set of 
circumstances. It is interesting that the phrase "the purpose" is included in the text,
129
 this 
means that D must intend that his conduct is to have the effect of wronging another and 
this will induce that person into acting violently in response. D may therefore only use the 
defence if it is not planned. For example, in Edwards D planned to blackmail V,
130
 his 
                                           
124 See 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n88) for further discussion of this point. 
125 [1989] 1 WLR 740 
126 See 'Chapter 4: Adequate Provocation' (n37-45) for the discussion of self-induced provocation. 
127 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 63 [3.139] 
128 Ibid 64 [3.140]: "it would be for the jury to take a common-sense view whether the defendant's conduct met the 
requirements of the objective test." 
129 "the provocation was incited by the defendant for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence" 
130 [1973] AC 648: D was attempting to blackmail V. V then swore and attacked D with a knife inflicting several 
wounds. This provoked D into killing V as D wrestled the knife from V and stabbed him in a blind rage. 
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purpose was not to use this in order to anger V and then kill him, arguing that he was 
provoked. This exclusion, with merit, is very narrow but the jury could still hear cases 
which commonly would be defined as self-induced. 
 
The actual rule set out in Edwards is preferable to later developments (Johnson) and the 
Edwards provision, D can only rely on self-induced provocation if V's conduct went 
beyond reasonable expectations, ought to apply to the 'broad' category of self-induced 
provocations.
131
 The Law Commission's proposal does not explicitly deal with the 
broader circumstances, instead of advocating an approach such as the one in Edwards it 
merely instructs that those cases should be dealt with within the normal rules. 
 
s6) Role of the judge and jury 
The aim of the Homicide Act 1957 was to give greater power to the jury because the 
common law had developed in a way which meant judicial control was great and it 
contained many exclusions which were not necessary.
132
 This goes very much the other 
way. The fact that such a provision is required in the proposal is significant as the Law 
Commission have made the decision that certain cases should never reach the jury: "[t]o 
leave such a case to the jury would imply that a properly directed jury could reasonably 
conclude" that the defence could succeed.
133
 In a later report it was stated that the 
judge's role involves "filtering out purely speculative and wholly unmeritorious claims."
134
 
 
The Law Commission set out a number of cases which it did not want to succeed under 
its proposal. They cited the Australian case of Stingel
135
 where a jealous D killed his ex-
girlfriend. Other cases were highlighted: "Examples of other cases which under our 
approach ought not to be left to the jury are Baillie, Doughty and Dryden."
136
 Therefore, 
apart from sexual jealousy and possessiveness, the intention of the Law Commission 
was to also exclude cases which involved a great time of delay and possibly motives of 
                                           
131 [1973] AC 648. See 'Chapter 4: Adequate Provocation' (n39 & n45). 
132 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n81-2) 
133 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 65 [3.145] 
134 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 80 [5.16] 
135 (1990) 171 CLR 312: D was stalking his ex-girlfriend and saw her having sex with V in a car. V swore at D and D 
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136 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 66 [3.148] 
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revenge (Baillie),
137
 cases where the provocation stems from a normal and natural 
source (Doughty)
138
 and cases involving D relying on mental abnormalities (Dryden).
139
 
 
Part I discussed many cases which explored how much evidence was actually required 
for the case to go to the jury.
140
 For example, in Hopper it was stated that "some 
evidence"
141
 was required and following Holmes "a preliminary ruling" by the judge on all 
the elements of the defence was required.
142
 Following the 1957 Act all cases of loss of 
self-control which stemmed from D feeling provoked had to go to the jury.
143
 Presumably, 
the provision in the proposal requires a similar approach to the much criticised case of 
Holmes, a judge must inspect all of the elements of the defence and be satisfied before 
the case may proceed. On one hand, an argument has been made that undeserving 
cases should not be heard at all by a jury as this has significance,
144
 and on the other, it 
gives greater powers to the judge at the jury's expense and this is not desirable. The 
greater worry, rather than a jury hearing an undeserving case, is that such cases will 
actually succeed or that the judge will mistakenly rule out a case with merit. Ideally, the 
provisions of the proposal ought to be sufficient to stand alone. It is understandable that 
the Law Commission, following how the 1957 Act was applied, would be hesitant to 
follow the Hopper approach, but as the proposal both rests on a more stringent 
warranted excuse rationale and gives a definition of provocation handing over such 
power to the judge at the expense of the jury is unnecessary for this defence.
145
 
 
Conclusion 
The Law Commission can be praised for many of the aspects of the proposal: 
appreciating the rationale of the defence and moving towards the warranted excuse form 
                                           
137 (n116) 
138 (n53) 
139 [1995] 4 All ER 987. See 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n41-3). 
140 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n83-9) & 'Chapter 2: Adequate Provocation' (n7-11). 
141 [1915] 2 KB 431, 435 
142 Phillips v The Queen [1969] 2 AC 130 
143 R v Acott [1997] 2 Cr App R 94, 102: "If there is such evidence, the judge must leave the issue to the jury." 
144 V. Nourse, ‘Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense’ (1997) Yale LJ, Vol 106, No 5, 
1331, 1357: "the decision to send the case to a jury itself has legal meaning". 
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of partial excuse; for removing the loss of self-control requirement and instead placing 
the focus on the core emotions and lack of revenge; modifying provocation's gravity and 
control tests by removing many of the criticisms of the pre-2009 law, and not just re-
stating the Camplin direction but enhancing it. 
 
Despite the fact that this proposal would have improved the provocation defence there 
are problems with it. The key issue is how to properly deal with the emotions of fear and 
anger in one defence and, particularly, in a 'combination' limb. The provocation limb 
contains a gravity test based on the justifiability of the anger, but there is no 
corresponding gravity test within the fear limb; this means that the jury never assess the 
severity of the threat as it is an entirely subjective matter and it means that there is not 
really room to consider contextual evidence to support an objective assessment of the 
circumstances. Also, for each limb an identical control test is stipulated and the factors 
which deal with self-control and restraint are more suited to provocation. The reasons to 
have anger and fear in a single defence were strongly made and rest on the overlapping 
nature of the situations they cover, however, having a limb which includes aggressive 
and defensive reactions could cause problems. Therefore, how the combination limb 
operates is not entirely clear, in terms of how the limbs work in conjunction. 
 
How the Ministry of Justice proposal and the ultimate reform which took place in 2009 
Act dealt with these issues, plus those raised concerning self-inducement and sufficient 
evidence, will help to establish whether the problems identified with the pre-2009 
defence have been resolved. The Law Commission laid down a path to be followed and 
all that was required was for certain aspects of their proposal to be enhanced as the 
main elements of this proposal both built on positive aspects of the pre-2009 defence 
and attempted to resolve the problems which were identified with that defence. One key 
area, which must be highlighted, which would help to make improvements on this 
proposal would be if more clarity could be given to the terms used, for instance, 
'justifiable' in the 'provocation' limb, in order to more fully appreciate the scope of the 
provisions and enable them to be applied in the manner in which they were intended.
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CHAPTER 8 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 
The Ministry of Justice produced two important reports in response to the Law 
Commission's proposal for reform. One sets out their position but also highlights 
responses from academics and interested groups.
1
 The other explains the basis for their 
proposal for reform.
2
 To summarise, the Ministry stated that they agreed with much of the 
Law Commissions findings but "propose a slightly different approach in respect of the 
detail".
3
 As will be demonstrated, this does not reflect the significance of the differences 
between the two proposals, they are fundamentally different. This Chapter will deal with 
the reasons why there are differences with the Law Commission's proposal and Chapter 
9 will look at the provisions in more detail. 
 
The Ministry of Justice proposal
4
 is to abolish provocation and to establish "two new 
partial defences" which can be "run either separately or in parallel".
5
 The qualifying 
triggers are "based on the limbs of the Law Commission’s proposal", fear and/or anger:6 
"fear of serious violence", something said and/or done which amounts to "circumstances 
of an extremely grave character"
7
 and "caused D to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged" or a "combination of the matters". The most significant aspect is that 
a loss of self-control would be required. It requires D, stemming from a qualifying trigger, 
to have lost his self-control and fulfilment of an ordinary person test. There are three 
exclusions or limitations contained within the proposal: the conduct cannot be 
"predominantly attributable" to a criminal offence, "an act of sexual infidelity is not, of 
itself, an exceptional happening" and D cannot incite the wrong in the 'provocation' 
trigger. 
                                           
1 Ministry of Justice (2009) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law: Summary of 
Responses and Government Position CP(R) 19/08 
2 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law Consultation 
Paper CP19/08 
3 ibid 10 [25] 
4 ibid 'Annex A - Provocation: draft clauses' 33-4 
The proposal is contained in Appendix B. 
5 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 9 [24] 
6 Ibid 
7 The term 'circumstances of an extremely grave character' replaced 'exceptional happening' in the 2009 Report 
(n35). 
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A proposal was also set out for changes to diminished responsibility.
8
 D must suffer from 
a "relevant mental impairment", this means "an abnormality of mental functioning" which 
"arises from a recognised medical condition"; this must impair D's ability "to understand 
the nature" of his conduct, "to form a rational judgment" and/or "to exercise self-control". 
This impairment must cause or be "a significant contributory factor in causing" the 
conduct. The ultimate reform of diminished responsibility in s52 of the 2009 Act is very 
similar, merely removing the term "relevant mental impairment". 
 
The Ministry of Justice's proposal is much narrower in scope than the Law Commission's 
final proposal as it only deals with the partial defences. The Ministry of Justice found that 
it does not necessarily matter if the rest of homicide law is reformed, the proposals for 
provocation reform "should be able to stand on their own".
9
 Later in the Chapter it will be 
stated that it may have been political concerns which led to this reform rather than a 
wider alteration to the structure of homicide.
10
 It has been discussed that the same 
pressures as before, restricting the defence for male violence and attempts to 
accommodate women, would simply be put on any reform if a wider reform of homicide 
did not take place.
11
 In particular, the success of other defences will have an impact on 
how provocation operates as there are important relationships with diminished 
responsibility and self-defence which have been stressed; if each defence was reformed 
with this in mind, self-defence being for justifiable killings in fear, diminished 
responsibility for 'abnormal' actors and provocation for excessive emotional killings, then 
this outlook could lead to a set of defences which are designed to function within their 
specific areas and without the gaps and flaws which made the pre-2009 law in such need 
of reform. In a sense it is correct that a provocation defence "should be able to stand on" 
its own merit, but this expectation can only be in place if the defence is limited to 
provocation-style anger and fear cases and is not required to be stretched out of 
                                           
8 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, 'Annex B - Diminished responsibility: draft 
clauses' 35 
9 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [21] 
10 (n82-8) 
11 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n33-5) 
 Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice   188 
 
necessity for hard cases. This is why throughout, when discussing certain aspects of the 
defence, provocation's relationship with other defences must be referenced. 
 
s5) Fear of serious violence 
The reports highlight some important points on the fear limb. Firstly, the Ministry did not 
believe that there was "much of a loophole in practice"
12
 and this is what the research 
conducted by the Law Commission suggested.
13
 In a study, which was a part of the Law 
Commission's 2004 Report, it found that women in the sample tended to run self-defence 
and provocation together more often than men.
14
 Also, in the sample, where a female 
killed her partner this was the case too.
15
 In another study none of the women who killed 
men were convicted of murder and in nearly all of these cases there was a sexual 
relationship.
16
 However, the Ministry did wish to include fear of serious violence as a limb 
so that such cases, when they do arise, are not "shoehorned into a partial defence which 
is aimed at killings triggered by anger".
17
 
 
Secondly, in the response to the Ministry of Justice's proposal it was felt that "the 
boundary between serious and non-serious violence" and also the necessary degree of 
"imminence" needed greater clarity.
18
 The Ministry did agree with the terms used by the 
Law Commission but acknowledged that there could "be cases on the borderline", it was 
viewed that it would not be "desirable to be more specific in the statute" in order to allow 
for flexibility and this, in part, was because context is often required to assess the 
seriousness of the circumstances.
19
 In Chapter 7
20
 it was stated that the fear limb does 
                                           
12 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 10 [26] 
13 These studies were contained in Appendix A and D of the 2004 Report, cited below. 
14 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, Appendix D: 'Partial Defences and Defendants 
Convicted of Murder' 223: the gender differences are "highly significant." 
15 Ibid 224: "Self-defence and, in particular self-defence run alongside provocation, was run by significantly more 
female than male defendants." 
16 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, Appendix A: R.D. Mackay, 'The Provocation 
Plea in Operation – An Empirical Study' 123 [25]: "Of the 11 female defendants only one killed another female. She 
in turn was the only female convicted of murder. The remaining 10 all killed men, of whom 9 were in a sexual 
relationship with the victim. Nine were convicted of manslaughter and one was found unfit to plead." 
17 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 10 [27] 
18 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [23] 
19 ibid [28] 
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not have to be so stringent on rules such as this in comparison to the 'provocation limb' 
because killing in fear has a stronger grounding to provide mitigation but this is not 
wholly reflected in the proposals for reform and it could be down to an unwillingness to 
create a partial defence with a wider scope.
21
 Requiring a fear of serious violence does 
raise concerns of a possible gap where victims of abuse who killed may not fall under a 
defence, this is where they did not kill stemming from an abnormality within the definition 
of diminished responsibility and where the violence they feared was not serious;
22
 this is 
significant as this scenario is similar to the paradigm 'battered woman' case, of a person 
who has experienced abuse which may have impacted on her ability for self-control and 
of a person who kills in response to a threat which appears slight. 
 
Thirdly, in agreement with the Law Commission,
23
 the Ministry found that fear of serious 
violence does include sexual violence,
24
 thereby allowing for the scope of the defence to 
include cases such as fear of rape. An important limit to this trigger is that D’s fear of 
serious violence must stem from V. This provision was used in the 2009 Act and will be 
discussed in more detail in the Chapter 9,
25
 but it does mean that the defence cannot be 
relied upon if D, who has lost her self-control, does not kill the person who threatened 
her or another. This, as was also an issue when rules were placed on conduct in the pre-
2009 defence,
26
 requires D curb her reaction whilst she is in a state where she has lost 
her self-control. 
 
Finally, in response to Ministry of Justice's proposal it was viewed that the exclusion 
clause for 'self-induced provocation' needs to be extended to inciting fear of violence,
27
 
                                                                                                                                   
20 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n106-7) 
21 (n82-8) 
22 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [83]: "would be some cases which 
would fall between the new fear of serious violence and words and conduct partial defence(s) and the diminished 
responsibility partial defence." 
23 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n84) 
24 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [27] 
25 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n46) 
26 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n102 & n127) 
27 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [68]: "should be extended to the fear 
of serious violence limb of the defence, in order to ensure criminal gangs may not benefit from the defence if they 
have incited the violence in order to provide an excuse for killing." 
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such an exclusion ought to cover only those cases in the narrow category of inducement 
where the inducement is a part D's purpose or plan to rely on a defence.
28
 
 
Overall, the fear limb itself has not been developed beyond what the Law Commission 
proposed in any significant way, except that V must be the person who created the fear. 
The term 'serious violence' has not been given any greater clarity and the jury are to play 
a significant role in a case-by-case basis in interpreting its sufficiency. The inclusion of 
the loss of self-control element will be discussed in depth below but it is striking how it 
seems that the Ministry of Justice has stepped around the concerns of the Law 
Commission and linked fear to this concept. The Law Commission only proposed the 
reform in such a manner because it had removed the loss of self-control requirement.
29
 
In reference to women who "deserve at least a partial defence", the Law Commission 
stated that "[w]omen’s reactions to provocation are less likely to involve a ‘loss of self-
control’" and this can "make it difficult or impossible for women to satisfy the loss of self-
control requirement".
30
 If loss of self-control was to be maintained, at best, it should only 
have applied to the 'provocation limb' and a separate fear-based defence would have 
needed to have been proposed. By requiring this sort of reaction it makes this a very 
different type of trigger and will significantly restrict the limb from dealing with the most 
problematic cases. 
 
s6) 'Provocation' 
The Ministry of Justice believed the pre-2009 law was "too generous" for those who were 
arguing that they were provoked.
31
 In response to the proposals, the 'justifiable sense of 
being seriously wronged' provision was seen by some as being too broad
32
 and, also, as 
                                           
28 A distinction between the narrow and broad categories of inducement was discussed previously at 'Chapter 7 - 
Law Commission' (n127). 
29 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n77-80) 
30 Law Commission: Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) No304, 81 [5.18] 
Full quote at 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n13). 
31 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 10 [20] 
Also, at 12 [34]: "want to provide a partial defence which has a much more limited application than the current 
partial defence of provocation." 
32 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [43]: "A few respondents commented 
on the phrase ‘seriously wronged’ and thought this might allow in too many circumstances." 
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being inappropriate.
33
 However, neither criticism really holds; to raise the bar on the 
required standard is a more favourable approach compared to positively laying down 
categories of valid provocation as it allows a standard which must be reached based on 
the circumstances and the justifiable element refers the emotion and not the act of killing, 
which is excessive. It is possible that greater guidelines could be given for what they 
believe ought to be considered to be justifiable, such judgements are made elsewhere 
through excluding self-induced provocation and sexual infidelity so there is no reason to 
suggest this would be inappropriate on their part. Any suggestion that the term 
'justifiable' should be removed from the proposal was viewed as wrong as it "would lower 
the threshold unacceptably"
34
 and this is in keeping with the intentions of the reformers 
throughout the process and the underlying rationale. 
 
Another layer of evaluation was added to the 'provocation' trigger. Initially, the Ministry of 
Justice decided to use of the term 'exceptional happening' for this added layer, but 
instead the preferred term, 'circumstances of an extremely grave character', was adopted 
as it was better equipped to acknowledge cumulative provocation and abuse.
35
 This 
would imply that a jury would be required to apply an even greater objective standard 
and that the 'justifiable sense of being seriously wronged' provision is inadequate by 
itself.
36
 It was desired that the defence would only be available "in a very narrow set of 
circumstances".
37
 
 
In evaluating the success of these provisions much will depend on how these terms are 
defined but the reports do not give much explanation; it is unclear how the two elements 
of the trigger should operate together, how they differ and by adding 'circumstances of an 
extremely grave character' what sort of scenarios this would avoid. Providing a distinction 
between murder and manslaughter, the ultimate purpose of the partial defences, may 
                                           
33 ibid [44]: "Some respondents also thought that the term should not include ‘justifiably’, as this suggested the 
killing was justified." 
34 ibid [45] 
35 ibid [38-40] 
36 This term will be explored in further detail when discussing the 2009 Act, see, in particular, 'Chapter 9 - Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009' (n65-9). 
37 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [40] 
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well have been achieved with the 'justifiable sense of being seriously wronged' provision 
alone. 
 
s9)(a) Sexual infidelity 
The government wanted it made "clear – on the face of the statute – that sexual infidelity 
should not provide an excuse for killing":
38
 
 
"We want to make it absolutely clear that sexual infidelity on the part of the 
victim can never justify reducing a murder charge to manslaughter."
39
 
 
Exclusions, in general, ought to be adopted cautiously; Part I highlighted that many of the 
problems which arose in the defence stemmed from having hard rules on issues which 
were debateable and there was a general move, through introducing the reasonable man 
test, in the defence to examine each case on its individual merits, hence, it has been 
suggested that exclusions should only be adopted where it is indisputable that an 
exclusion ought to apply.
40
 It only takes one example of a particularly severe case of 
taunting over sexual infidelity where an exclusion would become undesirable. Introducing 
guidelines and creating presumptions for the sort of circumstances which should not be 
considered may be a better approach.
41
 
 
A valid point which arose in the responses to the Ministry of Justice's proposal was if this 
exclusion is included then "there ought also to be an exclusion for honour killings."
42
 Pre-
2009 honour killings were capable of being taken into account in the ordinary person test 
                                           
38 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [54] 
39 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 11 [32]: "This should be the case even if sexual 
infidelity is present in combination with a range of other trivial and commonplace factors." This is an important 
point as the reference to other factors will prove to be significant in how the 2009 Act has been interpreted, see 
'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n107). 
40 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n126-8) 
41 See Part IV. 
42 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [53] 
Honour killings will be discussed in greater detail at 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n79 & n118-121). 
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even though they are based on views which are strongly offensive in modern society.
43
 
Honour killings, where D usually kills a member of their family as V is seen to have 
injured their reputation within their community,
44
 provide a much stronger reason to set 
out an exclusion than sexual infidelity. However, the Ministry of Justice stated that even 
though the "Government fully agrees" with the statement that honour killings should be 
excluded they saw that it would be excluded within the normal elements of the defence.
45
 
This explanation both makes the sexual infidelity exclusion seem unnecessary and fails 
to answer the initial point over why honour killings are being treated differently as with 
the same logic sexual infidelity cases should be excluded within the normal elements of 
the defence without the need for a specific exclusion. 
 
It could be the Ministry simply did not want the defence to maintain the image of the 
previous defence, used in defence of violence against women, and calls by the Liberal 
Democrats "accused the government of exaggerating the current use of sexual jealousy 
as a defence".
46
 The Law Commission conducted two studies as a part of its reports. In 
one study from a sample of 71 defendants it was found that "only four cases ... of a male 
killing a female clearly resulted in a successful plea of provocation".
47
 It was also found 
that in the sample "of the 16 female victims, 11 resulted in murder convictions" and all of 
11 involved male defendants.
48
 Therefore, in this study provocation defences were 
successful for men killing women about as often as the overall sample.
49
 However, in 
another study there was a considerable difference between males and females, 
specifically on the issue of sexual infidelity: "13% (19/146) of male defendants as 
compared to 3.8% (3/79) of female defendants" killed "in response to infidelity on the part 
                                           
43 See Mohammed [2005] EWCA Crim 1880 at 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n88). 
44 This newspaper article gives insight into the circumstances, the reasons behind honour killings and how they are 
perceived in the UK: 'Death before dishonour', The Observer, 21 November 2004 (accessed on 03/06/13: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/21/gender.features?INTCMP=SRCH) 
45 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [56] 
46 D. Pallister and R. Stevenson, 'Plans to reform murder laws unveiled', The Guardian 29 July 2008 (accessed on 
03/06/13: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/jul/29/justice.ukcrime) 
47 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, Appendix A: R.D. Mackay, 'The Provocation 
Plea in Operation – An Empirical Study' 121 [23] 
48 Ibid: "These eleven murders were perpetrated by 10 single male defendants and in ... [one case] two male co-
defendants and one female co-defendant." 
49 Ibid 118 [19]: the overall success for provocation in the sample being 33.8% 
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of the victim."
50
 Also, in this type of scenario, where the female V was "unfaithful", 
"provocation was run or put to the jury in 68.4% (13/19) of cases".
51
 On the whole, the 
results followed the stereotypical view of the defence: when a man killed a woman 
infidelity was commonly, whether successfully or not, claimed to be a cause. 
 
A point which was made in the responses was that "as a matter of principle, the defence 
should succeed if the other tests in the defence were met".
52
 As has been discussed, it is 
not that exclusions ought not to exist, it is that they should only be applicable if the 
scenario should indisputably be removed from the scope of the defence, and this is not 
the case. The exclusion also has the potential to "exclude a woman who killed after years 
of abuse, in response to a final act of sexual infidelity."
53
 This is an interesting point and it 
highlights that narrowing the defence for men can also impact on the availability of the 
defence for women, just as expanding the defence for women can expand it for men too 
as, for example, the fear limb could lead to gang-related scenarios falling into the 
defence. The actual term 'sexual infidelity' needs to be defined and how the term is to be 
applied will be discussed at length in Chapter 9.
54
 
 
s1)(a) Loss of self-control 
The most important part of the Ministry's report was to do with its views on the subjective 
element. The Ministry went against the Law Commission's proposals and wished to 
retain the loss of self-control requirement: "we believe that the danger of opening this up 
to cold-blooded killing is too great".
55
 It was stated that there was a concern that the 
defence would be "used inappropriately":
56
 
                                           
50 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, Appendix D: 'Partial Defences and Defendants 
Convicted of Murder' 229 
51 Ibid 
52 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [48] 
53 ibid [49] 
54 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n107-52). 
55 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [62] 
R.D. Mackay & B.J. Mitchell, 'But is this provocation? Some thoughts on the Law Commission's report on partial 
defences to murder' (2005) Crim LR 44, 47-8: the Law Commission's proposal "strongly implies an element of 
revenge". 
56 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 12 [36] 
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[T]here is still a fundamental problem about providing a partial defence in 
situations where a defendant has killed while basically in full possession of 
his or her senses, even if he or she is frightened, other than in a situation 
which is complete self-defence." 
 
There was a specific provision, s3)(b), contained within the Law Commission's proposal 
which excluded killings in revenge, the Ministry were therefore concerned with more than 
just revenge killings. Whilst the Law Commission wished to include emotional killings the 
Ministry requires irrational reactions and obviously this will draw the proposal into the 
criticisms of the pre-2009 defence. The Ministry stated that if D's reaction was not 
irrational in this manner there would be "insufficient grounds" to provide mitigation.
57
 
Despite the Ministry's proposal being similar to the Law Commission's in many respects 
the retention of the loss of self-control requirement changes the entire basis of the 
defence. 
 
In order to remove some of the problems which have been identified with the loss of self-
control concept it was proposed that it should be altered to exclude any 'suddenness' 
requirement.
58
 Loss of self-control remains undefined and how the suddenness removal 
could impact on it is unclear.
59
 The two cases which this provision may assist are victims 
of abuse who kill with delay,
60
 even though not all of those who the Law Commission 
                                           
57 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [65] 
58 Ibid [66]: "we acknowledge the concerns that ‘suddenness’ could be read back into the law and therefore have 
decided to put the matter beyond doubt on the face of the statute." 
59 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 13 [37]: "This would allow for situations where 
the defendant’s reaction has been delayed or builds gradually. We think this strikes the right balance between 
addressing the problems identified with the current law whilst not creating new ones." 
60 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [66]: "We also do not believe that it 
will be a bar to the partial defence applying in deserving cases of long-term abuse." 
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described as deserving cases would fall into this type of reaction,
61
 and cases such as 
Baillie where D stays out-of-control for a long time.
62
 
 
The Ministry were aware that many viewed it as being inconsistent, that "some 
academics and legal practitioners believed that the retention of the loss of self-control did 
not fit well with the intention for the partial defence".
63
 Many genuine cases of fear and 
outrage would have no place within the defence. Edwards stated that "[t]here remain 
problems with what behavioural response the courts will embrace as constituting a loss 
of self-control",
64
 implying that the same problems which existed with the pre-2009 could 
be transferred to the new defence. However, as has been stated the Ministry clearly had 
a different vision of the defence. The views of academics were not universally supportive 
of the Law Commission's proposal to remove the loss of self-control requirement. 
Mackay and Mitchell stated that there was a "failure to deal with the fundamental issue of 
how emotions affect human behaviour".
65
 They went on to state that the Law 
Commission's proposal "makes no reference to D's mental state at the time of the killing" 
and that it seems that "D does not have to be emotionally disturbed" to fall within its 
scope.
66
 The Law Commission attempted to reform the defence by making the subjective 
element about the core emotion and less about irrational and disturbed responses. It is 
clear that the inclusion of the fear limb drove this type of proposal, putting the two 
emotions toge+ther but at the same time making the provocation limb tougher through 
the objective elements of the defence. 
 
There are other issues which surround the concept's retention. The Ministry stated that a 
"loss of self control does not act as a bar to a full defence of self defence",
67
 the full 
defence would still be available as it gives a "considerable degree of latitude" by taking 
                                           
61 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 89 [5.54]: "D should not be 
prejudiced because he or she over-reacted in fear or panic, instead of overreacting because of an angry loss of self-
control." See 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n80). 
62 [1995] 2 Cr App R 31. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n28). 
63 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [60] 
64 S. Edwards, 'Justice Devlin's legacy: Duffy - a battered woman "caught" in time' (2009) 12 Crim LR 851, 869 
65 R.D. Mackay & B.J. Mitchell, 'But is this provocation?' 44 
66 Ibid 46 
67 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [63] 
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into account the circumstances from D's viewpoint.
68
 Even so, D must still argue that they 
acted in a reasonable manner in the circumstances; on one hand, arguing that he was 
out-of-control and, on the other, that he acted with necessity and reasonably will be 
difficult. The links with self-defence which the Law Commission envisioned would be lost 
and it is worth noting that the Law Commission saw its removal as necessary despite 
recognising that self-defence operated in a quite lenient fashion too.
69
 
 
The final issue is that there has never been a suitable definition of loss of self-control 
provided in case law. As will be outlined in Chapter 9, there will not be too much 
difference between this form of loss of self-control and the one which existed in the pre-
2009 defence; the removal of suddenness will not have too much impact because of how 
the concept was interpreted since Ahluwalia.
70
 Following this, not much difference ought 
to be expected between this proposal and the pre-2009 defence and problems will still 
exist for those victims of abuse who do not lose their self-control. Many of the 
advantages of adding the fear trigger will be removed with the concept's retention. 
 
Other issues 
Judge and jury 
The responses to the proposal showed that there were concerns raised by some over 
the proposed role of the judge, that it ought to be the jury and not the judge to make 
decisions on the viability of the defence.
71
 Even though it is oddly not within the draft 
proposal,
72
 the 2008 Report states that the Ministry agrees with the Law Commission in 
that the defence should only be left to the jury if "a reasonable jury, properly directed, 
could conclude that it might apply."
73
 The Ministry stated that there was not a problem on 
this issue as the provision would only apply "where the evidence of the defence is very 
                                           
68 Ibid [64] 
69 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n31 & n96) 
70 [1992] 4 All ER 889. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n30-3). 
71 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [79]: "judges would be able to 
withdraw a defence based on loss of self control in circumstances where the decision should be left to the jury." 
72 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, 'Annex A - Provocation: draft clauses' 33-4 
73 Ibid 13 [40] 
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poor."
74
 These two statements do not correspond as a 'reasonable jury' standard would 
be much higher than excluding where the evidence is "very poor". 
 
The Ministry made reference to the Holmes decision,
75
 where it was decided that the 
judge must make a preliminary ruling over all the elements of the defence before 
provocation could go to the jury, but it did not allude to the fact that the main purpose of 
the Homicide Act 1957 was to remove this rule and give the jury greater power.
76
 Clough 
has stated that "[i]t seems as though the government have taken a step back ... by 
reverting the law back to its original state before it was altered by  the 1957 Act."
77
 
 
Ordinary person test 
The Ministry included "age and sex" as control characteristics,
78
 it was stated that they 
"agree" with the Law Commission on this point even though the Law Commission had 
not provided that sex could be a control characteristic.
79
 If women and men are viewed to 
respond differently according to stereotypical views on levels of self-control then one of 
the key criticisms of the pre-2009 defence will remain as it would put women D's at a 
disadvantage. Also, it inhibits the defence from operating on a gender neutral basis.
80
 It 
has been advanced that the self-control test should not make reference to gender 
differences beyond the impact of maturity on teenagers, but instead for the social reality 
of a woman's position to be taken into consideration fully and this is particularly relevant 
for the fear trigger.
81
 
 
 
 
                                           
74 Ministry of Justice (2009) Summary of Responses and Government Position [80] 
75 Ibid 
76 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n2-9) 
77 A. Clough, ‘Loss of Self-Control as a Defence: The Key to Replacing Provocation’ (2010) 74 JCL 118, 120 
Also, Clough has asked: "will this lead to opening the floodgates for appeals on misdirection?" 
78 Ministry of Justice (2008) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 13 [39] 
79 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n59-61) 
80 Law Commission: Partial Defence to Murder – Final Report (2004) 49 [3.78]. See 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' 
(n113-4). 
81 'Chapter 5: Objective Element' (n47-51) 
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Political considerations 
It is undoubtedly true that political considerations have influenced the reform of homicide 
law. An interesting article cites the reaction of some newspapers to the Law 
Commission's proposal to restructure homicide law, the article begins by stating: 
"Today's horror headlines in the tabloid papers will explain why it has taken 50 years to 
review the law on murder".
82
 Removing the loss of self-control requirement and 
broadening the scope for those who do not quite fall into self-defence
83
 would have been 
a difficult thing to do. Articles such as 'Go soft on killer women, courts told'
84
 and 'Killers 
could get away with murder'
85
 underline the political difficulty to embrace the reforms 
which the Law Commission proposed. 
 
It is not just the removal of the mandatory life sentence for murder which would be 
difficult, expanding partial defences would mean that laws would be enacted which dealt 
with people who formed an intention to kill not falling under the scope of murder. It was 
stated towards the beginning of the process to reform homicide law that "for politicians, 
tampering with the legislation has always been a hot potato."
86
 A later article cited Judge 
John Samuels as "[h]e feared that politicians had held back from" reforming homicide law 
in the way which the Law Commission proposed "because they were looking over their 
shoulders at public concerns."
87
 It was expressed that the way which the Ministry of 
                                           
82 'Three tiers for reform', The Guardian 21 December 2005 (accessed on 03/06/13: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/dec/21/ukcrime.prisonsandprobation?INTCMP=SRCH) 
83 Those cases "where a defendant has killed while basically in full possession of his or her senses", see (n56). 
84 Daily Mail 30 November 2006 (accessed on 03/06/13: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-419559/Go-soft-
killer-women-courts-told.html#ixzz2VFtkK3bn) 
85 Daily Mail 20 December 2005 (accessed on 03/06/13: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-372168/Killers-
away-murder.html#ixzz2VFtt9QNN) 
86 J. Silverman, ''Messy' murder law a hot potato', BBC 24 May 2005 (accessed on 03/06/13: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4576169.stm) 
K. Fitz-Gibbon, 'Replacing Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control' 
(2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society 2, 304: "Overwhelmingly, the respondents attributed the government's 
unwillingness to implement the reforms proposed by the Law Commission to its desire to impose a package of 
reforms that would garner public support and further promote a 'tough on crime' political image." 
87 P. Wintour, 'Battered women: Change in murder law seeks to aid victims of domestic abuse', The Guardian 28 July 
2008 (accessed on 03/06/13: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jul/28/ukcrime.law?INTCMP=SRCH) 
K. Fitz-Gibbon, 'Replacing Provocation in England and Wales' 304: "respondents across all samples interviewed 
believed that the government's primary motivation to appease public concerns had prevented the implementation 
of legally favoured reforms to the law of homicide in England and Wales." 
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Justice had presented the reform, for just the partial defences, was pragmatic; there was 
"[n]o grand shake-up" or "radical restructuring" but instead it was "taking the murder 
reforms step by complex step" as reformers would get "more support for these 
measures" if murder law and punishment were left untouched.
88
  
 
Conclusion 
The Ministry of Justice reports give an insight into how the government wished to reform 
the defence. They sought to build upon some of the Law Commission's 
recommendations but altered it enough so that their proposal was quite detached. The 
changes to the subjective element, the 'provocation' limb and the introduction of the 
sexual infidelity exclusion mean that the 2009 Act stands apart from the Law 
Commission's proposal. The identity of that proposal was to focus on the reason why D 
killed and move away from the pre-2009 defence's reliance on irrational and 
spontaneous reactions. The 2009 Act and its terminology is explored in the following 
chapter. 
 
The inspection of these reports enables a contrast to be drawn between the basis of the 
Law Commission's proposal and the reform which ultimately took place. Both outlooks 
acknowledged the same problems but sought to deal with them differently. It is, though, 
doubtful if the Ministry's proposal will be as effective for victims of abuse who kill in fear, 
but both proposals seek to tighten up the 'provocation' trigger for men in particular. The 
lack of justification for the two most significant changes from the Law Commission's 
proposal, the re-emergence of the loss of self-control requirement and the sexual 
infidelity proposal, is surprising and of importance; these two issues will not only be key 
in shaping the success of the reform but also its perception. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
88 D. Shaw, 'Tidying up the murder law "mess"', BBC 29 July 2008 (accessed on 03/06/13: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7530186.stm) 
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CHAPTER 9 
CORONERS AND JUSTICE ACT 2009 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 followed the Ministry of Justice proposal and revived 
the requirement that D must suffer a loss of self-control; therefore, the underlying 
rationale can be described as 'warranted loss of self-control' rather than 'warranted 
excuse'.
1
 The Ministry of Justice proposal and the ultimate reform in the 2009 Act are 
very similar, so this Chapter and Chapter 8 help to give an overall outlook of the new 
defence. The previous Chapter was more focused on the reasoning behind the proposal 
and why the government had not decided to enact the Law Commission's proposal. This 
chapter will deal with the terminology used in the Act and evaluate the Act with reference 
to previous chapters. How the Act responds to the issues previously raised will help to 
determine whether it will be effective in resolving the problems identified with the pre-
2009 defence. 
 
Under section 56 of the Act 2009 the common law partial defence of provocation was 
abolished and under sections 54 and 55 a new defence, named 'loss of control', was 
established.
2
 D is liable for manslaughter rather than murder if he kills whilst he lost his 
self-control, this state must be caused by a "qualifying trigger" and D must also fulfil an 
ordinary person test. It is stated that "it does not matter whether or not the loss of control 
was sudden". There are three qualifying triggers: D fears serious violence, conduct 
and/or words "constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character" and "caused D 
to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged" or "a combination of the matters". 
There are three exclusions: D cannot have killed whilst he had a "considered desire for 
revenge", for any trigger to be satisfied the killing must not have been for the "purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence" and "sexual infidelity is to be disregarded". For the 
defence to go to the jury there must be "sufficient evidence", this is only when the trial 
judge decides that "a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence 
might apply." 
 
                                           
1 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n111-2) 
2 The provisions are contained in Appendix C. 
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Clinton
3
 was the first major case to deal with interpreting the new defence and will be 
discussed throughout. The cases which deal with the new defence are highly significant 
as there are many problems with the 2009 Act which stem from imprecise drafting and 
they indicate how the provisions will be interpreted. The Clinton judgment contained the 
cases of Clinton, Parker and Evans. In Clinton D killed his partner and the main source of 
provocation for D seemed to be that V taunted him about her sexual partners, therefore, 
this was significant as it tested the sexual infidelity exclusion. In Parker D killed V after 
she expressed that she wished to end their relationship, this case is also related to the 
limits of the sexual infidelity exclusion but its main significance was to do with the role of 
the judge. In Evans D stabbed V after an argument, this case raises issues relating to 
loss of self-control requirement and the revenge exclusion. 
 
Many issues to do with the 2009 Act were also raised in the case of Dawes.
4
 The Dawes 
judgment contained the cases of Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer. In Dawes D claimed to be 
trying to remove V from his property and was fearful, the case brings up the issue of the 
relationship between fear and loss of self-control and also the incitement provision. In 
Hatter D killed V after he found out that she had been seeing another person. In Bowyer 
D had planned a burglary of V's home and killed V when he returned, he claimed he 
killed in fear and in anger over comments V made about a woman known by both parties. 
The role of the judge in removing the defence, in Hatter, and how the judge summed up 
the defence to the jury, in Bowyer, were the subject of the appeals. The cases referred to 
from Clinton and Dawes will be used in order to aid the discussion of the provisions. 
 
Section 52 of the 2009 Act also provides for a new diminished responsibility defence 
which is heavily based on the Law Commission's proposal in the 2006 Report
5
 and the 
Ministry of Justice's proposal.
6
 The 2009 Act aims to provide "a modernised definition" of 
the defence so that expert evidence can be relied upon more satisfactorily.
7
 D must 
suffer from "an abnormality of mental functioning" which "arose from a recognised 
                                           
3 R v Clinton [2012] 3 WLR 515 
4 R v Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim 322 
5 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n12-6) 
6 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n8) 
7 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [327] 
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medical condition" and this must provide "an explanation" for D's part in the killing. The 
medical condition must have "substantially impaired D's ability" to "understand the 
nature" of his conduct, "to form a rational judgment" and/or "to exercise self-control". The 
explanatory notes suggest that the 2009 Act ought to be seen as preferable to the pre-
2009 defence as that defence did not specify how a person's mental responsibility 
needed to be substantially impaired.
8
 Diminished responsibility will be discussed further, 
below,
9
 because of how it relates to the loss of control defence. 
 
Warnings 
It was envisioned that the new defence meant a fresh start and the old common law 
defence was no longer authoritative.
10
 The thrust of the reform was to make the defence 
more difficult to satisfy for those who killed in anger by "raising the bar", so that the 
defence would only be available in "exceptional circumstances", and, also, there was a 
desire to create a specific route for those who killed excessively owing to fear.
11
 There 
was an aim to ensure the distinction between the new defence and diminished 
responsibility remained, the defence is about D meeting a standard of behaviour which is 
linked to common and ordinary experience.
12
 It was to clarify the move away from Smith 
(Morgan) and cases like Doughty: "We are trying to put the bar higher and not to bring it 
down."
13
 There are, however, a set of warnings for the success of the reform. 
 
a) diminished responsibility 
The relationship which loss of control has with diminished responsibility is going to 
impact on the overall success of the partial defences in providing a step-down from 
murder to manslaughter. The new diminished responsibility defence restricts the impact 
of D's abnormality to certain scenarios; one of the three ways in which the abnormality 
may impact on D is on his ability "to exercise self-control", this therefore lays down a 
                                           
8 Ibid [329] 
9 (n15-21) 
10 Clinton 518: "It therefore needs to be emphasised at the outset that the new statutory defence is self-contained. 
Its common law heritage is irrelevant. The full ambit of the defence is encompassed within these statutory 
provisions. Unfortunately there are aspects of the legislation which, to put it with appropriate deference, are likely 
to produce surprising results." 
11 Maria Eagle, February 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 1st Sitting, col 8 
12 This approach is summed up when discussing the applicability of control characteristics (n90). 
13 Maria Eagle, February 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 1st Sitting, col 9 
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logical pathway for a D who does not have a 'normal' ability to control himself. Smith 
(Morgan) attempted to pull these cases into the pre-2009 provocation defence.
14
 If D 
kills owing to a mental abnormality, post-2009, it is to be dealt with in the diminished 
responsibility defence and this helps to settle one of the most controversial issues in 
recent times. 
 
The 2009 Act made diminished responsibility a tougher defence to satisfy. As stated 
above, the defence can only be used in scenarios which relate to three types of 
abnormalities
15
 but also for it to be fulfilled there must now be a "recognised medical 
condition". With the tightening up of both the partial defences it may create pressure on 
them, there may be hard cases where D does not kill in line with ordinary standards but 
has a condition which is not recognised in diminished responsibility.
16
 In the House of 
Commons Committee David Howarth, citing "those with learning disabilities", stated that 
he was "worried" by this potential problem.
17
 If there is a gap between these two 
defences it will create pressures similar to those which existed before, these pressures 
were behind Lord's Steyn's dissenting judgment in Luc Thiet Thuan
18
 and Smith 
(Morgan).
19
 
 
Card states that depressive illnesses would come under a recognised medical condition 
and these could be argued by men who kill their partners or ex-partners.
20
 
Consequently, this could potentially mean that with the sexual infidelity exclusion such 
cases would merely fall under diminished responsibility instead. In the post-1957 case 
                                           
14 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n77-81). 
15 R. Card, Criminal Law (20th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) 252: "limits the aspects of D's mental functioning 
which must be affected". 
16 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n22): this problem was identified in the Ministry of Justice Report, the most 
significant example being if D does not have a fear of serious violence but does not suffer from an abnormality that 
is recognised within diminished responsibility. 
17 David Howarth, February 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 1st Sitting, col 8-9: "By making that defence more precise, 
and with reference to recognised medical conditions, there is a danger of people who perhaps come under the 
category of those with learning disabilities who might not be said to have a recognised medical condition, being 
caught by the law of murder rather than manslaughter." 
18 Luc Thiet Thuan v The Queen [1997] AC 131 (PC): it was viewed that by not allowing conditions such as D's brain 
damage it would lead to "crude and unfair results" through murder convictions which were "wholly inappropriate." 
See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n76). 
19 R. Card, Criminal Law 249: Card has stated that by tightening-up diminished responsibility it reduces its "utility". 
20 Ibid 251 
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Vinagre D killed his wife and argued that he suffered from 'Othello syndrome', described 
as a "'morbid jealousy for which there was no cause'".
21
 Lawton LJ criticised the scope of 
this defence where jealous husbands killed their wives: he stated that before diminished 
responsibility was introduced a partial defence was only available for where there were 
"good reasons", through provocation, but "wives should be protected by the law", in 
cases such as this, where "the reasons are flimsy".
22
 This is the dilemma in this area of 
law, if provocation-type defences are restricted in scope then it leaves a vast area for 
diminished responsibility to deal with and this could bring undesirable cases within the 
ambit of that defence.
23
 It is advanced that this, though, is the correct approach: 
diminished responsibility is not about assessing the reason behind D's action, it is about 
testing whether the impairment is substantial. 
 
b) moving forward 
A second concern which surrounds the reform is that it is difficult to draft a provocation-
type defence without encountering the same problems which have been identified with 
the previous defences. This was introduced in Part I, where the history of the 
provocation defence was discussed; restricting the defence from dealing with certain 
types of cases, setting standards to reach, how to treat impetuous people and ensuring 
that D was emotional owing to the provocation are issues which all provocation defences 
have to deal with and it is obviously a difficult task to suitably deal with all these matters. 
For example, when Nourse was discussing provocation reform she stated that "there is 
no reason to believe that they will not simply transfer these conflicts into new and less 
controversial guises".
24
 This was in reference to abolishing the partial defence and 
dealing with the matter in sentencing, but it remains a valid point for all routes of 
reform.
25
 
                                           
21 R v Vinagre [1979] 69 Cr App R 104, 105 
22 Ibid 
23 For example, when the sexual infidelity exclusion applies D's best option may be to claim diminished 
responsibility, see (n149-51). 
24 V. Nourse, 'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense' (1997) Yale LJ, Vol 106, No 5, 
1331, 1403 
25 When the Homicide Act 1957 was introduced many of the problematic issues were no longer dealt with as 
exclusions but hard rules instead were put into the reasonable man test as considerations, see the conclusion of 
'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence'. 
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The subjective element is an area where revenge, delay and levels of rationality will 
always be controversial. It is difficult to envisage that these reforms will settle these 
issues. It is, though, more likely that the objective element could be reformed in a way to 
resolve many of the matters which have plagued it, if it is set out in a way where only the 
most severe provocations are allowed to succeed and proper context is given. There will 
always be cases which will test the boundaries of the concepts used but a defence 
which is more focused on the objective factors involved in a provocation case has the 
potential to be a more grounded and consistent defence. 
 
c) title and wording 
A final concern comes from the actual title of the defence and the wording which was 
used in the provisions. Even though naming the new defence 'loss of control' will not 
directly impact on its success it seems to go against the core aims of the reform 
process.
26
 On one hand, it makes perfect sense to name the defence 'loss of control', a 
trigger must cause a loss of self-control so each incident will require this to take place. It 
allows a clean break with the common law and it removes the same sense that blame is 
being placed on V as it is implicit when using the word 'provocation' that another has put 
D into that state.
27
 On the other hand, it seems to go against the purpose of the reform, 
the aims of the defence were to raise the bar on what could succeed and to outline a 
specific route for cases of fear. The title of the defence may only be symbolic but a focus 
on the triggers would have been in line with these aims;
28
 to name it after the subjective 
element makes the defence sound as if it is going down a more introspective route when 
it is not. 
 
                                           
26 Peter Lodder, February 5, 2009, HofC Committee, 4th Sitting, col 111: "I appreciate that this is an attempt to 
break away from the law as it has been ... We wonder a little whether 'loss of control' conveys the right message ... 
In our view 'loss of control' does not convey the same standing or high threshold as 'gross provocation' would." 
27 Ministry of Justice (2009) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law: Summary of 
Responses and Government Position CP(R) 19/08: The word 'provocation' carries "negative connotations". 
28 For example, 'warranted emotion' does focus on the reasons behind the killing whilst the wrongfulness of the act 
is implicit. 
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More importantly, the wording of the clauses and the lack of precision means that the 
legislation may not have the impact which was intended and when these terms are 
defined by the courts they could easily be given similar definitions as before. This links to 
a previous point, the same problems could easily return. Leigh has stated that the 2009 
Act does not "represent a high water mark of legislative coherence"
29
 and that in 
comparison to the pre-2009 defence the reform is "an even worse set of statutory 
provisions."
30
 Even though the reform is drafted poorly and its provisions are not 
thoroughly explained it is, on the whole, likely to be an improvement on the pre-2009 
defence because it is tailored to deal with the problematic cases. As will be outlined, the 
triggers, the exclusions and the loss of self-control element are not meticulously 
explained and as was shown in Chapters 7 and 8 the Law Commission and Ministry of 
Justice reports failed to be specific enough on some of the core provisions of their 
proposals which were the basis for the 2009 Act. For example, one of the main tasks for 
the Court of Appeal in Clinton was how to deal with the 'sexual infidelity' exclusion, this 
was not a straightforward task.
31
 In that case and in Dawes definitions and explanations 
had to be given for sections 54 and 55 owing to lack of clarity. 
 
As Chapter 5 demonstrated,
32
 Norrie was correct to state that the 2009 Act "may cover 
much of the old ground", in that the Law Commission's proposal has much in common 
with it, "but there is a significant difference of approach and emphasis".
33
 In Clinton it was 
stated that the Law Commission's proposal for reform does not impact on how the 2009 
Act ought to be interpreted: 
 
"[T]he legislation does not sufficiently follow the recommendations of the 
Law Commission to enable us to discern any close link between the views 
and recommendations of the Law Commission and the legislation as 
enacted."
34
 
                                           
29 L.H. Leigh, 'Loss of control: the significance of sexual infidelity and other matters' (2012) 2 Arc Rev 4, 4 
30 Ibid 
31 A good example of this is cited below (n126). 
32 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n3) 
33 A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 - partial defences to murder (1) Loss of control', (2010) 4 Crim LR 
275, 275 
34 Clinton 518 
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Therefore, even though some of the language is the same and the 2009 Act is built on 
the framework of the Law Commission's proposals the 2009 Act must be viewed 
independently. According to Clinton, the 2009 Act therefore needs to be interpreted 
independently from the Law Commission's reports and the pre-2009 defence.
35
 
 
The 2009 Act 
Section 56(1) states that "[t]he common law defence of provocation is abolished and [is] 
replaced by sections 54 and 55." The discussion of the elements of the 2009 Act will be 
split into the following five sections: triggers, ordinary person test, exclusions, subjective 
element and the sufficient evidence test. 
 
a) triggers 
s55(3): This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to D's fear of 
serious violence from V against D or another identified person. 
For this trigger the explanatory notes of the Act state that this is a subjective test as it 
requires "a genuine fear of serious violence" and it does not matter "whether or not the 
fear was in fact reasonable."
36
 In Dawes it was stated that "[t]he presence, or otherwise, 
of a qualifying trigger is not defined or decided by the defendant",
37
 however, this seems 
to be an incorrect interpretation of the law as the fear of violence trigger is shaped by D's 
experience.
38
 The notes also explain that the fear has to be specific; the fear could be 
over "a child or [an]other relative", however, "it could not be a fear that the victim would 
in the future use serious violence against people generally."
39
 D must fear serious 
violence, as with the Law Commission and the Ministry of Justice reports this remains 
undefined
40
 but as the test is subjective it will be up to the jury to decide whether they 
believe that D deemed that the threat was to carry out such a substantial harm. D's 
                                           
35 (n10): "[T]he new statutory defence is self-contained. Its common law heritage is irrelevant." 
36 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [345] 
37 Dawes [61] 
38 T. Storey, 'Loss of Control: the Qualifying Triggers, Self-induced Loss of Control and 'Cumulative Impact'' (2013) 77 
JCL 3, 189, 192: "the issue is whether the accused feared violence which he personally regarded as 'serious'." 
39 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [345] 
40 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n18-22) 
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previous experiences of violence and the history of V's behaviour ought add weight to 
D's belief that the threat was of this nature.
41
 
 
Withey states "it is unlikely that the fear of violence has to emanate from an immediate 
threat",
42
 if it did then many victims of abuse would struggle to fall into the scope of 
defence and it would restrict the impact of the trigger.
43
 The Law Commission reports 
demonstrated that the issue of immediacy was not clear as there were contradictory 
statements made, it stated that a killing would not "[o]rdinarily" be partially excusable 
without "imminent danger" but an example which they gave for the type of case which 
the fear limb would cover is that of a killing which is "insufficiently imminent" to a threat 
of violence.
44
 As the trigger is framed as a subjective test it is most likely the case that 
the further detached a killing is from the threat the less likely that the fear will be viewed 
as genuine. Once again, if the jury is provided with the context of previous events this 
may assist them in believing, from D's perspective, that a real threat existed.
45
 From this 
it is clear that the scope of the trigger is difficult to appreciate and much depends on how 
the defence will ultimately be applied. 
 
The provision requires that the person who causes the threat must be the person who 
gets killed. This is an odd requirement as when D loses his self-control mistakes over 
identity can be made and it may be expecting a lot of him in those circumstances to 
make such a rational decision.
46
 Also, in the 'provocation' trigger it is not required that 
the serious wrong came from V, with this in mind to restrict the fear trigger in this way 
does not seem consistent. The reach of this trigger could go as far as a "householder 
killing an intruder, or the policeman shooting dead an unarmed suspect",
47
 but D must 
                                           
41 The use of such evidence will be discussed in Part IV and the Law Commission supported the use of contextual 
evidence for this purpose, see 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n84). 
42 C. Withey, 'Loss of control, loss of opportunity?' (2011) 4 Crim LR 263, 270 
43 It is evident that this is the reason why 'battered women' struggle to fulfil the conditions of self-defence when 
similar rules are required to be fulfilled, see 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n64-70). 
44 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n82 & n87-9) 
45 The case of Humphreys (1995) 145 NLJ 1032 is an example of where past events shaped D's future expectations of 
violence against her, see 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'  (n39-40 & n48). 
46 See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n102 & n127). 
47 A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009' 285 
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lose his self-control and this would be a substantial impediment for those types of 
cases.
48
 
 
The intention of the 2009 Act was to create a specific route for those who kill excessively 
in fear, this limb was "intended to apply in a more tailored" way.
49
 In Chapter 4 it was 
discussed whether the pre-2009 defence could have been interpreted to include the 
emotion of fear,
50
 it would depend on the definition of 'provoked' but the main obstacle 
was fear's incompatibility with the loss of self-control element. The inclusion of the fear 
trigger ought to be an improvement but with the retention of the loss of self-control 
requirement it is questionable whether these cases can be sufficiently dealt with under 
the new defence. Witney has stated that the trigger "is likely to fail"
51
 some of those who 
the Law Commission sought to be beneficiaries of the reform.
52
 The 2009 Act will restrict 
this trigger to dealing with irrational decisions made in fear where D does not really 
consider her response, many genuine cases of fear where the reaction is excessive exist 
outside of this type of response.
53
 
 
s55(4): This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or 
things done or said (or both) which— 
  (a)constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and 
  (b)caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. 
The 'provocation' trigger does not require that V must be the one who 'provokes' D. Also, 
the stimulus could take the form of a single incident or a series of events;
54
 this means 
                                           
48 Self-defence has been reformed in the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Section 43(2)  states that "[i]n a householder 
case" the defence will only be denied if D's response was "grossly disproportionate" rather the usual requirement, 
from s76(6) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, that it was "disproportionate". 
49 Lord Bach, October 26, 2009, HofL Report, 2nd Sitting, col 1041: "It achieves this by focusing on what the 
defendant feared in the future, rather than being based on what occurred in the past." 
50 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n7-18) 
51 C. Withey, 'Loss of control, loss of opportunity?' 271 
52 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 89 [5.54]: "D should not be 
prejudiced because he or she over-reacted in fear or panic, instead of overreacting because of an angry loss of self-
control." See 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n80). 
53 This was the main point in 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' and will also be further discussed when looking at the 
subjective element. 
54 Dawes [54]: "Given the changed description of this defence, perhaps 'cumulative impact' is the better phrase" 
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that anything can be the trigger. However, for the trigger to be valid it must fulfil two 
further conditions: firstly, that it "(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave 
character" and, secondly, that it "(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged."
55
 This test replicates the Ministry of Justice's final proposal, but the 
latter element was originally taken from the Law Commission's proposal. 
 
Instead of using the word 'provoked' the provision, in a sense, is an attempt to define 
what it means to be provoked and set a higher standard for evaluation. There has been 
an early indicator that this outlook will be successful. In Zebedee
56
 D killed V, his elderly 
father, after V had soiled himself, D had cleaned him, and then V soiled himself again 
soon afterwards. The defence was denied. Storey points out that this case is very similar 
to Doughty,
57
 that being a case which highlighted that D could rely on normal or natural 
behaviour in the pre-2009 defence. With the terminology used in the trigger both the 
required standard is raised and it rules out cases such as this where the conduct cannot 
be described as 'provocation'. 
 
A reason for avoiding the word 'provocation', though, is that it implies that V is at fault or 
played a part in his own death.
58
 This is a concern which has been discussed 
throughout, that the defence must attempt to relate to provoking conduct without placing 
blame on V, most likely the source of the conduct. However, by trying to sever this tie it 
may undermine the reason for the existence of the defence. In the House of Commons 
Committee it was stated that 
 
                                           
55 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [347]: "The effect is to substantially narrow the potential 
availability of a partial defence". 
Dawes [60]: "normal irritation, and even serious anger do not often cross the threshold into loss of control." 
56 [2012] EWCA Crim 1428 
57 T. Storey, 'Raising the Bar: Loss of Control and the Qualifying Triggers' (2013) 77 JCL 17, 19. See 'Chapter 4 - 
Adequate Provocation' (n26-30) for a discussion on Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319. 
58 A. Samuels, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009': "abolition of the word 'provocation' might be seen as diverting 
attention from the conduct and responsibility of the victim for the death." Issue also raised at (n27) 
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"If one ... forgets about who did that justifiable wrong, the provocation has 
been turned into the kind of defence in which being angry with the world is 
an excuse to kill someone. I cannot see, morally, how that is the case."
59
 
 
Evaluating the basis of D's emotions with more vigour through a warranted emotion 
rationale could help to create the correct balance as the victim's role will only be brought 
out in such a manner if a jury could state that D's emotion was warranted. With this in 
place and a stricter rule on what can go to the jury the provocation defence would sit on 
a firmer basis and would not operate in many of the more controversial areas. On the 
point which Howarth made, it is unlikely that the defence as outlined in the 2009 Act 
could be interpreted in such a manner owing to the intentions of the reform and the 
language used in the provision. Also, the phrase used by Samuels,
60
 "diverting attention" 
from V, is probably the best choice of words, it is trying to focus on the emotion and D 
without setting out to blame V. 
 
With regards to the terminology used in the trigger, in Clinton it was stated that "[t]here is 
no point in pretending that the practical application of this provision will not create 
considerable difficulties."
61
 It is the case that precise definitions were not given for the 
justifiable emotion terms. In Part II Baker and Zhao's definition of warranted emotion was 
set out:
62
 the wrong "must be one that accords with contemporary society's norms and 
values."
63
 However the justifiable emotion terms are actually interpreted, below, it is 
important to state that for the test to have any meaning and utility it must both raise the 
bar and demand that such judgements should only be made after allowing for proper 
context to be given to all the relevant surrounding events. The role of the jury is to apply 
                                           
59 David Howarth, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 423 
60 (n58) 
61 Clinton 521 
62 D.J. Baker & L.X. Zhao, ' Contributory Qualifying and Non-Qualifying Triggers in the Loss of Control Defence: A 
Wrong Turn on Sexual Infidelity' (2012) 76 JCL 254, 262. See 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n121). 
63 S. Yeo, 'English Reform of Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Whither Singapore?' (2010) Sing JLS 177, 
183: Yeo stated that it was "an objective test based on contemporary community values and standards by which to 
measure the provocation". 
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the values of society to D's situation and this is the purpose of going down the route of 
requiring warranted emotion. 
 
It has been argued previously that D ought to feel that their emotion was justifiable too,
64
 
this ensures that the killing was down to the strength of the emotion and D felt this at the 
time. Even if the 2009 Act rests on a loss of self-control this still ought to be a 
requirement as then it could be stated that D's own feeling of justifiable emotion caused 
such an impulse which led to D acting out-of-control. If it was not necessary for D to feel 
a justifiable emotion at the time then the defence could be relied upon when D did not 
have a belief that he was acting with a such a strong sense of injustice; D may have 
been wronged but not have appreciated the severity of the circumstances and a jury 
may find them to be more provocative than he did. Therefore, it ought to be necessary 
that both the jury and D believe that the emotion was warranted. 
 
From the reform process which has been outlined in Part III and wording of the 2009 Act 
it is not clear how the trigger was intended to be interpreted.
65
 The 2009 Act states that 
the 'provocation' must have "(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave 
character" and that it "(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously 
wronged." The explanatory notes state that "[w]hether a defendant’s sense of being 
seriously wronged is justifiable will be an objective question for a jury to determine"
66
 and 
this is the view which was expressed in the House of Commons: "It would be subjective if 
it said, 'He has a sense of being seriously wronged.' The word 'justifiable' makes the test 
objective."
67
 Therefore, the 'justifiable' element of this limb is an objective test but D must 
experience 'a sense of being seriously wronged'. For the other element, Withey has 
stated that "[t]he Act is silent on whether 'extremely grave character' is a subjective or 
objective test" and she "submitted that it is most likely to be an objective test."
68
 This was 
                                           
64 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n124) 
65 In R. Card, Criminal Law 263 & C.M.V. Clarkson, H.M. Keating, S.R. Cunningham, Criminal Law: Text and Materials 
(7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 677 it has been stated that the wording and explanation of the trigger is unclear 
on how it is to be applied. 
66 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [346] 
67 Maria Eagle, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 439 
68 C. Withey, 'Loss of Control' (2010) 174 JPN 197 
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indeed how it was interpreted in Clinton: "all the requirements of section 55(4)(a) and (b), 
require objective evaluation."
69
 
 
This interpretation of the trigger raises three important points concerning D's 
characteristics, the ordinary person test and D's emotion. A simpler and more effective 
test will be advanced whilst discussing the problems with the trigger.
70
 
 
i)  response characteristics 
The relevance of D's response characteristics is not clear, so it is not certain if both, one 
or none of the two elements of the trigger require context to be given to the surrounding 
circumstances and, if so, the extent of this. The ordinary person test, discussed below, 
sets out how far these factors need to be applied by the jury, in accordance to the 
Camplin judgment, however, with the lack of direction given to the two terms of the 
trigger it is uncertain just how far the jury are free to express their own opinion or if they 
must put themselves entirely in D's position.
71
 Without the context being appreciated the 
task of comparing D to any standard would be meaningless; the trigger, surprisingly, 
given the debate over the extent of response characteristics makes no allowance for 
what is relevant for a jury to consider.
72
 
 
ii) the ordinary person test & the gravity test 
By including the trigger it seems to make a gravity test in the ordinary person test 
redundant. If the jury find that the emotion was warranted there seems to be no reason to 
ask the jury whether an ordinary person would find the provocation severe, therefore the 
gravity of the provocation is established in the trigger. It is possible that the discussion on 
the sexual infidelity exclusion, below, gives light to the function of this test.
73
 Sections 
(1)(c) and (3) refer to "the circumstances of D" and Clinton firmly establishes that this is 
                                           
69 Clinton 521 
70 What will be discussed is consistent with what was introduced in Part II. 
71 C. Withey, 'Loss of Control' (2010) 174 JPN 197: "this begs the question whether this is a 'purely' objective test, or 
whether the defendant is judged against a reasonable person sharing the characteristics of the defendant which 
affected his or her assessment of the things said or done." 
72 It is implcit that warrant would not allow the intolerant views of D to be relied on. 
73 (n126-52). This interpretation may also limit the consideration of sexual infidelity following the Clinton judgment. 
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in order to merely give context to the control test;
74
 in order to ask if D behaved like an 
ordinary person it is necessary to properly consider the circumstances which they were 
in. It is important to note that the function of the ordinary person test is no longer to 
evaluate the severity of the provocation as was the case in the pre-2009 defence: the 
justifiable standard for the gravity test now comes from the trigger whilst the ordinary 
standard is only to do with control test. Despite this the ordinary person test is far more 
detailed in how response characteristics ought to be interpreted and applied.
75
 
 
iii) D's emotion 
A third point is that it is never asked if D felt justified in feeling the emotion, this "is 
irrelevant as far as the new defence is concerned."
76
 Both of the elements of the trigger 
are jury questions evaluating D's anger rather than looking into the strength of his 
feelings towards the incident; D is required to feel seriously wronged and lose his self-
control owing to the circumstances of the trigger but this does not necessarily mean that 
he lost his self-control as he believed he was warranted in feeling angry. The structure of 
the trigger can be called into question owing to this as having two objective limbs in the 
provocation trigger seems excessive. The Law Commission only relied on the 'justifiable 
sense' limb and it is unclear, other than to raise the bar further, what the function of 
requiring the 'extremely grave character' limb on top of this is.
77
 A preferable test would 
be to have both subjective and objective limbs within the triggers: to ask the jury 'if they 
believe D felt his emotion was warranted' and if they believe 'a normal person would find 
that the emotion was warranted'. 
 
Even though the 2009 Act is on the correct track in how it deals with the 'provocation' 
trigger not enough has been done to outline the nature of the two tests, and there have 
                                           
74 (n130-3) 
75 (n86-9) 
76 D.J. Baker & L.X. Zhao, ' Contributory qualifying and non-qualifying triggers in the loss of control defence' 262 
See (n64). 
77 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n35-7) 
Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [347]: "Subsection (4) therefore sets a very high threshold ... 
The effect is to substantially narrow the potential availability of a partial defence". 
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been no improvements in terms of clarity from the Law Commission proposals.
78
 The 
lack of clarity within the Act on such an important point sets the new defence off on the 
wrong footing. When the role of the judge is discussed this area of the defence will be 
important, when the terms are ill-defined in this manner their greater power will become 
more difficult to manage. 
 
The most coherent interpretation of the trigger would be that "(b) caused D to have a 
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged" will be viewed as an objective test which 
includes the response characteristics and circumstances of D. The other limb, "(a) 
constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character", is probably best interpreted 
as an objective test without consideration of D's circumstances in the same way; the jury 
will be given free reign as to whether the provocation was severe enough. The two 
elements ought to lead to the same answers being reached but there could be some 
circumstances where without consideration of D's personal feelings the jury could 
conclude that the defence should not apply. In the case of honour killings D kills to 
"uphold the honour of the family",
79
 it is possible that through '(b)' a jury could find that D 
had warranted anger but through '(a)' they would find these killings unacceptable by the 
standards of society; a jury would not be forced to consider the religious or social 
pressures which D may have faced. It is submitted, however, that if '(b)' was to be 
interpreted correctly it would be sufficient by itself to rule out such cases, the provision is 
not asking if D felt a warranted emotion but asking the jury to evaluate the emotion taking 
into account society's values and a honour killing would not be in line with such values. 
 
s55(5): This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a 
combination of the matters mentioned in subsections (3) and (4). 
Within Law Commission's and the Ministry of Justice's reports there was no explanation 
for how the combination trigger would operate and the 2009 Act gives no indication 
either. Quick and Wells have stated that this trigger is "interesting" as it would serve little 
                                           
78 C. Withey, 'Loss of control, loss of opportunity?' 274: "The problem is in the statutory wording, and the failure to 
stipulate the exact nature of the 'justifiably wronged' and 'extreme graveness' tests." 
79 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 82 [5.25] 
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purpose if it did not cover cases which were "not sufficient on their own to qualify as 
triggers under subsections 3 or 4."
80
 However, as has been indicated, the best 
understanding of the trigger is that both the 'provocation' and the fear triggers must be 
satisfied in full and the purpose of the combination trigger is merely to be helpful when 
both of the emotions are the basis of a defence;
81
 evidence regarding both the emotions 
could work to support the ordinary person test and the loss of self-control requirement. 
 
The combination trigger would work slightly differently to the Law Commission's 
proposal, this is because the 2009 Act is centred around the loss of self-control 
provision. The Law Commission proposal was all about the sufficiency of the core 
emotion and there was no link in the subjective elements as the two limbs were separate 
in this regard. For the 2009 Act the combination limb would therefore also support D's 
efforts to fulfil the subjective element as it implies that the two emotions can work 
cooperatively to support the finding that D lost his self-control. 
 
On the understanding above, the combination trigger could only be relied upon in one 
scenario: when both the triggers are fulfilled. For example, Card states that combination 
trigger could be used "where D kills V who is threatening to stab D's daughter unless the 
daughter lets V have sex with her",
82
 here both the 'provocation' and fear triggers would 
be fulfilled and a combination trigger could be construed to be the preferable option in 
comparison to relying on one of the triggers in order to give greater force to the 
subjective element and the ordinary person test. Such as in the case of the 'battered 
woman' it must be shown that D has been seriously wronged by the provocative events 
which have gone on before, fulfilling the two warranted emotion limbs, and that she was 
fearful of serious violence in the future.
83
 
 
                                           
80 O. Quick & C. Wells, 'Partial Reform of Partial Defences: Developments in England and Wales' (2012) 45 Australian 
& New Zealand Journal of Criminology 337, 344 
81 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n102-9) 
82 R. Card, Criminal Law 264 
83 Dawes [56]: "In most cases the qualifying trigger based on a fear of violence will almost inevitably to include 
consideration of things said and done, in short, a combination of the features identified in s55(3) and (4)." 
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For the combination limb to work a loss of self-control must be able to be caused by 
anger and fear cooperatively. A problem is that where these two emotions overlap the 
finding of anger could undermine D's argument that she killed in fear.
84
 The reason why 
D killed could become muddled and where this is the case it may, in turn, damage her 
argument. A single narrative for D's defence will always be preferable and as the fear 
trigger must already have been satisfied for the combination trigger to come into play 
there will be little advantage to be gained by requiring the jury to consider the presence 
of D's anger towards V. It is submitted that even though there will be cases where there 
is an overlap between the two emotions there should not be a combination trigger, 
instead D should have to rely on the argument that she was fearful or provoked but the 
jury should be instructed that any anger towards V does not harm her defence if she was 
genuinely fearful.
85
 
 
b) ordinary person test 
s54(1)(c):a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar 
way to D. 
s54(3): In subsection (1)(c) the reference to “the circumstances of D” is a reference to all 
of D's circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D's conduct is that they 
bear on D's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. 
i) contextual evidence 
The function of the gravity test, assessing the severity of the provocation, is now carried 
out in the trigger.
86
 The ordinary person test's sole work is evaluate D's behaviour 
through the control test. However, in the 2009 Act it still refers to "the circumstances of 
D", meaning that the test is still looking to contextualise D's behaviour by taking into 
account all the relevant factors. The pre-2009 law had already shown preference for the 
                                           
84 See 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n102-9). 
85 In the Law Commission's proposal s4 stated that D shall not be viewed to have killed in revenge if she killed out of 
fear but was angry at the same time. See ibid (n109). 
86 (n73-5). This is only in the 'provocation' trigger as the fear trigger has no gravity test. 
Part IV will discuss in detail how the defence should deal with contextual evidence in a way which corresponds to 
the emotion in the trigger and how this can be achieved in a consistent manner. 
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term 'circumstances' over 'characteristics'.
87
 Using 'circumstances' means that there is a 
greater scope for what can be attributed to the standard and ensures the emphasis of the 
defence is on ordinary behaviour.
88
 
 
The template for this clearly comes from the pre-2009 defence as response 
characteristics did not cause the complications which control characteristics did and the 
only issue was to do with undesirable characteristics which D may have and which the 
jury, therefore, needed to attribute to the ordinary person.
89
 The 2009 Act addresses this 
issue by requiring "a normal degree of tolerance", meaning that circumstances which are 
outside of this need to be ignored by a jury; it is probable that racist, homophobic and 
sexist views would fall under this category but it is also possible that it could be used 
against honour killings, D's views may need to be ignored as they show a lack of 
tolerance to V's lifestyle and decisions. 
 
ii) control test 
The ordinary person standard ensures that D is judged by the normal standards 
expected in society. The approach in the 2009 Act pretty much follows on from the Law 
Commission's proposal and uses an approach similar to the moderate excuse theory by 
only allowing the 'normal' characteristics of D, such as age, to alter the expected 
standard of behaviour in the control test.
90
 The ordinary person test in the 2009 Act is 
very similar to the one which was developed in the pre-2009 defence and that was 
obviously designed to deal with provocation cases. Traditionally, women's responses 
                                           
87 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n63-8) 
88 S. Edwards, 'Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control', (2010) JCL 74.3, 223, 239: "such an 
approach transfers the focus away from her psychology onto his violence." 
A. Clough, 'Loss of Self-Control as a Defence: The Key to Replacing Provocation' 124: "it is a move away from making 
such women seem as though they have a mental illness. 'Circumstances' suggests being able to consider prior abuse 
as an external element rather than having to try and deem it as a characteristic by internalising it as some kind of 
syndrome or character flaw." 
89 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element'  (n57-63) 
90 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [338]: "a defendant's history of abuse at the hands of the 
victim could be taken into account in deciding whether an ordinary person might have acted as the defendant did, 
whereas the defendant's generally short temper could not." 
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have struggled to satisfy evaluative tests on behaviour.
91
 As the fear trigger is entirely 
subjective the ordinary person test becomes highly significant as it is the only objective 
component which D must satisfy. Therefore, it is suggested that when dealing with the 
fear trigger a tailored ordinary person test would improve the defence; one which instead 
of referring to restraint and self-control is more to do with how people react to threats.
92
  
 
The test has been slightly altered from the pre-2009 defence as it asks if an ordinary 
person "might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D." Asking whether the 
ordinary person 'might' have done so rather than 'would' he "do as he did" means that 
the test is more in line with the loss of self-control rationale.
93
 It would be difficult for a 
jury to give a conclusive answer whether a person who has lost their self-control would 
have acted in a certain manner, it makes more sense to ask whether it is within the range 
of responses.
94
 
 
As was outlined when discussing the Law Commission's proposal, the wording of the 
provision is not satisfactory and this was not resolved in the reform process.
95
 Section 
54(3) has the potential to include much more, in terms of control characteristics, than 
was presumably intended. One reading of it is that where the circumstance is not only 
relevant as a control characteristic it can be considered in the control test, meaning that if 
it is also relevant as a response characteristic then it can be considered to reduce the 
expected level of self-control, such as the impact of intoxication on D when he has been 
taunted on being an alcoholic.
96
 
                                           
91 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n64-70) 
92 See 'Chapter 11 - Proposal' for the proposal which is advanced. 
93 A. Clough, 'The Judge's Role Where Provocation Is Evident but Not Discussed' (2011) 75 JCL 350, 354: "This 
appears to be a much looser term than that used in s. 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, and this 'might/would' distinction 
is hopefully a step in the right direction when it comes to assessing the actions of a person, once self-control has 
been lost." 
94 The range of conduct that could be expected from D is discussed at 'Chapter 5: Objective Element': 'a) the 
standard of self-control and ordinariness'. However, if D has lost his self-control then even this range would be 
difficult to appreciate. 
95 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n62-6) 
96 D. Ormerod has also stated that the language used allows for another relevance, mistake of fact, at Smith and 
Hogan's Criminal Law (13th ed, Oxford University Press, 2011) 526: "also [if it] had some other relevance - e.g. that 
it caused a relevant mistake". 
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This issue has already been raised in Asmelash
97
 where the judge directed the jury to 
apply the ordinary person standard but stated that this would be "unaffected by 
alcohol".
98
 The D's representation made reference to the wording of s54(3)
99
 and the 
prosecution even acknowledged it by contesting that D's drunkenness was only relevant 
to his self-control,
100
 thereby not falling into the contested "only relevance" language. The 
Court of Appeal stated that if it had been Parliament's intention to allow intoxication to be 
considered then "it would have been spelled out in unequivocal language."
101
 Apart from 
the actual text used nothing supports this deviation from the moderate excuse theory as 
it would be absurd if D could alter the expected self-control through a factor such as 
intoxication if it was relevant in some other way in his case. As has been stated,
102
 it 
would have been preferable if the text simply read 'D's age is the only factor which can 
be considered with regards to the general capacity for self-control.' 
 
This interpretation ensures that the Camplin approach is followed and only normal 
factors can be considered in the control test. Age is included as a signifier of maturity but 
sex is also included, this goes against the Law Commission's proposal.
103
 Nothing was 
stated to justify sex's inclusion and if applied improperly then it could create gender 
differences within the new defence by expecting women to show greater restraint than 
men.
104
 Yeo has stated that the reformers have "condone[d]" gender differences on the 
issue of self-control and he supports "a single standard of tolerance and self-restraint for 
                                           
97 [2013] EWCA Crim 157 
98 R v Asmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157 [15] 
99 Ibid [18] 
100 Ibid [19]: "the only relevance of the drunkenness was that it affected the appellant's self-restraint ... Such 
drunkenness was an irrelevant consideration. It may have had some relevance to his general capacity for tolerance 
or self-restraint: but no more." 
101 Ibid [24] 
Also, at [25]: "It does not mean that the defendant who has been drinking is deprived of any possible loss of control 
defence: it simply means, as the judge explained, that the loss of control defence must be approached without 
reference to the defendant's voluntary intoxication." 
102 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n62-6). Note that gender is also included in the 2009 Act but this is not supported, 
below. 
103 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n59-61) 
104 A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009' 281: "it is unclear what role 'sex' should play in the new law ... 
Presumably the idea is that sex also generally affects capacity for self-control, but exactly how is left unstated." 
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both sexes."
105
 As has been discussed,
106
 the control test ought to be maintained in a 
manner which is pretty inflexible and by doing so it would judge all by the same 
standards of expected behaviour. Adult men and women should not face different tests 
and the only flexibility which is justifiable is in setting a lower standard for teenagers who 
have not yet reached maturity. Gender may be a relevant as a contextual factor, but this 
is to do with the situations which women find themselves in and not because it is 
expected that they may react differently from men. 
 
c) exclusions 
s55(6)(c): In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger the fact 
that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded. 
i) the merit and scope of the exclusion 
It is important to note that the sexual infidelity exclusion only refers to the trigger and if 
there are multiple provocations D can fulfil the trigger by relying on another source.
107
 An 
interesting example is given in the explanatory notes, it refers to "a person [who] 
discovers their partner sexually abusing their young child".
108
 In this scenario D cannot 
rely on the sexual infidelity by their partner as a trigger but they could argue that the 
abuse they witnessed against their child was a trigger. 
 
The existence of the exclusion does not deny that sexual infidelity is a provocative 
scenario. In the House of Commons Anne Main stated that when there is a "sexual bond" 
then there is "a greater closeness and involvement" and infidelity results in a "betrayal" 
which "is so much greater and the anger may be so much more".
109
 The government 
                                           
105 S. Yeo, 'English Reform of Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Whither Singapore?' (2010) Sing JLS 177, 
183 
106 Alongside the warranted emotion standard for the gravity test, this is the main argument in 'Chapter 5: Objective 
Element'. 
107 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [349]: "the thing done or said can still potentially amount 
to a qualifying trigger if (ignoring the sexual infidelity) it amounts nonetheless to circumstances of an extremely 
grave character causing the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged." 
108 Ibid 
109 Anne Main, November 9, 2009, HofC, col 82 
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position accepts that this is the case but it simply does not want these types of cases to 
be the basis for mitigation: 
 
"We are not trying to legislate away people’s natural and normal upset, 
concern and anger about those circumstances, but we do not accept that 
that itself ought to lead to reducing a murder finding."
110
 
 
It has been stated that it is perfectly acceptable to have an exclusion in a warranted 
excuse provocation defence but only where the presence of the exclusion can be viewed 
as indisputable.
111
 However, there may be circumstances of an extreme nature, 
involving insults and taunting, where a denial of a partial defence would be unsuitable.
112
 
 
In Dawes it was stated that "the events surrounding the circumstances in the breakdown 
of a relationship will often but not always" be excluded under the provision.
113
 However, 
as will be shown, this interpretation seems to ignore the wording of the 2009 Act and 
demonstrates that the there may be attempts to re-define the ordinary meanings of the 
terms used; this exclusion is about sexual infidelity and not about the breakdown of a 
relationship. A point which was made in a House of Commons debate was that this 
exclusion is not in line with the Law Commission's proposal,
114
 the Law Commission 
were concerned with "male possessiveness and jealousy" and that these factors "should 
not, of themselves, constitute good cause."
115
 An alternative provision was debated in 
the House of Lords: 
                                                                                                                                   
Lord Thomas of Gresford, July 7, 2009, HofL Committee, 5th Sitting, col 589: "I fail to see why a loss of self-control 
caused by a deep breach of trust and unfaithfulness should be any less a reason for reducing murder to 
manslaughter than any other form of provocation that may be advanced. It is fundamental." 
110 Maria Eagle, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 440 
A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009' 288: "The Government does not want to say conduct was 'rightful but 
wrongful' in such cases; rather that it was doubly wrongful, in both taking offence initially and killing." 
111 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n126-8) 
112 J. Horder, Memorandum to Public Bill Committee (2009): "One of the difficulties about being 'absolutist' in this 
area is that one prevents the jury hearing rare meritorious cases." 
113 Dawes [65] 
114 Mr. Hogg, November 9, 2009, HofC, col 92 
115 The Law Commission wished to use power of the judge and the standard elements of the defence to exclude 
such scenarios, see 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n135-9). 
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"(c) where D acted principally out of a desire to punish V for any act, 
whether by V or by any other person, which D perceived at the time to 
amount to sexual infidelity, or where D acted principally out of sexual 
jealousy or envy, the circumstances shall not constitute 'circumstances of 
an extremely grave character' for the purposes of subsection (4)(a)."
116
 
 
The provision therefore views a "desire to punish" and where D "acted principally out of 
sexual jealousy or envy" as outside the scope for mitigation. On one hand, this gets to 
the core of what is attempted to be achieved by including such a provision at all, but, on 
the other, it could create another layer of problems and complicate the defence 
further.
117
 The debate does highlight that the term 'sexual infidelity' may not be a precise 
term and could conceivably cover circumstances where the defence ought to run; 
therefore, through such a finding its existence is controversial and could cause some 
who are worthy of mitigation to fall under murder. 
 
A specific exclusion for sexual infidelity shows up that another form of provocation case, 
honour killing, does not have an exclusion:
118
 "[W]e are making explicit certain types of 
situation where the defence will not be available."
119
 This means that an honour killing 
could provide the basis for a trigger if the conditions are met. It has been stated that the 
difference between the two scenarios is merely that it is more difficult to define a honour 
killing, so an exclusion would be unworkable: "It is much easier to define sexual 
                                           
116 Lord Thomas of Gresford, November 11, 2009, HofL, col 836 
Also, see J. Horder, Memorandum to Public Bill Committee (2009): "If this clause is to remain, it might be worth 
considering re-wording to say that in so far as D was motivated by sexual jealousy or envy, these motivations are to 
be disregarded." 
117 Lord Bach, November 11, 2009, HofL, col 845: "Having a list of motives risks creating loopholes where killers can 
argue that their motive was something else not on the list; for example: fury, shock, embarrassment or betrayal." 
118 David Howarth, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 426: "why [has] one particular form of 
provocation or loss of control had been picked out, when there are other forms that one might equally insert in the 
primary legislation to state that they should not form the base of a defence." 
R. Card, Criminal Law 264: "Why should this one situation be singled out for express exclusion?" 
119 Maria Eagle, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 431 
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infidelity, say, than honour killings. Honour killing is not easy to define."
120
 The Law 
Commission did, however, set out a pretty clear description of what it believed a honour 
killing was: D seeks "to make an example" out of V because V has "defied tradition, 
custom or parental wishes in her choice of boyfriend, spouse or life-style."
121
 Providing a 
clear definition for the sexual infidelity exclusion may be difficult, though; in many ways 
the term is too broad but it may also not include the controversial cases where the 
reform ought to have been focused. A case which was discussed was Stingel,
122
 this 
was an Australian case which the Law Commission highlighted as being the sort of 
scenario which needed to be excluded from the defence. If plain language is used then 
this case does not involve sexual infidelity as there is no existing relationship between 
the parties.
123
 
 
Nourse has asked that "[i]f intimate homicide frequently involves separated couples why 
does our canonical legal image still revolve around sexual infidelity?".
124
 The exclusion 
of sexual infidelity does not include the key set of cases which required the attention of 
the drafters. Much of Nourse's discussion on the provocation defence rested on cases of 
departure, a woman attempting to leave a relationship and being killed. In Clinton a 
                                           
120 Ibid 442: We do not believe that the phrase 'violation of a code of honour' is sufficiently precise. We think that 
the current wording deals with the point, and we all agree that we do not want to allow honour killings to sneak 
into the partial defence." 
121 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 82 [5.25] 
122 (1990) 171 CLR 312: D was stalking his ex-girlfriend and saw her having sex with V in a car. V swore at D and D 
went to get a butcher's knife from his car and killed V. See 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n135). 
123 See (n126-52) for a more detailed definition of 'sexual infidelity'.  
R. Bradfield, 'Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on the Jealous Husband 
and the Battered Wife' (2000) 19 U Tas L Rev 5, 30-1: "the relationship is over and the 'intimate relationship' only 
exists in the male offender's mind ... How does the concept of unfaithfulness have any relevance in the context of a 
relationship that is over?" 
H. Edwards & J. Robson, 'Caging the Green-Eyed Monster - Restrictions on the Use of Sexual Infidelity as a Defence 
to Murder' (2012) 21 Nottingham LJ 143, 145: "Is it correct that the obsessive stalker who murders their quarry will 
have a defence when the faithful spouse will not?" 
124 V. Nourse, 'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense', (1997) Yale LJ, Vol 106, No 5, 
1331, 1345 
Also, at 1359: "But what if the parties are legally divorced'? Separated  by force of law? What if the defendant finds 
the rival in the arms of his ex-wife, ex-lover, or ex-girlfriend? A jilted lover snaps when he sees his former  girlfriend 
'dancing' with another man? A battered woman is thwarted by physical violence when she tries to leave for 
another? Seen through the lens of infidelity, these cases may seem only minor extensions of our canonical image of 
a crime of passion. Seen through the lens of departure, however, these cases challenge us to ask whether it is 
possible to be unfaithful to a relationship if one party believes that there is no relationship at all." 
 Chapter 9 - Coroners And Justice Act 2009   226 
 
decision on the Parker case, where V was killed after previously stating she wanted to 
end the relationship, was given and the defence was left to the jury. Parker highlights the 
limits of the exclusion; it will not prevent the defence from being used when a partner 
attempts to leave a relationship, it is limited to infidelity. Clinton refers to an example 
similar to Stingel and it finds that this scenario "could not sensibly be called 'infidelity'" 
and would not be excluded.
125
 Sexual infidelity is the term used in the exclusion but it is 
possessiveness and jealousy which are at the core of the problem. The exclusion may 
be too broad, it is not indisputable that all the cases which fall under the exclusion ought 
to be excluded, and it may be too narrow, infidelity may not deal with the key scenario of 
where V is trying to leave or already has left a relationship. 
 
ii) the Clinton judgment and contextual evidence 
In Clinton it was stated that objective evaluation is "hugely complicated by the 
prohibitions in section 55(6)",
126
 meaning that the added layer of exclusions made the 
task of interpreting the defence more difficult. In Clinton a key consideration was how to 
deal with the sexual infidelity exclusion and the solution proved to be somewhat 
controversial even though the approach which was outlined in the Parliamentary 
debates was followed. 
 
The first task in Clinton on this issue was to attempt to define the term 'sexual infidelity': 
 
"To begin with, there is no definition of 'sexual infidelity'. Who and what is 
embraced in this concept? ... Is the provision directly concerned with 
sexual infidelity, or with envy and jealousy and possessiveness, the sort of 
obsession that leads to violence against the victim on the basis expressed 
in the sadly familiar language, 'if I cannot have him/her, then no one else 
will/can'? The notion of infidelity appears to involve a relationship between 
                                           
125 Clinton 523 
126 Ibid 521 
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the two people to which one party may be unfaithful. Is a one-night-stand 
sufficient for this purpose?"
127
 
 
In a House of Lords Committee Lord Thomas stated that "[i]nfidelity has a very wide 
range."
128
 He discussed how it could be interpreted to vary from a "casual affair, where 
there is a feeling of disappointment" to a "lengthy marriage, where there has been 
concealment". The key point is that he found that infidelity involves a "breach of the 
trust" between the two parties. 
 
The exclusion refers to sexual infidelity, so this breach can only be excluded if it is of a 
sexual nature. Card has stated that sexual infidelity seems to refer "to a lack of 
faithfulness" and the parties must "already [be] in a 'sexual relationship'"; Card finds that 
this "must mean more than a one-night stand or casual relationship."
129
 The term is 
probably wider than Card's interpretation as it is really down to the expectations of the 
parties involved, for example, there would be expectations of fidelity between a couple 
who are engaged to marry but do not believe in sex before marriage. Therefore, sexual 
infidelity must refer to a sexual act involving a person who is in a relationship where 
there are expectations of faithfulness so that the sexual act could be considered to be a 
breach of trust. The term is clearly inadequate. 
 
In Clinton the impact of the exclusion on the defence was then set out: the sexual 
infidelity exclusion is only relevant to the trigger.
130
 The exclusion includes acts of sexual 
                                           
127 Ibid 522: "Is sexual infidelity to be construed narrowly so as to refer only to conduct which is related directly and 
exclusively to sexual activity? Only the words and acts constituting sexual activity are to be disregarded: on one 
construction, therefore, the effects are not. What acts relating to infidelity, but distinguishable from it on the basis 
that they are not 'sexual', may be taken into account?" 
128 Lord Thomas of Gresford, July 7, 2009, HofL Committee, 5th Sitting, col 589 
129 R. Card, Criminal Law 263 
130 Clinton 523: "the statutory provision is unequivocal: loss of control triggered by sexual infidelity cannot, on its 
own, qualify as a trigger for the purposes of the second component of this defence. This is the clear effect of the 
legislation." 
Ibid 521: "On the face of the statutory language, however grave the betrayal, however humiliating, indeed however 
provocative in the ordinary sense of the word it may be, sexual infidelity is to be disregarded as a qualifying trigger." 
 Chapter 9 - Coroners And Justice Act 2009   228 
 
infidelity but also words which relate to it.
131
 With the exclusion's reach limited to the 
trigger this means that sexual infidelity may be considered in the ordinary person test as 
context:
132
 
 
"The exclusion in section 55(6)(c) is limited to the assessment of the 
qualifying trigger ... [S]ection 54(3) expressly provides that reference to the 
defendant's circumstances extends to 'all' of the circumstances except 
those bearing on his general capacity for tolerance and self-restraint. 
When the [ordinary person test] ... is examined it emerges that, 
notwithstanding section 55(6)(c), account may, and in an appropriate case, 
should be taken of sexual infidelity."
133
 
 
The judgment acknowledges that this is not satisfactory but that it is effect of the 
legislation: "there will be occasions when the jury would be both disregarding and 
considering the same evidence. That is, to put it neutrally, counter intuitive."
134
 The 
judgment goes further in stating that to "compartmentalise" sexual infidelity by asking the 
jury to exclude it and then consider it "is unrealistic and carries with it the potential for 
injustice".
135
 However, it is made clear that sexual infidelity may be considered in the 
ordinary person test as context when it is "integral" and "essential".
136
 
 
The language of the 2009 Act is consistent with the findings in Clinton but also in the 
Parliamentary debates it was made clear, after concerns were raised relating to the 
consequences of the exclusion, that this is how the exclusion was intended to 
operate.
137
  Concerns were raised that the exclusion would mean that proper context 
                                           
131 Ibid 523: "In our judgment things 'said' includes admissions of sexual infidelity (even if untrue) as well as reports 
(by others) of sexual infidelity." 
132 See (n73-5 & n86-9) for the discussion of how contextual evidence is to be used in this test. 
133 Clinton 526 
134 Ibid 526 
135 Ibid 528 
136 Ibid 
137 L.H. Leigh, 'Loss of control' 5: "the Court charted a path already indicated in the Parliamentary debates." 
 Chapter 9 - Coroners And Justice Act 2009   229 
 
could not be given for other sorts of provocations.
138
 In supporting the government's 
position, Claire Ward stated that "[i]f other factors come into play, the court will of course 
have an opportunity to consider them", the purpose of the exclusion was to remove the 
situation where the defence can be raised "exclusively on the ground[s] of sexual 
infidelity."
139
 Following Wards' comment an important exchange took place: 
 
"Claire Ward: ... If something else is relied on as the qualifying trigger, any 
sexual infidelity that forms part of the background can be considered but it 
cannot be the trigger. That is essentially what the legislation seeks to do - 
to stop the act of sexual infidelity being the trigger ... 
Mr. Grieve: ... There is a clear contradiction between the wording of 
subsection (6)(c) and her intention. That is why I urge her to be so 
cautious about the clause, which I think has been very poorly thought 
through."
140
 
 
Any criticism over how the Clinton judgment interpreted the law on this issue is 
misdirected, this was simply the approach which was set out in the debates and the 
ordinary meaning of the legislation. For example, Baker and Zhao have stated that the 
judgment "overlooked the fundamental policy issues that led Parliament to enact a 
narrower defence of loss of control."
141
 Also, they have stated that it "undercuts 
Parliament's aim" and "[i]t is clear that Parliament did not intend sexual infidelity to be 
used in this way."
142
 It is more accurate to state that the drafters focused on the wrong 
area, sexual infidelity, and once they did this they only intended to remove this scenario 
in a smaller manner than many would have desired. 
 
                                           
138 David Howarth, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 426: "It might mean that where the context for 
some other form of provocation needed to be explained, it might become impossible to explain that to the court." 
139 Claire Ward, November 9, 2009, HofC, col 79 
140 Claire Ward & Mr Grieve, November 9, 2009, HofC, col 94-5 
141 D.J. Baker & L.X. Zhao, ' Contributory qualifying and non-qualifying triggers in the loss of control defence' 255 
142 Ibid 270-1 
Also, at 273: "The decision seems to ignore that a core aim of reforming the law in this area was to give women 
greater protection." 
 Chapter 9 - Coroners And Justice Act 2009   230 
 
Wake has stated that "the prohibition will rarely be invoked since it is unlikely that sexual 
infidelity will be raised in isolation from other factors."
143
 This statement is mistaken as 
the exclusion should impact on the trigger each time sexual infidelity arises, but its use 
as contextual evidence later, in the ordinary person test, will mean it continues to be a 
factor. However, Clinton itself only has to be observed to discover how multiple sources 
of provocation can be relied upon and its application in this case caused inconsistencies. 
In Clinton, according to D, V had taunted him about sexual partners (she had intercourse 
with five men) and him wanting to commit suicide (she stated that he had "not the balls 
to commit suicide"). She had also said that she did not want her children anymore. The 
trial judge found that the defence of loss of control was not available because of the 
sexual infidelity exclusion, the provoking factors outside of sexual infidelity were not 
sufficient to satisfy the trigger. In line with s54(6) the defence did not go to the jury as the 
trial judge found that a jury properly directed could not reasonably conclude that the 
defence might apply.  
 
The Court of Appeal, however, ordered a retrial as they found that the defence should 
have been left to the jury: 
 
"we have concluded that she misdirected herself about the possible 
relevance of the wife's infidelity. We have reflected whether the totality of 
the matters relied on as a qualifying trigger, evaluated in the context of the 
evidence relating to the wife's sexual infidelity, and examined as a 
cohesive whole, were of sufficient weight to leave to the jury. In our 
judgment they were."
144
 
 
The Court of Appeal's judgment can be interpreted in two ways; firstly, the qualifying 
trigger was satisfied by the taunts about suicide and the references to the children and 
the sexual infidelity was merely context in the ordinary person test or, secondly, that 
sexual infidelity was considered as context in order to satisfy the qualifying trigger. It is 
                                           
143 N. Wake, 'Loss of control beyond sexual infidelity' (2012) 76 JCL 193, 197 
144 Clinton 536 
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submitted that it must be the latter. The Court of Appeal did not state that they re-
interpreted the strength of the other issues and deemed them to have satisfied the 
trigger but that they had differed in their decision because of the sexual infidelity being 
used as context for these factors, meaning that the exclusion was not properly applied. 
This is supported by the following statement which the Court of Appeal made: 
 
"On the basis that the remarks made by the wife had to be disregarded, 
her conclusion that the defence should be withdrawn from the jury was 
unassailable."
145
 
 
The Court of Appeal therefore agreed that when disregarding sexual infidelity the other 
factors were not sufficient to satisfy the defence; this shows that the trigger could not 
have been satisfied without reference to sexual infidelity and the only difference which 
can explain this divergence is that sexual infidelity was relied upon in the trigger. The 
Court of Appeal therefore did not properly apply the exclusion. Consequently, Baker and 
Zhao have stated that "[t]he sexual infidelity was the dominant contributory trigger"
146
 
and Slater has stated that it "means sexual infidelity can be the principal reason for the 
presence of a qualifying trigger despite s55(6)(c)."
147
 
 
From the Court of Appeal's own interpretation of the exclusion, the trigger needs to be 
satisfied before the ordinary person test and sexual infidelity as context comes into play. 
The role of the judge is to consider all the elements of the defence and then only allow 
the jury to consider it if he is satisfied that a "properly directed" jury might apply the 
defence. The judge must apply s54(1) to the facts of the case and, in order, determine if 
there is evidence that D lost his self-control, if this could be deemed to be caused by a 
valid qualifying trigger and if the ordinary person test could be satisfied. The qualifying 
trigger requires an examination of the sexual infidelity exclusion and this process should 
                                           
145 Clinton 536 
146 D.J. Baker & L.X. Zhao, ' Contributory qualifying and non-qualifying triggers in the loss of control defence' 265 
147 J. Slater, 'Sexual Infidelity and Loss Of Self-Control: Context or Camouflage?' (2012) 24 Denning Law Journal 153, 
160: "A closer examination of the outcome of Clinton and the implications of the contextual approach reveal that it 
enables sexual infidelity to act as the main and indeed predominant qualifying trigger despite s55(6)(c)." 
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stop if the judge needs sexual infidelity to be considered in order to satisfy the trigger. 
This is what the trial judge did but the Court of Appeal relied on this excluded factor. 
 
The Court of Appeal were wrong but it can be questioned whether the trial judge was 
wrong too. The trial judge was correct to ignore the sexual infidelity but where D gives 
two such reasons to satisfy the trigger, about suicide and the children, a jury should be 
given the opportunity to hear the defence. It is quite likely that a jury would find that the 
trigger is not satisfied and would not have to considered the other elements of the 
defence. If this is the case it cannot be said that the defence would then become a 
platform for cases of sexual infidelity as the jury would not be able to consider that issue 
unless the trigger is first established.
148
 
 
iii) diminished responsibility 
Clinton makes an important point and in some ways gives a warning to how sexual 
infidelity could be dealt with in the future: 
 
"If the defendant is suffering from a recognised medical condition, for 
example, serious and chronic depression, the discovery that a partner has 
been sexually unfaithful may, and often will be said to, impair the 
defendant's ability to form a rational judgment and exercise self control. 
This situation is not all that uncommon ... Sexual infidelity may therefore 
require consideration when the jury is examining the diminished 
responsibility defence even when it has been excluded from consideration 
as a qualifying trigger for the purposes of the loss of control defence."
149
 
 
The prediction in Clinton is that as sexual infidelity cannot be the sole basis for the loss 
of control defence such cases will move to be dealt with under diminished responsibility. 
The intentions of the reformers were to limit the reach of the defence for men when they 
                                           
148 This point on the role of the judge will be explored further when the sufficient evidence test is discussed at 
(n224). 
149 Clinton 526-7 
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claimed to be solely provoked by sexual infidelity. In a fashion, this is achieved as sexual 
infidelity cannot be relied upon as a trigger, but there is likely to be a move to include 
these cases in diminished responsibility as was suggested in Clinton. Card
150
 has stated 
that depressive illnesses would come under a recognised medical condition within the 
definition of diminished responsibility.
151
 It stands to reason that if D is excluded from 
loss of control he will run diminished responsibility to avoid a conviction for murder and 
this will mean that these scenarios will rely on medical evidence of depression rather 
than comparing D to a standard of behaviour in order to receive mitigation. 
 
A class of cases certainly exist which ought to be restricted for being a basis for 
mitigation. Other proposals which were considered have their merits in that they aim to 
deal with the core issues.
152
 Ultimately, the intentions of the drafters must be questioned 
on this issue. The term is flawed; it does not cover a killing outside of a relationship 
where there can be no 'infidelity', meaning that many cases of possessiveness and 
jealousy will be outside this. Also, it was their intention that sexual infidelity will play a 
significant part in the new defence. There is a potential that the main provoking feature 
of the case will be sexual infidelity and this is even where the law is correctly applied, 
unlike Clinton. If D is able to satisfy the trigger with another reason, or a combination of 
many other reasons, then sexual infidelity may be the primary force in satisfying the 
ordinary person test and the subjective test. The reason why the compartmentalisation 
of sexual infidelity occurs in the 2009 Act is so that an overall view of the circumstances 
may be presented and not to allow D to rely on sexual infidelity in the trigger. The most 
effective way of limiting the impact of sexual infidelity is to ensure that the factor which 
established the trigger is the central force behind the satisfaction of all the evaluative 
elements of the defence. 
 
 
 
                                           
150 R. Card, Criminal Law 251 
151 (n14-23) 
152 (n116) 
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s55(6)(a) & (b): In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger— 
(a)D's fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was 
caused by a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence; 
(b)a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not 
justifiable if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence; 
These two provisions ensure that D cannot incite the circumstances which the trigger 
rests on for the purpose of relying on the defence. The Law Commission's equivalent 
provision referred to an exclusion based on the incitement of "provocation",
153
 but the 
2009 Act specifically refers to both triggers as was suggested in the Ministry of Justice 
Report.
154
 As has previously been discussed,
155
 "purpose of providing an excuse" ought 
to be viewed narrowly and be seen as the equivalent of forming a plan. It is indisputable 
that if D planned to incite the trigger that the defence ought not to apply, therefore this is 
an exclusion which can be fully supported. 
 
Both the Law Commission and the 2009 Act, though, failed to deal with the broader 
circumstances of incitement and did not put a mechanism in place for such cases.
156
 In 
the pre-2009 defence Johnson found that there was no difference between standard 
provocation and self-induced provocation, each needed to be dealt with in the subjective 
and objective tests.
157
 A preferable method of settling these cases was established 
before, in Edwards it was found that self-induced provocation could only be relied upon if 
V's conduct went beyond reasonable expectations;
158
 this is for when D did not plan on 
inciting V but ultimately did and then relies on the trigger which occurred. 
 
                                           
153 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n125-31) 
154 'Chapter 8 - Ministry of Justice' (n27) 
155 'Chapter 4: Adequate Provocation' (n37-45) 
156 The distinction between the 'narrow' and 'broad' circumstances of self-induced provocation was discussed at 
ibid. 
157 [1989] 1 WLR 740 
158 [1973] AC 648 
 Chapter 9 - Coroners And Justice Act 2009   235 
 
In Dawes
159
 this issue was raised as D did not plan to kill V, he was trying to get V out of 
his flat, but his conduct had made the situation escalate; D had an altercation with V 
before fetching a knife and stabbing him. The Court of Appeal had to decide on the 
scope of the exclusion and how these broader cases of incitement need to be dealt with. 
Firstly, they found that "inciting, or encouraging or manufacturing a situation for this 
purpose" is covered under the exclusion but "behaving badly and looking for and 
provoking trouble" is not.
160
 This supports the distinction between the narrow and broad 
circumstances of incitement but the interpretation seems to go slightly beyond the 
wording of the Act; 'inciting' and 'manufacturing' are covered under the exclusion but 
'encouraging' ought not to be, if D 'encourages' V but V's reaction is so far out of 
proportion then the Edwards rule should apply instead of the exclusion. 
 
Secondly, the Court of Appeal seemed uncertain in how to deal with the broader 
category of incitement and how far Johnson was relevant to the matter as there were a 
series of contradictory statements. In Dawes D fell outside the exclusion and into this 
grey area because he neither planned the attack nor was his conduct agreeable. Initially, 
it was stated that "the impact of Johnson is now diminished, but not wholly extinguished 
by the new statutory provisions."
161
 Following this, it was stated that "[a]s Johnson no 
longer fully reflects the appropriate principle, further reference to it is inappropriate."
162
 
However, later it was found, when applying the law to the case, that "Johnson should not 
have been treated as overruled".
163
 
 
How this issue was dealt with in Dawes highlights both a weakness in the 2009 Act and 
uncertainty in how to apply the provisions, an issue which the former may have caused. 
The exclusion only deals with a narrow set of circumstances, where D plans to incite, but 
there was no provision set out in the 2009 Act for how to deal with cases which involved 
incitement without such a plan. Rather than the Court of Appeal referring to Johnson, a 
                                           
159 R v Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim 322. The facts of the case will be more fully discussed below (n196). 
160 Ibid [57-8] 
At [63], it was decided that "[t]here was no sufficient evidence that this was the defendant’s purpose." 
161 Ibid [58] 
162 Ibid 
163 Ibid [63] 
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case which is, to an extent, symbolic of the problems with the pre-2009 defence, it ought 
to have established a more suitable way for dealing with these cases.
164
 The 
inconsistent way in which this issue was approached in the judgment indicates that the 
judiciary were uncertain over the significance of pre-2009 law as the 2009 Act did not 
specifically deal with the issue at hand. The 2009 Act is meant to be a new beginning,
165
 
but this does raise the issue of whether previous law ought to be referenced at all, 
especially when some of the provisions were directly influenced by the pre-2009 
defence. 
 
d) subjective element 
s54(4): Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted 
in a considered desire for revenge. 
The "considered desire for revenge" provision was supported when discussing the Law 
Commission's proposal, the exclusion goes to the core of the subjective element. The 
subjective element is essentially there to distinguish between cases of what are 
commonly referred to as 'hot blooded' and 'cold blooded' killings.
166
 Removing 'cold 
blooded' killings expressly makes sense as all the cases which it covers ought to be 
outside the defence, however, the correct balance needs to be found in order to ensure 
those who kill with the emotion which relates to human frailty with delay are not 
excluded. 
 
The term 'considered' requires some understanding but it would seem to be the opposite 
of an impulsive and emotional killing. The two points of view about attaching the term to 
the provision were set out in the Parliamentary debates: 
 
                                           
164 See 'Chapter 4: Adequate Provocation' (n37-9) for the discussion of Edwards. 
165 (n10): in Clinton it was stated that the "common law heritage is irrelevant". 
166 'Chapter 6: Subjective Element' (n6-10) 
 Chapter 9 - Coroners And Justice Act 2009   237 
 
"I do not want a prolonged and footling discussion about revenge being 
considered or unconsidered. If somebody does something from a sense of 
revenge, it does not matter how considered it was."
167
 
"By referring to a 'considered' desire for revenge, we are trying to strike 
the right balance—barring thought-out revenge killings, without 
automatically excluding cases in which some thought of revenge may have 
passed through the mind of the abused partner in an abusive relationship, 
when a complex range of emotions is in play."
168
 
 
A considered desire for revenge is to do with how the killing is carried out and not D 
taking time to become emotional,
169
 it is about ensuring that the response is not a 
calculated decision as it is necessary that the emotion stemming from the stimulus 
overrides D's ability to restrain himself.
170
 Expressing the exclusion in such a manner 
leaves an implication that there can be cases of unconsidered revenge in the defence. 
The best interpretation of this is that it does not mean that if D has a feeling of 
resentment towards V then this is necessarily the same as revenge, such desires are not 
an indication that D has made an entirely rational and 'cold' decision to kill. 
 
Withey has stated that "[t]here is no explanation of what 'considered' means, but it 
clearly refers to planned attacks and grudge killings."
171
 How the exclusion is phrased 
could potentially include a wider set of cases though, where there is any preparatory act 
it could be viewed as being a considered action. For example, if D fetches a weapon 
from a drawer this could be construed as a considered action as D has not only gone to 
find a weapon but has also judged her response in that she feels that the weapon is 
necessary to successfully attack V.
172
 
                                           
167 David Howarth, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 427 
168 Maria Eagle, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 436-7 
169 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n120-4) 
170 See 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n22-6). 
171 C. Withey, 'Loss of Control' (2010) 174 JPN 197 
172 J. Horder, Memorandum to Public Bill Committee (2009): "The removal of the [sudden] requirement will 
undoubtedly raise questions, not answered in the Bill, about the status of what appear to be 'forearming' actions by 
D." 
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A jury may have a difficult task in balancing a non-sudden loss of control killing, a 
delayed response, with this exclusion and "[t]his is likely to generate case law regarding 
where the line is to be drawn".
173
 In a House of Lords Committee Lord Kingsland has 
stated that this exclusion could be "destined to exercise the judiciary's minds for many 
years to come."
174
 In Evans, a decision contained in Clinton, D stabbed his wife after a 
prolonged argument. The prosecution argued that D had not lost his self-control and had 
acted in revenge. The Court of Appeal approved the language which was used by the 
trial judge on framing a jury question for a considered desire for revenge: 
 
"An act of retribution as a result of a deliberate and considered decision to 
get your own back, that is one that has been thought about. If you are sure 
that what the defendant did was to reflect on what had happened and the 
circumstances in which he found himself and decided to take his revenge 
on (his wife), that would not have been a loss of self control as the law 
requires."
175
 
 
The overall role of the jury has not changed much even if the language has; provocation 
has always been about finding a balance in order to exclude revenge killings.
176
 
However, this task is more complex than ever before. The Law Commission and the 
drafters have evolved the defence in order to include fear killings and these cases are 
likely to include an element of rational decision-making which cannot be properly 
described as vengeful. Complex cases which involve intimate partner violence can 
involve both triggers of the defence, D displaying anger at past violence and fear of 
future violence means that such a defence has to cater for both scenarios. The Court of 
                                           
173 C. Withey, 'Loss of control, loss of opportunity?' 267 
Mr Garnier, February 5, 2009, HofC Committee, 4th Sitting, col 112: "Are courts going to find it difficult to 
distinguish between a slow-burn but none the less 'justified' loss of control and a considered desire for revenge? 
The two may sometimes merge." 
174 Lord Kingsland, July 7, 2009, HofL Committee, 5th Sitting, col 575 
Mr Garnier, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 430: "It seems to us that the matters referred to in 
the clause dealing with revenge are in need of tightening and clarification." 
175 Clinton 543 
176 Sailsbury's Case (1553) Plowd Comm 100: D "took part suddenly" in the killing of V. See 'Chapter 1 - The Early 
Defence' (n7). 
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Appeal were wrong, however, to state that "[t]he language is clear. The direction 
accurately encapsulated the issue to be decided by the jury, and the way they should 
approach to [sic] it."
177
 It must be understood how the non-sudden loss of self-control 
and considered desire for revenge provisions will interact with each other and this is 
anything but clear; similarly to many aspects of the new defence, much depends on the 
court's interpretation of the terms. 
 
The factors of the subjective element which need to be considered are more apparent, 
though. A comparison of the key case of the pre-2009 defence on the issue of delay, 
Ahluwalia, and Clinton only has to be made to show this. In Ahluwalia it was stated that 
"[t]ime for reflection" could be "inconsistent" with the loss of self-control requirement but 
it "depends entirely on the facts of the individual case and is not a principle of law."
178
 In 
Clinton this reasoning was followed: 
 
"there does not appear to be very much room for any 'considered' 
deliberation. In reality, the greater the level of deliberation, the less likely it 
will be that the killing followed a true loss of self control."
179
 
 
It is doubtful whether much has changed with regards to revenge killings as the 
provision explicitly states the issues which were always a part of the defence, but it is a 
positive move as it is preferable to have the core issues in the open for a jury to decide. 
With the use of the term 'a considered desire for revenge' it is implicit that not all 
vengeful feelings are outside the scope of the defence. It is best that 'considered' is 
taken to mean a well thought-out plan, it ought not to mean an element of rational 
thought as D can kill with the emotion even with a degree of rational decision-making. To 
define revenge as a planned killing means that it is far removed from the core emotion 
and therefore human frailty; this would be a proper distinction, between a rational killing 
which takes place owing to the existence of the emotion and a planned killing where the 
links between the act and the trigger have broken down. However, as D must lose his 
self-control it is unlikely that these subtle differences can be applied to the new defence 
                                           
177 Clinton 544 
178 R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889, 897–8 (Lord Taylor CJ) 
179 Clinton 521 
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as it ought to be fairly apparent if D's reaction was out-of-control as opposed to a 
defence which merely relies on the core emotion. 
 
s54(1)(a): D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D's 
loss of self-control 
 s54(2): For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss 
of control was sudden. 
D must lose his self-control,
180
 but it is only valid if it is caused by one of the three 
triggers.
181
 The loss of self-control element remains undefined, but in s54(2) it is stated 
that "it does not matter whether or not the loss of control was sudden."
182
 When it states 
that "it does not matter" this is not entirely true, delay must be taken to be an evidential 
factor for the existence of a loss of self-control.
183
 In the explanatory notes it states that 
for the judge and jury "it will remain open, as at present, ... to take into account any delay 
between a relevant incident and the killing."
184
 The Clinton judgment follows this: more 
deliberation means that the existence of a genuine loss of self-control was "less likely".
185
 
The wording of the provision effectively re-states the position in Ahluwalia with a 
possibility that it could be interpreted in a more favourable manner to a person who kills 
with delay; it potentially allows for more delay than before, with the emphasis given, but, 
as with the revenge exclusion, it becomes another layer in the balance and this is part of 
the jury's difficult task. 
 
                                           
180 Ibid: "The loss of control need not be sudden, but it must have been lost. That is essential." 
181 Mitigation is not occurring solely because D lost his self-control but because he lost it owing to a reason which 
has been deemed good enough, a warranted loss of self-control. See 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n111). 
182 In the pre-2009 defence, in Duffy, it was stated that this was a necessary condition of the concept but in 
Ahluwalia it was found to be merely an evidential factor, see 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n30-2). 
183 O. Quick & C. Wells, 'Partial Reform of Partial Defences: Developments in England and Wales' (2012) 45 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 337, 342: "Yet the 2009 Act does not define loss of control, nor 
offer an elaboration in the accompanying explanatory notes, beyond noting that the time between the incident and 
the killing will remain relevant for the tasks of both judge and jury." 
184 Explanatory notes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 [337] 
185 (n179) 
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A fundamental concern with the 'removal' of suddenness is that the result would be 
"illogical" if a loss of self-control "by its very nature" is sudden:
186
 
 
"If you say that a loss of self-control need not be sudden, you are forcing 
the English language into an area where it cannot go. A loss of self-control 
is sudden or it is not a loss of self-control."
187
 
 
It is more straightforward to discuss loss of self-control when D reacts spontaneously as 
it best suits these sorts of cases but it is clear that the law has embraced 'slow-burn', 
where D's emotions build up. Despite the pre-2009 approach to suddenness being a 
concern with the drafters,
188
 this provision does not alter the subjective element too 
much, so the problem over how cases of delay were at odds with common expectations 
of what it is to lose self-control will still exist. 
 
The reason for its retention
189
 is the concern that it "would open the door to cold-blooded 
killings fitting into the defence",
190
 this is despite the revenge exclusion. Loss of self-
control was discussed in Chapter 6 and the concept was a great cause for concern and 
criticism, it was not only questioned whether the loss of self-control requirement could be 
given a proper definition but also whether it was necessary and able to respond to the 
demands of the defence. It was determined that the concept ought not to be the basis for 
the subjective element and it would be preferable, even though it would not settle all the 
issues, if the defence simply rested on finding if the core emotions were in place at the 
time.
191
 The problem is that the 2009 Act does not advance the concept substantially 
further, the Law Commission's criticism that it is "a judicially invented concept, lacking 
sharpness or a clear foundation in psychology" remains,
192
 so its retention in the 2009 
                                           
186 C. Withey, 'Loss of control, loss of opportunity?' 268 
187 Lord Thomas of Gresford, July 7, 2009, HofL Committee, 5th Sitting, col 587 
188 Maria Eagle, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 433: "We recognise that if we just used the words 
'loss of self-control', it would be read too much within the current requirements in respect of suddenness". 
189 The loss of self-control requirement was abandoned in the Law Commission's proposal, see 'Chapter 8 - Ministry 
of Justice' (n55-70). 
190 Maria Eagle, February 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 1st Sitting, col 10 
191 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n79-80) 
192 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 36 [3.30] 
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Act, given that the concept has not been developed in any significant way, cannot be 
supported. 
 
The retention of it has to be evaluated whilst keeping under consideration the aims of 
the reform; an overall aim was to create a specific trigger for cases of fear and make the 
defence more readily applicable for women.  The inclusion of the fear trigger combined 
with the 'removal' of suddenness has been viewed as progress of sorts as the defence is 
"more accessible to abused women",
193
 but despite these types of cases having a 
specific route laid out the retention of the loss of self-control requirement surely must 
limit its effectiveness. This was the conclusion of the Law Commission and it also came 
out in a House of Commons Committee, that the real problem was that the "whole 
clause depends on loss of control and that cannot be avoided":
194
 
 
"The obvious way to reform the law to help battered wives is to get rid of 
the idea of loss of control. ... [I]t is not the suddenness of the loss of 
control that matters; it is having to prove some sort of loss of control."
195
 
 
Cases of fear and many of anger do not require a loss of self-control to be genuine and 
if the defence is striving to be about more then there ought to be no place for the 
concept. 
 
The judgment in Dawes highlights this point. It was found that D had not killed V "in a 
rage. He was shocked rather than angry ... He had acted in self-defence."
196
 D's claimed 
that he was trying to get V out of his flat and, in doing so, went to the kitchen to retrieve 
                                           
193 S. Edwards, 'Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control' 226.  However, Edwards counters this, 
below at (n200), and discusses the lack of progress made with the subjective element. 
194 David Howarth, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 424 
195 David Howarth, February 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 1st Sitting, col 9 
R. Card, Criminal Law 259: The retention of loss of self-control "did not accord with its proclaimed intention to 
correct the imbalance between men and women which existed under the defence of provocation." 
196 Dawes [64]. See also (n159). 
The impact for the defence's relationship with self-defence will be further discussed at (n202-3). 
Also, see R v Gurpinar [2015] EWCA Crim 178 [48]: D's counsel described D's conduct as "not indicative of a loss of 
control", but stated that "[t]he evidence was indicative of an instinctive reaction to hit out at the deceased both in 
panic to stop the attack and in order to defend himself." 
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a knife. D argued self-defence, but failed, and could not rely on the loss of control 
defence as he did not lose his self-control. By D claiming he killed out of fear it made the 
subjective element difficult to satisfy. This case shows that 'battered women' who kill 
because of fear will have to face a substantial hurdle, just as before: they must lose their 
self-control. It is not enough that they genuinely felt afraid for their safety or another's but 
killed excessively, they must kill in this manner for the defence to apply. The 2009 Act 
created a specific trigger for fear but also retained a concept which seems to counter 
much of its effectiveness,
197
 so Withey is correct in stating that "[t]he law may 'take back 
with one hand what it gives with the other'".
198
 
 
A view stressed in a House of Commons Committee was that mitigation for anger and 
fear should not rely on the "same basic concepts" and loss of self-control "has nothing to 
do with the fear argument."
199
 The drafters clung to the concept because they were 
worried it would lead to revenge killings being accepted into the defence. It was more of 
a concern that killings in anger, which do not involve a loss of self-control, could be 
accepted. It may, therefore, be that, with this outlook, the desire to put the two emotions 
together in a single defence is what has harmed the new defence. 
 
The retention of the loss of self-control element also impacts on the fear trigger in 
another way. The Law Commission intended that this defence would be a natural step-
down for those who failed with self-defence.
200
 It creates difficulties, as can be seen in 
Dawes, to an extent, to run loss of self-control and argue that there was reasonableness 
in the response for self-defence. The retention of the loss of self-control requirement 
means that nothing has changed in this regard. The judge is no longer forced to leave 
                                           
197 A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009' 285: "its overall approach may be undermined by the final form of 
the new law." 
Also, at 288: "In the case of the abused woman who acts after a time delay, will this not take the law back into 
disputes about whether there was a loss of self-control, and from there, into questions of suddenness, for, it might 
be thought, a test for and constitutive feature of any loss of self control in anger is that it have an element of 
suddenness? ... Will that not work against the core logic of the new defence?" 
198 C. Withey, 'Loss of control, loss of opportunity?' 267 
S. Edwards, 'Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control' 224: "we can expect a mirror image of 
the behaviour and legal descriptors that passed for loss of self-control" to be replicated in the new defence. 
199 David Howarth, March 3, 2009, HofC Committee, 11th Sitting, col 444 
200 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n81-4) 
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the defence to the jury on trivial evidence of provocation,
201
 but it will create the same 
choice for someone who has a chance of falling under self-defence. 
 
 
e) sufficient evidence test 
s54(6): For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an 
issue with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the 
trial judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might 
apply. 
The 2009 Act gives the judge greater and broader powers to prevent the defence from 
going to the jury. Under s54(5) the judge must decide if the defence can be raised but 
now can base this on all the conditions referred to in s54(1); the judge can take into 
account evidence of whether an act or omission caused a loss of self-control, whether 
there was a qualifying trigger for this and whether the ordinary person test could be 
satisfied. Therefore, this is far more difficult to satisfy than the pre-2009 defence where 
all had to be done was to show that some conduct caused a loss of self-control.
202
 
 
Under the pre-2009 defence it was a common criticism that the judge was forced to leave 
the defence to the jury, even if D did not wish it, but this position has not
 
altered under 
the 2009 Act, the test just makes it more difficult for this to occur.
203
 Section 54(6) sees 
the defence move back to the position in Holmes,
204
 the judge must give an initial ruling 
on the issues in order for the defence to go to the jury. The intention of this power is 
clear: to create an additional buffer to prevent certain cases from going as far as the jury: 
 
                                           
201 See (n205). 
202 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n8-11) 
203 Dawes [53]: "whether the prosecution has raised the question or not, at the end of the evidence the judge 
should examine and decide whether, indeed, sufficient evidence relating to all the ingredients of the defence has 
been raised." 
Workman [2014] EWCA Crim 575 [25]: "it would have been known by all concerned that there can be occasions 
when such a defence, as with provocation before it, is required to be left to a jury even though it has never 
positively been advanced as part of the defence case." 
204 Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588. See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n89). 
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"What the old law entrusted to juries willy nilly, the new law takes out of 
their hands in cases that are 'purely speculative and wholly unmeritorious', 
empowering judges to make the moral and political call on what is a 
justifiable expression of provoked anger, albeit in the name of the 'ideal 
jury'."
205
 
 
This provision was introduced by the Law Commission to ensure cases of sexual 
possessiveness and jealousy, revenge, cases like Doughty and cases involving D relying 
on mental abnormalities were excluded from the defence.
206
 Just how far reaching the 
provision is will obviously depend on how it is applied in practice. 
 
Examinations for these powers came in two cases which were decided in Dawes. In 
Hatter D went to V's home with a knife, they argued about V's new boyfriend and D 
stabbed her.
207
 The trial judge stated that there was no evidence that D lost his self-
control and the 'provocation' trigger "did not come anywhere near" being satisfied.
208
 In 
Bowyer D had planned a burglary and killed V when he returned home. D claimed that 
he was both angry, at V's comments about a woman, and fearful. The Court of Appeal 
stated that it was "absurd to suggest" that this could be the basis for the 'provocation' 
trigger and the killing "bore all the hallmarks of appalling violence administered in cold 
blood."
209
 In neither of these cases did D provide any evidence that he lost his self-
control and there was clearly insufficient evidence to suggest that a trigger could be 
satisfied. However, whereas in Hatter the defence was not left to the jury in Bowyer it 
was. The Court of Appeal stated, when discussing Bowyer, that "[i]f we have any 
criticism ... it is that the loss of control defence was left to the jury at all."
210
 
 
It is easy to see that this provision could be problematic. Clough has stated that a lot 
more rests with D as there is a greater task to convince the judge that the defence 
                                           
205 A. Norrie, 'The Coroners and Justice Act 2009' 280 
206 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n35-9) 
207 Dawes [16-20]: D was heard to say: "look what you’ve made me do". 
208 Ibid [26] 
209 Ibid [66] 
210 Ibid 
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should be applied
211
 and in Clinton it was stated there is a greater opportunity to contest 
if the defence should go to the jury.
212
 In Clinton it was stated that the judge will have to 
give "a common sense judgment based on an analysis of all the evidence",
213
 but went 
on to highlight that the sexual infidelity exclusion could create difficulties: 
 
"The more problematic situations will arise when the defendant relies on an 
admissible trigger (or triggers) for which sexual infidelity is said to provide 
an appropriate context (as explained in this judgment) for evaluating 
whether the trigger relied on is a qualifying trigger for the purposes of 
subsection 55(3) and (4)."
214
 
 
This is precisely where the judges in Clinton went wrong.
215
 There is a greater and a 
more difficult task for the judge, they must decide what a reasonable jury might conclude 
and take on board the extra layers to the new defence. It is certain that the test of 
sufficient evidence is far more stringent than before and a shift needed to occur in the 
reform. However, the question is not only whether they can undertake this role but, also, 
whether they should. 
 
The drafters of the 2009 Act had to deal with the problematic cases and even if such 
cases were not successfully fulfilling the defence they were being considered as being 
capable of provoking D and going to the jury. The reform had to enforce a tougher test 
but it is not desirable that the trial judge is given so much power. In repeating the findings 
in Holmes the entire defence must go before a judge before it can reach a jury, but the 
Homicide Act 1957 was introduced in an attempt to remedy this problem of judicial 
control with the common law.
216
 The problem with this test in the 1957 Act came from the 
                                           
211 A. Clough, 'The Judge's Role Where Provocation Is Evident but Not Discussed' 352 
212 Clinton 540: In the Parker judgment it was stated that "[t]he judge was not invited to withdraw the 'loss of 
control' defence from the jury. With our increased understanding of the differences between the loss of control 
defence and the former provocation defence, we anticipate that such a submission would now be raised by the 
Crown for the judge to consider. 
213 Ibid 529 
214 Ibid 530 
215 (n144-8) 
216 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n7) 
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wording in that it was a purely subjective test. It is possible that the 2009 Act has gone 
too far the other way and reintroduced a problem from the pre-1957 defence. 
 
It has been stressed that the word 'provocation' rather than 'provoked' has to take hold of 
the defence again,
217
 if this were the case natural, normal conduct and trivial incidents 
could not be relied upon. 'Provocation' requires not just a feeling of being wronged but, 
also, something which could genuinely be described as grave actually taking place. The 
word 'provocation', however, is too narrow, it does not include, for example, where D kills 
a person who is not the provoker. Rather than using the word 'provoked', as the pre-
2009 defence did, a phrase such as 'D felt as if he faced provocation' would better suit 
the defence. If this were the test then a judge could become a better barrier for 
undeserving cases but the jury would remain as the principal guardians. If that test were 
applied by a judge then he could state that certain circumstances cannot be deemed to 
be 'provocation' and the defence should not proceed to a jury.
218
 
 
The problem with the 2009 Act is that in attempting to deal with this issue it has shifted 
too far and gives the judge free-reign over the whole defence, including on giving a 
preliminary verdict on whether the trigger is fulfilled and this means he must decide if the 
emotion could be justified.
219
 In Dawes it was expressed that the purpose of the Act was 
to make it harder for D but that the only way that this could be achieved was by handing 
the judge control over the defence.
220
 This is, however, not true; a stricter test ought to 
be imposed for a case to proceed to a jury but one which retains the jury's say as to 
whether D met the required standard in the trigger and met the standard of behaviour of 
an ordinary person.
221
 
                                           
217 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n36) 
218 Also, a set of guidelines could be put into place to assist judgements of this nature, presumptions that the 
defence should not apply in certain scenarios unless the incident was particularly severe. These points will be 
discussed further in Part IV. 
219 Dawes [61]: "In our judgment these matters require objective assessment by the judge at the end of the 
evidence and, if the defence is left, by the jury considering their verdict." 
220 Ibid [60-1] 
221 This point was key to the discussions of the sufficient evidence test in 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation'. 
C. Morgan, 'Loss of Self-control: Back to the Good Old Days' (2013) 77 JCL 119, 125: "the focus of the defence 
should remain with the jury, who will have the power to look at all the evidence and come to a decision which 
reflects the attitudes of society, with the jurors being its representatives." 
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When discussing Clinton it was stated that the Court of Appeal incorrectly applied the 
sexual infidelity exclusion, but, also, the trial judge could have allowed the defence to go 
to the jury. For example, the trial judge stated that, excluding sexual infidelity, the 
defence should not proceed to a jury even though D had two other reasons to explain 
why he was provoked.
222
 The other two reasons which were given in Clinton may not 
have satisfied a jury but they were strong enough to require a jury to hear the defence. In 
the partial defence the judge's role ought to be to test if there is strong evidence which 
suggests that D fulfilled the subjective test and that this stemmed from actual provocation 
or fear.
223
 This strikes the balance between giving the judge greater powers to exclude 
cases from the defence which ought to be outside of provocation and maintaining the 
role of the jury. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the new loss of control defence is an improvement on the pre-2009 defence. 
How the 2009 Act relies on triggers which stem from situations where D is fearful and/or 
faces substantial provocation helps to ensure that the defence only mitigates where there 
are warranted reasons for D's emotional reaction. The best understanding of the new 
defence is that it rests on the rationale of a warranted loss of self-control
224
 and the 
requirement of warranted emotions in order for mitigation to be appropriate has been 
advanced throughout. By the 'provocation' trigger requiring warranted anger it will help to 
set a higher standard for mitigation but the wording of the triggers and the lack of 
description, for example, how far characteristics are considered, means that the 2009 Act 
itself does not give much indication to how successful it will be. Also, the control test was 
poorly drafted and the fact that sex is a control characteristic seems to go against 
implementing a gender-neutral defence. 
 
                                           
222 (n144) 
223 T. Macklem & J. Gardner, 'Provocation and Pluralism' (2001) 64 MLR 6 815, 820: It was suggested that the pre-
2009 should only have applied when there was "something intelligible as a provocation". See 'Chapter 4 - Adequate 
Provocation' (n34). 
224 (n1 & n181) 
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The new defence differs from what has previously been supported because its subjective 
element does not merely rely on the existence of an accepted emotion which relates to 
human frailty but it requires that D's reaction must be in the form of a loss of self-control. 
The main drawback of the reform is this reliance on a loss of self-control given its flaws. 
The lack of the suddenness requirement may give a greater emphasis for cases of delay 
to succeed but there is little difference between this and how the pre-2009 defence 
ultimately interpreted delay. To have a specific fear trigger ought to be a sign of 
encouragement but requiring a loss of self-control has the potential to remove its 
effectiveness. A difficult problem in reforming this area is that cases of anger and fear 
have the potential to overlap but at the same time the presence of anger is likely 
undermine fear. How the two emotions interact was not given much explanation and the 
case of Dawes is an indicator that self-defence-type cases have no place in the defence 
as the subjective element will not be fulfilled. 
 
The sexual infidelity exclusion should not be a part of the defence; it is both too narrow, it 
does not include cases where V is leaving the relationship, and too broad, it covers all 
acts of infidelity and any associated acts, such as taunting, which potentially ought to 
form part of a trigger. The interpretation given to it in Clinton, it can be considered in the 
ordinary person test, follows the intentions of Parliament but undermines the point of the 
exclusion as it has the potential to be a highly influential factor. Also, the fact that the 
Court of Appeal wrongly applied the law in the Clinton case highlights the complexity of 
the new defence. 
 
In order to enforce the provisions of the defence there is a reliance on judicial control and 
it is concerning that the 2009 Act may have reintroduced this problem from the pre-1957 
defence. On this issue and on many of the others which have been discussed it is 
interesting in how it seems that the same mistakes have been made as before and how 
the elements of the defence have developed to this point. For example, Dawes 
demonstrated that it is likely that there will still be a reliance on the pre-2009 defence, in 
this case it referred to Johnson owing to the lack of guidance for self-inducement cases 
which are not included in the incitement exclusion, and the similarities between the 
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interpretations of delay in Ahluwalia and Clinton have been noted. The 2009 Act is an 
improvement but it has failed to deal with many issues effectively and has created others 
because of its poor drafting. 
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PART IV: PROPOSAL 
Chapter 10 looks at two key issues which are central to the reform of this area: shaping 
the objective and subjective enquiries in order to properly contextualise intimate partner 
violence and limiting the scope of the defence for those who kill in anger. It is advanced 
that in order to resolve these issues it must be done proactively and it is advocated that 
by using guidelines and presumptions, thereby allowing for flexibility, it will help to bring 
about better outcomes. Also, Chapter 11 sets out an outline for a proposal. In Part IV 
reference will be made to other jurisdictions. The Australian states, in particular, give a 
useful comparison because many went through a reform process at around the same 
time and identified many of the same problems as the pre-2009 defence; also, their 
responses were not uniformed and various fear-based defences were adopted or self-
defence law has been adapted and a discussion of these will help to give insight into the 
proposal. 
 
CHAPTER 10 
CONTEXTUALISING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND CREATING 
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST PROVOKED KILLERS 
The reform of provocation took place with an emphasis on dealing more appropriately 
with killings in the "context of domestic violence."
1
 The reformers were trying to change 
the defence on the basis that women struggled with the subjective and temporal 
elements but when they killed it was often possible to sympathise with their situation and 
manslaughter rather than murder was the preferable offence. When men killed they 
tended to fulfil the subjective elements but also the objective elements did not exclude 
some of the notorious reasons which they had for being provoked. Whereas the 
paradigm case for the early chance medley defence was the "barroom brawl", thereby 
covering sudden quarrels in public settings, as the provocation defence expanded it 
came to deal with killings in a domestic setting:
2
 a woman trying to leave a relationship, 
a woman who has already left a relationship, a woman admitting to an affair and a 
woman killing an abusive partner. It is clear that the latter example is very different from 
                                           
1 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 1 [1.1] 
2 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n16 & n25) 
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the previous ones and instead of restricting the provocation defence the purpose of the 
reform was to widen the scope of the partial defence for this scenario. Instead of dealing 
with this type of case in diminished responsibility there was a desire to create a fear-
based partial defence which requires D to meet a common standard and it serves 
provocation and self-defence to turn the relevant question on to the abuse she faced 
rather than a mental condition she may have suffered.
3
 
 
A theme is the issue of male control and men attempting to maintain this when the 
woman seeks to establish her freedom.
4
 For the partial defence to be acceptable it 
cannot mitigate owing to D's control over his partner being undermined; in a relationship 
close bonds are formed and it is natural that emotional scenarios are more likely but 
when these cases are about mitigating male jealousy or possessiveness such reasons 
cannot be considered sufficient.
5
 
 
Control is the reason behind male violence but it also has a lot to do with what pushes a 
woman into killing her abusive partner. A key to reforming partial defences is finding a 
place for excessive defensive killings, such killings tend to be more worthy of mitigation 
than provoked aggressive killings.
6
 For example, Baron's objection to provocation was 
not that it benefited men, this was something to be expected owing to the nature of the 
defence, but that excessive defensive killings were far more deserving of mitigation yet a 
partial defence was not designed to serve such cases.
7
 Therefore, a central theme to the 
                                           
3 M.R. Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation' (1991) 90 Mich LR 1, 57: 
"Recognizing the batterer's attempt at domination as the key to battering relationships allows a focus on his 
motivations rather than the psychology of the victim." 
A. Gray, 'Provocation and the Homosexual Advance Defense in Australia and the United States: Law out of Step with 
Community Values', (2010) 3 Crit 53, 56: "It seems not to matter that the cumulative psychological effect of long-
term domestic violence perpetrated against a woman may be far more profound than the single punch or insult at 
the bar that triggers the violent male response." 
4 M. Riley, 'Provocation: Getting Away With Murder?' (2008) 1 Queensland Law Student Review 56, 63: "By killing 
their partner, men are effectively trying to gain control over them. When women kill their partner, it is typically to 
escape this control, when they have exhausted all other options." 
5 See the arguments related to the sexual infidelity exclusion at 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n109-
12). 
6 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n106) 
7 M. Baron, 'Reframing the Issues: Differing Views of Justification and the Feminist Critique of Provocation' in P.H. 
Robinson, S.P. Garvey & K.K. Ferzan (ed), Criminal Law Conversations (Oxford University Press, 2009) 329, 330 
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reform of provocation was to create a suitable partial defence for when a woman kills 
excessively to escape this violence and control. The most desirable approach is to judge 
all by an ordinary standard but ensure that such a standard acknowledges the social 
reality for women; when a woman suffers abuse, in whatever form, it will alter that 
relationship and her response can only be judged when taking into account what she 
has faced. Therefore, in this Chapter the position is that the defence needs to set out 
guidelines in order to guarantee that evidence relating to an abusive relationship is 
properly appreciated so that the standard is more readily applicable. The Chapter will 
then focus on how to go about restricting the scope of the defence, in particularly for 
men who kill women, by creating a set of presumptions. 
 
1) Contextualising Evidence 
a) battered woman syndrome 
Dr Lenore Walker
8
 was a key proponent of battered woman syndrome (BWS) and 
despite much criticism over her research and findings
9
 BWS has had a significant impact 
on self-defence and partial defences in many jurisdictions. In the US, Canada and 
Australia evidence of BWS has been used in order support such defences so that they 
can thereby address the problematic case of the 'battered woman'.
10
 It is suggested that 
BWS is not suited to such defences and it is better to instead focus on the contextual 
evidence of the violence. 
 
BWS is made up of two concepts: the cycle theory and learned helplessness. The cycle 
theory seeks to explain why defensive action can occur during a period of calm, it 
supports that D felt she was responding to a threat even in circumstances which can be 
described as non-confrontational:
11
 as D goes through the cycle it "instils a constant fear 
                                           
8 L. Walker, 'The Battered Woman' (1st Ed, Harper Pub, 1979) 
9 For example, A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the 
Battered Woman' (2002) 81 NCLR 211, 237 
10 How these jurisdictions use BWS evidence will be discussed further (n29-30). 
11 For a detailed look of the cycle theory see W. Chan, 'Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides' (1997) 25 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 203, 205. 
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of what appears to her as imminent harm".
12
 It would be incorrect to state that BWS is 
about supporting an irrational fear, rather it explains why, because she suffers from the 
syndrome, "her perception of danger extends beyond the battering episodes 
themselves."
13
 Learned helplessness helps to explain why D did not leave the 
relationship with her abuser and why she did not appreciate that there were 
opportunities to leave.
14
 For a 'battered woman' the question is often 'why didn't she 
leave?'
15
 and learned helplessness seeks to address this. 
 
BWS fails to give a compelling reason for how such women end up killing their abusers 
by breaking the 'cycle' and it does not support that an ordinary person in that situation 
would have acted in that way.
16
 Referring to the work of Ewing and other authors, Stark 
has described this break as a moment of realisation or "a turning point" when D kills out 
of self-preservation to end her abuse.
17
 From the example Stark uses, Nathaline P, it is 
possible to see that such women realise that there are no viable alternatives and nobody 
is going to come and protect them.
18
 Stark states that without the reference to a BWS-
like condition under the traditional self-defence elements it would be viewed as a "a cold 
                                           
12 D.L. Faigman & A.J. Wright, 'The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science' (1997) 39 Ariz LR 67, 73 
A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 231: Under BWS D "lives under a constant reign of terror" 
and through experiencing the cycle she is aware that an attack is "inevitable". 
13 D.L. Faigman & A.J. Wright, 'The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science' 72 
W. Chan, 'Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides' 205: "a battered woman's perception becomes reality, regardless 
of whether or not this it is an accurate perception." 
14 State v Kelly (1984) 478 A2d 364, 372 (NJ) (Chief Justice Robert Wilentz): "Some women may even perceive 
the battering cycle as normal ... Other women, however, become so demoralized and degraded by the fact that they 
cannot predict or control the violence that they sink into a state of psychological paralysis and become unable to 
take any action at all to improve or alter the situation. There is a tendency in battered women to believe in the 
omnipotence or strength of their battering husbands and thus to feel that any attempt to resist them is hopeless." 
15 M.A. Dutton, 'Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman 
Syndrome' (1993) 21 Hofstra L R 1192, 1226 
In relation to the contextual evidence approach the issue of why a 'battered woman' did not leave will be addressed 
(n32-43). 
16 A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 245-6: Burke has stated "how women suddenly break from 
their helplessness" is not really explained, this "shift from passivity to action" could easily be construed as "revenge 
rather than the need for self-protection." 
17 E. Stark, 'Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control' (1995) 58 Alb LR 
973, 1021-2 
18 Ibid 1022:"The other actors in the process - police, hospital staff, the court, even her friends - operated from this 
same premise, responding only after she had been hurt." 
The case study of Nathaline P (at 1020-3) details her history of abuse at the hands of her partner. 
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and calculated decision", it would be a rational decision to kill and they are 
circumstances without an immediate threat.
19
 What the proponents of BWS would argue 
is that if the killing is viewed through the lens of a BWS sufferer then the threat would 
seem genuine and a response would be called for. 
 
The reliance on a syndrome to come to this conclusion is neither necessary nor 
appropriate. Faigman and Wright have stated that there is a "tendency to pathologize 
battered women" and view them as "victims of an identifiable psychological disability."
20
 
However, as Dutton states, women "do not fit a singular profile - in fact, they vary 
considerably from each other".
21
 Along these lines, the NGO, Rights of Women have 
found that BWS is not appropriate for all 'battered women'.
22
 If defences allow for the 
medicalised approach and if D is unable to establish that she fits the criteria she may not 
benefit from this contextual evidence to support her claim.
23
 For example, Stark stated 
that in Nathaline P's case, above, "BWS was contraindicated by a history of aggressive 
help-seeking",
24
 because she did not suffer learned helplessness and acted to try to end 
the violence against her she does not fall into the definition of a BWS sufferer. As the 
partial defence is about meeting common standards the focus ought to be on the wider 
contextual evidence relating to the abuse and presenting such evidence in a way which 
                                           
19 Ibid 1022 
20 D.L. Faigman & A.J. Wright, 'The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science' 69 
A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 243: BWS is about showing that D had "atypical psychology" 
that impaired her from perceiving threats to her normally. 
Also, at 303: "Even the very term 'syndrome' implicitly suggests that all battered women suffer from a psychological 
disability that prevents them from behaving 'normally'." 
21 M.A. Dutton, 'Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence' 1197 
Also, at 1208: "The violence may appear to come 'out of the blue', with no tension-building phase, or there may be 
no contrition phase following the violence, only the transient absence of violence and abuse." 
22 Rights of Women, 'Response to Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 177 - A New Homicide Act for England 
and Wales?' (2006) 4 (Accessed on 18/07/13 at 
http://www.rightsofwomen.org.uk/pdfs/consultation/homicide_act.pdf) 
Also, at 3: in response to the Law Commission's proposal Rights of Women stated that diminished responsibility 
needs to be maintained as BWS "has a role to play in some such cases", however, their concern was that women 
had to rely on BWS as it was "the only means of introducing evidence of ... [an abusive] history at trial." 
23 P.L. Crocker, 'The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense' (1985) 8 Harv Women's 
LJ 121, 144: "Unless she fits this rigidly-defined and narrowly-applied definition, she is prevented from benefiting 
from battered woman syndrome testimony." 
24 E. Stark, 'Re-Presenting Woman Battering' 1021 
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fully supports a claim based on such merits.
25
 Outside of this, diminished responsibility 
should be available for those who must rely on a substantial mental condition. 
 
b) adapting the gravity test and understanding fear
26
 
The defence needs to be adapted to cater for fear and fear more generally needs to be 
interpreted in a more appropriate manner than, for example, it was dealt with in the 2009 
Act. Fitz-Gibbon looked at the impact of the 2009 Act and found that without "education" 
on the emotion of fear and 'battered women' there is a potential that the new law will 
"continue to provide an inadequate response" in such scenarios.
27
 How evidence 
relating to 'battered women' is introduced into the enquiry needs to be addressed and it 
will be shown how some of the key decisions on BWS can be adapted so that it is 
possible to tailor the the partial defence in order to acknowledge women's experiences 
of the violence perpetrated against them.
28
 
 
Stubbs and Tolmie have discussed how BWS has been adapted in various jurisdictions 
across the US and Canada into being more about answering the enquiry in self-
defence.
29
 In these jurisdictions BWS is used in an attempt to give a proper context to 
the killing, as a part of 'social framework evidence'. In the Supreme Court of Canada it 
was found that the jury must be informed about the following in order for BWS to be 
applied properly:
30
 
                                           
25 A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 266: the issues surrounding 'battered women' who kill "can 
be explained without resorting to pathology." 
26 Many of the authors and arguments below are referring to BWS or 'battered women' in general with regards to 
providing the basis for self-defence. 
27 K. Fitz-Gibbon, 'Replacing Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control' 
(2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society 2, 292 
28 One of the themes of this section is that the use of such evidence has been stretched in attempts to use it as the 
basis for self-defence where its proper place will usually be to support a partial defence. 
A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 219: It is about excusing "unnecessary killings, simply because 
they were committed by sympathetic actors." 
29 J. Stubbs & J. Tolmie, 'Falling Short of the Challenge? A Comparative Assessment of the Australian Use of Expert 
Evidence on the Battered Woman Syndrome' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 709, 711-2 
30 Malott [1998] 1 SCR 123, 133-4 
M.A. Dutton, 'Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence' 1202: Dutton has stated that evidence for 
"the overall social context" can be made up of four components. Dutton finds that evidence of the "cumulative 
history of violence and abuse", the "psychological reactions" of the 'battered woman', the "strategies used (or not 
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1. Why an abused woman might remain in an abusive relationship. 
2. The nature and extent of the violence that may exist in a battering 
relationship. 
3. The accused's ability to perceive danger from her abuser. 
4. Whether the accused believed on reasonable grounds that she could 
not otherwise preserve herself from death or grievous bodily harm. 
 
Without reference to a syndrome, these are factors which a jury should be guided on. 
The second and third factors are highly relevant in an enquiry into whether D had a 
genuine fear of violence, D's past experiences of violence will shape her future 
expectations and how she responds. As the history of the provocation defence is 
evidence of, from the criticism of Bedder,
31
 effective objective standards require the jury 
to be put into the position of D and the above factors help to focus the evidence of past 
abuse to assist understanding of D's actual emotion at the time. In the following sub-
sections the four factors which were outlined in Malott will be explored, however, the 
final factor will instead deal with 'battered women' who kill excessively. 
 
i) "why an abused woman might remain in an abusive relationship" 
Such evidence would show that 'battered women' "lack ... viable escape options".
32
 It is 
evident that women who have suffered abuse could "justifiably fear that leaving would be 
even more dangerous"
33
 because the violence against her could escalate.
34
 This 
violence is often called 'separation assault' and this "occurs at or after the moment she 
                                                                                                                                   
used)" and the "contextual factors" will all "contribute ... significantly to the clarity" of a 'battered woman's' 
experience and help to show how these factors are relevant to the defences sought to be relied upon. 
31 Bedder v DPP (1954) 38 Cr App R 133. See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n132-40). 
32 A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 268 
M.A. Dutton, 'Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence' 1226: "Why didn't she leave? ... [T]he 
question assumes not only that there are viable options for alternative behavior, but that she should have 
employed them, and that doing so would have lead [sic] to her safety." 
33 A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 268 
34 State v Norman (1989) 324 NC 253, 378 SE 2d 8: this was a high profile US case involving a 'battered woman' who 
attempted to leave but V brought her back and the abuse got worse; V threatened to kill her and she shot him 
whilst he was asleep. Self-defence failed as the harm was not deemed to be imminent. 
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decides on a separation or begins to prepare for one."
35
 Mahoney states that "these 
attacks are aimed at preventing or punishing the woman's autonomy"
36
 and, likewise, 
Stark finds that through the man seeking to maintain control over the relationship "the 
extreme dangers of separation" are displayed.
37
 
 
The 2010/11 British Crime Survey supports this factor.
38
 23% of victims
39
 shared 
accommodation with their abusive partner and 42% of these left the accommodation 
because of this for some period.
40
 Interestingly, 23% of partner abuse victims reported it 
to the police
41
 and for those who did 55% felt safer but 14% felt less safe.
42
 These 
statistics help to support that it is understandable that women find it difficult to leave, 
there are a lack of viable options and women fear an escalation of violence. There are a 
number of varied other reasons to explain why 'battered woman' do not leave,
43
 but the 
separation assault is a key one to bring out because it directly relates to a fear of future 
violence. 
 
                                           
35 M.R. Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women' 65 
36 Ibid 
37 E. Stark, 'Re-Presenting Woman Battering' 981 
38 Home Office (2012) 'Homicides, Firearm Offences and Intimate Violence 2010/11: Supplementary Volume 2 to 
Crime in England and Wales 2010/11' 20: "Female victims were more likely than male victims to be killed by a 
partner or ex-partner (47% and 5% respectively)". 
39 Ibid 83: 6% (900 000) of women and 4% (600 000) of men. 
40 Ibid 96: "Reasons mentioned for not leaving the shared accommodation were presence of children (38%), love or 
feelings for partner (34%), and having nowhere to go (21%)." 
41 Ibid 97: "For those that did not report the abuse to the police, the most common reasons given were the abuse 
was too trivial or not worth reporting (42%), it was a private, family matter and not the business of the police (34%) 
and the victim did not think the police could help (15%)." 
42 Ibid 98 
43 M.A. Dutton, 'Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence' 1232: "(1) fear of retaliation; (2) the 
economic (and other tangible) resources available to her; (3) her concern for her children; (4) her emotional 
attachment to her partner; (5) her personal emotional strengths, such as hope or optimism; (6) her race, ethnicity, 
and culture; (7) her emotional, mental, and physical vulnerabilities; and (8) her perception of the availability of 
social support." 
A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 271-2: "It may be economically infeasible for the woman to 
leave because she has no money, job, child care, or housing ... Battered women often suffer marked feelings of 
shame for the abuse they have endured, rendering them reluctant to seek help. The isolation from family and 
friends that is common during the course of an abusive relationship further restricts potential avenues of support." 
Also, at 272-3: Burke cites religious reasons, a desire not end the marriage, V threatening to commit suicide, D's 
love for V and D's promises of change as other reasons. 
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ii) "the nature and extent of the violence that may exist in a battering relationship" 
There needs to be an understanding of the sort of behaviour which can be the basis of 
an abusive relationship, but, also, that the circumstances may be varied. Indeed, one of 
the problems with BWS is that it sets out a template for all 'battered women'.
44
 
 
Stark has stated that "physical violence may not be the most significant factor about 
most battering relationships" and that an act of abuse may be just one instance of an 
"ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation, and control that extends to all areas of a 
woman's life."
45
 Abuse may take various forms
46
 and Munjal has stated that it is used for 
the purpose of preserving power and control:
47
 "Men resort to violence when their control 
is or appears to be under threat by their partner."
48
 
 
The Rights of Women have argued in favour of a "more expansive definition of violence", 
by doing so "it would be more appropriate at reflecting the reality of violence" and would 
help to provide "clarity ... where there is a history of violence."
49
 Such an insight into the 
types of conduct which may form part of a pattern of domestic abuse would inform 
decision-making when it comes to the elements of the defence. The Australian case 
Lock
50
 is important because of how such evidence was used in this manner, to support 
self-defence instead of relying on BWS. In Lock D stabbed her husband and claimed 
                                           
44 (n20-5) 
45 E. Stark, 'Re-Presenting Woman Battering' 987 
R. Busch & N. Robertson, '"What's Love got to do with it?" An Analysis of an Intervention Approach to Domestic 
Violence' (1993) 1 Waikato LR 109, 117: "[A]n act of physical violence is part of a continuum of power and control, 
rather than an isolated, uncontrollable eruption." 
46 M.A. Dutton, 'Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence' 1206: "coercion and threats; 
intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation; minimization, denial, and blaming; use of the children to control the 
victim; use of 'male privilege'; and economic/resource abuse." 
R. Busch & N. Robertson, '"What's Love got to do with it?"' 116: "Other tactics of power and control utilised by 
abusers include emotional and verbal abuse; intimidation; isolation; treating the victim as subservient while the 
abuser reserves to himself the right to make all major decisions in the relationship; minimising and trivialising the 
violence; blaming the victim for such violence." 
47 Control was discussed, see (n3-5). 
48 D. Munjal, 'Intimate Partner Violence - Is There a Solution?' (2012) 19 Duke JGL&P 347, 351 
49 Rights of Women, 'Response to Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 177 - A New Homicide Act for England 
and Wales?' (2006) 4-5 (Accessed on 18/07/13 at 
http://www.rightsofwomen.org.uk/pdfs/consultation/homicide_act.pdf) 
In the approach from Victoria, Australia, which is advocated, a template for the various forms of abuse is set out 
(n75). 
50 (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 
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because of past experience she knew that he would use violence against her. To 
support her claim she used police and medical records as evidence. Lock shows how 
contextual evidence relating to the nature and extent of the violence can be used 
effectively.
51
 
 
iii) D's "ability to perceive danger from her abuser" 
A seemingly minor incident could be interpreted by D as an indicator of future abuse and 
cause a genuine fear even when a threat of bodily harm is not immediately present at 
the time.
52
 An example of this can be found in the pre-2009 defence:
53
 in Humphreys
54
 it 
was appreciated that an innocuous act could be considered provocative. In the pre-2009 
defence strides were made to make the ordinary person test more inclusive of D's past 
experiences. The development of that test in Camplin
55
 and Morhall
56
 was on the same 
basis as has been suggested in this Chapter and there is no reason why the same 
principles cannot be extended even further when dealing with the emotion of fear in the 
objective and subjective components. 
 
A reason why the pre-2009 defence struggled and the 2009 Act will struggle to deal with 
fear correctly is that they require a loss of self-control.
57
 If the partial defence was merely 
about showing that D was genuinely fearful then the defence would be more effective 
and able to deal with the 'battered woman' scenario based on the fact that D had a belief 
that she was subjected to a threat but it was ultimately an excessive reaction. Evidence 
of past abuse and this influencing how D perceived events will not add anything to the 
enquiry over whether D did in fact lose her self-control when she killed. Therefore, 
                                           
51 J. Stubbs & J. Tolmie, 'Falling Short of the Challenge? A Comparative Assessment of the Australian Use of Expert 
Evidence on the Battered Woman Syndrome' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 709, 739: Stubbs and 
Tolmie refer to two other unreported Australian cases, Stephenson and Stjernqvist, where self-defence was also 
relied on in such a manner without the use of BWS. For example, in Stjernqvist D shot V in the back as he walked out 
of the room, but the entire history of violence between was used as context to show the threat that she faced. 
52 P.L. Crocker, 'The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense' 127: "Battered women 
in particular may perceive danger and imminence differently from men ... A subtle gesture or a new method of 
abuse, insignificant to another person, may create a reasonable fear in a battered woman." 
53 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n39 & n48) 
54 (1995) 145 NLJ 1032 
55 [1978] AC 705. See 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n26-30). 
56 [1996] AC 90 
57 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n59-70) 
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extending the use of contextual evidence would not be likely to improve the 
effectiveness of the defence without the removal of the loss of self-control requirement.
58
 
 
iv) when 'battered women' kill excessively 
Fitz-Gibbon
59
 finds the idea that a partial defence should exist as "a 'safety net' for 
women" loses credibility if the position is taken that a full defence is appropriate.
60
 The 
greater danger, though, would be that there is no defence at all or provocation has to be 
relied upon in an undesirable fashion. This Chapter has been about constructing a 
suitable partial defence for excessive fear-based killings and a key area is to define the 
necessary temporal standards which characterise an excessive response. 
 
Burke states that her aim is to "present to the jury an accurate and complete depiction" 
of what happened and "not a change in formal legal standards."
61
 She finds that self-
defence should be about "a reasonable fear that it is inevitable, but not necessarily 
imminent."
62
 It is by making the temporal issues of self-defence more flexible that is the 
basis for her proposal. Along similar lines, Kaufman finds that "imminence and necessity 
sometimes diverge", meaning that even though the harm was not imminent there may 
be a necessity to act.
63
 Stubbs and Tomlie have cited examples of Australian 
jurisdictions where necessity is not equated to imminence.
64
 For example, in the case of 
Secretary from the Northern Territory it was stated that the "common law has moved 
                                           
58 At 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n182-5) the loss of self-control requirement was discussed and it 
was concluded that there was no reason to believe that it would be interpreted differently. 
59 K. Fitz-Gibbon, 'Provocation in New South Wales: The need for abolition' (2012) 45 Australian & New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 194, 207 
60 R. Bradfield, 'Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation' 26: "The danger in recognising fear as an 
emotion capable of founding the defence of provocation, is that women (and the courts) may rely on provocation 
rather than give consideration to the potential application of the defence of self-defence ... The tendency 
automatically to classify women who kill after prolonged domestic abuse as provoked killers has meant that the fact 
that these women were predominantly acting in self-preservation has been obscured." 
61 A.S. Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress' 217 
Also, at 219: For her it is about "realigning, rather than expanding" self-defence. 
62 Ibid 274 
Also, at 297: a consequence of this approach is that it would "permit fewer non-confrontational uses of force than 
the battered woman syndrome theory would". 
63 W.R.P. Kaufman, 'Self-defence, Imminence, and the Battered Woman' in P.H. Robinson, S.P. Garvey & K.K. Ferzan 
(ed), Criminal Law Conversations (Oxford University Press, 2009) 407, 408 
64 J. Stubbs & J. Tolmie, 'Falling Short of the Challenge? 733-6 
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away from the requirement of immediacy, favouring a more flexible approach to the law 
relating to ... self-defence."
65
 In Secretary D shot her partner whilst he was asleep. There 
was a history of violence and V threatened D before he went to sleep. The Northern 
Territory Code
66
 required a threat and it was adjudged that a sleeping aggressor could 
be viewed as a continuing threat.
67
 Angel J stated that "the deceased's ability to carry 
out the threat continued",
68
 pre-emptive strikes were allowed
69
 and owing to "the nature 
of the threat and the relationship" self-defence could succeed.
70
 
 
The problem is that these arguments strain self-defence beyond recognition and are not 
consistent with defensive justificatory force. In Chapter 3 justifications were discussed
71
 
and they are to do with "necessary and proportionate response[s]" when there is a threat 
of substantial harm.
72
 There is a distinction between self-defence and self-preservation, 
a reasoned and/or emotional-based response which may be closer to what an excessive 
killing by a 'battered woman' is.
73
 Finding that killing another is justifiable when there are 
alternative options and the danger is not present at that moment is not a view which can 
be supported. However, this reasoning, looking for an inevitable threat, could be applied 
to a partial defence and this is the correct category for such circumstances. In this vein, 
Ramsey has stated that by arguing in favour of self-defence it may "distort" the temporal 
                                           
65 Secretary (1996) 5 NTLR 96 [16] 
66 Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s187(b). 
67 J. Stubbs & J. Tolmie, 'Falling Short of the Challenge?' 735: The judges viewed the words as an "assault against 
which the accused was defending herself ... rather than the general threat he represented in the relationship with 
her." 
68 Secretary (1996) 5 NTLR 96 [6] 
69 Ibid [8] 
70 Ibid [9] 
H. Douglas, 'A Consideration of the Merits of Specialised Homicide Offences and Defences for Battered Women' 
(2012) 45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 367, 377: "in R v Falls [(2010) (unreported, QSC, 
26/5/10)] Applegarth J stressed that the threat could continue regardless of the fact that the deceased was 
temporarily unable to carry out the threat (i.e. asleep)." 
71 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n13-45) 
72 P. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 98 
G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 775: Necessity requires that the conduct helps 
to "avoid an imminent and impending danger of harm" and proportionality requires that there must not be an 
"alternative reasonable means for avoiding the threatened harm". 
73 K.K. Ferzan, 'The Values and Cost of Imminence' in P.H. Robinson, S.P. Garvey & K.K. Ferzan (ed), Criminal Law 
Conversations (Oxford University Press, 2009) 419, 419 
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requirements but that this "surely has no place when the outcome sought is only 
mitigation, not exoneration."
74
 
 
General expert evidence 
The use of general expert evidence regarding domestic violence and victims of abuse 
killing is only possible if such evidence is admissible.
75
 Apart from the evidence being 
relevant, the key consideration, expressed in Turner, for expert evidence is that it "is 
likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge and jury."
76
 This principle 
has often led to "psychological and psychiatric evidence" being found to be inadmissible, 
except where insanity and diminished responsibility are being considered as these 
issues naturally rely on such evidence.
77
 The jury need the expert evidence on certain 
matters in order aid their decision-making but an essential point is that it should 
ultimately be their decision.
78
 
 
However, the restriction on admissibility of evidence in the way which Turner outlines 
has been criticised and Roberts and Zuckerman have stated that the principle found in 
Turner is not really the one which is being applied, admissibility of expert evidence is 
governed by its "helpfulness",
79
 thereby potentially expanding the scope of admissible 
evidence. Firstly, expert evidence has been used in areas where it has been helpful to 
                                           
74 C.B. Ramsey, 'Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law Reform' (2010) 100 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 33, 102 
75 Examples of US jurisdictions which allow such evidence include California (s1107 - Evidence Code: "...expert 
testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the defense regarding intimate partner battering and its 
effects...") and Oklahoma (Code of Criminal Procedure: Rule 22-40.7 'Expert Testimony – admissibility': "...testimony 
of an expert witness concerning the effects of such domestic abuse on the beliefs, behaviour and perception of the 
person being abused shall be admissible as evidence."). 
76 R v Turner [1975] QB 834, 841 (Lawton LJ): "Our law excludes evidence of many matters which in life outside the 
Courts sensible people take into consideration when making decisions ... An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish 
the Court with scientific information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge and jury. 
If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is 
unnecessary." 
77 A.M. Colman & R.D. Mackay 'Equivocal rulings on expert psychological and psychiatric evidence: turning a muddle 
into a nonsense' (1996) Crim LR 88, 88: "The Turner rule has been used to exclude psychological and psychiatric 
evidence on issues of, inter alia, duress, provocation, and mens rea, but the courts have generally adopted a more 
indulgent attitude towards evidence regarding diminished responsibility". 
78 Davie v Edinburgh Magistrates [1953] SC 34, 40: by hearing expert opinion it can "enable the judge and jury to 
form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence." 
79 P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2nd ed, OUP, 2010) 286: the author's title of the relevant section is 
"Helpfulness - the one and only authentic criterion of admissibility". 
At 287: common knowledge and other principles are "never more than rough rules of thumb to guide the 
application of the helpfulness standard". 
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the jury but within common experience and knowledge. In Stockwell
80
 expert evidence 
was given on the matter of looking at photographs and in DPP v A & BC Chewing Gum 
Ltd  expert evidence was given on child psychology.
81
 Secondly, on the face of it the 
Turner principle seems to apply in the partial defence as the jury are required to judge 
D's circumstances and behaviour by normal and ordinary standards, so expert evidence 
ought not to apply where it is within common experience and knowledge. However, 
expecting a jury to have suitable knowledge on some matters of "normal psychology", 
such as victim's responses to rape and domestic violence, may not be reasonable
82
 and 
the consequences of this, as discussed below, may be at the heart of why such areas 
are so problematic. 
 
The helpfulness of such evidence will be discussed below, with reference to research 
regarding rape cases, but, firstly, the policy concerns, which are at the centre of 
restricting expert evidence, will be outlined. Protecting the role of the jury in the face of 
expert evidence is a concern. The principle from Turner is that when the field is within 
common experience and knowledge it is found that the matter is best left in the hands of 
the jury: 
 
"Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not 
suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and 
strains of life."
83
 
 
Limiting the role of expert evidence is a way of reducing the risk of "juror deference" on 
all sorts of matters which should really be under their ambit, a jury could simply go along 
with the expert and their function would be undermined.
84
 This is why even where expert 
                                           
80 (1993) 97 Cr App R 260. This case was reaffirmed in R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 
81 [1968] 1 QB 159, 165: "when dealing...with children from five upwards, any jury and any justices need all the help 
they can get." 
82 P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence 287: "Turner's critics rightly observe that expert testimony might 
still be helpful to jurors even if it concerns matters broadly within the sphere of general knowledge or questions of 
normal psychology. Jurors are unlikely to share an expert's detailed, systematic knowledge of specific aspects of 
normal psychological processes, for example." 
A.M. Coleman & R.D. Mackay, 'Legal issues surrounding the admissibility of expert psychological and psychiatric 
testimony' in N.K. Clark and G.M. Stephenson (eds), Children, Evidence and Procedure (Leicester: British 
Psychological Society, Issues in Criminological and Legal Psychology No 20) 49: "Our view is that expert 
psychological evidence should be admitted whenever it is both relevant and potentially helpful to the jury in 
explaining aspects of human behaviour that are not easily understood with common sense alone." 
83 Turner  841 (Lawton LJ) 
84 P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence 473-4 
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evidence is given the jury have been reminded to approach it with "caution"
85
 and make 
their own determinations.
86
 Therefore, this concern can be overcome by reassuring the 
jury it is their decision after evaluating the expert evidence themselves and the existing 
case law cited supports this. 
 
A second policy concern is to do with psychological and psychiatric evidence being used 
to undermine the function of objective tests, akin to expanding the application of control 
characteristics in the ordinary person test,
87
 and such evidence being a burden on the 
system.
88
 The Martin case, where D alleged that he killed burglars in self-defence, helps 
to show that these concerns are not present in the partial defence. In Martin, to support 
that D's fear and conduct were reasonable in self-defence, arguments in favour for the 
admissibility of evidence that D suffered from "a long-standing paranoid personality 
disorder" were heard.
89
 It was stated that for self-defence the "evidence could be said to 
fall within the admissibility test set out by Lawton LJ in Turner" as it was "scientific 
information" which was "likely to be outside that range" of a jury.
90
 However, the Court of 
Appeal went about "distinguishing self-defence from provocation" and deemed such 
evidence inadmissible for "policy reasons" in self-defence but acceptable in provocation; 
such a divergence in approach was justified by considering the applicability of self-
defence to "all assaults" and the limited scope of the provocation defence.
91
 
 
A limited expansion of expert evidence in the partial defence is outside the scope of the 
policy concerns raised in Martin and as the evidence would relate to general contextual 
                                           
85 R v Emery [1993] 14 Cr App R 394, 399: "...consider the experts' evidence. Do not accept it even then without 
question because it is for you and not any expert to decide the effect that ... [the] violence would have upon her. 
They are there to help you make the decision ... It is for you to decide whether their evidence helps you to decide 
the matters that are for you. So it is for you to accept or reject the experts' evidence..." 
86 R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260, 265: "It is important, however, that the judge should make clear to the jury 
that they are not bound by the expert's opinion, and the issue is for them to decide." 
87 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n64-70) 
88 G. Douglas, 'Self-defence and Expert Evidence in the Light of R v Martin' (2002) 166 JPN 368: "to allow expert 
evidence will increase both the time and cost of the trial and also, on occasions, the difficulty for the jury." 
89 R v Martin (Anthony) [2002] 1 Cr App R 27, 338 
90 Ibid 342 
However, for diminished responsibility it was stated (at 343): "The position as to the fresh evidence relating to 
diminished responsibility is different. Here the evidence is admissible and relevant. The jury did not have the 
opportunity of considering this issue."  
91 Ibid 341: "Is the same approach appropriate in the case of self-defence? There are policy reasons for 
distinguishing provocation from self-defence. Provocation only applies to murder, but self-defence applies to all 
assaults. In addition, provocation does not provide a complete defence; it only reduces the offence from murder to 
manslaughter. There is also the undoubted fact that self-defence is raised in a great many cases resulting from 
minor assaults and it would be wholly disproportionate to encourage medical disputes in cases of that sort." 
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information regarding domestic violence and abuse, rather than psychiatric evidence, it 
would be consistent with a moderate excuse theory and the reasoning in Camplin, to aid 
the understanding of the situation which D faced.
92
 The following categories of expert 
evidence which are proposed are in line with this: 
 
a) the nature and extent of the violence, 
b) wider contextual evidence (for example, evidence which relates to why D remained in 
the relationship and the strategies D used), 
c) how the threat of violence would have been perceived. 
 
The first two categories are similar to the response characteristics which have been 
used in the ordinary person test since Camplin, applying such information to the relevant 
tests in the partial defence would support that a threat was present and that D was 
fearful of it. The third category is, again, supporting that D experienced fear but is key to 
the ordinary person test, it would demonstrate that a link between the fear and the killing 
was present and therefore how D behaved was consistent with the excessive but 
understandable reactions which are mitigated in the defence. 
 
If the policy concerns identified above are not applicable for the use of expert evidence 
which is advanced then in order to justify its use the helpfulness of the evidence needs 
to be highlighted. Simply put, the perceptions and expectations placed on victims of 
abuse are incorrect and this leads to a difficulty in satisfying the standards which the 
partial defence imposes; the reactions are only ordinary in the light of what D was 
subjected to and with a greater understanding of such situations, so the jury need this 
evidence to truly understand the circumstances so they can properly apply the tests in 
the partial defence. 
 
This problem also exists in rape cases owing to the similarity of the scenarios. The 
justification in a proposal advancing expert evidence in rape cases has been put forward 
in a consultation report by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform in 2006:
93
 
 
                                           
92 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n92-100) 
93 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 'Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape' (2006) 
17: even though the proposal limits expert evidence to rape case it also acknowledges that "general expert 
evidence would be likely to be beneficial in cases of domestic violence too." 
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"The aim of 'general expert evidence' is to dispel myths and stereotypes 
concerning how a victim should behave, and help a judge and jury 
understand the normal and varied reactions of such victims."
94
 
 
The report put forward a non-exhaustive list of relevant topics with which the evidence 
could relate.
95
 Ellison and Munro have done research looking into how juries came to 
decisions in mock trials.
96
 In their deliberations jurors often based their judgements on 
misguided views on rape and ignored evidence to the contrary, also, there was an 
element of victim blaming.
97
 Ellison and Munro would "insist" on "educating jurors on the 
empirical realities" of such cases but this would be "insufficient" if the "expectations" and 
"assumption[s]" were not challenged.
98
 The 2006 report discusses whether such 
evidence is within common knowledge and, despite favouring its use, acknowledges it 
could be argued either way.
99
 
 
The conclusion from this is that it is necessary to supply the jury with more information 
on the nature of domestic violence and the consequences of abuse as it would benefit 
the jury's decision-making process, particularly given that this is a key factor in why this 
area has been problematic and the use of such evidence would be limited. While it is 
doubtful that these areas can realistically be described as being within the common 
knowledge of a jury, with the misconceptions surrounding these areas, it is likely that 
such a move would require a statutory intervention to implement such changes. Without 
more information being supplied to the jury it is difficult to envisage how the reforms to 
the partial defence could lead to it becoming more open to women who kill excessively 
                                           
94 Ibid 16 
Also, at 17: "At the moment, the only evidence as to what allegedly occurred is being considered against a 
background of misperceptions and myths as to how 'proper' victims should behave which is going unchallenged." 
95 Ibid 20: "The anticipated issues that the expert may give general evidence upon include: The common 
misconception that if the rape occurred against a domestic abusive background, then the victim would leave; The 
common misconception that a victim would willingly come to court to give evidence against his/her abuser; Why 
victims delay reporting; Why victims blame themselves; Why victims minimize the events and their injuries; Why 
victims have incomplete, discrepant or inconsistent memories of the incident; Why victims do not always physically 
resist or escape." 
96 L. Ellison & V.E. Munro, 'Better the devil you know? 'Real rape' stereotypes and the relevance of a previous 
relationship in (mock) juror deliberations' (2013) 4 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 17 
In the consolation report conducted by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 'Convicting Rapists and Protecting 
Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape' (2006), Annex C, at 40, contains a list on the 'Research on Myths and 
Misconceptions about Sexual Assault'. 
97 ibid 17 
98 Ibid 
99 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 'Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape' (2006) 
18-9 
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in fear because it requires a true understanding for the standards, subjective and 
objective, to become accessible for those relying on the defence.
100
 
 
Victoria, Australia 
What has been advanced is that if the proper context is given to the history of abuse 
which D suffered not only will it make her belief of fear more believable to a jury but it will 
also shape the objective element in favour of the 'battered woman' as her experiences 
will be considered. Below are the key provisions from Victoria's offence of defensive 
homicide, which carries a discretionary sentence, set out in a condensed form.
101
 It lays 
down a non-exhaustive list of the factors which may be evidence in such cases: 
 
"Without limiting the evidence that may be adduced", evidence which may be helpful 
includes evidence of (a) "the history of the relationship", (b) "the cumulative effect, 
including psychological effect", (c) "social, cultural or economic factors" and (d) "the 
general nature and dynamics of relationships affected ... including the possible 
consequences of separation from the abuser". 
Violence is also defined and may include "(a) physical abuse", "(b) sexual abuse" and 
"(c) psychological abuse". More specifically, reference is made to certain forms of 
violence: "(i) intimidation", "(ii) harassment", "(iii) damage to property", "(iv) threats of 
physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse" and (v) subjecting children in 
some way to the abuse. 
In order to not limit the definition of violence it is stated that "(a) a single act may amount 
to abuse" or "(b) a number of acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour may amount to 
abuse ... even though some or all of those acts, when viewed in isolation, may appear to 
be minor or trivial." 
 
                                           
100 K. Fitz-Gibbon, 'Replacing Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control' 
(2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society 2, 292: without "education" on the emotion of fear and 'battered women' 
there is a potential that the 2009 Act will "continue to provide an inadequate response" in such scenarios. 
101 Crimes Act 1958 - s9AH (Victoria, Australia). 
The provisions make constant references, which have been removed, to violence done by and to family members as 
s1 of this offence limits its application to "defensive homicide or manslaughter, in circumstances where family 
violence is alleged". 
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Victoria have appreciated the issues which have been discussed and through the 
provisions have set clear guidance for all concerned about the nature of the offence and 
what can be used to support it. The 2009 Act does not provide detail for how the 
emotion of fear or how domestic violence is to be treated and without the sort of 
structure which has been argued in favour of it could be detrimental to the success of 
the reform. Focusing the questions and guiding the jury on how to interpret the evidence 
provided will help to make the partial defence more effective; identifying the various 
types of abuse, how each type of abuse helps to make up the overall abuse and how 
this creates a fear of future violence for the 'battered woman' needs to be reflected in the 
defence if the emotion of fear is to be properly appreciated.
102
 
 
2) Creating Presumptions 
The reform of provocation was also influenced by the desire to restrict the defence 
through setting tougher standards. By requiring warranted emotion it ensures a higher 
standard of comparison as it is determined by the values of society.
103
 Aside from 
altering the rationale, there are various ways of dealing with the most problematic cases; 
by looking at the definition of provocation and the role of exclusions and presumptions it 
is possible to give more structure to the sufficient evidence test and the gravity test. 
 
a) redefining provocation 
The requirement for a provoking stimulus is a part of the sufficient evidence test. The 
post-1957 defence did not set a strict enough barrier as all that was required was for D 
to feel provoked and this was a purely subjective question.
104
 The 2009 Act is similar to 
the pre-1957 case of Holmes
105
 in that the trial judge needs to inspect all the aspects of 
the defence and be satisfied before the jury can hear the defence.
106
 It has been argued 
                                           
102 N. Wake, 'Battered women, startled householders and psychological self-defence: Anglo-Australian perspectives' 
(2013) 77(5) JCL 433, 454: "the fact remains that in order to understand the 'circumstances' of the 'abused woman', 
contextual information must be adduced and the introduction of a social framework model, with appropriate 
limitations, would assist in ensuring that such evidence is made available under the same conditions in each case." 
103 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n121-4) 
104 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n12-20) 
105 Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588. See 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' (n87-9). 
106 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n226-30) 
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that this is the incorrect approach,
107
 the jury should unequivocally be the primary 
guardians as they are best placed to judge the justifiable emotions of an ordinary person 
and it is not desirable to give a judge too much power, this being a major influence of the 
Homicide Act 1957.
108
 
 
Neither of these approaches, outlined above, for the test of sufficient evidence set the 
correct balance. When discussing the 2009 Act it was advanced that the judge's role 
ought to be to test if there is strong evidence which suggests that D fulfilled the 
subjective test and that this stemmed from provocation. Testing whether D faced 
provocation is really about avoiding the cases where D relied on "blameless or trivial" 
conduct.
109
 It is important to note that the test for sufficient evidence should not be about 
attempting to rule out every case that in all probability will not succeed, it is about the 
defence not being used in circumstances which are inappropriate. The role of the judge 
ought to be to inspect the case and decide if there is something which an ordinary 
person could describe as provocation which explains D's emotional killing. 
 
Altering the sufficient evidence test would help to create the first substantial hurdle for 
men who kill women owing to sexual jealousy or possessiveness. Bradfield has stated 
that many of these instances are "just the confirmation of what has already been 
strongly suspected, or hurt and brooding emotions following rejection."
110
 Good 
examples of this sort of case came up in Clinton
111
 as Clinton
112
 and Parker
113
 both dealt 
with a D who killed his partner post-separation.
114
 Mahoney has stated that in such 
cases the true nature of the killings "may remain disguised" if it is indeed "an attack on 
                                           
107 Ibid (n218-25) 
108 'Chapter 2 - The Post-1957 Defence' (n7) 
109 Law Commission (2004) Partial Defences to Murder Report No 290, 46 [3.65] 
110 R. Bradfield, 'Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on the Jealous 
Husband and the Battered Wife' (2000) 19 U Tas L Rev 5, 24 
W. Gorman, 'Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence' (1999) 42 Crim LQ 478, 495: "There is nothing wrong with 
putting the act or insult in context ... The approach [could potentially allow] a jealous husband to brood over his 
spouse's conduct and then to use one act by her, particularly if she finally leaves him, as an excuse to kill her. This is 
not provocation." 
111 R v Clinton [2012] 3 WLR 515 
112 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n143-7) 
113 Ibid (n124-5) 
114 Post-separation assaults were discussed previously in relation to women's fear of violence (n33-37). 
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separation, rather than on the woman's sexual provocation".
115
 A judge would have to be 
convinced that this is a case of provocation and not revenge being masked by an 
argument of provocation nor merely natural behaviour on the part of his partner. In the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Canada, it was stated that it would set a "dangerous 
precedent" to portray this scenario as provocation.
116
 This is an entirely appropriate 
position to take and one which the drafters of the 2009 Act seemed to share,
117
 however, 
how they dealt with the issue was not only confusing but the wording of the sexual 
infidelity exclusion means that it will be ineffective for the cases where the exclusion is 
most needed.
118
 
 
The first barrier in the defence is altering the rule of sufficient evidence to remove 
scenarios not involving provocation, cases of revenge and cases involving natural, trivial 
or blameless behaviour. It also means that the emphasis is placed on the jury to 
determine the next step, the justifiable emotion element, this being the central part of the 
rationale. 
 
b) exclusions 
It has been stressed that exclusions should only operate in the provocation defence if 
the circumstances in which they apply indisputably call for an exclusion,
119
 meaning all 
the cases which fall under its ambit are pre-judged as being insufficient. Where there is 
any legitimate chance for a case to succeed then an exclusion should not exist as it may 
cause hardship and as here, where it is the difference between murder and 
manslaughter, the consequences would be significant. 
 
                                           
115 M.R. Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women' 79 
If, as in Clinton, D claims that he was provoked by other factors then these instead may be deemed sufficient for the 
defence to proceed. 
116 R v Young (1993) 78 CCC (3d) 538, 542 
117 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n110) 
118 Ibid (n122-5) 
119 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n126-8) 
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Even though sexual infidelity still has the potential to be a significant factor in the new 
defence where there are multiple reasons for the trigger
120
 it still must be questioned 
whether sexual infidelity is an appropriate set of circumstances to exclude.
121
 Firstly, it 
would only take a very extreme case of taunting over sexual infidelity to highlight that 
there are such cases where mitigation should run. Secondly, if the drafters were seeking 
to create an exclusion then one which is more focused on the problematic cases would 
serve the reform better. The problematic cases involve sexual jealously and 
possessiveness, this includes, for instance, where a women seeks to end a relationship, 
or already has, and the man kills her because of these reasons. An exclusion in these 
circumstances, though, would also be incorrect as there may be a range of factors which 
lead to the end of a relationship and something which could be categorised as 
provocation could arise. 
 
The only set of circumstances where an exclusion ought to exist involve certain cases of 
self-induced provocation and honour killings. The Law Commission distinguished 
between narrow and broad self-induced provocation and it is the narrow category where 
the defence should not apply.
122
 In the narrow category D plans to use V's anger, which 
he incites, in order to rely on a defence. Honour killings involve D killing V because V 
broke some sort of code of conduct within their society and D kills to "uphold the honour 
of the family".
123
 As these circumstances have such a purpose behind them they ought 
to be barred.
124
 In comparison to sexual infidelity these two examples, the self-induced 
provocation exclusion already being in place in the 2009 Act, are much more deserving 
of an exclusion. It is appropriate for the judge to apply the exclusion before the case 
reaches the jury as the warranted emotion element could not be satisfied. 
 
These two exclusions are to do with the objective gravity assessment but a revenge 
exclusion should also be in place to rule out where the subjective element could not be 
satisfied. 
                                           
120 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n143-7) 
121 Ibid (n111-2) 
122 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n127-31) 
123 Law Commission (2006) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide LAW COM No 304, 82 [5.25] 
124 See 'Chapter 11 - Proposal' (n11) for the definition of an honour killing. 
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c) presumptions 
It has been suggested that in order to make the provocation defence tougher a 
warranted emotion element, a provocation requirement in the judge's sufficient evidence 
test and exclusions in limited circumstances all should be in place. It is proposed that the 
best way to deal with the remaining problematic and controversial cases would be to lay 
down presumptions; these would help to restrict the defence but allow deserving cases 
to succeed where it is appropriate, it would put the onus on D to show that the 
circumstances which fell under a presumption were exceptional.
125
 
 
i) how the presumptions would work 
In cases where the partial defence is invoked the prosecution must first show, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that D murdered V and then sufficient evidence must arise for the 
defence to be left to the jury, a determination for the judge and not necessarily stemming 
from D's representation.
126
 For the prosecution to then disprove the defence they must 
show, beyond reasonable doubt, that it is not satisfied.
127
 This is consistent with what 
was described as the "golden thread" of criminal law, that the prosecution must prove 
the D's guilt.
128
 However, for exceptions and the like, the onus has often been placed on 
D.
129
 In particular, statutory law has frequently created presumptions against D which 
require him to meet a burden on the, lesser, balance of probabilities,
130
 for specified 
                                           
125 K. Fitz-Gibbon, 'Replacing Provocation in England and Wales' 294: a senior judge stated that in the 2009 Act, 
rather than using a sexual infidelity exclusion, "it was better to lay down the general principles". 
126 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n226-30) 
127 s54(5) of the 2009 Act it states that the onus is on the prosecution: "the jury must assume that the defence is 
satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not." 
128 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481-2 
129 P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2nd ed, OUP, 2010) 234: "At the same time as the prosecution is 
relieved of its burden, a corresponding probative burden is placed on the accused to rebut the presumption, on the 
balance of probabilities." See R v Hunt [1987] AC 352. 
For example, s101 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980: "Where the defendant to an information or complaint relies for his 
defence on any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification, whether or not it accompanies the 
description of the offence or matter of complaint in the enactment creating the offence or on which the complaint 
is founded, the burden or proving the exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification shall be on him; and 
this notwithstanding that the information or complaint contains an allegation negativing the exception, exemption, 
proviso, excuse or qualification." 
130 Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264, 290 (Lord Bingham): "One form of statutory exception arose where a 
defendant sought to rely, in answer to a criminal charge on indictment, on any statutory exception,  exemption, 
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matters. Williams states that the purpose of such clauses are "largely for practical 
reasons".
131
 The burden placed on D can either be a legal burden,
132
 which requires D to 
provide evidence on a matter unless he is convicted, or an evidential burden, which 
requires him to raise sufficient evidence so that the prosecution must then provide 
evidence on the matter beyond reasonable doubt.
133
 
 
Under certain circumstances reverse burdens have been found to be compliant with 
human rights obligations.
134
 In the leading case, Salabiaku, the European Court of 
Human Rights stated that "the Convention does not prohibit such presumptions in 
principle ... It requires States to confine them within reasonable limits" which balances 
the aim of the clause with the individual's rights.
135
 With the proviso from Lord Hope that 
this balancing "is not an exact science",
136
 Kebeline sets out greater guidance in how to 
determine if a reverse burden is compliant by highlighting three areas related to these 
issues: firstly, what the prosecution have to prove, secondly, what the burden relates to 
                                                                                                                                   
proviso, excuse or qualification. It was clearly established that the burden of proving such ground of exoneration, on 
a balance of probabilities, lay on him". 
131 G. Williams, "The Logic of 'Exceptions'" [1988] CLJ 261, 269: "The principle is that the prosecution must give 
evidence on the bare bones of the charge, while the defendant must normally offer evidence on matters of 
justification or excuse on which he wishes to rely." 
Also, 290: "That it is easy for the defendant to give evidence on an issue, and relatively difficult for the prosecution, 
may be an excellent reason for placing an evidential burden upon the defendant." 
R v DPP Ex p Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326, 379 (Lord Hope): "It is quite common in summary prosecutions for routine 
matters which may be inconvenient or time-consuming for the prosecutor to have to prove but which may 
reasonably be supposed to be within the accused's own knowledge to be dealt with in this way. It is not suggested 
that statutory provisions of this kind are objectionable." 
132 ibid 289 (Lord Bingham): "a legal or persuasive burden on a defendant in criminal proceedings to prove the 
matters respectively specified in those subsections if he is to be exonerated from liability on the grounds there 
provided. That means that he must, to be exonerated, establish those matters on the balance of probabilities. If he 
fails to discharge that burden he will be convicted." 
133 ibid 289 (Lord Bingham): "An evidential burden is not a burden of proof. It is a burden of raising, on the evidence 
in the case, an issue as to the matter in question fit for consideration by the tribunal of fact. If an issue is properly 
raised, it is for the prosecutor to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that that ground of exoneration does not avail 
the defendant." 
134 Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law." 
135 Salabiaku v France (1991) 12 EHRR 379 [28] 
136 Kebeline 380 (Lord Hope) 
P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence 280: "it seems that each and every reverse onus clause in English 
criminal law must be reconsidered on an individual , case-by-case, basis." 
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and how easily D will be able to prove that and, finally, what the nature of the threat the 
offence is designed to combat.
137
 
 
It is proposed that a list of circumstances can be constructed where a reasonable 
presumption can be made that the defence will not usually apply.
138
 If D's case falls into 
one of these categories an evidential burden would be placed on him to provide 
sufficient evidence, on the balance of probabilities, to demonstrate that his case was not 
a typical case of sexual infidelity, for example, and that the circumstances were 
exceptional; by doing so this would require the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that D does not meet the warranted emotion standard. Alternatively, D could 
argue that his case falls outside the category and then the burden would not be 
reversed. 
 
In the proposal an evidential burden is sought as a legal burden may be too onerous for 
D, especially considering the seriousness of the offence and punishment; these factors 
being under consideration in the acceptability of reverse burdens.
139
 In limited 
circumstances, where the partial defence ought not to usually apply, by creating an 
evidential burden on D it would create the correct balance of restricting the defence and 
ensuring the defence is still available where appropriate. The 2009 Act goes further, on 
the matter of sexual infidelity, and does not allow it to be considered in any 
circumstances, even where it is exceptionally grave. Also, D is best placed to make 
arguments in favour that his anger stemming from infidelity, for example, was 
exceptional and therefore a display of warranted emotion, and owing the nature of the 
defence and purpose of the reform it is consistent that the burden is placed on him. 
 
                                           
137 Kebeline 386 (Lord Hope) 
Sheldrake 297 (Lord Bingham): "Relevant to any judgment on reasonableness or proportionality will be the 
opportunity given to the defendant to rebut the presumption, maintenance of the rights of the defence, flexibility in 
application of the presumption, retention by the court of a power to assess the evidence, the importance of what is 
at stake and the difficulty which a prosecutor may face in the absence of a presumption." 
138 'Chapter 10 - Contextualising and Presumptions' (n147-67) 
139 R v Hunt [1987] AC 352, 374: in Lord Griffiths warned that for such clauses it should not be an "onerous duty" for 
D to reverse the burden. 
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A significant aspect of this area is how to word such a clause. The judgments in the case 
of Kebeline offer a good example of how difficult it can be to interpret reverse burdens, 
but they give a lesson in how to construct an evidential reverse burden clause by 
discussing if it was possible to 'read down' a legal burden to an evidential burden as a 
legal burden would have been incompatible.
140
 In that case s16A(3) of the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 was being considered as it required D to 
"prove" a matter regarding the possession of materials relating to terrorism.
141
 Lord 
Cooke discussed the possibility that if instead of "prove" a phrase such as "'unless 
sufficient evidence is given to the contrary'" could be used and this could be an 
acceptable evidential burden.
142
 Lord Bingham, in Sheldrake, discussed Kebeline and 
stated that subsequently "Parliament paid attention to these observations"
143
 by enacting 
a new provision in s118(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 with such language: 
 
"If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the 
matter the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution 
proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not." 
 
 
Another example of such a reverse burden is contained in s75 of the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003.
144
 In s75(2) six categories are set out where there is an evidential presumption 
that V did not consent to the sexual act, if the circumstances relate to one of these 
categories then, according to s75(1)(c), the onus is placed on D to rebut the 
                                           
140 Kebeline 373 (Lord Cooke): "It seems distinctly possible that it may require section 16A of the Act of 1989 to be 
interpreted as imposing on the applicant an evidential, but not a persuasive (or ultimate), burden of proof. I agree 
that such is not the natural and ordinary meaning of section 16A(3)." 
141 s16A(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989: "(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he 
has any article in his possession in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the article is in his 
possession for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which 
this section applies …. (3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that at the 
time of the alleged offence the article in question was not in his possession for such a purpose as is mentioned in 
subsection (1) above..." 
142 Kebeline 373 (Lord Cooke) 
143 Sheldrake298 (Lord Bingham) 
144 s75(1) Sexual Offences Act 2003: "the complainant is to be taken not to have consented to the relevant act 
unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he consented, and the defendant is to be taken 
not to have reasonably believed that the complainant consented unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an 
issue as to whether he reasonably believed it." 
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presumption by providing sufficient evidence that V consented and if this is done then 
the burden reverts back to the prosecution.
145
 In Ciccarelli Lord Judge CJ stated that s75 
"relates to matters of evidence" and is justified because "as a matter of reality and 
common sense, the strong likelihood is that the complainant will not, in fact, be 
consenting";
146
 a similar justification can be made on behalf of the reverse burden clause 
which will be proposed. 
 
There seems to be necessary conditions for evidential reverse clauses: D must meet the 
evidential burden, clarity of the circumstances which this takes place and a guarantee 
that, if successful, the consequences of this are that the onus is then back on the 
prosecution. Therefore, by using the terms "is to be taken" and "unless sufficient 
evidence is adduced", from the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and reference to a successful 
production of evidence, from the Terrorism Act 2000, a clause can be constructed using 
the language found to be compliant with Article 6(2): 
 
If D's reason falls within the following it is to be taken to not have satisfied the trigger 
unless sufficient evidence is adduced to show that it is. If sufficient evidence is adduced 
it shall then be assumed that the trigger is satisfied unless the prosecution proves 
beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
 
ii) creating a list of presumptions 
An example of where presumptions operate can be found in Queensland, Australia, 
where they have reformed their provocation defence; it "does not apply, other than in 
circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character, if" the provocation is based 
on the following: 
 
"(i) to end the relationship; or 
(ii) to change the nature of the relationship; or 
                                           
145 In Ciccarelli [2011] EWCA Crim 2665 [18] Lord Judge CJ stated that for there to be sufficient evidence against the 
presumption "some evidence beyond the fanciful or speculative" needs to be produced. 
146 ibid 
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(iii) to indicate in any way that the relationship may, should or will end, or that there may, 
should or will be a change to the nature of the relationship."
147
 
 
 
Brown and Ramsey have both designed lists of exclusions for a provocation defence but 
many of their suggestions would be better suited, for the reasons already referred to, to 
be presumptions for when the defence should not succeed. Brown states that even 
though her exclusions are in "gender-neutral language" their purpose is to deal with 
male killings:
148
 
 
"(i) Where a defendant alleges provocation where the deceased has left, 
attempted to leave or threatened to leave an intimate sexual relationship 
(ii) Where a defendant alleges provocation because of suspected, 
discovered or confessed infidelity 
(iii) Where a defendant alleges provocation due to a non-violent sexual 
advance" 
 
The first of Brown's exclusions, (i), regards separation killings. There should be a 
presumption that the defence will not run when this is the reason behind the killing but, 
as previously stated, in many of these cases there is no actual provocation, V is merely 
attempting to leave the relationship. The infidelity exclusion, (ii), is reminiscent of the 
2009 Act.
149
 As has previously been discussed, it is proper that this is not always 
excluded owing to the fact that the situation could turn into a provocation scenario but 
there should be a presumption against it.
150
 A difference can be appreciated between 
when the parties are in a relationship, in (ii), compared to when V is leaving the 
                                           
147 s304 Criminal Code of Queensland, Australia 
148 H. Brown, 'Provocation As A Defence To Murder: To Abolish Or To Reform?' (1999) 12 Australian Feminist Law 
Journal 137, 140 
149 Another example of where it is in place is in Maryland, US: "The discovery of one's spouse engaged in sexual 
intercourse with another does not constitute legally adequate provocation for the purpose of mitigating a killing 
from the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was provoked by that discovery." 
(Maryland Criminal Code, CODE Ann, § 2-207(b)) 
150 (n94-5) 
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relationship, in (i). If there is still a relationship in place an act of infidelity, by definition,
151
 
would breach the trust between the parties and should be considered a more solid base 
than when D is provoked by the fact that V no longer wishes to be in a relationship. 
Neither scenario is particularly appealing to be the basis for mitigation but where there is 
a relationship in place the anger, comparatively, should be viewed as more 
understandable. With regards to non-violent sexual advances, (iii), they usually should 
not be considered to be provocation at all, but if they do pass the sufficient evidence test 
a presumption ought to be in place.
152
 
 
Ramsey states that "it is preferable to list the things which cannot constitute the basis of 
a provocation claim" rather than positively state categories of provocation "because it is 
difficult to anticipate every conceivable wrong":
153
 
 
"(1) a decision by the victim to terminate or decline to begin a romantic or 
sexual relationship with the defendant or to have sex with another person; 
(2) a non-violent homosexual advance by the victim toward the defendant; 
(3) any behavior by a child, except for an aggressive act that posed a risk 
of death or serious bodily injury to the defendant or another; 
(4) and mere words."
154
 
 
The first two exclusions, (1) and (2), are similar to those put forward by Brown but 
Ramsay enhances her exclusion by referring to the "decline to begin a romantic or 
sexual relationship", this is consistent with the theme of the defence not mitigating owing 
to a man's feeling of rejection. Ramsay then refers to, (3), conduct carried out by 
children. In Minnesota, US, an exclusion is in place to rule out cases similar to Doughty 
as it states that "the crying of a child does not constitute provocation".
155
 Once again, if 
                                           
151 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n127-9) 
152 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n52-4): as Dressler points out it only takes D to claim that V touched him and 
then this turns into a violent sexual advance. 
153 C.B. Ramsey, 'Provoking Change' 82 
154 Ibid 93 
155 Minnesota Stat Ann, Chapter 609: Criminal Code § 609.20(1) 
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the defence required something which could be properly described as provocation then 
the defence would not even reach the jury as the child is blameless and the conduct is 
entirely natural.
156
 The "mere words" exclusion, (4), is not appropriate for the same 
reasons which were outlined when supporting Camplin,
157
 there could be cases, given 
proper context, where some words may have added meaning; there is no reason not to 
believe that certain instances of 'words alone' could have the same impact as actions. 
 
The presumptions which are outlined are issues which have been discussed throughout, 
but, in particular, were in Chapter 4, and are all examples of male violence: 
 
1) when V is trying to leave or already has left the relationship; 
2) when V refuses to begin a relationship; 
3) when D seeks to rely on V's sexual activity; 
4) non-violent sexual advances. 
 
Presumption 1-3) are to do with jealousy and possessiveness. The 2009 Act only deals 
with sexual infidelity, and excludes it, but these scenarios are, on the whole, all on par 
with each other and together they would cover the killings behind these motivations. 
Presumption 4) will mainly be concerned with homosexual advances and in Chapter 4 it 
was expressed, despite the motivation being intolerance, that there were similarities in 
so far as all these cases can be about such disagreeable motivations being masked 
behind a claim of provocation. Through these presumptions being set out it would place 
an emphasis that the notorious reasons where male violence has been mitigated should 
not usually be able to satisfy the partial defence, this is in line with the structure and 
rationale of the defence and with the objective of bring about better outcomes. 
 
These circumstances potentially could succeed but it would take a very strong reason to 
satisfy the objective requirements of the defence; possibly a combination of factors or 
                                           
156 On the broader point of all conduct done by a child, the control test should place expectations on D to maintain 
self-control in the face of conduct by a child. 
157 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n32-3) 
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the nature of the events were particularly severe. To avoid one of the great concerns 
with the sexual infidelity exclusion in the 2009 Act the proposal
158
 refers to a rule that the 
control test can only be satisfied by "[t]aking into consideration the events which satisfied 
the limb". This helps to ensure that if, for example, sexual infidelity was deemed not to 
be sufficient in the gravity test then this must be ignored in the control test too; the 
consequence being that sexual infidelity will not ultimately become the most significant 
factor in the objective assessment.
159
 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter it has been suggested that the use of guidelines, for contextual evidence, 
and presumptions, for where the defence should not usually run, would serve the 
defence better than the pre-2009 defence or the provisions of the 2009 Act. Evidence 
which relates to 'battered women' needs to be tailored in order to meet the requirements 
of the defence, as the defence is not about mental abnormalities, like diminished 
responsibility, but instead about reaching standards. Such evidence needs to be focused 
on showing that the fear was genuine, this fear was a warranted emotion and an 
ordinary person may react in such a manner too. The evidence needs to relate to the 
overall context of the history of violence D experienced, the types of abuse she suffered 
and, if applicable, why she remained in the relationship. It is important that these factors 
all relate to the elements of the defence. Such evidence may be important in arguing 
self-defence but for a fear-based partial defence it can be acknowledged that the 
reaction was excessive, so, for example, the threat may not have been imminent, but the 
emotion was genuine. 
 
On the other hand, there is a need to restrict the reach of the defence when the reasons 
behind provoked anger relate to normal, blameless and trivial conduct by the 'provoker'. 
Requiring that the defence should only go to the jury when a judge finds evidence which 
supports that D experienced such provoked anger and faced provocation will help to 
focus the defence on cases which are appropriate for a provocation defence to deal 
                                           
158 See 'Chapter 11 - Proposal'. 
159 It could still be relevant in the subjective element as this is a factual test. 
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with. The role of the jury and the rationale of warranted excuse combined with 
presumptions will guide the defence in expressing society's values. There are four key 
presumptions: when V is trying to leave or already has left the relationship, when V 
refuses to begin a relationship, when D seeks to rely on V's infidelity and cases of non-
violent sexual advance. If these presumptions are in place it will assist the jury in making 
these judgements and, more broadly, it will help the defence track common views over 
what is acceptable to get angry over. Instead of excluding circumstances such sexual 
infidelity, as the 2009 Act does, creating presumptions where the onus is on D to rebut 
them is more likely to create an effective defence as it would be able to allow such cases 
to succeed if they were shown to be exceptional. 
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CHAPTER 11 
PROPOSAL 
The following proposal has been devised whilst taking on board the other defences and 
proposals referred to and is based on the conclusions which have been drawn 
throughout the thesis, including the solutions put forward for tackling the key problematic 
areas in Chapter 10. The proposal is for a provocation and fear partial defence, entitled 
excessive warranted emotional killing, based on warranted emotion, that is, mitigation of 
an excessive killing to manslaughter if the emotion, by society's standards, is viewed to 
be warranted and D experienced such an emotion. D's behaviour, through the control 
test, must also be inspected to ensure he lived up to ordinary standards. 
 
In the introduction to Part IV it was stated that the best way to design an effective 
defence is to deal with the contentious issues proactively. The prescriptive approach 
which is advanced, the use of exclusions, presumptions and guidelines for contextual 
evidence, is done because the best way to confront the problems which have arisen is to 
tackle them and fashion a defence with such considerations in mind. Throughout various 
other approaches have been referenced and the flaw behind them is that there is no 
guarantee that they would be effective. Certain jurisdictions, such as Germany,
1
 have 
shown preference for broad defences which simply contain the key elements and some 
reject the objective components which ought to be viewed as necessary.
2
 This route, as 
would making it a consideration in sentencing if the mandatory sentence were removed,
3
 
would mean that there would be little opportunity to control the operation of the defence 
and it would be more difficult to appreciate if an issue such as gender bias, for example, 
has been resolved.
4
 In other words, it is better to design a defence which can deal with 
                                           
1 See 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n33). 
s213 of the German Criminal Code: "If the murderer (under section 212 [but not including a 'Murder under specific 
aggravating circumstances' under section 211]) was provoked to rage by maltreatment inflicted on him or a relative, 
or was seriously insulted by the victim and immediately lost self-control and committed the offence, or in the event 
of an otherwise less serious case, the penalty shall be imprisonment from one to ten years." 
2 South African provocation law, although not a defence, is seen to be subjective, see 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n9). 
J.K. Weber, 'Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary Manslaughter Law', (1981) 10 Comm L World R 159, 160: "All in 
all, though with an attitude of caution, it seems possible to conclude that heat of passion alone would be 
justification for reducing an offence from murder to voluntary manslaughter." See 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n98). 
3 For example, as was the case in France, see 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n37). 
4 See 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n37-41). 
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the circumstances in an appropriate manner, evaluate the individual elements of the 
defence and then if there is a problem it is possible to reform an element which proves to 
be deficient. 
 
With this approach, however, there is a clear divide between the objective and 
subjective elements. For objective tests it is beneficial to give structure and guidance; 
these will assist answering enquiries on expected standards of behaviour, over the 
gravity assessment and contextual evidence. Some aspects relating to the subjective 
tests of the defence are difficult, maybe impossible, to resolve in a legislative format;
5
 
when asking a jury to consider the impact of delay and whether D genuinely felt 
emotional these are matters which require balance, based on the facts of the case, and 
understanding of common human experience. The best approach to move forward on 
these issues is to give freedom to a jury by using a test which examines the authenticity 
of the emotion and not to try to place restrictions on matters of this nature.
6
 
 
Proposal 
The proposal, below, begins by outlining the basic elements of the defence (s1): 
subjective test, gravity test and control test. Then the rules relating to the operation of 
the defence are set out, the trial judge's sufficient evidence test (s2) and the burden of 
proof for the prosecution (s3). The exclusions for the trial judge to apply in the sufficient 
evidence test are specified (s10). Whilst the subjective test is further clarified (s4), the 
more complicated triggers are contained in various sections (s5). The provoked anger 
(s6)
7
 trigger is connected to the provision relating to the presumptions (s7), likewise, the 
contextual evidence provision (s9), where relevant, is applicable to the fear of violence 
trigger (s8). Finally, for the control test, the limited role of control characteristics and how 
                                                                                                                                   
J. Tolmie, 'Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish Provocation' [2005] NZLR 25, 
36: "If injustices occur - like those that have historically taken place in relation to battered defendants or battered 
victims - it is difficult to know what is taking place and what might be done." 
5 In the introduction of 'Chapter 1 - The Early Defence' it states that "provocation has perpetual issues which cannot 
truly be settled" and in 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n24-5) it states that it is better to design a 
consistent defence based on a structured objective element. 
6 For example, in the 2009 Act the jury a required to balance the revenge exclusion, the loss of self-control element 
and the provision which stipulates that "it does not matter whether or not the loss of control was sudden", even 
though it clearly does. See 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n78-85). 
7 'Warrant' in (s6) would be given a definition in supplementary notes. 
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the control test needs to operate differently depending on the emotion involved is set out 
(s11). 
 
Excessive warranted emotional killing 
(1) Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V”), D is not to be 
convicted of murder, but instead is to be convicted of manslaughter, if— 
(a) the killing resulted from 
i) provoked anger against V or another or 
ii) fear of violence against V or another, 
(b) the emotions in section (1)(a) had a qualifying trigger, and 
(c) taking into consideration the events which satisfied the qualifying trigger, an ordinary 
person might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D. 
 
(2) To raise the defence sufficient evidence, in the opinion of the trial judge, must be 
adduced. The trial judge, considering the relevant circumstances, must be satisfied that 
sufficient evidence exists to support that the killing resulted from— 
a) provoked anger and D faced provocation or 
b) fear of violence and there was a threat of violence. 
 
(3) On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise the defence under 
section (2), the jury must assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution 
proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
 
(4) For the purposes of section (1)(a), the provoked anger or fear of violence at the time 
of the killing, taking into account all relevant evidence, must be genuine. 
 
(5) A qualifying trigger exists if section (6) or (8) applies. 
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(6) Provoked anger: considering the relevant circumstances, the provocation which D 
faced caused anger which was warranted and D had a reasonable belief in this. 
 
(7) If, within section (6), D's reason falls within the following it is to be taken to not have 
satisfied the trigger unless sufficient evidence is adduced to show that it is: 
a) when V is trying to leave or already has left the relationship, 
b) when V refuses to begin a relationship, 
c) when D seeks to rely on V's sexual activity, 
d) non-violent sexual advances. 
If sufficient evidence is adduced it shall then be assumed that the trigger is satisfied 
unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
 
(8) Fear of violence: considering the relevant circumstances, D feared violence from an 
identifiable threat which was imminent or inevitable. 
 
(9) Where relevant, D may support the claim of fear of violence throughout the defence 
with the use of general expert evidence regarding domestic violence and victims of 
abuse on the following matters: 
a) the nature and extent of the violence, 
b) wider contextual evidence (for example, evidence which relates to why D remained in 
the relationship and the strategies D used), 
c) how the threat of violence would have been perceived. 
 
(10) For the purposes of section (2), the trial judge must exclude the defence if D's 
reason falls within one of the following: 
a) if the killing was carried out with the purpose of revenge, 
b) if D incited the circumstances with the purpose of providing an excuse to use 
violence, 
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c) if the killing has been committed to protect or defend the honour of the family and/or 
community. 
 
(11) In determining, in section (1)(c), whether an ordinary person might have reacted in 
the same or in a similar way to D— 
a) the only characteristics of D which may be considered are D's age and sex if D is 
under the age of 18, and only in so far as they would impact on an ordinary person's 
maturity. 
b) an ordinary person's reaction is dependent on which qualifying trigger is raised in 
section (1). 
 
Discussion of the proposal 
a) sufficient evidence and role of the trial judge 
The defence may only go to the jury where there is evidence of a subjective basis, that 
D experienced the emotion in the trigger, and an objective basis, that there were proper 
grounds for D's emotion; either D must have experienced provoked anger and faced 
provocation (s2(a)) or D must have feared violence and there was a threat of violence 
(s2(b)). With s2 framed in this manner it means that there must be subjective and 
objective grounds for the defence to advance and this is a reasonable demand as 
satisfaction of these two areas are the pillars of the defence. If sufficient evidence is 
adduced then the burden is placed on the prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt, to 
provide evidence that the defence is not satisfied (s3). 
 
The trial judge must consider "the relevant circumstances", this means that response 
characteristics and contextual evidence must inform the decision-making process (s2). 
Also, if D's reason falls under the fear of violence trigger then expert evidence, if 
relevant, can be used to support the claim "throughout the defence" (s9), thereby not just 
covering the trigger but the sufficient evidence test, the subjective test and the control 
test. Combined these two provisions would help to support the objective grounds for the 
fear trigger, that there was a threat of violence, as determining whether a threat existed 
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would requires contextual information to be considered and may lead to expert evidence 
supporting the claim. For the fear trigger, the gravity test component of the objective 
element, in any event, is not a substantial hurdle, the trigger refers to an "identifiable 
threat" rather than "serious violence" as the 2009 Act does; the purpose of the objective 
element running through the fear trigger is to ensure that threatening circumstances 
existed and it is not entirely subjective, this is because human frailty only exists where 
the circumstances lead to the emotion and an excessive reaction, this being the 
rationale behind why mitigation is available. 
 
The proposal gives the trial judge the power to exclude the defence at this stage in 
limited circumstances (s10); the aim of this approach is to set the correct balance 
between the role of the judge and jury, the judge is given the authority to exclude cases 
where the defence cannot possibly apply. Chapter 10 sets out that exclusions should 
only exist if the circumstances are indisputable,
8
 therefore the language of s10 is very 
specific so it is correct that this is a mandatory requirement for the trial judge. If the 
killing was carried out owing to revenge then the judge will be able to exclude the case 
as this simply cannot be the basis for the defence (s10(a)).
9
 The over-arching purpose of 
the subjective element is to exclude revenge and this is best done by having a clear 
exclusion. This provision has a very limited scope, it only applies when there is evidence 
that D's actions were inspired "with the purpose of revenge". The exclusion is not to be 
exercised merely because, for example, delay has occurred or there is evidence of a 
preparatory act, as these are factors to be considered and something more substantial 
needs to be found to satisfy the language of the provision. 
 
If D incites the circumstances of the trigger on "purpose" (s10(b)) then the defence 
cannot apply as D's emotion will not be genuine, nor will his reason be warranted. Again, 
this is a very limited exclusion and for the broader category of incitement the normal 
rules of the defence should apply with the understanding that self-induced provocation 
                                           
8 'Chapter 10 - Contextualising and Presumptions' (n119) 
9 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n6-10) 
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can only be considered if V’s response to the inducement goes beyond what is 
reasonable.
10
 
 
If the killing fell under the definition of an honour killing the trial judge would also be able 
to rule out the defence (s10(c)), whilst D may experience anger the reason behind it 
either cannot properly be described as provocation, nor can it be classified as warranted 
anger. The provision is based on a definition which is used by the Crown Prosecution 
Service, Association of Chief Police Officers and the Forced Marriage Unit at the Home 
Office: "'Honour based violence' is a crime or incident which has or may have been 
committed to protect or defend the honour of the family and/or community."
11
 
 
As was outlined in Chapter 10,
12
 in certain circumstances (s7) there is an evidential 
burden which requires D to produce evidence to show that his reason could satisfy the 
warranted emotion standard imposed in the provoked anger trigger (s6), otherwise his 
reason "is to be taken to not have satisfied the trigger". D must provide evidence to show 
that, on the balance of probabilities, his reason could satisfy the trigger or he could 
contest that his reason did not fall into one of the categories. If this is achieved then the 
prosecution need to produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defence is 
not satisfied (s3). The four categories in s7 are not deserving of exclusion, but, owing to 
their nature, these circumstances should not be able to be the basis of such a defence 
without more. The justification for s10, and using an evidential burden in this manner, is 
that it is the best way to create a balance between two competing factors:
13
 a purpose of 
the reform process was to limit the scope of the defence in cases where D relies on 
undesirable reasons, but, on the other hand, the function of the defence must be 
respected once its rationale is made clear as it is correct to mitigate where warranted 
emotion has led to human frailty. 
                                           
10 See 'Chapter 4 - Adequate Provocation' (n37-45) for the Edwards rule. 
11 CPS, 'Honour Based Violence and Forced Marriage' (accessed on 03/06/15 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/honour_based_violence_and_forced_marriage/#a04) & CPS, 'Honour Based 
Violence and Forced Marriage: Guidance on Identifying and Flagging cases' (accessed on 03/06/15 
'http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/forced_marriage_and_honour_based_violence_cases_guidance_on_flagging_
and_identifying_cases/) 
12 'Chapter 10 - Contextualising and Presumptions' (n125-46) 
13 ibid (n135) 
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b) subjective test 
The subjective test should always be an entirely factual question: it ought to ask whether 
D experienced the required emotion at the time of the killing. The proposal simply 
enquires, after taking into account all relevant evidence, whether the provoked anger or 
fear of violence was "genuine" (s4). In terms of the intensity of the emotion, for it to be 
genuine it requires that it was sufficiently severe that D's anger or fear led him to form 
his murderous intent; it would not be acceptable that D felt a slightly aggrieved or that he 
was concerned over his safety.
14
 As was discussed in Chapter 6,
15
 it is preferential that 
this test is aligned to its function and this is achieved; requiring a loss of self-control, for 
example, is not a true reflection of the required emotions as provoked anger and fear of 
violence can exist outside of this concept and the case for mitigation remains equal.
16
 
The subjective element proposed is intended to be broader and more realistic of the 
circumstances which the defence covers, which will be particularly beneficial to those 
who kill in fear. 
 
If all that matters is the authenticity of the emotion then a factor such as delay will be 
significant to this determination. The decisions, pre-2009, in Ahluwalia,
17
 and post-2009, 
in Clinton,
18
 found that if D's response was delayed then this could be an indicator of 
revenge but much depends on the circumstances and it needs to be a decision taken on 
a case-by-case basis.
19
 The principle of this is correct as it is a factual question and it 
ultimately comes down to whether a jury believes that D was angry or fearful. These 
judgments, however, concerned defences requiring D to lose his self-control and in the 
language used there was an awareness that finding delay to be compatible with a loss of 
                                           
14 This is also tested in another way, by evaluating D's behaviour in the control test by comparing him to an ordinary 
person (s1(c)). 
15 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n6-10) 
16 Ibid (n45-5) 
17 [1992] 4 All ER 889 
18 [2012] 3 WLR 515 
19 Ahluwalia 897–8 (Lord Taylor CJ): "In some cases, such an interval may wholly undermine the defence of 
provocation; that, however, depends entirely on the facts of the individual case and is not a principle of law." 
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self-control was problematic.
20
 The proposal would put the defence on a better footing to 
deal with delayed responses as this issue does not exist, but delay still could be 
perceived to be an indicator of revenge and decisions would need to be taken on a 
case-by-case basis. The language of the provision is focused on the key concern and 
clearly whether D's emotion is genuine is a determination which naturally requires 
consideration of all the surrounding factors. 
 
c) triggers 
The defence contains two triggers which reflect the emotions which are consistent with 
the human frailty rationale of the defence. However, the triggers are framed in a manner 
which acknowledges that not all provoked anger and fear of violence cases are 
deserving of mitigation, even where the emotion is genuine: the defence requires that 
the emotion stems from events which are of sufficient gravity in order for the emotion to 
have legitimacy.
21
 
 
Provoked anger would mainly consist of feelings of being wronged and/or insulted as it 
requires "anger which was warranted" (s6). The fear of violence trigger includes 
provisions which ensure that a threat existed but it gives leeway on what can cause the 
fear by requiring "an identifiable threat which was imminent or inevitable" (s8).
22
 Both of 
the triggers would allow for the emotion to emanate from anger or fear "against V or 
another" (s1(a)). There is not a combination trigger, so D would have to run the triggers 
independently, this is with the concern that even though the two emotions may overlap 
anger may be seen to undermine the emotion of fear.
23
 However, the fact that D felt 
anger or resentment, as well as fear, does not mean that D should be viewed as having 
killed in revenge.
24
 
 
                                           
20 Clinton 521: "In reality, the greater the level of deliberation, the less likely it will be that the killing followed a true 
loss of self control." 
21 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n99) 
22 A justificatory self-defence ought to only allow responses to immediate threats as justificatory killings need to be 
necessary, but as this trigger involves excessive killings there should be greater scope on what is a sufficient threat. 
23 'Chapter 7 - Law Commission' (n102-9) 
24 Ibid (n109) 
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Warranted emotion demands that the circumstances were grave and that D appreciated 
this, so that D's emotion was caused by the recognition of the gravity of the 
circumstances.
25
 Therefore, the jury must be satisfied that a normal person in society 
would view D's emotion as warranted, this is according to society's contemporary norms 
and values
26
 (warrant at being provoked or an identifiable threat which was imminent or 
inevitable) and, also, they must believe that D himself felt this warranted emotion at the 
time (D felt warrant in being provoked or feared such violence). Therefore, the triggers 
contain both objective and subjective elements and are specific to the emotion involved. 
There is a platform for contextual information to support decision-making in both triggers, 
with the consideration of "relevant circumstances" the jury can to appreciate how 
provocative or threatening the incident was to D and a normal person in D's 
circumstances. In line with the 2009 Act, intolerant beliefs, such racist and homophobic 
views, cannot the relied upon as they are outside the warranted emotion standard.
27
  
 
The fear trigger requires the jury to inspect the circumstances from D's perspective but 
in judging this they need to look at the nature of the threat and consider temporal issues 
in order to see if the threat was present. It must be appreciated when applying this that 
D's response was an excessive killing and the purpose of the objective component of the 
trigger is to merely assess if the circumstances existed, that is why there is a place for 
inevitable future violence:
28
 all that matters is that some form of threat existed and that 
D's fear stemmed from this. If relevant, when the jury apply the fear trigger, as with all 
the elements of the proposal, "general expert evidence regarding domestic violence and 
victims of abuse" may be used to assist them in interpreting the contextual evidence 
(s9). It is of importance that this evidence helps to support the elements of the defence 
                                           
25 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n124) 
26 A possible definition of warrant was referred to at 'Chapter 3 - Rationale' (n121-3) from D.J. Baker & L.X. Zhao, ' 
Contributory Qualifying and Non-Qualifying Triggers in the Loss of Control Defence: A Wrong Turn on Sexual 
Infidelity' (2012) 76 JCL 254, 262: "the defendant's sense of being seriously wronged must be one that accords with 
contemporary society's norms and values. In other words, it must be shown that a normal person in contemporary 
Britain would have felt seriously wronged in the same situation. This is judged according to the normative standards 
of a normal person communally situated in Britain." 
27 This approach by focusing on warranted emotions rather than ordinary ones, in relation to response 
characteristics, is a modified version of Camplin, see 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n62-3). 
28 'Chapter 10 - Contextualising and Presumptions' (n59-74) 
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and is about the threat which such women face and how they would perceive it, that is 
why it is based on the specified areas, as discussed in Chapter 10.
29
 
 
d) control test 
The partial defence rests on D reaching the minimum expected standard of behaviour 
for an ordinary person in D's situation.
30
 In order to avoid a major criticism with the 2009 
Act, that whilst sexual infidelity ought to be excluded in the trigger D can use it to satisfy 
the ordinary person test,
31
 this proposal limits what can be considered to "the events 
which satisfied the qualifying trigger" (s1(c)); this also makes the defence simpler as the 
judge and jury will not have to disregard sexual infidelity and then apply it in the next 
evaluative element of the defence.
32
 
 
The proposal also contains two others provisions relating to the control test. Firstly, the 
extent to which control characteristics may be considered is limited as a moderate 
excuse theory is followed.
33
 Adults are judged by the same standard and the only 
deviation in the control test is for those under the age of 18 where age and sex may 
naturally impact on their maturity (s11(a)).
34
 Defences such as this one are reliant on D 
meeting a minimum standard of behaviour which is based on how ordinary people would 
react so that mitigation is only granted when it can be found that D acted like anyone 
else might have done in that situation.
35
 
 
Secondly, for the control test to have any meaning the expected behaviour levels must 
be in line with the emotion involved. When the provoked anger trigger is applied this test 
will be more to do with ordinary levels of self-restraint and self-control but when fear is 
dealt with it will be focused on how people respond to threats (s11(b)). This is a key 
provision as, in combination with the use of expert evidence (s9), it ought to allow a 
                                           
29 Ibid (n26-31) 
30 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n19-24) 
31 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n144-8 & n152) 
32 By contrast, everything can be considered in the subjective element as it is a factual enquiry. 
33 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (n92-5) 
34 D would not be judged by his own level of self-control if he was 17 and male, for example, but an ordinary person 
from that set. See ibid (n110-1 & n117-9). 
35 Ibid (n143-55) 
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greater scope for excessive reactions in fear. Unlike the 2009 Act, which does not 
differentiate between the two emotions in this manner,
36
 it means that there is a 
framework in place where the jury can acknowledge that an ordinary person acting in 
fear may react in a specific way to a threat in those circumstances, this could be very 
different from a paradigm provocation case where anger may be expected to lead to a 
more impulsive reaction. 
 
Conclusion 
The proposal is split into two; fear and anger may overlap but to have a defence which 
rests on aggressive and defensive reactions and to treat them with an identical loss of 
self-control requirement and ordinary person test, like the 2009 Act does, is not 
appropriate. The proposal instead tailors the elements of the defence to the relevant 
emotion. It would be possible to split the defence up into two but by keeping them 
together it not only acknowledges the potential overlap but that both triggers are about 
providing a partial defence for excessive killings where the emotion is warranted by 
society's standards and genuinely felt by D. Fear is an emotion which is more deserving 
of recognition than anger and that is why the aim has been to make the fear trigger more 
accessible but restrict the provoked anger trigger. 
 
The proposal works on two fronts for victims of domestic violence and abuse in order to 
best remedy the problems which have traditionally meant that relying on a defence has 
been difficult:
37
 immediacy of the threat of violence and the labelling of D's behaviour as 
ordinary. The trigger allows for a wide definition of what is an acceptable threat and with 
the ordinary person test being tailored for the emotion the minimum expected standards 
of behaviour will be more respectful of the situation which D was placed in. Therefore, in 
this proposal a victim of abuse who kills can claim a partial defence if the threat she 
experienced was not immediate but existed, so was inevitable, and if her reaction, whilst 
obviously being excessive, was consistent with a normal person who killed with a fear of 
violence. An essential element of this proposal is that a greater amount of contextual 
                                           
36 'Chapter 9 - Coroners and Justice Act 2009' (n92) 
37 See 'Chapter 6 - Subjective Element' (n58-70), 'Chapter 5 - Objective Element' (112-9) and 'Chapter 10 - 
Contextualising and Presumptions' (n59-74). 
Chapter 11 - Proposal   295 
 
and expert evidence can be used to support the objective and subjective elements. The 
proposal is about ensuring that the legal terms used, such as 'fear', 'threat', and 
'ordinary', are better at reflecting what has occurred and this can be achieved, partly, by 
giving more information to the decision-makers in the process and, partly, by looking at 
this trigger independently without the constraints which a loss of self-control provocation 
defence requires. 
 
The proposal, as discussed in Chapter 10,
38
 looks to restrict the provoked anger trigger 
in three ways: firstly, by requiring a subjective and an objective basis for the defence in 
the sufficient evidence test, so the trial judge can act as an appropriate filter by 
determining if D was emotional and if there was something intelligible as the basis of the 
emotion; secondly, by setting out exclusions in limited, specific scenarios where the 
defence could never be established; finally, by creating presumptions for where the 
defence ought not to usually apply but where in exceptional circumstances D can 
provide evidence that his anger was warranted. These three ways attempt to create the 
correct balance between the aim of restricting the anger-based partial defence and 
allowing its use where there is a legitimate basis for arguing that D was both emotional 
and had a warranted emotion. 
 
The wide range of problems and various attempts to reform the defence have shaped 
this proposal and it is acknowledged that it may be impossible to resolve certain issues, 
such as how to conclusively deal with delayed responses. As was set out in the 
Introduction, an aim was to form provisions which were practical and consistent with the 
broader aims of the defence; the factual elements are in line with how an individual 
would respond in such scenarios and the evaluative elements stem from the 
expectations and values of society. The assessments which have been made with 
regards to the warranted emotion standard, exclusions and presumptions all flow from 
the viewpoint which finds that labelling conduct as provocative has meaning and the 
defence can only operate when it is in line with society's values of respecting individual 
freedoms and tolerance. Only by raising the bar and being realistic for the provoked 
                                           
38 'Chapter 10 - Contextualising and Presumptions' (n103) 
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anger trigger and by giving the judge and jury more information and education for the 
fear trigger can the aims of reforming the partial defence can be achieved. 
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CONCLUSION 
The success of the reform contained in the 2009 Act is significant owing to the areas 
which the defence touches on, in terms how to respond to killings concerning domestic 
violence and abuse, honour killings, violence against women and homosexuals. The 
proposal outlined in Part IV is in light of these issues, the aims of the reform process and 
the problems identified with the pre-2009 provocation defence, whilst, also, being in 
response to the evaluation made of the loss of control defence. Basically, the 2009 Act 
needed to create a partial defence which responded to those who kill in fear, particularly 
when the fear is derived from experiences of domestic violence and abuse, and to 
restrict the provoked-anger element of the defence where the reasons which are relied 
upon do not merit mitigation. In Part IV solutions were put forward as it was adjudged 
that the 2009 Act failed to suitably resolve these issues. 
 
The fear trigger, although an improvement, is undermined by the retention of the loss of 
self-control element and the maintenance of the control test in this manner as neither 
represent the emotion of fear nor how people actually behave in such circumstances. To 
improve the fear trigger two key reforms are suggested. Firstly, for both emotions in the 
partial defence, it is discussed how the subjective element ought to focus on the 
existence of the core emotion as this is the true function of the test, to lose self-control is 
a specific response which only covers a limited area and the partial defence ought to 
allow for a greater span of excessive responses in order for it to be effective. 
 
Secondly, throughout the thesis a greater role for contextual evidence in the partial 
defence is supported. The pre-2009 law, following Camplin, had recognised that in order 
to gauge the gravity of the situation and understand the circumstances, so behaviour 
can properly be assessed, there was a need determine the evaluative elements in light 
of D's history, circumstances and, where appropriate, characteristics. The proposal 
outlines how the partial defence could go further with this and how the use of general 
expert evidence could be used to support D's claim of an excessive killing in fear 
throughout the defence. By giving the trial judge and jury more information in their 
decision-making process on such matters it could make the partial defence more 
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accessible to deserving cases as the sufficient evidence test, subjective test, gravity test 
and control test would all be impacted as how D felt and responded would be grounded 
in evidence which supports that this was ordinary in the circumstances. 
 
In the 2009 Act the provoked-anger element of the defence was improved by requiring a 
warranted emotion from the jury's perspective in order to align society's view on the 
gravity of the provocation with the availability of mitigation, however, the provisions 
surrounding this trigger lacked clarity and the sexual infidelity exclusion will not touch on 
some of the most controversial reasons which were relied upon as a basis for a defence 
in the pre-2009 law. The proposal sets a fourfold approach towards the provoked-anger 
trigger which is consistent with the warranted emotion rationale discussed in the thesis 
and specifically targets the flaws of the 2009 Act, in particular, with regards to how it 
inadequately deals with male possessiveness and jealousy. 
 
Firstly, in the sufficient evidence test it requires the existence of provocation, not D being 
provoked, thereby ensuring that there must be a solid basis for the claim and not merely 
D getting angry at a natural or normal situation. Secondly, the trigger itself is similar to 
the warranted emotion test contained in the 2009 Act, but the proposal goes further by 
requiring D himself to feel his emotion was warranted, ensuring that the anger D 
experienced actually stemmed from a source he appreciated to be severe provocation. 
Thirdly, the proposal sets out a limited scope for exclusions which are only in place when 
there is no prospect for the defence to succeed. Finally, the proposal identifies a class of 
cases where the defence is not normally expected to succeed but could potentially, in 
these scenarios an evidential burden would be placed on D to provide sufficient 
evidence, on the balance of probabilities, to demonstrate that the case was not a typical 
case of sexual infidelity, for example, and that the circumstances were exceptional; by 
putting in place presumptions it creates a balance between restricting the defence in 
cases, for instance, of male jealousy but, also, allowing for the possibility that such 
cases could succeed in exceptional circumstances. The advantages of the approach 
outlined is that by focusing the defence on provocation it ensures that the cases which 
fall under its ambit are appropriate, the test in the trigger raises the bar but is compatible 
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with rationale and reasoning behind the defence and there are mechanisms in place to 
prohibit or limit the scope of the trigger for the most controversial reasons which have 
traditionally been relied upon. 
 
The proposal, entitled excessive warranted emotional killing, is based on the rationale 
which has been supported throughout the thesis, that if D's anger or fear was warranted, 
by society's standards, in the circumstances and genuine then this is a solid base for a 
partial excuse as such defences operate when D's choice was difficult and an ordinary 
person would have found it difficult too. By supplying this rationale it not only gives a 
framework for the elements of the defence but it also gives the defence standing and 
justifies its existence. It is acknowledges that D's killing is always an excessive act and 
this means that the focus is on D's reason and emotional difficulty. As long as the 
defence is grounded in providing a partial defence for reactions which are the result of a 
common human frailty and the source of the emotion is deemed to be particularly severe 
then the defence has its own space, distinct from justificatory actions in self-defence or 
the abnormal actors in diminished responsibility, based on such understanding. 
 
It is possible to argue alternate approaches to deal with excessive emotion killings: 
these issues do not need to be acknowledged at all, they could be dealt with in 
sentencing or they could be tied together with diminished responsibility to create a single 
overarching partial defence. The reasons why the three most credible alternate 
approaches are not suitable can be brought out in the justification of the warranted 
emotion/partial excuse approach: firstly, there is a necessity to respond to such 
circumstances as it would lead to disproportionate labelling and punishment if provisions 
are not made, this is partly owing to the mandatory life sentence for murder but such 
arguments still have force if this were not in place; secondly, if provocation was a matter 
of mitigation in sentencing there would be less opportunity to scrutinise and review its 
operation as it would be more difficult to assess its significance in the punishments 
handed out and in the defence it contains evaluative elements where the jury should be 
in place to make those judgements; finally, provocation and diminished responsibility 
function to award partial defences on different grounds, basically provocation deals with 
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excessive but ordinary responses and diminished responsibility looks after abnormal 
actors, and it is better if, along with self-defence which deals with justificatory defensive 
action, that they operate cohesively so that the overall operation of the defences is the 
most effective. A partial defence, entitled excessive warranted emotional killing, as 
suggested, would set the correct label, allow for a flexible level of punishment whilst 
acknowledging that there may be differentials between killing in anger and fear, have a 
clear rationale as to why mitigation is provided and the specific provisions would be in 
line with this. 
 
One unavoidable consequence of an excessive emotion defence is that V's own conduct 
is inspected, in terms of evaluating the gravity of the provocation, and the proposal put 
forward would not entirely extinguish the prospect of victim blaming. However, the 
defence is centred on D's reasoning, D's emotional difficulty and D's own fault for 
retaliating when he should not have done so. The proposal puts in place provisions 
which would reduce the scope for victim blaming, though: the warranted emotion 
element of the trigger means that something particularly substantial is required to satisfy 
the requirements of the defence; by requiring provocation, rather than D being provoked, 
it means that V's conduct must be something more than normal or natural behaviour and 
as this is contained within the sufficient evidence test then the defence would be unlikely 
to even advance to the jury in this scenario; the presumptions combat the sorts of cases 
where victim blaming has been most troublesome, partners or ex-partners blaming V for 
the breakdown of their relationship or V's sexual activity with others and cases of non-
violent homosexual advance. 
 
A key flaw with the 2009 Act is that there has been a failure to adapt the defence to deal 
with both emotions and the reform is too entrenched in the language of provocation and 
this may lead to the utility of having a fear trigger being lost. Despite excessive 
emotional reactions being linked behind the same rationale, a common human frailty to 
act excessively when placed in certain situations, the specific provisions which deal with 
each emotion have to be tailored to the relevant emotion: the loss of self-control 
element, at the least, should be confined to the provoked-anger trigger and the control 
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test in the 2009 Act fails to address that truly assessing ordinariness, particularly in 
terms of feminine responses in fear, only comes from greater context and 
understanding. 
 
Despite two of the key elements of the 2009 reform, the fear trigger and the sexual 
infidelity exclusion, being well-intentioned it has been shown that they will struggle to 
achieve what was intended in the reform process, and the success of the reform is likely 
to rest on how the problematic cases which arise in these areas are dealt with. As it is 
most likely that in the 2009 Act the loss of self-control element was retained because of 
the provocation trigger it would have been better if two separate partial defence were 
created, an excessive self-defence or self-preservation partial defence would have been 
more suitable than the reform which ultimately was adopted. It will be interesting to see 
how the judiciary continue to interpret the defence, considering the flaws with the 
provisions, though, as how the fear trigger interacts with the loss of self-control element 
requirement and what the span of sexual infidelity exclusion is will be significant in 
determining the effectiveness of the defence's key reforms. 
 
The proposal which has been outlined seeks to resolve the long-standing problems with 
the partial defence, but in a different way to the 2009 Act. The loss of control defence 
should be seen as a stricter version of the pre-2009 provocation defence with a fear 
trigger added on, an emotion which had already begun to be recognised as being a part 
of the defence. The proposal put forward comes from the perspective that anger and 
fear are similar and potentially connected emotions, but are separate as fear is to do 
with self-preservation and about excessive defensive conduct but provoked-anger is to 
do with a loss of temper and is aggressive. The provisions in the proposal have been 
constructed following a look at the rationale of the defence and its overall function, and 
the key elements of the defence stem from this outlook. The sufficient evidence test 
ensures the trial judge can filter out cases and juries are ones who are essential in 
determining whether the evaluative aspects of the defence are satisfied, the triggers are 
grounded in warranted emotion so that mitigation is consistent with how society views 
the circumstances, the subjective test requires genuine and realistic responses, and the 
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control test relies on ordinariness as mitigation can only occur when D has acted like 
others may in those circumstances. The proposal for the use of contextual evidence is in 
order to assist this process leading to a better outcome, so that the decision-making for 
the factual and evaluative tests are more informed, and presumptions are a workable 
compromise in order to limit the scope of the defence. All in all, this is about constructing 
a partial defence which is effective, is able to restrict and allow mitigation appropriately, 
and there is a clear basis for why this is done. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Law Commission proposal: 
 
1) Unlawful homicide that would otherwise be murder should instead be manslaughter if 
the defendant acted in response to 
(a) gross provocation (meaning words or conduct or a combination of 
words and conduct which caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense 
of being seriously wronged); or 
(b) fear of serious violence towards the defendant or another; or 
(c) a combination of (a) and (b); and 
a person of the defendant’s age and of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and 
self-restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or a 
similar way. 
2) In deciding whether a person of ordinary temperament in the circumstances of the 
defendant might have acted in the same or a similar way, the court should take into 
account the defendant’s age and all the circumstances of the defendant other than 
matters whose only relevance to the defendant’s conduct is that they bear simply on his 
or her general capacity for self-control. 
3) The partial defence should not apply where 
(a) the provocation was incited by the defendant for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence, or 
(b) the defendant acted in considered desire for revenge. 
4) A person should not be treated as having acted in considered desire for revenge if he 
or she acted in fear of serious violence, merely because he or she was also angry 
towards the deceased for the conduct which engendered that fear. 
5) The partial defence should not apply to a defendant who kills or takes part in the killing 
of another person under duress of threats by a third person. 
6) A judge should not be required to leave the defence to the jury unless there is 
evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude that it might 
apply. 
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Appendix B 
Ministry of Justice's 2008 proposal: 
 
(1) Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V”), D is not to be 
convicted of murder if -  
(a) D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted 
from D’s loss of self-control,  
(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and  
(c) a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and 
self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the 
same or in a similar way to D.  
(2) On a charge of murder, where sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with 
respect to the defence under subsection (1), the court must assume that the defence is 
satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not.  
(3) A person who, but for this section, would be liable to be convicted of murder is liable 
instead to be convicted of manslaughter.  
(4) A loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger if subsection (5), (6) or (7) applies.  
(5) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of 
serious violence from V against D or another identified person.  
(6) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things 
done or said (or both) which -  
(a) amounted to an exceptional happening, and  
(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.  
(7) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a combination of 
the matters mentioned in subsections (5) and (6).  
(8) But subsection (1) does not apply if the qualifying trigger to which the loss of self-
control is attributable is itself predominantly attributable to conduct engaged in by D 
which constitutes one or more criminal offences.  
(9) For the purposes of subsection (6) -  
(a) an act of sexual infidelity is not, of itself, an exceptional happening;  
(b) a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not 
justified if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence.  
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(10) In subsection (1)(c) the reference to “the circumstances of D” is a reference to all of 
D’s circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D’s conduct is that they 
bear on D’s general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint.  
(11) The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be 
convicted of murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted to murder 
in the case of any other party to it. 
 
 
Appendix C 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provisions: 
s54 Partial defence to murder: loss of control 
(1)Where a person ("D") kills or is a party to the killing of another ("V"), D is not to be 
convicted of murder if— 
(a)D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted 
from D's loss of self-control, 
(b)the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and 
(c)a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or 
in a similar way to D. 
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of 
control was sudden. 
(3)In subsection (1)(c) the reference to “the circumstances of D” is a reference to all of 
D's circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D's conduct is that they 
bear on D's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. 
(4)Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a 
considered desire for revenge. 
(5)On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect 
to the defence under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the defence is satisfied 
unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
(6)For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue 
with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the trial 
judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply. 
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(7)A person who, but for this section, would be liable to be convicted of murder is liable 
instead to be convicted of manslaughter. 
(8)The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted 
of murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted to murder in the 
case of any other party to it. 
 
s55 Meaning of "qualifying trigger" 
(1)This section applies for the purposes of section 54. 
(2)A loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger if subsection (3), (4) or (5) applies. 
(3)This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to D's fear of serious 
violence from V against D or another identified person. 
(4)This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things 
done or said (or both) which— 
  (a)constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and 
  (b)caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. 
(5)This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a combination of 
the matters mentioned in subsections (3) and (4). 
(6)In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger— 
(a)D's fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was 
caused by a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence; 
(b)a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not 
justifiable if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence; 
(c)the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be 
disregarded. 
(7)In this section references to "D" and "V" are to be construed in accordance with 
section 54. 
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